JUDGMENT Arya, J. - Looking to the similitude of controversy involved, both these criminal appeals having arisen from same Sessions Trial are being disposed of by this common judgment. 1. These appeals, under Section 374 (2) Cr.P.C., arise out of the judgment dated 18.12.2000 passed by First Additional Sessions Judge, Gwalior in Sessions Trial No.116/1999, whereby appellant Bhupendra stands convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC, while appellant Kalla alias Kallu Koli stands convicted under section 302 read with S.34 of the IPC. Both the appellants have been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.500/-, in default to suffer R.I. for six months. Co-convict Chandra Prakash alias Kallan S/o Rambabu Jha is reported to have expired on 28/1/2007 and consequently Cr.A. No.83/2001 preferred by him, stood dismissed as abated vide order dated 12/5/2008. 2. Prosecution story, as found proved, is that Badshah (since deceased) was in the business of Dairy and used to return home between 8-9 PM daily. On the fateful day of 30/11/1998, when he did not return, complainant Beer Singh and Rajendra Tomar went in his search. At about 10.30 PM, near Mohan Misthan Bhandar, they found that Badshah had been caught hold by appellant Kallan Koli and Kallan Luhar, while appellant Bhupendra Kushwah was stabbing him by a Baka. As complainant and his associate raised alarm, the miscreants fled away throwing Badshah on the ground. On going near him, they found that Badshah was bleeding profusely from head and neck and had already succumbed to the injuries caused to him, having been assaulted by the aforesaid miscreants owing to previous animosity. Upon information to the aforesaid effect by complainant Beer Singh (PW3), FIR (Ex.P/13) was registered at Police Station Hazira, District Gwalior at Crime No.0457/98, whereupon report (Ex.P/17) was registered at Police Station Gwalior at Crime No.1006/98 for the offence punishable under section 302/34 of the IPC. During investigation, spot map (Ex.P/6) was prepared by ASI Chandrabhan Singh (PW5) and blood stained and plain earth was also seized vide seizure memo (Ex.P/10) from the spot. Panchyatnama Lash (Ex.P/2) was prepared on 1/2/1998 and on the same day the appellants were arrested vide arrest memo (Ex.P/3). Clothes were seized from co- accused Chandraprakash alias Kallan Luhar and appellant Kalla alias Kallu Koli vide seizure memos Ex.P/8 and Ex.P/9 respectively while, weapon of Offence viz. Panchyatnama Lash (Ex.P/2) was prepared on 1/2/1998 and on the same day the appellants were arrested vide arrest memo (Ex.P/3). Clothes were seized from co- accused Chandraprakash alias Kallan Luhar and appellant Kalla alias Kallu Koli vide seizure memos Ex.P/8 and Ex.P/9 respectively while, weapon of Offence viz. Baka was recovered vide seizure memo (Ex.P/7) at the instance of appellant Bhupendra upon his discovery memo (Ex.P/4) . On 1/12/98, the dead body of deceased was sent to J.A. Hospital for post mortem examination. After completion of the investigation, charge-sheet against the appellants was submitted in the Court of JMFC, Gwalior, who committed the case to the Court of Sessions for trial. 3. On being charged with the offence punishable under section 302, in alternative 302/34 of the IPC, the appellants abjured the guilt. In the examination under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellants pleaded false implication due to prevailing enmity. 4. To establish the charges, the prosecution examined as many as 9 witnesses including Jaswant Singh (PW1), Jai Singh (PW2) complainant Beer Singh (PW3) and Rajendra Singh (PW4) as eyewitnesses to the incident though Jaswant Singh and Rajendra Singh have turned hostile, whereas evidence of only one witness viz. Devendra Singh (DW1) was recorded in defence. 5. On consideration of the evidence on record, the learned trial Judge, for the reasons recorded in the impugned judgment, found the appellants guilty of the offence charged with. He, therefore, convicted and sentenced them as indicated hereinabove. 6. Post mortem examination of deceased Badshah was conducted by Madhup Kumar (PW7). In the autopsy report (Ex.P/19), he noted following injuries:- 1. Chop wound on right parieto occipital region running posteriorily medially and downwards with posterior end near external occipital protuberance 12 cms x 11/2 cms, communicated with cranial cavity. 2. Chop wound on right occipitotemporal region 8 cms x 1 cm, communicated with cranial cavity, located 3 cms. lateral and downwards to HN(1). 3. Chop wound 17 cms x 3 cms, running laterally and backwards on temporo-occipital region right from a point 5 cms lateral to right eye to 5 cms below posterior end on HN (1) but located half cm below HN (2) 4. Chop wound on right side from right ear and mastoid to occipital region 111/2 cms x 3 1/2 cms 5. Chop wound below right ear 4 cms x 1/2 cm 6. Chop wound on right side from right ear and mastoid to occipital region 111/2 cms x 3 1/2 cms 5. Chop wound below right ear 4 cms x 1/2 cm 6. Chop wound on left ear and cheek, the depth being more on temporal region with cut in pinna, 9 cms x 1/2 cm 7. Oblique abrasion on right shoulder 8 cms x 11/2 cms 8. Abrasion on left frontal eminence 2 cms x 1 1/2 cm 9. Abrasion on left cheek 2 in no, 2 cm x 11/2 cms and 1 cm x 1/3 cm All the injuries were ante mortem in nature caused within 6 hours of death. Injuries nos. 1 to 6 were cause by hard sharp cutting and heavy object. Injuries nos. 7 to 9 were caused by hard and blunt object. On internal examination, he noted as under:- 1. Inner surface of scalp is echhymosed around ext. HN (1) to (4) on right frontal, parietal, temporal and occipital region and around HN (6) on left temporal region. 2. Through and through sharp cuts are present in cranial vault underneath external hurt no. (1) to (4). 3. Meninges are torn with sharp cuts underneath ext. H.No. (1) to (4) 4. Right cerebral hemisphere of brain has sharp cuts compatible with H.N (1) to (4) of external with subdural, extradural and subarchnoid haemorrhage and laceration at places. All internal injuries were ante mortem caused within six hours of death. He opined that the death was caused due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of craniocerebral hurts and the hurts appeared to be inflicted. The duration of death was within 24 hours of the post mortem examination. Thus, the homicidal death of Badshah is well established from the medical evidence on record. 7. Shri Rakesh Sharma, learned Senior Advocate with Shri M.K.Chaudhary and Ms. Sudha Shrivastava, learned counsel for the appellants while taking exception to the impugned judgment made the following submissions:- (1) The conviction of the appellants is based on the sole testimony of alleged eye witness Beer Singh (PW-3) as the remaining eye witnesses viz., Jaswant Singh (PW-1), Jai Singh (PW-2) and Rajendra Singh (PW-4) have not supported the prosecution version, therefore, their evidence has been disbelieved by the trial Court. (2) Beer Singh (PW-3) was a mere chance witness/interested witness and close relative of the deceased. Therefore, his testimony is of no credence. (2) Beer Singh (PW-3) was a mere chance witness/interested witness and close relative of the deceased. Therefore, his testimony is of no credence. The same is vulnerable and liable to be disbelieved for more than one reasons viz. (a) As per the testimony of Dr. Madhup Kumar (PW-7) in para 3, chili powder was found in the eyes of deceased Badshah, whereas there is no whisper about the alleged act of throwing chili powder into the eyes of deceased Badshah either in the FIR; in the statement under section 161 Cr.P.C. or in the evidence of Beer Singh (PW-3) during trial. (b) The injury No. 7 on the right shoulder, the injury No. 8 on the forehead and the injury No. 9 on the left cheek, as deposed by Dr. Madhup Kumar (PW-7), on the corpse of deceased Badshah during postmortem examination have not even been mentioned either in the FIR or in the testimony of Beer Singh (PW-3). (c) Even otherwise, in his cross-examination Beer Singh (PW-3) has denied the story of prosecution and denied even the presence of appellants on the spot. Therefore, the conviction based on the sole testimony of Beer Singh (PW-3) gives rise to grave suspicion. Hence, benefit of doubt ought to have been extended to the appellants acquitting them of the charges. (d) The FIR (Ex.P/13) lodged on 30.11.1998 at 10.50 PM at Hazira Police Station was not made over/forwarded to the Magistrate having jurisdiction over the Police Station as required under Section 157 of Cr.P.C. This gives rise to suspicion of manipulation in the FIR including the same being ante dated. (e) The spot map (ExP-6) does not disclose the source of light on the place of incident, particularly when the incident had occurred late at about 10 O'clock in the night. (f) There is no explanation also in the statement of Investigating Officer on the question of non- mentioning of source of light in the spot map. (g) The recovery of Baka, the alleged weapon used for causing injury to Badshah leading to his death, has not been believed by the trial Court. (h) The appellants have not been identified by the prosecution witnesses. With aforesaid submissions learned counsel contended that the impugned judgment be set aside and the appellants be acquitted. 8. (g) The recovery of Baka, the alleged weapon used for causing injury to Badshah leading to his death, has not been believed by the trial Court. (h) The appellants have not been identified by the prosecution witnesses. With aforesaid submissions learned counsel contended that the impugned judgment be set aside and the appellants be acquitted. 8. Per contra, Shri B.P.S.Chauhan, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent/State submitted that the FIR lodged at Police Station Hazira was without delay as the alleged incident occurred at 10.30 on 30.11.1998 and the FIR (Ex.P-13) was lodged at 10.50. There is consistency in the content of the information supplied by the complainant Beer Singh (P.W.3) in the FIR under Section 154 of Cr.P.C, his statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C. on the same day and his evidence before the trial Court. As such, no exception can be taken to the proving of the occurrence of the incident and the death of the deceased Badshah. He submitted that true it is that testimonies of Jaswant Singh (PW-1) and Rajendra Singh (PW-4) did not support the story of the prosecution and were disbelieved by the trial court, yet, it is pertinent to mention that Jai Singh (PW-2) and Beer Singh (PW-3) examined on 6.7.2000 had supported the story of the prosecution. However, in their further cross-examination conducted on 29.07.2000 they had taken a somersault. The conduct of Jai Singh (PW-2) and Beer Singh (PW-3) under such circumstances apparently is suspicious in nature and contrary to normal human conduct. Therefore, the said part of cross- examination has rightly been discarded by the Sessions Judge while convicting the appellants. For this, learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari Vs. State of MP reported in AIR 1991 SC 1853 . It is further submitted that it is incorrect to say that Section 157 Cr.P.C. has not been complied with. It is submitted that Chandrabhan Singh, I.O. (PW-5) in para 21 has clearly stated that the Constable Kishan Singh Thakur had sent the copy of the FIR registered at Crime No.1006/98 under Section 302/34 of IPC to the concerned Magistrate, an entry of receipt was made in the Dak Book. The Statement of Constable Kishan Singh, as made to the I.O., had been made part of challan and is at page No.36 of the Paper book. The Statement of Constable Kishan Singh, as made to the I.O., had been made part of challan and is at page No.36 of the Paper book. It is submitted that though a doubt is sought to be created in the matter of preparation of spot map, yet there is no cross examination on that point. Learned counsel further submitted that as per the deposition of Beer Singh (PW-3), when he reached on the spot, appellant Kalla had caught hold of the deceased Badshah and Bhupendra was wielding Baka on him. Therefore, he was not present at the beginning of the incident when chili powder was thrown in the eyes of the deceased Badshah. Learned counsel further submitted that the narration of events in the FIR, statement under Section 161 and deposition of Beer Singh (PW-3) dated 6.7.2000 if seen, it would be evident that when complainant along with Rajendra had reached the spot, deceased Badshah was caught hold of by Kalla and appellant Bhupendra was stabbing him with Baka. As such, the contention that the so called eye witness has not deposed about throwing of chili powder in the eyes of the deceased by the accused as found by Dr. Madhup Kumar (PW-7) during postmortem examination and likewise the alleged unexplained injuries No.7,8 and 9 on the shoulder, cheek and forehead, is of no consequence. 9. Before adverting to the rival contentions advanced, it is expedient to reiterate the law related to :- (i) Quality of evidence and appreciation thereof when conviction is assailed to be based on sole/solitary witness. In the case of Anil Phukan Vs. State of Assam ( (1993)3 SCC 282 ), State of A.P. Vs. Patnam Anandam ( (2005)9 SCC 237 ), Gulam Sarbar Vs. State of Bihar ( (2014)3 SCC 401 ), it has been held that conviction can be based on the testimony of single eye-witness if he/she passes the test of reliability and consistency with the information supplied in the FIR and material collected during the course of investigation. It is not the number of witnesses examined, but the quality of evidence that is important, whereupon conviction can be based. In other words, the evidence must be weighed and not counted. The litmus test of quality of evidence is the touchstone if it has a ring of truth and is cogent, credible and trustworthy, or otherwise. It is not the number of witnesses examined, but the quality of evidence that is important, whereupon conviction can be based. In other words, the evidence must be weighed and not counted. The litmus test of quality of evidence is the touchstone if it has a ring of truth and is cogent, credible and trustworthy, or otherwise. (ii) Credibility/reliability of the statement of witness recorded on the first day including part of his cross-examination which was in consonance with the prosecution case, but who belied the story of prosecution in further cross-examination recorded at a belated stage; The law in this behalf is also well settled. Firstly the evidence of witnesses, declared hostile, is not wholly effaced from the record and that part of evidence which is otherwise acceptable to the extent their version is found to be dependable on careful scrutiny of the testimonies, can be acted upon ( AIR 1976 SC 202 , AIR 1977 SC 170 , AIR 1979 SC 1848 , AIR 1991 SC 1853 referred to). Similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Duleshwar and another Vs. State of M.P. ( (2020)11 SCC 440 ). In the present case, Jai Singh (PW2) was examined and partly cross-examined on 6/7/2000. At that time, his testimony was well in consonance with the prosecution case and also withstood the cross-examination. However, after adjournment, further cross- examination was recorded on 29/7/2000 wherein he belied the story of prosecution. Likewise, Beer Singh (PW3), in his examination on 6/7/2000, supported the story of prosecution. However, in his cross-examination on 29/7/2000, belied the story of prosecution. Applying the ratio of judgments referred to above, the part of evidence of PW2 and PW3 supporting the prosecution, cannot be altogether effaced or washed off merely for the reason that in their cross-examination on the next day, after a gap of about 22-23 days, they have not supported the story of prosecution and the same has rightly been critically evaluated by the trial Court while resting conviction thereupon. At this stage, it is worthwhile to quote the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in similar facts and circumstances as reiterated in the case of Khujji Vs. At this stage, it is worthwhile to quote the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in similar facts and circumstances as reiterated in the case of Khujji Vs. State of M.P. ( AIR 1991 SC 1853 ), which read thus:- '7 The High Court came to the conclusion and, in our opinion rightly, that during the one month period that elapsed since the recording of his examination-in- chief something transpired which made him shift his evidence on the question of identity to help the appellant. We are satisfied on a reading of his entire evidence that his statement in cross-examination on the question of identity of the appellant and his companion is a clear attempt to wriggle out of what he had stated earlier in his examination-in-chief. Since the incident occurred at a public place, it is reasonable to infer that the street lights illuminated the place sufficiently to enable this witness to identify the assailants. We have, therefore, no hesitation in concluding that he had ample opportunity to identify the assailants of Gulab, his presence at the scene of occurrence is not unnatural nor his statement that he had come to purchase vegatables unacceptable:We do not find any material contradictions in his evidence to doubt his testimony. He is a totally independent witness who had no cause to give false evidence against the appellant and his companions. We are, therefore, not impressed by the reasons which weighed that the trial court for rejecting his evidence. We agree with the High Court that his evidence is acceptable regarding the time, place and manner of the incident as well as the identity of the assailants.' (iii) Law related to 'proved', 'disproved' and 'not proved' in the context of section 3 of the Evidence Act. In the case of M.Narsinga Rao Vs. State of A.P. ( (2001)1 SCC 691 ), it has been held by the Apex Court as under:- '15 A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes it to exist, or consider its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. This is the definition given for the word proved in the Evidence Act. This is the definition given for the word proved in the Evidence Act. What is required is production of such materials on which the court can reasonably act to reach the supposition that a fact exists. Proof of the fact depends upon the degree of probability of its having existed. The standard required for reaching the supposition is that of a prudent man acting in any important matter concerning him...' In the case of Vijayee Singh Vs. State of U.P. ( (1990)3 SCC 190 ), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with S.3 of the Evidence Act has lucidly explained the concept of 'proved', 'disproved' and 'not proved' as under:- '28. ......Section 3 while explaining the meaning of the words "proved", "disproved" and "not proved" lays down the standard of proof, namely, about the existence or nonexistence of the circumstances from the point of view of a prudent man. The Section is so worded as to provide for two conditions of mind, first, that in which a man feels absolutely certain of a fact, in other words, "believe it to exist" and secondly in which though he may not feel absolutely certain of a fact, he thinks it so extremely probable that a prudent man would under the circumstances act on the assumption of its existence. The Act while adopting the requirement of the prudent man as an appropriate concrete standard by which to measure proof at the same time contemplates of giving full effect to be given to circumstances or condition of probability or improbability. It is this degree of certainty to be arrived where the circumstances before a fact can be said to be proved. A fact is said to be disproved when the Court believes that it does not exist or considers its non- existence so probable in the view of a prudent man and now we come to the third stage where in the view of a prudent man the fact is not proved i.e. neither proved nor disproved. It is this doubt which occurs to a reasonable man, has legal recognition in the field of criminal disputes...' 10. This Court has also carefully perused the evidence brought on record, particularly that of eye-witnesses, Investigating Officer and medical evidence. Jai Singh (PW2) in paragraph 1 of his examination-in-chief has identified appellants Bhupendra, Kallan Koli and co-accused Kallan Luhar. It is this doubt which occurs to a reasonable man, has legal recognition in the field of criminal disputes...' 10. This Court has also carefully perused the evidence brought on record, particularly that of eye-witnesses, Investigating Officer and medical evidence. Jai Singh (PW2) in paragraph 1 of his examination-in-chief has identified appellants Bhupendra, Kallan Koli and co-accused Kallan Luhar. He has also deposed that Badshah was caught hold of by Kallan Koli and Kallan Luhar and Bhupendra had stabbed him by Baka. The presence of Jai Singh (PW2) on spot is established from the evidence of Jaswant Singh (PW1). As stated earlier, Jai Singh (PW2) has supported the prosecution story in his examination-in-chief . In paragraph 16, he has deposed that Veer Singh (PW3) was also present on the spot. Though Jai Singh (PW2) in his cross-examination on 29/7/2000 has resiled from his earlier statement, yet, it is clear from his evidence that Jaswant, Rajendra and Veer Singh were present on the spot. It, therefore, appears from the cross-examination conducted on 29/7/2000 that PW2 and PW3, for some extraneous considerations or reasons, have changed their statement which clearly leads to the conclusion that they were won-over by the defence. Thus, from the evidence of Jaswant Singh (PW1), Jai Singh (PW2) and Beer Singh (PW3), it is well established that they were present on the spot and have witnessed the incident. Therefore, in the light of judgment in the case of Khuji alias Surendra Tiwari Vs. State of M.P. (Supra), their testimony, to the extent it supports the case of prosecution, can safely be relied upon to rest conviction. 11. Now adverting to the contentions advanced, as regards first contention, suffice it to say that as per prosecution story, while Jai Singh (PW2) and Beer Singh (PW3), were on their way to lookout for Badshah, at about 10.30 PM near Mohan Mishthan Bhandar, they saw that appellant Kalla Koli and co-accused Kallan Luhar had caught hold of Badshah, whereas appellant Bhupendra was hitting him with a Baka. No sooner did they raise alarm, all the three miscreants, after throwing Badshah on the ground, fled away. They had seen Badshah bleeding profusely from head and neck and other parts of his body. Same facts have been reiterated by them in their testimony before the trial Court. No sooner did they raise alarm, all the three miscreants, after throwing Badshah on the ground, fled away. They had seen Badshah bleeding profusely from head and neck and other parts of his body. Same facts have been reiterated by them in their testimony before the trial Court. Attempt to cast doubt/suspicion on the credibility/reliability of evidence of these two witnesses for the reason they did not depose about the alleged act of throwing of Chilli powder by accused persons in the eyes of deceased Badshah though in the post mortem report chilli powder was found in the eyes of deceased, in fact is in despair and devoid of substance. These two witnesses had witnessed the scene of occurrence while Badshah was being assaulted. Therefore, this Court is in agreement with the learned Public Prosecutor while he suggests that at the beginning of incident, the chilli powder must have been thrown in the eyes of deceased and thereafter two miscreants caught hold of Badshah and the third one hit him with a Baka on vital/various parts of his body. Hence, the contention so raised, is rejected. The next contention about unexplained injury no.7 on right shoulder, injury no.8 on forehead and injury no.9 on left cheek, as noted by Dr. Madhup Kumar (PW7) on the corpse of deceased Badshah during post mortem examination, in the opinion of this Court, is also of no substance as the eye-witness account clearly demonstrates injuries being caused by appellant Bhupendra with Baka to Badshah on head and other parts of his body . This Court cannot lose sight of the fact there are, as many as, nine injuries on various parts of his body caused in the same incident. For want of details of each and every injury caused to the deceased/injured either in the FIR or statements recorded under section 161, Cr.P.C., or before the trial Court, the entire evidence cannot be rendered non credible, of course with a caveat that the evidence led during trial should be in consonance with the allegations in the FIR relating to factum of incident, complicity of accused persons, act/overt act attributed to them in the scene of occurrence, cause of death and factum of homicidal death. Moreover, it is well settled that minor discrepancies in the testimony of eye-witness does not operate against the case of prosecution; rather some discrepancies in the narrations are bound to occur when the witness speaks on details (Leela Ram Vs. State of Haryana ( (1999)9 SCC 525 ) and Kallu Vs. State of M.P. ( (2006)10 SCC 313 ), referred to). At the cost of repetition, it is reiterated that depositions of Jai Singh (PW2) and Beer Singh (PW3) recorded on 6/7/2000 conform to the aforesaid test, hence there is no reason to take exception thereto. The contention relating to non compliance of Section 157, Cr.P.C. is dehors the facts. The evidence of Chandrabhan Singh (PW5), Investigating Officer, in paragraph 21 of his evidence, clearly suggests that constable Kishan Singh Tyagi had sent copy of FIR registered at Crime No.1006/98 under S.302/34 of the IPC to the Magistrate and an entry of receipt thereof was made in the Dak book. The statement of Kishan Singh made before the Investigating Officer is part of the Challan and is at page no.36 of the Paperbook. Hence, contention in that behalf is also of no consequence. Learned counsel has laid much emphasis on the spot map (Ex.P/6), which according to him, does not disclose the source of light on the spot. Relying upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of State of Rajasthan Vs. Bhola Singh ( AIR 1994 SC 542 ), Arokia Thomas Vs. State of T.N. ( (2006)10 SCC 542 ), learned counsel submitted that in absence of source of light the credibility of evidence of PW2 and PW3, in fact is doubtful and their evidence could not have been relied upon by the trial Court. As a matter of fact, there is no cross-examination of witnesses PW2 and PW3 on this point. That apart, merely for the reason that in the spot map (Ex.P/6) source of light is not mentioned, this by itself would not render the eye-witness account, as detailed in the examination-in-chief of PW2 and PW3 which withstood the cross-examination on 6/7/2000, doubtful. Jai Singh (PW2) in paragraph 15 has deposed that he and Jaswant had witnessed the incident from close proximity of 10-15 feet. Jai Singh (PW2) in paragraph 15 has deposed that he and Jaswant had witnessed the incident from close proximity of 10-15 feet. There is no cavil of doubt about the principles of law enunciated in the precedents relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants, but the same being distinguishable on facts, are of no assistance to the appellants. As regards contention with regard to recovery of Baka having not been believed by the trial Court, the same is not factually correct. In fact, Ex.P/4 on page 11 of the Paperbook reveals that on the disclosure of information by appellant Bhupendra under section 27 of the Evidence Act, the Baka used for causing injury to deceased Badshah was recovered. Description of disclosure is to the following effect:- ^^eSusa ftl cdk ls ckn'kkg dks ekjk Fkk mls eSusa eyx<k frjkgs ds ikl] 'kekZ QkeZ jksM+ ij iMs+ gq;s ikbiksa esa ?kkl esa fNik fn;k gwWa pyks lkFk py dj cjken djk;s nsrk gwWA** Upon the aforesaid disclosure, the weapon of offence viz. Baka has been recovered vide seizure memo (Ex.P/7). The trial Court has dealt with such recovery of Baka at the instance of appellant Bhupendra in paragraph 34 of the impugned judgment. The said recovery cannot be doubted only for the reason that FSL report was not produced before the trial Court as recovery of Baka is in consonace with the prosecution story and eye-witness account recorded during trial. So far as identification of appellants by the said witnesses is concerned, the trial Court has aptly and critically evaluated the evidence in that behalf in paragraphs 23 to 28, as discussed above, and this Court is in agreement with the same. 12. In view of the foregoing discussion in the wake of careful and critical appreciation of the entire evidence brought on record, this Court does not find any illegality or perversity in the judgment of conviction and sentence recorded by the Court below. The appeals fail and are, accordingly, dismissed.