JUDGMENT Ravi Shanker Jha, C. J. (Oral) - The genesis of the instant case lies in the era of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter to be referred as 1894 Act) which is commonly known as 'era of compulsory acquisition' whose basic foundation was 'public interest' which was given supremacy over 'private interest'. It is well known facet of law that whensoever conflict arises between public interest and private interest, the private interest has to make way for the public interest, and that is how the 1894 Act contributed to the development of this country. The 1894 Act was in itself a complete code and had prescribed the procedure so as to raise grievance against the action of the State Government to acquire someone's land, and whensoever Courts found any deviation by the State or its authorities from settled procedure the interference has been made so as to come to the rescue of such land owners. Applying the said settled principles to the factual matrix of the present case, the question which arises for consideration is as to whether a land owner who remained silent and is now approaching the Court on the basis of the provision of Section 24(2) of The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter to be referred as 2013 Act) can take up those pleas as well, which were available to him at an earlier point of time but never taken, under the guise of deeming fiction of lapsing provided under the 2013 Act, or his silence all throughout will invoke the doctrine of acquiescence which as per the consistent view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India is sufficient to even destroy the right of such person. Besides, if the land owner is allowed to raise such pleas at such a belated stage, would not it result in allowing the public interest to suffer, hampering of the process of development, going against the concept of vesting of land in State and unsettling the settled competing rights between the parties in contradiction to well settled tenets of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India through various judicial pronouncements including the recent Hon'ble Constitution Bench Judgment in the case titled as 'Indore Development Authority Vs. Manohar Lal and others' cited as 'AIR 2020 Supreme Court 1496'. 2. Manohar Lal and others' cited as 'AIR 2020 Supreme Court 1496'. 2. In order to decide the controversy involved and to answer the issues taken up for adjudication, certain elemental facts are required to be noted. In exercise of the power vested in it under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act, the Government of Haryana issued notification dated 20.04.1990 for the acquisition of the petitioner's land (described in Para 2 and 3 of the petition) along with the other parcels of land situated in Village Jharsa, Bindapur, Kanhai and Samaspur for the development and utilization thereof for residential, commercial and institutional parts of different sectors of Bahadurgarh. 3. As per the categoric case pleaded by the petitioners, a construction in the form of sheds within the boundary wall was situated on the part of their land bearing Khewat No. 6/4, Khanoni No. 6, Khasra No. 38//19/2/1 (1-15). The objection under Section 5A(1) of 1894 Act was filed by them, however, it did not find favour and their land including the constructed portion was included in the declaration issued under Section 6 of the 1894 Act. Thereafter, the Land Acquisition Collector passed the award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act dated 23.03.1993. 4. In the instant petition, the petitioners have pleaded that even though the award was announced by the Land Acquisition Collector on 23.03.1993, they are continuing their possession over the subject land and same has not been utilized for any purpose much less the public purpose for which it was acquired. The Parliament enacted the Act of 2013 with effect from 01.01.2014 thereby repealing the 1894 Act and also providing deeming fiction of lapsing by way of Section 24(2) of the Act which was made applicable to such cases of acquisition under the 1894 Act wherein the award came to be announced on or before 31.12.2008 as the prerequisite provided was the gap period of 5 years or more between the passing of the award under the 1894 Act and coming into effect of 2013 Act w.e.f. 01.01.2014. It further provided for two contingencies i.e. firstly the physical possession of the land acquired has not been taken and secondly the compensation determined for the land acquired has neither been paid nor deposited. 5. It further provided for two contingencies i.e. firstly the physical possession of the land acquired has not been taken and secondly the compensation determined for the land acquired has neither been paid nor deposited. 5. Setting up a positive case duly supported with an affidavit, the petitioners claimed that their case is squarely covered with the provisions of the 2013 Act as they are still retaining the physical possession of the land in question by way of residing in their residential houses and that the compensation for the acquired land as well as their residential houses has not been paid to them (para 16 of the petition) and thus, both the contingencies as provided under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act are fulfilled. On an earlier occasion, they approached this Court seeking issuance of necessary directions for declaration that the acquisition proceedings qua their land have lapsed by filing CWP No. 20866 of 2014 which was disposed of by this Court with a direction to decide the claim of the petitioners in accordance with law vide order dated 09.10.2014. The petitioners claimed that their plea that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed qua their land in question was arbitrarily rejected by passing a speaking order dated 16.09.2016 on the wrong grounds. 6. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the action of the State in rejecting their claim, the petitioners invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court as provided under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, thereby assailing the order dated 16.09.2016 (P-8) and prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to release the land in question as they fulfill both the contingencies as provided under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. Para nos. 16 to 18 from the writ petition are extracted herein below:- '...16. That the findings of the respondents are totally wrong and against the actual and factual position. As per Section 24(2) only the possession has to be seen and further the payment of compensation whether it has been paid or not. In this regard it is submitted that till date the compensation has not been paid to the petitioners qua the land of their residential houses and the petitioners are in actual physical possession of the land in dispute and having their residential houses. In this regard it is submitted that till date the compensation has not been paid to the petitioners qua the land of their residential houses and the petitioners are in actual physical possession of the land in dispute and having their residential houses. The award is more than 5 years old and thus, the petitioners completely covers under Section 24(2) of the Act. 17. That the land acquisition proceeding initiated under the land acquisition Act, 1894 and the physical possession of the land has not been taken and the compensation has not been paid. Thus, the acquisition proceedings in the present case shall be deemed to have been lapsed. The revenue record shows that the petitioners are still in actual physical possession over the land. 18. That from the bare reading of the impugned order it is clear that the Award pertaining to the subject land has been made by the Special Land Acqsuition Officer more than Five Year prior to the compensation so awarded and has neither been paid to the petitioners nor deposited in their account. The deposit of compensation amount in the Government treasury is of no avail and cannot be held to be equivalent to compensation paid to the petitioners... " 7. The instant petition came up for preliminary hearing before this Court on 03.10.2016 whereby, in view of the categoric case pleaded by the petitioners as extracted herein above that neither the physical possession has been taken nor the compensation has been paid, this Court issued notice of motion and subsequently on 14.12.2016 passed the interim order of status quo regarding possession. Pursuant to the issuance of notice of motion, the respondents filed their reply dated 02.09.2017 thereby refuting all the claims made by the petitioners and highlighting that the land of the petitioners was vacant at the time of issuance of Section 4 notification under 1894 Act, the entire compensation amount for the acquisition of their land has been received by them way back on 27.04.1993, the enhanced amount after redetermination of the compensation at the instance of the petitioners also stood deposited before the Reference Court on 17.09.2003, the physical possession has stood taken vide Rapat Roznamcha No. 425 dated 23.03.1993 and, above all, established the essentiality of the land in question by demonstrating the effect of the land in question over the layout plan sanctioned to achieve the public purpose for which the acquisition proceedings were carried out. Notably, the petitioners chose to not to file any rejoinder to the facts pleaded by the State in the written statement and thus, the facts so pleaded have gone uncontroverted. 8. Before entering into the respective pleadings by the parties, it needs necessary mention that owing to the pendency of interpretation of the provisions of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, many petitions including the present one, wherein the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was sought to be invoked, were kept pending; awaiting the outcome of the issue at hand by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. After seeing various interpretations, the controversy erupted was finally set at rest by the Hon'ble Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case title as 'Indore Development Authority Vs. Manohar Lal cited as AIR 2020 SC 1496 . The penultimate para of the judgment is reproduced herein below:- '....1. Under the provisions of Section 24(l)(a) in case the award is not made as on 1.1.2014 the dale of commencement of Act of 2013, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of Act of2013. 2. In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(l)(b) of the Act of2013 under the Act of1894 as if it has not been repealed. 3. 2. In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(l)(b) of the Act of2013 under the Act of1894 as if it has not been repealed. 3. The word 'or' used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as 'nor' or as 'and'. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 takes place where due to inaction of authorities for Jive years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse. 4. The expression fpaidf in the main part of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not include a deposit of compensation in court The consequence of non-deposit is provided in proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of land holdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the Act of1894 shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. In case the obligation under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to the "landowners" as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. 5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the Act of1894, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). 5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the Act of1894, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). Land owners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act of2013. 6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is to be treated as part of Section 24(2) not part ofSection 24(l)(b). 7. The mode of taking possession under the Act of 1894 and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/ memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the Act of1894, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2). 8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more before the Act of 2013 came into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with concerned authority as on 1.1.2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years. 9. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013, Le., 1.1.2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition'. 9. Having perused the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Indore Development Authority (supra) and the principles laid down therein, we now proceed to test the factual matrix of the case in hand as pleaded before us onto the afore-reproduced principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. 9. Having perused the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Indore Development Authority (supra) and the principles laid down therein, we now proceed to test the factual matrix of the case in hand as pleaded before us onto the afore-reproduced principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. 10. Appearing for the respondents, Mr. Mittal while opening his arguments as regards the exposition of law in Indore Development Authority (supra) submitted that the sum and substance of the interpretation of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India is that the first and foremost condition to seek lapsing is that both the contingencies provided regarding the physical possession and the payment of compensation are to be fulfilled, meaning thereby that if either of the conditions is not satisfied there would be no lapsing. As far as the obligation to make the payment in lieu of the land acquired is concerned, it has been clarified that such obligation to pay is complete by tendering the compensation which would mean that the compensation amount was made available to the land owner and if he has not accepted the same, it will not be available for the land owner to claim that the compensation has not been paid. Similarly, word 'deposit' has been interpreted to mean depositing with the LAC or the treasury or the Reference Court. Drawing of panchnama has been considered to be a valid proof of taking physical possession and once the land stands vested in the State, there is no divesting provided under Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has further clarified that the period for which any interim order was in operation will be excluded while computing the gap period of five years. Similarly, it has been clarified that Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to any new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition as it applies to only those cases wherein the proceedings were pending on the date of enforcement of Act of 2013. 11. Similarly, it has been clarified that Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to any new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition as it applies to only those cases wherein the proceedings were pending on the date of enforcement of Act of 2013. 11. He has further argued that the instant petition deserves to be dismissed not only on the ground that the case in hand is squarely covered against the petitioners by Indore Development Authority (supra) but also on the ground of not approaching this Court with clean hands as in spite of having taken the entire compensation amount way back in the year 1993, the petitioners have chosen to wrongly plead on affidavit that the compensation amount has neither been paid nor deposited and that too at many places in the petition which by no stretch of imagination can be attributed to be a slip of words and in all eventualities is a deliberate act. It is on this wrong statement made in the petition, they persuaded this Court to pass a status quo order on 14.12.2016 which is still in operation. As against the facts pleaded by the petitioners of the construction in existence over the land in question prior to issuance of notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act which as per them was not released under Section 5A of the 1894 Act, he has vehemently argued that such plea is not available with the petitioners to be raised in a petition having been filed seeking benefit of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 which admittedly as per the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Indore Development Authority (supra) does not give a fresh cause of action to the land owners to litigate against the State and, as such, this plea being raised is not even worth looking it. He further submits that the plea of the petitioners is against the record as the land in question was lying vacant at the time of issuance of notification under section 4 of Act of 1894. 12. While referring to the enunciation of law in Indore Development Authority (supra) and of this Court in Sehdev Singh and Others Vs. He further submits that the plea of the petitioners is against the record as the land in question was lying vacant at the time of issuance of notification under section 4 of Act of 1894. 12. While referring to the enunciation of law in Indore Development Authority (supra) and of this Court in Sehdev Singh and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others in CWP No. 8878 of 2018 decided on 11.11.2020, he has submitted that entertaining such plea would mean considering the dead/stale claims as the same is not confined to only those cases wherein the earlier challenge made did not find favour from the Courts but would also include the cases where the litigants have failed to challenge when the cause of action was actually present. He further argued that such plea would not only be hit with the principle of "delay and laches' but also the "doctrine of acquiescence' which means giving tacit accent to an act of others even though you may not agree with it. He has further argued that the acquiescence virtually destroys the rights accrued in favour of someone by way of maintaining silence. It comes into play when a party having a right stands by and sees the other party dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right, and while the act is in progress and after violation is completed, shows such conduct which reflects his assent or accord. And afterwards such conduct he cannot complain. There is only one exception to the doctrine of acquiescence which comes into play if the lapse of time is of no importance or consequence, and thus, as far as the case of land acquisition is concerned it assumes more significance especially after the land having been vested in the State and the land owner seemingly not having any right qua the land in question, any plea being raised against the acquisition at the instance of land owners will have to cross the hurdle of "doctrine of acquiescence' whose parameters are more stringent than the laches as it destroys not only the remedy but also the rights. He has further argued that, thus in a case of challenge to the land acquisition, the consistent view of this Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India is that if someone is aggrieved with the action of the State, he needs to avail his remedy at the first instance and cannot be allowed to sit on the fence and to jump in the field at a later stage seeing the result in favour of similarly situated persons. He has further asserted that the settled law in this regard is that if a land owner is aggrieved with the action of the State on any account including of deprivation of his legal rights or any procedural irregularity, i.e, any defect in the notification issued, not dealing with the objections filed under Section 5A of the Act properly etc., a right accrues in his favour to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, but if he maintains silence and allows the proceedings to happen at the instance of the State, then any plea by such land owners to seek the equitable relief will have to cross the hurdle of not only the delay and laches but also of the doctrine of acquiescence which has been conceded to be sufficient to destroy the rights. He has relied upon the recent judicial pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case titled as 'The Chairman, State Bank of India and another Vs. MJ James cited as Civil Appeal No. 8223 of2009' decided on 16.11.2021 wherein their lordship while deliberating upon the distinction between 'acquiescence' and 'delay and laches' has held that the laches destroy the remedy but acquiescence virtually destroys the rights of the person. The acquiescence can be either direct with full knowledge and express approbation, or indirect where a person having the right, sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right and inspite of the alleged infringement, takes no action; mirroring acceptance. 13. The acquiescence can be either direct with full knowledge and express approbation, or indirect where a person having the right, sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right and inspite of the alleged infringement, takes no action; mirroring acceptance. 13. Applying the said principle of law laid down onto the factual matrix of the instant case, he has argued that in petition filed in the year 2016 invoking the provisions of the Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, the petitioners had pleaded that the alleged infringement took place on or before 18.04.1991 when after rejecting the objections filed by them under Section 5A of the Act of 1894, the State Government proceeded to issue declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act thereby including their land in it as well. The petitioners made no effort to assail the declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act issued on 18.04.1991. They further allowed the award to be announced under Section 11 of the 1894 Act on 23.03.1993. The physical possession of the land in question was taken vide Rapat Roznamcha No. 425 dated 23.03.1993 and that time also they had chosen to maintain silence. Not just this, contrary to the statement being made before this Court, the petitioners received the entire compensation of their land on 27.04.1993. Having seen the acquisition proceedings completed in an absolutely legal manner and while enjoying the amount of compensation received, they allowed the mutation of the land in question to take place in favour of HUDA (now HSVP) vide mutation no. 1218 dated 04.08.2004. There cannot be any better example of the petitioners having accepted the acquisition in its entirety and thus, today they cannot be allowed to raise any grievance pertaining to an alleged cause of action accrued to them way back in the year 1991 and by virtue of maintaining silence all throughout, their plea now sought to be raised is clearly hit with the doctrine of acquiescence and the tacit consent, concurrence or acceptance of the petitioners have virtually destroyed their right, even if it is believed to have accrued in their favour way back in the year 1991 and thus, acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars them from claiming such infringement. 14. 14. He has further argued that even otherwise as clarified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Indore Development Authority (supra), Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not give a fresh cause of action and is available to be invoked only in respect of the cases wherein the proceedings were pending as on the date of coming into the effect of the Act of 2013. Thus, if any land owner chooses to invoke the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, the same can only and only be confined to demonstrate that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed and it does not entitle the land owner to take up any other plea including of procedural irregularity, discrimination, parity etc. as permitting the same would mean interfering with the settled competing rights of the parties and will virtually affect the larger public interest and is bound to result in the loss to the public exchequer. Thus, a strict duty lies upon the shoulders of the Courts as well to ensure maintenance of the supremacy of public interest over the private interest when a conflict arises between two. At the end, he submitted that the physical possession of the land in question having been taken by recording the Rapat Roznamcha, the compensation amount having been accepted by the petitioners and the redetermination of the compensation amount sought by them which amount has also been deposited in the Reference Court, the case in hand is squarely covered against them by the exposition of law in Indore Development Authority (supra) and thus, is liable to be dismissed and the status quo order is liable to be vacated. While concluding, he has further argued that while deciding the issue involved, the conduct shown by the petitioners in making a blatant attempt to misuse the process of law by deliberately asserting that the compensation amount have not been received and thus persuading this Court to pass an interim order in their favour, which is operating since last 6 years, is liable to be viewed very seriously as no one can be allowed to misuse the process of law, hamper the process of development by resorting to such kind of practice and thus, prayed for dismissal of the instant petition by imposing exemplary cost. 15. 15. We have perused the pleadings made in the petition wherein the petitioners have categorically pleaded about them having constructed sheds within the four wall boundary prior to the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act. They have also pleaded that their section 5A objection filed did not find favour and their entire land including the one whereupon the construction was existing was made part of the declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act. They have also pleaded that even though the award was announced on 23.03.1993, they are still retaining the physical possession of the land including of their residential houses and further, the compensation amount for the land acquired has neither been paid nor deposited in the Reference Court. The writ petition is also silent about any reference filed under Section 18 of the 1894 Act by them. They have assailed the speaking order dated 16.09.2016 by claiming same to have been wrongly passed thereby rejecting their claim for release of land under Section 24(2) by specifically recording the number and date of Rapat Roznamcha and further recording that after making the payment the land acquired becomes the sole property of the State and that if no additional amount has been paid then that would show that there was no structure at the relevant point of time. On the contrary, the written statement filed by the State maintains that the land in question of the petitioner was vacant at the time of issuance of notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act, rejection of their section 5A objections, taking physical possession by way of Rapat Roznamcha, acceptance of compensation amount by the petitioners, seeking the redetermination of the compensation amount by the petitioners which stood deposited in the Reference Court and the essentiality of the land in question 16. The bare comparison between the respective pleadings is sufficient to demonstrate the malafide intent of the petitioners and supplements the submissions made by Mr. Mittal that the petitioners have not approached this Court with clean hands and rather made a positive wrong statement to make this Court believe about the existence of both the contingencies provided under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. Mittal that the petitioners have not approached this Court with clean hands and rather made a positive wrong statement to make this Court believe about the existence of both the contingencies provided under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. The facts pleaded in the written statement further supplements the arguments raised by the respondents that right from 1993 till coming into the effect of new Act in 2013, the silence maintained by them and rather the overt act of accepting the compensation amount disentitles them to raise any plea based upon an alleged cause of action, if any, that had accrued in their favour at an earlier point of time and is sufficient to destroy such right even if assumingly to have accrued in favour of the petitioners. 17. Before adverting to the plea of lapsing of acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 as claimed by the petitioners, in view of the case pleaded by the petitioners alleging infringement of their right by not releasing their construction under Section 5A of the 1894 Act, allegedly to be in existence at the time of issuance of notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act, we would first like to examine as to whether in view of exposition of law in Indore Development Authority (supra), can a land owner be permitted to take such pleas in the guise of a petition having been filed under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 or as being pleaded by the State, such pleas will be hit not only with the delay and laches but also by the doctrine of acquiescence which as per the settled view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India is sufficient even to destroy the rights. 18. As far as the cases of land acquisition are concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Indore Development Authority (supra) has categorically held that plea of section 24(2) is available to only those land owners in respect of which the acquisition proceedings were pending on the date of coming into effect of the Act of 2013 i.e. 01.01.2014. It has been clarified that Section 24 contemplates pending proceedings and not the concluded ones. After making detailed discussions and placing reliance on the previous judicial pronouncements, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in para no. It has been clarified that Section 24 contemplates pending proceedings and not the concluded ones. After making detailed discussions and placing reliance on the previous judicial pronouncements, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in para no. 359 has made it clear that Section 24(2) cannot be used to revive dead & stale claims and concluded cases as the same cannot be permitted to be canvassed on the pretext of enactment of Section 24. Para 359 is extracted herein below:- '...359. We are of the considered opinion that Section 24 cannot be used to revive dead and stale claims and concluded cases. They cannot be inquired into within the purview of Section 24 of the Act of 2013. The provisions of Section 24 do not invalidate the judgments and orders of the Court, where rights and claims have been lost and negatived. There is no revival of the barred claims by operation of law. Thus, stale and dead claims cannot be permitted to be canvassed on the pretext of enactment of Section 24. In exceptional cases, when in fact, the payment has not been made, but possession has been taken, the remedy lies elsewhere if the case is not covered by the proviso. It is the Court to consider it independently not under section 24(2) of the Act of 2013... " 19. The aforesaid observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India not only relates to the cases wherein in an earlier round of litigation, challenge to the acquisition proceedings had been negatived but also includes such cases which were concluded decades back without seeing any challenge from the land owners and the claims have been barred by efflux of time. It would not be gainsaying that the observation of the Apex Court is based on the underlying principles of 'res judicata' as well as 'claims barred by law/ stale and dead claims'. It would not be gainsaying that the observation of the Apex Court is based on the underlying principles of 'res judicata' as well as 'claims barred by law/ stale and dead claims'. Though the discussion in Indore Development Authority (supra) leaves no doubt as regards the applicability of principles of res judicata and stale claims, however, we deem it appropriate to discuss the same, especially in view of the fact that time and again, we are coming across the petitions wherein despite failure of earlier challenge laid to the acquisition proceedings or failure to even challenge the acquisition proceedings at the given point of time, all sorts of pleas are being raised under the guise of section 24(2) of Act of 2013 with intent to revive the cause of action which had witnessed death a long time ago either due to delay or due to failed challenge. Such an attempt is neither permissible in law nor is in public interest as it ends up halting the entire acquisition proceedings for years altogether. 20. At first, we deem it appropriate to discuss the aspect of rule of res judicata and its applicability in land acquisition matters. The rule of res judicata is based upon the public policy which envisages that finality should be attached to the binding decisions of the Court so that the parties are not made to face the litigation on same issue again. The litigation between the parties shall reach to a conclusion i.e., if the rights between the parties have been settled once and same has attained finality, it cannot be allowed to be re-opened by setting up different pleas each time. 21. As far as land acquisition cases are concerned, acquisition proceedings are challenged time and again by terming it to be based upon fresh plea even though in essence the said plea has already been dealt with. 21. As far as land acquisition cases are concerned, acquisition proceedings are challenged time and again by terming it to be based upon fresh plea even though in essence the said plea has already been dealt with. Instant case is classic example wherein not only the right to lay challenge at the given point of time was given up but, on the contrary, the entire compensation amount was also happily accepted, so much so that the re-determination of the compensation amount was also sought which was also deposited in the Reference Court, yet, owing to the greed crept into, the present case has been set up on the pillars of falsehood by stating that compensation amount has not been paid to them and that construction was in existence at the time of the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 but the same was not released, that too under the umbrella of section 24(2) of Act of 2013. 22. We acknowledge the fact that the attachment of the land holding makes it very hard for people to accept the fate of acquisition proceedings and keeps ignited the spirit of assailing the acquisition proceedings again and again. But at the same time the heavy onus comes on the shoulders of the Court of Law to ascertain as to whether any disgruntled elements like the petitioners are misusing the judicial platform to cause harm and injury to the public interest at large. Thus onus becomes stronger in a case of land acquisition as any such challenge made which otherwise is not permissible by law can clearly result into stalling the development process by the State with respect to a land which stood vested in it and of which, the State has already become the owner. Eventually, the Courts have to consider the aspect that ultimate objective of the acquisition of land carried out by State is to achieve 'public purpose' which in any case is at the public expense. The development works once completed are for public benefit and the gains from the utilization of land are ploughed back into the public interest itself. The challenge to the acquisition proceedings at the hands of the landowners' time and again often delays as well as derails the process of development leading to wastage of public money and time. 23. The development works once completed are for public benefit and the gains from the utilization of land are ploughed back into the public interest itself. The challenge to the acquisition proceedings at the hands of the landowners' time and again often delays as well as derails the process of development leading to wastage of public money and time. 23. While dealing with the acquisition matters especially after the land stands vested in the State, the foremost consideration shall be the 'public interest' which in any case will supersede the 'private interest'. Once the land owner has failed to lay challenge to the acquisition proceedings at an appropriate point of time allowing the vesting of the land to take place in favour of the State and accept the amount of compensation awarded for the land acquired, then the consequential rights flowing from it shall not be interfered with based upon any misplaced sympathy and without evaluating the fallout of conflict between the public interest and the private interest. This is essential to put an end to the litigation and settling the claims of the parties to the proceedings, more so when the ultimate beneficiary as well as sufferer is the interest of public at large, be it in the form of public money or development process. This rationale is reflected in the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Indore Development Authority (Supra) when the Court observed that the legal certainty in the acquisition matters is to be protected and even though section 24(2) of Act of 2013 was in the form of beneficial provision, the Hon'ble Court has assertively held that such settled claims cannot be allowed to be re-agitated or re-opened. The reference here can be made to the following paragraphs from the judgment:- '....353. We are of the opinion that Courts cannot invalidate acquisitions, which stood concluded. No claims in that regard can be entertained and agitated as they have not been revived. There has to be legal certainty where infrastructure has been created or has been developed partially, and investments have been made, especially when land has been acquired long back. It is the duty of the Court to preserve the legal certainty, as observed in Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India and Ors245. There has to be legal certainty where infrastructure has been created or has been developed partially, and investments have been made, especially when land has been acquired long back. It is the duty of the Court to preserve the legal certainty, as observed in Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India and Ors245. The landowners had urged that since the Act of 2013 creates new situations, which are beneficial to their interests, the question of delay or laches does not arise. This Court is of the opinion that the said contention is without merits. As held earlier, the doctrine of laches would always preclude an indolent party, who chooses not to approach the Court, or having approached the Court, allows an adverse decision to become final, to re-agitate the issue of acquisition of his holding. Doing so, especially in cases, where the title has vested with the State, and thereafter with subsequent interests, would be contrary to public policy. In A.P. State Financial Corp. v. Garware Rolling Mill, this Court observed that equity is always known to defend the law from crafty evasions and new subtleties invented to evade the law. There is no dearth of talent left in longing for the undue advantage of the wholesome provisions of Section 24(2) on the basis of wrong interpretation... ' 24. Not only this, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also dealt extensively with the contention raised by the landowners that 'new cause of action' has accrued in their favour by virtue of section 24(2) of Act of 2013 to approach the Court and said contention was rejected by referring to the true interpretation of section 24(2) of Act of 2013 which in the opinion of the Court is not to reopen the concluded proceedings which include the cases wherein the land stood vested in the State. Following excerpts from the judgment of the Constitution Bench make the underlying principle more clear '.....355. We are unable to accept the submission on behalf of the landowners that it is by operation of law the proceedings are deemed to have lapsed and that this Court should give full effect to the provisions. It was submitted that lapse of acquisition proceedings was not contemplated under the Act of1894, and there is departure made in Section 24 of the Act of 2013. It was submitted that lapse of acquisition proceedings was not contemplated under the Act of1894, and there is departure made in Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Thus, Section 24 gives a fresh cause of action to the landowners to approach the Courts for a declaration that the acquisition lapsed, if either compensation has not been paid or the physical possession has not been taken. The decision of this Court in the Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy was relied upon to contend that there cannot be res judicata in the previous proceedings when the cause of action is different; reliance is also placed on Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty and Anr, where the decision of Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. (supra) was followed as to belated challenges. Reliance was further placed on Anil Kumar Gupta v. the State of Bihar in which it was held that vesting of land in the Government can be challenged on the ground that possession had not been taken in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The invocation of the urgency clause in Section 17, can be questioned on the ground that there was no real urgency. The notification issued under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 can be challenged on the ground of noncompliance of Section 5-A(l). Notice issued under Section 9 and the award passed under Section 11 can also be questioned on permissible grounds. Reliance has also been placed on Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union of India to contend that inaction and delay on the part of the acquiring authority would also give rise to a cause of action in favour of the landowner. 356. The entire gamut of submissions of the landowners is based on the misinterpretation of the provisions contained in Section 24. It does not intend to divest the State of possession (of the land), title to which has been vested in the State. It only intends to give higher compensation in case the obligation of depositing of compensation has not been fulfilled with regard to the majority of holdings. A fresh cause of action in Section 24 has been given if for five years or more possession has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. It only intends to give higher compensation in case the obligation of depositing of compensation has not been fulfilled with regard to the majority of holdings. A fresh cause of action in Section 24 has been given if for five years or more possession has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In case possession has been taken and compensation has not been deposited with respect to the majority of landholdings, higher compensation to all incumbents follows, as mentioned above. Section 24 does not confer a new cause of action to challenge the acquisition proceedings or the methodology adopted for the deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of reference Court, in that case, interest or higher compensation, as the case may be, can follow. In our considered opinion. Section 24 is applicable to pending proceedings, not to the concluded proceedings and the legality of the concluded proceedings, cannot be questioned. Such a challenge does not lie within the ambit of the deemed lapse under Section 24. The lapse under section 24(2) is due to inaction or lethargy of authorities in taking requisite steps as provided therein. 357. Wig are also of the considered opinion that the decision in an earlier round of litigation operates as res judicata where the challenge to the legality of the proceedings had been negatived and the proceedings of taking possession were upheld. Section 24 does not intend to reopen proceedings which have been concluded. The decision in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. (supra) is of no avail. Similar is the decision in Anil Kumar Gupta v. State of Bihar (supra). No doubt about it that proceedings (i.e., the original acquisition, or aspects relating to it) can be questioned but within a reasonable time; yet once the challenge has been made and failed or has not been made for a reasonable time, Section 24 does not provide for reopening thereof... ' 25. In order to construe whether a new cause of action arises by virtue of a provision of law or not, in view of the interpretation given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority (supra), it is imperative to understand the nature of the provision and the object which it intends to achieve. Without referring to and understanding the intent, extent and scope of the provision of law, new cause of action cannot be said to have been accrued. Without referring to and understanding the intent, extent and scope of the provision of law, new cause of action cannot be said to have been accrued. More so, when the claims have already been settled by the Court of law in an earlier round of litigation, the legal certainty cannot be interfered with. This seems to have stimulated the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India to observe and hold that the stale claims or the claims barred by law cannot be revived under the guise of section 24(2) of Act of 2013. On one hand the Apex Court has referred to the cases wherein the challenge to the acquisition proceedings have been negatived as 'concluded cases', on the other hand the Apex Court has also held that the 'claims barred by law/ dead claims' cannot be revived under section 24(2) of Act of 2013. In the ambit of concluded cases, the Hon'ble Court has not only included the cases wherein earlier challenge to acquisition proceedings has failed but also included such cases wherein the land stands vested in the State and no challenge was made to the acquisition proceedings and landowners have acquiesced to the fate of such proceedings. In Sehdev Singh and others v. State of Haryana and others CWP 8878 of 2018, we have discussed in detail the four categories of concluded cases which are enumerated herein below:- '....a. The cases where the landowners challenged the acquisition proceedings, they failed and the possession was taken after the announcement of award cannot take benefit of section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. (para 338) b. The cases where the beneficiaries/ landowners filed references and sought the enhancement of compensation, enhancement was made and the compensation was deposited in the treasury and thereafter the lapsing has been sought, (para 339) c. Where after taking the possession of the land, development is complete, infrastructure has been developed and the challenge has been made to the acquisition proceedings under section 24(2). (para 339) d. The cases wherein the claims for release of land under section 48 of the Act of 1894 have been dismissed and thereafter the claims have been made to declare the acquisition proceeds as has been lapsed, (para 339)..' 26. (para 339) d. The cases wherein the claims for release of land under section 48 of the Act of 1894 have been dismissed and thereafter the claims have been made to declare the acquisition proceeds as has been lapsed, (para 339)..' 26. While discussing this aspect, a reference has been made to the instances where the Courts have declined to interfere in the acquisition proceedings on the ground of delayed challenge after the possession of the land is taken and the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances. 'Delay and laches' are one of the foremost hurdles which a litigant has to cross before invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Likewise, if the challenge to acquisition proceedings is delayed i.e., is being made after announcement of award, same cannot be entertained as they have acquiesced to the acquisition proceedings. Once it is so, and the landowners' let the land vest in the State free from all encumbrances, they cannot come and plead that such vesting, which is otherwise as per law, should be reversed. Such an approach towards acquisition is neither intended in the scheme of Acquisition Act 1894 nor is approved by the Courts owing to the fact that such approach would ultimately have an effect of frustrating the entire public purpose for which the land was acquired. 27. Having taken into consideration the exposition of law in Indore Development Authority (supra), we are of the considered opinion that Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give a fresh cause of action and as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, is available only in those proceedings which were pending on the date of coming into effect of the Act of 2013 and as such, we have no hesitation to hold that if a land owner chooses to invoke the provisions of the Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 the consideration should be confined to only the aspects as enumerated under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 as interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court, and the land owner cannot be allowed to take up any other plea including of plea of procedural irregularity on the part of the State in undertaking the acquisition proceedings under the 1894 Act, rejection of the claim of the land owner at an appropriate stage, grievance regarding assessment of compensation made etc. which though were available but not raised at that given point of time and any such plea, being sought to be taken in a petition filed under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 are required to be rejected at the threshold. 28. There is another facet of law argued by Mr. Mittal in support of his plea to not allow the land owners to raise a plea which otherwise has no relation with the applicability of the Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 in a petition filed by invoking the said provision, with which we agree, is the doctrine of acquiescence which as per him is sufficient to even destroy the right accrued, if any. He has argued that the rigor of acquiescence is much harsher than mere 'delay and laches' which otherwise have been acknowledged by the Courts of law to deny the equitable relief being sought especially in a case of land acquisition. For establishing that the relief being claimed is hit with doctrine of acquiescence, the relevant consideration is the conduct of the party to demonstrate that a party expressly or by its conduct acted in a manner which is inconsistent with the continuance of its rights. Applying the same to the facts of the instant case, it stands established beyond any doubt that the plea raised by the petitioners in the instant petition of their constructions having not been released or rejection of their objections filed under section 5A is clearly hit not only by delay and laches but also by the doctrine of acquiescence. The silence maintained by the petitioners for a period of almost 25 years is sufficient to supplement this. 29. In the recent judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case titled as 'The Chairman, State Bank of India and another Vs. MJ James cited as Civil Appeal No. 8223 of2009', while clarifying the distinction between the 'acquiescence' and 'delay and laches', their lordship went on to hold that doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which applies when a party having a right stands by and sees another dealing in a matter inconsistent with that right, while the act is in progress, which clearly reflects his assent or accord. Para No. 29 and 30 from the said judgment are extracted herein below:- 29. Para No. 29 and 30 from the said judgment are extracted herein below:- 29. Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify distinction between 'acquiescence' and 'delay and laches'. Doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which applies when a party having a right stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right, while the act is in progress and after violation is completed, which conduct reflects his assent or record. He cannot afterwards complaint. In literal sense, the term acquiescence means silent assent, tacit consent, concurrence, or acceptance, which denotes conduct that is evidence of an intention of a party to abandon and equitable right and also to denote conduct from which another party will be justified in inferring such an intention. Acquiescence can be either direct with full knowledge and express approbation, or indirect where a person having the right to set aside the action stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right and inspite of the infringement takes no action mirroring acceptance. However, acquiescence will not apply if lapse of time is of no importance or consequence. 30. Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However, both limitation and laches destroy the remedy but not the right. Laches like acquiescence is based upon equitable considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports even simple passivity. On the other hand, acquiescence implies active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppels in pais. As a form of estoppels, it bars a party afterwards from complaining of the violation of the right. Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent, which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction which is involved in laches. Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct from day. Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person. Given the aforesaid legal position, inactive acquiescence on the part of the respondent can be inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for the period post filing of the appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the right affair representation. 30. Having considered this part of the argument raised by Mr. Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the right affair representation. 30. Having considered this part of the argument raised by Mr. Mittal and enunciation of law in The Chairman, State Bank of India and Another (supra) we are of the considered opinion that a person who alleges deprivation of his legal rights at the hands of the State by invoking writ jurisdiction of this Court so as to obtain the equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, must fully satisfy the Court that there are no laches or undue delay on his part in invoking the jurisdiction of this Court. The blame worthy conduct such as laches or undue delay, acquiescence or waiver are well acknowledged principles of law, on which, the litigant can be ousted at the threshold. A person's entitlement for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, be it against the State or anybody else, even if it is founded on the allegations of infringement of his legal right, has to necessarily depend upon blame worthy conduct of the person seeking relief. The issue as to whether the doctrine of laches disentitle grant of relief to a person in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in 'Moon Mills Ltd. Vs. M.R. Meher, President, Industrial Court' cited as 'AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1450' wherein it was regarded as a principle that disentitle a party for grant of relief in exercise of discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. As far as the doctrine of acquiescence is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India while considering the distinction between 'acquiescence' and 'delay and laches' has went on to hold both limitation and laches destroy the remedy but not the right, however, acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person. It implies active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel. As a form of estoppel it bars a party from complaining afterwards of the violation of the right. Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction as involved in laches. 31. It implies active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel. As a form of estoppel it bars a party from complaining afterwards of the violation of the right. Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction as involved in laches. 31. In the cases arising out of land acquisition, the concept of negating a challenge on account of the doctrine of delay and laches is well acknowledged. It assumes more significance when the plea of delay and laches is taken against the land owner after the vesting has taken place in favour of the State. It is well acknowledged principle of law that in order to plead infringement or to claim equitable relief, the litigant who choose to approach the Court must not have blameworthy conduct such as delay and laches etc. Undoubtedly the concept of doctrine of acquiescence as explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India is on much higher footing which has been considered to be sufficient to even destroy the rights. We are in agreement with the arguments being raised by the State that as regards the pleas of procedural irregularity, not taking into consideration the status of land at the time of initiation of the acquisition proceeding in a proper manner, and rejecting the objections filed under Section 5A of the Act, etc, the land owner is not entitled to raise such pleas with any delay as these are to be raised at the first instance and immediately, whenever they accrue to a land owner and if the land owner choose to remain silent and allows the State to proceed, the doctrine of acquiescence will come into play which is sufficient to take away that right. Any such plea being raised at a belated stage is required to be rejected at the threshold. 32. In the instant petition, the petitioners are claiming that their construction was not released under Section 5A of the 1894 Act. Significantly, these grievances are being raised in the year 2016 as regard the cause of action, if any, which was available to them in the year 1991. 32. In the instant petition, the petitioners are claiming that their construction was not released under Section 5A of the 1894 Act. Significantly, these grievances are being raised in the year 2016 as regard the cause of action, if any, which was available to them in the year 1991. Can the petitioners be allowed to raise these grievances after 25 years, especially when they not only maintained silence but even accepted the amount of compensation without hesitation, the answer is 'no' and as such, they cannot be permitted to raise these pleas after such a delay what to talk of considering the same. 33. Having said so, we have no hesitation to hold that as explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Indore Development Authority (supra), Section 24(2) of the Act does not give a fresh cause of action, the land owner is not entitled to take up any other plea apart from the plea of lapsing of acquisition proceedings and any such plea being taken will be required to be rejected which otherwise are hit with the doctrine of delay and laches as well as acquiescence. 34. Now coming to the averment made by the petitioners that they are in physical possession of the land in question inspite of the award having been announced in the year 1993. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Indore Development Authority (supra) has added certainty to law by holding that with drawing of Panchnama it is presumed that the possession is of the State and anyone retaining the possession thereafter is a 'trespasser'. Such clarity has narrowed down the clouds surrounding the modes of taking possession of the land to almost negligible and has clarified the stance when the land vests in the State. The reference in this regard is made to the following paragraphs from the judgment:- '....342. Section 24(2) is sought to be used as an umbrella so as to question the concluded proceedings in which possession has been taken, development has been made, and compensation has been deposited, but may be due to refusal, it has not been collected. The challenge to the acquisition proceedings cannot be made within the parameters of Section 24(2) once panchnama had been drawn of taking possession, thereafter re-entry or retaining the possession is that of the trespasser. The challenge to the acquisition proceedings cannot be made within the parameters of Section 24(2) once panchnama had been drawn of taking possession, thereafter re-entry or retaining the possession is that of the trespasser. The legality of the proceedings cannot be challenged belatedly, and the right to challenge cannot be revived by virtue of the provisions of Section 24(2). Section 24(2) only contemplates lethargy/inaction of the authorities to act for five years or more. It is very easy to lay a claim that physical possession was not taken, with respect to open land. Yet, once vesting takes place, possession is presumed to be that of the owner, i.e" the State Government and land has been transferred to the beneficiaries. Corporations, Authorities, etc., for developmental purposes and third-party interests have intervened. Such challenges cannot be entertained at all under the purview of Section 24(2) as it is not what is remotely contemplated in Section 24(2) of the Act of2013... ' 343. In matters of land acquisition, this Court has frowned upon, and cautioned Courts about delays and held that delay is fatal in questioning the land acquisition proceedings. In case possession has not been taken in accordance with law and vesting is not in accordance with Section 16, proceedings before Courts are to be initiated within reasonable time, not after the lapse of several decades... 35. The entire genesis of the aforesaid conclusion lies in the 'concept of vesting of land' in the State. Vesting of the land has been held to mean that the State is endowed with all the benefits that are available to an owner of the land. As reiterated and explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, vesting of the land happens the moment possession of the acquired land is taken, and on happening of such an event the title of the landowner ceases in the land for once and all. The law in this regard is well settled that after such vesting even if the land has not been utilized for the public purpose for which it was acquired, erstwhile landowner has no right to seek re-conveyance of the land. Vesting amounts to an absolute and indefeasible right which implies that the bundle of all rights which were vested in the erstwhile owner before acquisition fully vests in the State once the possession of the acquired land has been taken. Vesting amounts to an absolute and indefeasible right which implies that the bundle of all rights which were vested in the erstwhile owner before acquisition fully vests in the State once the possession of the acquired land has been taken. State becomes the absolute owner of the land and if after such vesting the possession has been retained by the erstwhile landowner or anyone else, they are trespassers on the acquired land. 36. In view of the settled proposition of law, especially in terms of Indore Development Authority (Supra) wherein the Apex Court has held that once the possession of the land is taken by the State, person retaining the possession is merely a 'trespasser', a very pertinent question arises as to on what parameters the Courts shall interfere in the acquisition proceedings at the instance of a 'trespasser'. A trespasser is a person who enters or remains in the possession of land of another without a privilege to do so. In law, a trespasser certainly can neither challenge the title of the rightful owner nor can claim any better right that the owner might have in the land. Such a person neither has any animus to take the property and to control it nor can he aver his title over the property against the State. The Apex Court has extensively explained the aspect of possession, vesting and how after vesting the person in possession of the property is considered as trespasser. As regards the meaning and concept of trespasser, the reference was made to Mitra's 'Law of Possession and Ownership of property'. The relevant extract is reproduced herein below:- '...248. Mitra's 'Law of Possession and Ownership of Property', 2ndEdn., expressions 'trespass' and 'trespasser' have been dealt with by the learned Author with the help of Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, West Publishing Co. which has also been quoted with respect to who is a trespasser: 'A 'trespasser' is a person who enters or remains upon land in the possession of another without a privilege to do so created by the possessor's consent or otherwise. In re Wimmer's Estate, 182 P.2d 119,121, 111 Utah 444. ' 'A 'trespasser' is one entering or remaining on land in another's possession without a privilege to do so created by possessor's consent, express or implied, or by law. Keesecker v. G.M. Mckelvey Co., 42 N.E. 2d 223, 226, 227, 68 Ohio App. 505. In re Wimmer's Estate, 182 P.2d 119,121, 111 Utah 444. ' 'A 'trespasser' is one entering or remaining on land in another's possession without a privilege to do so created by possessor's consent, express or implied, or by law. Keesecker v. G.M. Mckelvey Co., 42 N.E. 2d 223, 226, 227, 68 Ohio App. 505. ' 249. One who enters or remains in possession on land of another without a privilege to do so, is also treated as a trespasser. On the strength of Full Bench decision of Patna High Court in S.M. Yaqub v. T.N. Basu AIR 1949 Pat 146, Mitra, has referred to the observation that the possession should not be confused with occupation. A person may be in actual possession of the property without occupying it for a considerable time. The person who has a right to utilise the whole in any way he likes. Possession in part is good enough to infer that the person is in possession of the rest. Learned Author has referred to Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, Ed. 1969, so as to explain what constitutes possession. 'There are three requisites of possession. First, there must be actual or potential physical control. Secondly, the physical control is not possession unless accompanied by intention hence if a thing is put into the hand of a sleeping person he has no possession of it. Thirdly, the possibility and intention must be visible or evidence by external signs for if the thing shows no signs of being under the control of anyone, it is not possession. ' xxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx 251. A person with title is considered to be in actual possession. The other person is a trespasser. The possession in law follows the right to possess as held in Kynoch Limited v. Rowlands (1912) ICh 527.Ordinarily, the owner of the property is presumed to be in possession and presumption as to possession is in his favour. In Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja & Ors., (1979) 4 SCC 274 , this Court observed that possession implies a right and a fact; the right to enjoy annexed to the right of property and the fact of the real intention. It involves the power of control and intent to control. Possession is annexed to right of property. '13. 'Possession' is a polymorphous term which may have different meanings in different contexts. It involves the power of control and intent to control. Possession is annexed to right of property. '13. 'Possession' is a polymorphous term which may have different meanings in different contexts. It is impossible to work out a completely logical and precise definition of 'possession' uniformally applicable to all situations in the contexts of all statutes. Dias and Hughes in their book on Jurisprudence say that if a topic ever suffered from too much theorising it is that of "possession." Much of this difficulty and confusion is (as pointed out in Salmond's Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., 1966) caused by the fact that possession is not purely a legal concept. "Possession," implies a right and a fact; the right to enjoy annexed to the right of property and the fact of the real intention. It involves power of control and intent to control. (See Dias and Hughes, ibid.) 14. According to Pollock and Wright, 'when a person is in such a relation to a thing that, so far as regards the thing, he can assume, exercise or resume manual control of it at pleasure, and so far as regards other persons, the thing is under the protection of his personal presence, or in or on a house or land occupied by him or in any receptacle belonging to him and under his control, he is in physical possession of the thing. ' 15. While recognising that 'possession' is not a purely legal concept but also a matter of fact, Salmond (12th Edn., p. 52) describes 'possession, in fact', as a relationship between a person and a thing. According to the learned Author the test for determining 'whether a person is in possession of anything is whether he is in general control of it' 37. By referring to the aforesaid treatise of law, it has been clarified that the person with title is presumed to be in possession of the property. Considering the fact that there can be a case where property may be occupied by a person other than an owner, the Apex Court distinguished between the concept of 'possession' and 'occupation' of the land and observed that the possession amounts to holding of property as owner and occupation amounts to keeping the possession by being present in it. The reference in this regards is made to the following paragraphs from Indore Development Authority (supra) 252. The reference in this regards is made to the following paragraphs from Indore Development Authority (supra) 252. In Ram Dass v. Davinder (2004) 3 SCC 684 , this Court stated that possession and occupation in common parlance may be used interchangeably, but in law possession amounts to holding property as an owner, while to occupy is to keep possession by being present in it. In Bhinka & Ors. v. Charan Singh, Bhinka & Ors. v. Charan Singhl64, this Court considered the dichotomy between taking and retaining possession. They are mutually exclusive expressions and apply to two different situations. The word 'taking' applies to a person taking possession of a land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law, while the word 'retaining' applies to a person taking possession in accordance with the provisions of the law, but subsequently retaining the same illegally. In Bhinka & Ors. (supra), as to retaining possession, it was observed: '14. If the appellants did not take possession of the disputed lands, did they retain possession of the same in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force? The dichotomy between taking and retaining indicates that they are mutually exclusive and apply to two different situations. The word 'taking' applies to a person taking possession of a land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law, while the word 'retaining' to a person taking possession in accordance with the provisions of the law but subsequently retaining the same illegally. So construed, the appellants' possession of the lands being illegal from the inception, they could not be described as persons retaining possession of the said lands in accordance with the provisions of any law for the time being in force, so as to be outside the scope of Section 180 of the Act. ' 38. As regards the Scheme of acquisition, the Hon'ble Apex Court by making reference to Section 16 of Act of 1894 categorically held that vesting of title in the government takes place immediately upon taking possession of the land and the State becomes the owner of the property without any condition or limitation either as to the title or to the possession. After taking of possession of the acquired land and vesting of the land in the State, the person who retains the possession is a 'trespasser'. After taking of possession of the acquired land and vesting of the land in the State, the person who retains the possession is a 'trespasser'. The reference is made to the following:- '...253. Under section 16 of the Act of 1894, vesting of title in the Government, in the land took place immediately upon taking possession. Under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1894, the acquired land became the property of the State without any condition or limitation either as to title or possession. Absolute title thus vested in the State. xxx xxxxx xxxx 256. Thus, it is apparent that vesting is with possession and the statute has provided under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1894 that once possession is taken, absolute vesting occurred. It is an indefeasible right and vesting is with possession thereafter. The vesting specified under section 16, takes place after various steps, such as, notification under section 4, declaration under section 6, notice under section 9, award under section 11 and then possession. The statutory provision of vesting of property absolutely free from all encumbrances has to be accorded Juli effect Not only the possession vests in the State but all other encumbrances are also removed forthwith. The title of the landholder ceases and the state becomes the absolute owner and in possession of the property. Thereafter there is no control of the landowner over the property. He cannot have any animus to take the property and to control it Even if he has retained the possession or otherwise trespassed upon it after possession has been taken by the State, he is a trespasser and such possession of trespasser enures for his benefit and on behalf of the owner...' 39. Once the vesting in the aforesaid manner takes place, the petition laying challenge to the acquisition proceedings on any ground is not maintainable and rightly so as the landowner has no title to assert his claim as regards the acquired land as being a trespasser he loses any locus to challenge the acquisition proceedings since he loses any title in the acquired land itself. This in fact is the reason why the Courts have consistently refused to entertain any challenge to the acquisition proceedings after vesting of the land. This in fact is the reason why the Courts have consistently refused to entertain any challenge to the acquisition proceedings after vesting of the land. Thus, erstwhile landowners are precluded from questioning the legality of acquisition proceedings after vesting of land as they are only trespassers and no more owners who can asset any sort of right over the land of which the State is owner. It is in view of the aforesaid, that the Hon'ble Court held that the claims barred by law cannot be agitated even under the guise of provision of section 24(2) of Act of 2013 which otherwise is considered to be a beneficial provision for the landowner. It being so, there remains no doubt that so far as the land in question is concerned, the plea of lapsing of the acquisition under Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 is not available and thus, the instant petition being not maintainable deserves to be dismissed which is accordingly dismissed. 40. The petitioners in the instant petition have claimed that they are in physical possession of the land in question. Refuting the same Mr. Mittal has argued that the possession of the land in question was taken at the time of announcement of award by recording Rapat Roznamcha no. 425 dated 23.03.1993. He has further argued that in view of the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India that after recording the Rapat Roznamcha, if anybody retains or re-enters the land, his status will clearly be of trespasser and the possession of the trespasser always inure for the benefit of the real owner i.e. the State Government in the case. Para No. 244 and 245 of Indore Development Authority are extracted herein below:- '...'244. Section 16 of the Act of 1894 provided that possession of land may be taken by the State Government after passing of an award and thereupon land vest free from all encumbrances in the State Government. Similar are the provisions made in the case of urgency in Section 17(1). The word 'possession' has been used in the Act of 1894, whereas in Section 24(2) of Act of 2013, the expression 'physical possession' is used. Similar are the provisions made in the case of urgency in Section 17(1). The word 'possession' has been used in the Act of 1894, whereas in Section 24(2) of Act of 2013, the expression 'physical possession' is used. It is submitted that drawing of panchnama for taking over the possession is not enough when the actual physical possession remained with the landowner and Section 24(2) requires actual physical possession to be taken, not the possession in any other form. When the State has acquired the land and award has been passed, land vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances. The act of vesting of the land in the State is with possession, any person retaining the possession, thereafter, has to be treated as trespasser and has no right to possess the land which vests in the State free from all encumbrances. 245. The question which arises whether there is any difference between taking possession under the Act of1894 and the expression 'physical possession' used in Section 24(2). As a matter of fact, what was contemplated under the Act of1894, by taking the possession meant only physical possession of the land. Taking over the possession under the Act of 2013 always amounted to taking over physical possession of the land. When the State Government acquires land and drowns up a memorandum of taking possession, that amounts to taking the physical possession of the land. On the large chunk of property or otherwise which is acquired, the Government is not supposed to put some other person or the police force in possession to retain it and start cultivating it till the land is used by it for the purpose for which it has been acquired. The Government is not supposed to start residing or to physically occupy it once possession has been taken by drawing the inquest proceedings for obtaining possession thereof. Thereafter, if any further retaining of land or any re-entry is made on the land or someone starts cultivation on the open land or starts residing in the outhouse, etc., is deemed to be the trespasser on land which in possession of the State. The possession of trespasser always inures for the benefit of the real owner that is the State Government in the case. 41. The possession of trespasser always inures for the benefit of the real owner that is the State Government in the case. 41. The perusal of the aforenoted observations and the factual matrix of the present case as pleaded by the respondents, we are of the considered opinion that the physical possession of the land in question stands duly taken which has already been vested in the State and thus, the plea being raised by the petitioners being in physical possession of the land in question is required to be noticed, only for rejecting it and the same is thus being rejected. 42. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Indore Development Authority (supra) while interpreting the provisions of the Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 has clarified that in order to claim lapsing, both the ingredients/contingencies as provided are to be fulfilled, i.e., compensation is not paid and possession is not taken, i.e. if either of the condition is fulfilled, the lapsing cannot happen. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has observed that word 'or' occurring in Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 must be read as 'and/nor'. Relevant paras from the judgment are reproduced here in below:- '...99. In this Court's considered view, as regards the collation of the words used in Section 24(2), two negative conditions have been prescribed. Thus, even if one condition is satisfied, there is no lapse, and this logically flows from the Act of 1894 read with the provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Any other interpretation would entail illogical results. That apart, if the rule of interpretation with respect to two negative conditions qualified by 'or' is used, then 'or' should be read as 'nor' or 'and'. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx 101. In M/s. Ranchhoddas Atmaram andAnr. v. The Union of India and Ors.77, a Constitution Bench of this Court observed that if there are two negative conditions, the expression 'or' has to be read as conjunctive and conditions of both the clauses must be fulfilled. It was observed: '(13) It is clear that if the words form an affirmative sentence, then the condition of one of the clauses only need be fulfilled. It was observed: '(13) It is clear that if the words form an affirmative sentence, then the condition of one of the clauses only need be fulfilled. In such a case, "or" really means "either" "or." In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary one of the meanings of the word "or" is given as "A particle co-ordinating two (or more) words, phrases or clauses between which there is an alternative." It is also there stated, "The alternative expressed by 'or' is emphasised by prefixing the first member or adding after the last, the associated adv. EITHER." So, even without "either," "or" alone creates an alternative. If, therefore, the sentence before us is an affirmative one, then we get two alternatives, any one of which may be chosen without the other being considered at all. In such a case it must be held that a penalty exceeding Rs. 1,000 can be imposed. (14) If, however, the sentence is a negative one, then the position becomes different. The word "or" between the two clauses would then spread the negative influence over the clause following it. This rule of grammar is not in dispute. In lsuch a case the conditions of both the clauses must be fulfilled and the result would be that the penalty that can be imposed can never exceed Rs. 1,000/ (15) The question then really comes to this: Is the sentence before us a negative or an affirmative one? It seems to us that the sentence is an affirmative sentence. The substance of the sentence is that a certain person shall be liable to a penalty. That is a positive concept. The sentence is therefore not negative in its import. ' (emphasis supplied) Thus, for lapse of acquisition proceedings initiated under the old law, under Section 24(2) if both steps have not been taken, ie., neither physical possession is taken, nor compensation is paid, the land acquisition proceedings lapse../ In the case in hand as stated by the respondent in the written statement, the physical possession stands taken vide Rapat Roznamcha No. 425 dated 23.03.1993 which was followed by sanctioning the mutation no. 1218 dated 04.08.2004 in favour of HUDA (now HSVP) and thus, in view of the exposition of law in Indore Development Authority (supra), the physical possession of the land in question stands taken, the land stands vested in the State and it being so, the only possible conclusion is the closure of doors for the petitioners to invoke the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. 43. Even though, after recording the conclusion that the physical possession of the land in question stands taken, the petition filed by the petitioners invoking the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 itself is not maintainable. We are not obligated to delve any further on any other aspect but in view of the arguments raised by the State about the misstatement having been made by the petitioners as regards the aspect of compensation, we are examining this aspect as well. 44. In the petition filed, the petitioners in so many words have asserted that even though the award had been announced way back in the year 1993 but the compensation amount is neither paid nor deposited which fact has been disputed by the respondents in the written statement filed in the year 2017, to which, no rejoinder has been filed. In view thereof, the only conclusion comes out is that the petitioners after the announcement of the award had accepted the amount of compensation. So much so, they sought re-determination of the compensation amount by filing reference petition under Section 18 of the 1894 Act which resulted into enhancement of the compensation amount. Even the amount of enhanced compensation stands deposited with the Reference Court way back in the year 2003. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that even the contingency provided under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 as regards payment of compensation, is also not available with the petitioners. 45. Even otherwise, in view of exposition in Indore Development Authority (supra), the obligation of the State to pay the compensation is discharged if the amount of compensation is tendered which has been interpreted to mean that the amount was made available to the land owners. Para No. 203 of Indore Development Authority in this regard is reproduced herein below:- '....203. The word 'paid' in Section 31(1) to the landowner cannot include in its ambit the expression "deposited" in court. Para No. 203 of Indore Development Authority in this regard is reproduced herein below:- '....203. The word 'paid' in Section 31(1) to the landowner cannot include in its ambit the expression "deposited" in court. Deposit cannot be said to be payment made to landowners. Deposit is on being prevented from payment. However., in case there is a tender of the amount that is to mean amount is made available to the landowner that would be a discharge of the obligation to make the yayment and in that event such a verson cannot be penalised for the default in making the yayment. In default to deposit in court, the liability is to make the payment of interest under Section 34 of Act of 1894. Sections 32 and 33 (which had been relied upon by the landowners' counsel to say that valuable rights inhere, in the event of deposit with court, thus making deposit under Section 31 mandatory) provide for investing amounts in the Government securities, or seeking alternative lands, in lieu of compensation, etc. Such deposits, cannot fetch higher interest than thel5 per cent contemplated under Section 34, which is pari materia to Section 80 of Act of 2013. Section 34 is pari materia to section 80 of Act of 2013 in which also the similar rate of interest has been specified. Even if the amount is not deposited in Reference Court nor with the treasury as against the name of the person interested who is entitled to receive it, if Collector has been prevented to make the payment due to exigencies provided in Section 31(2), interest to be paid. However, in case the deposit is made without tenderins it to the verson interested, the liability to yay the interest under section 34, shall continue. Even assuming deposit in the Reference Court is taken to be mandatory, in that case too interest has to follow as specified in section 34. However, acquisition proceeding cannot lapse due to non-deposit.... ' 46. Thus, as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, the obligation of the State towards paying the amount of compensation stands discharged if in terms of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, the State is able to show that the amount was tendered to land owners which has been interpreted to mean that the amount was made available. Thus, as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, the obligation of the State towards paying the amount of compensation stands discharged if in terms of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, the State is able to show that the amount was tendered to land owners which has been interpreted to mean that the amount was made available. So far as the case in hand is concerned, it is not mere tender but the petitioners have actually received the amount of compensation that to in the year 1993 itself. Thus, the plea being raised of nonpayment of compensation is not only misconceived but is a result of clear malafide intent of the petitioners. 47. The petitioners in support of their claim of lapsing of acquisition proceedings have placed reliance on many judicial pronouncements by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India including the Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr v. Harakchand Misrimal Solanki and others cited as 2014(3) SCC 183 . In this regard, it is required to be noticed that the aforesaid judgment was over-ruled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Indore Development Authority (supra) in Para No. 362 which is extracted herein below:- '...362. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. (supra) is hereby overruled and all other decisions in which Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) has been followed, are also overruled. The decision in Shree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra) cannot be said to be laying down good law, is overruled and other decisions following the same are also overruled. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (Dead) through L.Rs. and Ors., (supra), the aspect with respect to the proviso to Section 24(2) and whether 'or' has to be read as 'nor' or as 'and' was not placed for consideration. Therefore, that decision too cannot prevail, in the light of the discussion in the present judgment... 48. Apart from making the aforenoted submissions, Mr. Mittal has further contended that the land in question was acquired for the public purpose namely, for the development of residential, commercial, institutional and open space/ recreational area in Gurgaon whose layout plan has already been approved. These sectors have already been developed, plots have been allotted and the allottees are residing. Other basic amenities like road, hospital, police station etc. are functional in these sectors. The land in question affects 3 number of 18 mtr. These sectors have already been developed, plots have been allotted and the allottees are residing. Other basic amenities like road, hospital, police station etc. are functional in these sectors. The land in question affects 3 number of 18 mtr. wide road, 1 number 12 mtr. wide road, 7 plot of 14 maria category, 1 site of ESS, site of high school, site for group housing, site for commercial centre and the site for the shopping centre partly, therefore, the land in question is very much essential to complete the development work as per the planning. He has further argued that sufficiently long time has already lapsed from the date of the acquisition in the form of award having been announced on 23.03.1993, therefore, the instant writ petition which otherwise is not maintainable be dismissed so that the State/HUDA (now HSVP) could proceed with the execution of the developmental work as per the planning. We have considered this part of argument raised by the respondents and are in complete agreement with the same as this is an important factor to be kept in mind while dealing with the case arising out of the acquisition of land to achieve the public purpose and it is the State or its authority who is in the best position to decide about utilization of the land acquired, after it having been vested in the State. 49. As far as the challenge made to the speaking order dated 16.09.2016 regarding the claim made by the petitioners for declaration that the acquisition proceedings qua their land in question under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 have lapsed, in view of the order dated 09.10.2014 passed by this Court in CWP No. 20866 of 2014, we have considered the same and found that the reasoning given to reject the claim of the petitioners is absolutely in line with the exposition of law in Indore Development Authority (supra) and thus, we affirm the order dated 16.09.2016 (Annexure P-8). 50. Coming to the argument raised by the Id. 50. Coming to the argument raised by the Id. State counsel as regards the malafide intent shown by the petitioners in approaching this Court by making blatant wrong statement as regards the factum of nonpayment of compensation, the perusal of the respective pleadings made and the arguments raised before us leaves no scope for doubt that the petitioners did not approach this Court with clean hands and are liable to be non suited on this ground alone without delving any further as regards the other issues. The issue regarding approaching the Court by concealing the facts/making wrong statement has been examined by Hon'ble the Supreme Court on number of occasions and it has consistently held that such an act on the part of litigant results into polluting the stream of justice by making patently false statement. In the writ jurisdiction, the Court naturally takes statement of facts and grounds contained in the petition at their face value and it is highly unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading. For many centuries, the Indian Courts have seen the litigants who used to feel proud in stating truth and only truth without caring for the outcome of the litigation but now as been witnessed, a new creed of litigants has cropped up who do not have any respect for truth and shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical practices for achieving their vested interest. It is now well established that a litigant who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief. In the case in hand, it is clear that based upon the falsehood of not receiving the compensation money, the petitioners remained successful in persuading this Court to grant an interim order in their favour which having been obtained by practicing fraud and stating wrong facts cannot be allowed to stand. In the case in hand, it is clear that based upon the falsehood of not receiving the compensation money, the petitioners remained successful in persuading this Court to grant an interim order in their favour which having been obtained by practicing fraud and stating wrong facts cannot be allowed to stand. Thus, not only on the ground that none of the contingency as provided in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is available with the petitioners, the petition itself being not maintainable on account of the case in hand being clearly a case of stale claim, the land having been vested in the State long time ago, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of the misstatement having been made by the petitioners and not approaching this Court with clean hands. There is no dispute that the conduct shown by the petitioners has been viewed very seriously by this Court and deserves imposition of an exemplary costs upon them, yet by recording our perturbance we refrain ourselves from imposing cost upon the petitioners. Conclusion 51. In the wake of the above conspectus of the whole issue, we unhesitatingly hold:- a. The petition being filed invoking the provisions of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 can only be confined to the pleas available within the four comers as provided in the said section only and not any other plea for example of any procedural irregularity, non dealing of the objection under Section 5A of the 1894 Act etc. which though were available but not raised except in the cases wherein the said challenge made on an earlier point of time was pending on the date of coming into effect of new Act as taking up of any such plea in the guise of Section 24(2) of 2013 Act will clearly be hit with the principle of delay and laches and doctrine of acquiescence which have been well acknowledge to be sufficient to non suit a litigant. b. In view of the exposition of law in Indore Development Authority (supra), the dead/stale claim are not only confined to those cases wherein the earlier challenge made is negated but also to the cases wherein the litigant chose to remain silent and to not to challenge the acquisition proceedings as such silence maintained will be a conclusive evidence of the waiver of interest on the part of the litigant which is sufficient to invoke the doctrine of acquiescence which as per the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India virtually destroys even the right of the person. c. The doctrine of acquiescence act as an estoppel which bars the litigant from complaining about the violation of his right. In order to invoke the doctrine of acquiescence, the conduct of the party is required to be seen which can be either direct with full knowledge and express, or indirect where a person having the right to set aside the action stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right and inspite of infringement, takes no action mirroring acceptance. The rigor of doctrine of acquiescence is much harsher then of laches as the laches destroys the remedy but the acquiescence destroys the rights. d. Once the vesting takes place, the petition laying challenge to the acquisition proceedings on any of the grounds is not maintainable and the landowner has no title to assert his claim as regards the acquired land as being a trespasser he loses any locus to challenge the acquisition proceedings. This is in fact the reason why the Courts have consistently refused to entertain any challenge to the acquisition proceedings after vesting of the land. e. In view of the exposition of law in Indore Development Authority (supra), the plea of lapsing under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is available only in those cases wherein the proceedings arising out of the acquisition were pending on the date of coming into the effect of the Act of 2013 as Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to a fresh cause of action to agitate against the acquisition proceedings. The dead and stale claims cannot be revived under the guise of the invocation of the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. The dead and stale claims cannot be revived under the guise of the invocation of the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. It has further been clarified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India that to claim lapsing under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, both the contingencies as provided in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 are required to be made out, i.e., if either of the contingency is not available, lapsing under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 cannot be claimed. f. In the instant case, the perusal of the respective pleadings made especially in the written statement filed by the State, we have no hesitation to hold that the State has fully discharged its both the obligations as envisaged under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. The physical possession of the land in question is stated to have been taken by recording Rapat Roznamcha No. 425 dated 23.03.1993 which was followed by entering the mutation in favour of the beneficiary department vide mutation no. 1218 dated 04.08.2004. As regards the compensation for the acquired land of the petitioners, they have accepted the amount of compensation on 27.04.1993, where after they sought the redetermination of the compensation amount and the enhanced amount has also been deposited in the Reference Court on 17.09.2003. Thus, having recorded that both the contingencies are not fulfilled, the claim made by the petitioner of issuance of declaration that the acquisition proceedings in their case have lapsed is wholly misconceived and is liable to be rejected, which is thus being rejected. g. In view of the categoric stand taken by the State in the written statement about the essentiality of the land in question, we find no reason to not to agree about the fact that the land in question is very much essential to achieve the public purpose for which it was acquired and is an integral part of the sanctioned layout plan. 52. 52. Having answered all the aforesaid issues in detail, considering the exposition of law in Indore Development Authority (supra) and applying the same onto the factual matrix of the instant case, further having recorded that the physical possession having been taken, the obligation of the State towards making the compensation having been discharged, the land in question having been vested in the State long time ago, rejecting the plea of grievance raised by the petitioner as against not releasing their construction while deciding the objection filed under Section 5Aof the 1894 Act being hit with the doctrine of acquiescence and considering the falsehood on the part of the petitioners in approaching this Court we are of the considered opinion that the instant writ petition is wholly misconceived, devoid of any merits and is liable to be dismissed and the same is thus dismissed. 53. Since the main petition has been dismissed, the pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. Status quo order, if any, shall also stand vacated.