JUDGMENT (Prayer: Criminal Revision Case is filed under Section 397 and 401 of Cr.P.C., to set aside the order, dated 09.05.2019 passed by the 1st respondent in Na.Ka.No.2348/2018(C) under section 145 of Crl.P.C proceedings by allowing this petition.) 1. This Revision is filed challenging the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate-cum-Revenue Divisional Officer, Sankari, passed under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The short facts which are relevant for the case are that the fifth respondent in the Revision Case, namely 'A' party, is the absolute owner of the land in Survey No.82/1. There is no other way to access the said Survey No.82/1 and the 'A' party has been using the cart track in Survey No.82/2B which is a temple land. The cart track runs abutting the temple and in the Survey No.82/2B, which according to 'A' party, is being used by him and others for time immemorial. The fifth respondent 'A' party had also filed O.S.No.190 of 2014, against the then trustees of Kaverippatty Pudur Mariamman Temple to which the land belongs and a permanent injunction is also granted against the defendants therein. Thereafter, 'B' party, the petitioner herein, being the new trustee, again filed a suit in O.S.No.159 of 2018 to declare the decree obtained by the fourth respondent as null and void. The said suit was dismissed for default. The application to restore the said suit on file is also dismissed. The appeal against the dismissal of the restoration application is now filed along with a condone delay application which is now pending. 3. In that background, the petitioner is said to have blocked the cart track by stone fencing, on account of which, there was a law and order situation and therefore, upon petition, the present proceedings were entertained by the respondent and after giving notice to both the sides, the impugned order is passed, by which, the respondent directed the maintenance of status quo immediately preceding the law and order problem by removing the stone fencing erected by the 'B' party, thereby, permitting the 'A' party, namely fifth respondent, to use the said cart track. 4. It is pertinent to state here that at the time of admission itself, this Court had appointed an Advocate Commissioner and the stone fencing was removed to an extent of four feet. 5. 4. It is pertinent to state here that at the time of admission itself, this Court had appointed an Advocate Commissioner and the stone fencing was removed to an extent of four feet. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner would attack the impugned order by stating that when already civil proceedings between the parties are pending, there was no jurisdiction for the learned Magistrate to pass the impugned order under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the parties have to approach the appropriate Civil Court for any interim order or final order as the case may be. To consider the said submission, it is essential to reproduce the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in this regard, in M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) Vs. Suresh Das (2020) 1 SCC 1 ) in paragraph Nos.295 and 296, which is as follows:- “295. Section 145 is recognised to be a branch of the preventive jurisdiction of the Magistrate. [Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Code by Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, 20th Edn. (2016) at p. 426.] Section 145(1) can be invoked on the satisfaction of the Magistrate that “a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists…”. The provision relates to disputes regarding possession of land or water or its boundaries which may result in breach of the peace. The function of the Magistrate is not to go into questions of title, but to meet the urgency of the situation by maintaining the party in possession. The Magistrate is empowered to call upon the parties to put in written statements in support of their claim to “actual possession”. Such an order is to be served as a summons upon the parties. The Magistrate is to peruse the statements, hear the parties and weigh the evidence, in order to ascertain who was in possession at the date of the order. The Magistrate may make that determination “if possible” to do so. Moreover, the determination is about the factum of possession on the date of the order “without reference to the merits of the claim of any of such parties to a right to possess the subject of the dispute”. These words indicate that the Magistrate does not decide or adjudicate upon the contesting rights to possess or the merits of conflicting claims. These words indicate that the Magistrate does not decide or adjudicate upon the contesting rights to possess or the merits of conflicting claims. The Magistrate is concerned with determining only who was in possession on the date of the order. If possession has been wrongfully taken within two months of the order, the person so dispossessed is to be taken as the person in possession. In cases of emergency, the Magistrate can attach the subject of the dispute, pending decision. The action ultimately contemplated under Section 145 is not punitive, but preventive, and for that purpose is provisional only till a final or formal adjudication of rights is done by a competent court in the due course of law. Thus, nothing affecting the past, present and future rights of parties is contemplated under the provision. 296. The object of the provision is merely to maintain law and order and to prevent a breach of the peace by maintaining one or other of the parties in possession, which the Magistrate finds they had immediately before the dispute, until the actual right of one of the parties has been determined by a civil court. The object is to take the subject of dispute out of the hands of the disputants, allowing the custodian to protect the right, until one of the parties has established her right (if any) to possession in a civil court. [Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Code by Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, 20th Edn. (2016) at p. 427.] This is evident from the provisions of subsection (6) of Section 146. The Magistrate declares the party which is entitled to possession “until evicted therefrom in due course of law”. While proceeding under the first proviso, the Magistrate may restore possession to a party which has been wrongfully and forcibly dispossessed. No party can be allowed to use the provisions of Section 145 for ulterior purposes or as a substitute for civil remedies. The jurisdiction and power of the civil court cannot in any manner be hampered. [Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Code by Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, 20th Edn. (2016) at p. 451.] ” 6. The above being the legal position, now considering the facts of the case, it is the contention of the petitioner that as far as the first suit is concerned, he is not bound by the decree and he is not a defendant in the case. (2016) at p. 451.] ” 6. The above being the legal position, now considering the facts of the case, it is the contention of the petitioner that as far as the first suit is concerned, he is not bound by the decree and he is not a defendant in the case. Therefore, the said suit cannot be held to be as between the parties. As far as the second suit instituted by the petitioner is concerned, the same is already dismissed for default and the restoration application also stands dismissed. The only application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal as against the dismissal of the restoration application is now pending. Therefore, the said matter cannot also be said to be pending before the Civil Court. 7. In that view of the matter, the Revenue Divisional Officer, as per the above judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, is entitled to restore the position of the party immediately prior to the skirmish or the law and order situation. When the petitioner had suddenly made stone fencing, after having allowed to suit to be dismissed for default and when a law and order situation arises, the first respondent has rightly exercised the power. The said order is meant to be temporarily until the petitioner approaches the Civil Court and obtain orders in his favour. Therefore, as on the date of passing of the order, there was no impediment for the first respondent Magistrate and therefore, the order passed, directing to remove the stone fencing so as to enable the fifth respondent/'A' party to use the cart track, is appropriate and sustainable in law. 8. Therefore, as on the date of passing of the order, there was no impediment for the first respondent Magistrate and therefore, the order passed, directing to remove the stone fencing so as to enable the fifth respondent/'A' party to use the cart track, is appropriate and sustainable in law. 8. Therefore, this Criminal Revision is ordered as follows:- (i) The impugned order, dated 09.05.2019 passed by the first respondent is upheld; (ii) Even though the stone fencing is removed only to an extent of four feet pursuant to the interim order, the remaining stone fencing of the balance six feet is also to be removed so as to enable the fifth respondent/'A' party to use the cart track; (iii) The said order of the first respondent shall be valid only until the petitioner/'B' party approaches the Civil Court as per law either by restoring the suit already filed or in any other manner which may be permissible under law and obtaining appropriate orders of the Civil Court; (iv) It is also made clear that the order of the first respondent, namely Sub Divisional Magistrate-cum-Revenue Divisional Officer, will not be binding on the Civil Court in any manner whatsoever and the same can be considered by the Civil Court in accordance with law on its own merits. (v) Consequently, Crl.M.P.No.6750 of 2019 is closed.