JUDGMENT : 1. This Criminal Misc. Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been preferred claiming the following reliefs:- “It is, therefore, most humbly and respectfully prayed that the appeal may kindly be allowed and the impugned judgment and order of sentence dt. 28.11.15 may kindly be quashed and setaside and the accused-appellant may kindly be acquitted from the charges leveled against him.” 2. This Criminal Misc. Petition has been preferred against the judgment, dated 28.11.2015, passed by the learned Special Judge, Sessions Court (Prevention of Corruption Cases), Udaipur in Criminal Regular Case No. 46/2008, whereby the accused appellant Mohanlal was convicted for the offence under Sections 7, 13 (1) (d)/13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and awarded a sentence of 1 year S.I. along with a fine of Rs. 1000/- in default of payment of which he was to further undergo an imprisonment of 1 month S.I. 3. At the outset, this Court takes note of the fact that the appellant, Mohan Lal S/o Shri Narayan Ji Jatiya has expired and the application to take his legal heir on record, namely Smt. Sumitra Bai W/o Mohan Lal, was allowed by this Court, vide order dated 25.08.2020 (in the present appeal). 4. Brief facts of the case as placed before this Court by learned counsel for the petitioner are that complainant, Ramprasad lodged a written report, at Ex/P/10, at the Anti – Corruption Department, Chittorgarh alleging therein that the accused, Mohanlal demanded a bribe of Rs. 2,500/- from the complainant for the purpose restoring the electricity connection at the complainant’s farm, to which the complainant at first acquiesced and paid Rs. 2,000/- but that the accused allegedly sought an additional Rs. 600/-, upon which the accused lodged the said report. Upon the receipt of such a complaint, the concerned A.C.D. authorities arranged the trap proceedings; subsequent to which an F.I.R. was registered and the accused was taken into custody and a charge sheet was filed against him for the charges as aforementioned. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned Court below has erred in passing the impugned order of conviction against the accused, despite the fact that the offences levelled him have not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. 6. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned Court below has erred in passing the impugned order of conviction against the accused, despite the fact that the offences levelled him have not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the entire story of the prosecution is concocted, and that the reason the accused sought the money is because 4 workers were engaged, at the cost of RS. 150/- per day, to cut the branches of the tree which was interfering in the electricity connection line of the complainant, and that when the accused was recovering the amount for the same; it was incorrectly held to be as if he were receiving a bribe. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the testimony of P.W. 5, the complainant, Ramprasad, is doubtful and was falsely relied upon by the learned Court below, to convict the accused vide the impugned order. 8. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor opposed the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner and submitted that the impugned order of conviction passed by the learned Court below was well reasoned, and passed after taking into due consideration the evidences placed on the record and looking into the overall facts and circumstances of the case. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case. 10. At the outset, this Court thinks it necessary and fit to keep into consideration, the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, with regard to the gravity and seriousness of offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the catastrophic effect that such offences, if left unchecked, have on a democratic society, in State of M.P. & Ors. Vs. Ram Singh (2000) 5 SCC 88 . Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced as under:- “Corruption in a civilised society is a disease like cancer, which if not detected in time is sure to malignancies the polity of country leading to disastrous consequences. It is termed as plague which is not only contagious but if not controlled spreads like a fire in a jungle. Its virus is compared with HIV leading to AIDS, being incurable. It has also been termed as Royal thievery. The socio-political system exposed to such a dreaded communicable disease is likely to crumble under its own weight. It is termed as plague which is not only contagious but if not controlled spreads like a fire in a jungle. Its virus is compared with HIV leading to AIDS, being incurable. It has also been termed as Royal thievery. The socio-political system exposed to such a dreaded communicable disease is likely to crumble under its own weight. Corruption is opposed to democracy and social order, being not only anti people, but aimed and targeted against them. It affects the economy and destroys the cultural heritage. Unless nipped in the bud at the earliest, it is likely to cause turbulence shaking of the socio-economic political system in an otherwise healthy, wealthy, effective and vibrating society.” 11. This Court observes that, for the offences under Sections 7 and 13 sub-section (1) (d) read with Section 13 sub-section (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to be made out against the accused, it is necessary that; the twin ingredients of a demand of illegal gratification/bribe of remuneration; or any valuable thing, either without consideration or a consideration which is known to be inadequate by the accused; or for a pecuniary advantage, for himself or another, made by the accused or by another on his behalf, coupled with a recovery of the said illegal gratification from the accused, or from someone who has accepted the same on his behalf; or if he has dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant, must be proven by the prosecution as per the facts and circumstances of each case. 11.1 It is a settled position of law that any allegation under the aforementioned sections against an accused, if sans a demand for any kind of illegal gratification, (hereinafter referred to as ‘Demand’) or a recovery of the same (hereinafter referred to as ‘Recovery’), as discussed above, would result in a failure of the prosecution to prove its case, beyond all reasonable doubt. 12. 12. However, in case a Demand and a Recovery have been proven before the competent Court by placing the evidence on record, which may include, but not be limited to; audio and/or video recording of trap proceedings, transcript of telephonic conversation between complainant and accused, chemical testing of the currency notes and the clothes/person of the accused, or his conduit, by phenolphthalein powder or anthracene powder, testimonies of complainant and/or investigating officer/shadow witness and/or trap/panch witness and/or other witnesses, and whether any of the witnesses have turned hostile, the accused may rebut the same, to the satisfaction of the competent Court and averting to the facts of the case, by providing a justification/explanation to such demand. 13. This Court further observes, as is clear from the legislative intention crystallised in the provision of law under Section 20 of the Act of 1988, that in case a demand for illegal gratification has been proved, then ‘it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved’ i.e. it is rebuttable at the instance of the accused if he is able to justify/explain the purpose for the said demand so made, and substantiate the same with cogent and clear evidence, to the satisfaction of the concerned Court. 14. The same has been reinforced, time and again, by the Hon’ble Apex Court, as is evident from the judgment rendered in B. Noha Vs. State of Kerala and Ors. (2006) 12 SCC 277 , wherein, while referencing the ratio decidendi laid down in the earlier decision of State of A.P. v. Kommaraju Gopala Krishna Murthy (2000) 9 SCC 752 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed the following:- “…that when amount is found to have been passed to the public servant the burden is on public servant to establish that it was not by way of illegal gratification.” 14.1 Therefore, when it appears that an amount, which may appear to be a Demand made by an accused, has been passed to the accused, then a presumption under Section 20 of the Act of 1988 is made against the accused, and the burden of proof of rebutting the same then lies on the shoulders of the accused. 15. Furthermore, in Guruviah & Ors. Vs. 15. Furthermore, in Guruviah & Ors. Vs. The State (2019) 8 SCC 396 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court referenced the ratio decidendi laid down earlier in T. Shankar Prasad v. State of A.P. (2004) 3 SCC 753 and also took into consideration, that although a justification/explanation was given by the accused, it was not offered immediately after the recovery of money but at a belated stage, which called into question the authenticity of the same. Relevant portion of T. Shankar (supra) is reproduced below:- “The involvement of both of the them a well-planned and cleverly managed device to systematically collect money stood sufficiently established on the evidence let in by the prosecution. Further, A-2 did not offer his explanation immediately after the recovery of money. A similar plea of receiving money as advance tax was rejected and affirmed by this Court in A. Abdul Kaffar v. State of Kerala.” 16. This Court is also conscious of the following judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court:- 16.1 State of Gujarat Vs. Bhalchandra Laxmishankar Dave (2021) 2 SCC 735 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court, while dealing with a case wherein the High Court had set aside the order of conviction passed by the Court below and acquitted the accused therein, made the following observations:- “We have gone through the detailed judgment and order of conviction passed by the Learned Trial Court and also the evidence on record laid down by the prosecution as well as the defence. We have perused the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the High Court to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the principles while exercising in the criminal appeal against the judgment and order of conviction. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner in which High Court ought to have while dealing with the appeal against the order of conviction. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the High Court, we find that, as such, there is no re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record in detail while acquitting the Respondent - Accused. The High Court has only made general observations on the depositions of the witnesses examined. The High Court ought to have appreciated that it was dealing with the first appeal against the order of conviction passed by the Learned trial Court. The High Court has only made general observations on the depositions of the witnesses examined. The High Court ought to have appreciated that it was dealing with the first appeal against the order of conviction passed by the Learned trial Court. Being First Appellate Court, the High Court was required to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record and also the reasoning given by the Learned trial Court while convicting the Accused. Being the First Appellate Court the High Court ought to have re-appreciated the entire evidence on record without any limitation, which might be there while dealing with an appeal against the order of acquittal passed by the Learned Trial Court. Therefore, we are of the firm opinion that the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court acquitting the Respondent - Accused without adverting to the reasons given by the Learned trial Court while convicting the Accused and without re-appreciating the entire evidence on record in detail cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside.” 16.2 State of U.P. Vs. Ram Asrey 1990 Supp (1) SCC 12 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:- “The appellate Court has given the following reasons for allowing the appeal of the respondent, they being: (1) There is no corroboration of the testimony of the complainant, Ambar Prasad regarding the demand of bribe by the respondent on 27.10.79. (2) The evidence adduced by the prosecution that even on 5.11.79, the respondent demanded the bribe from Ambar Prasad in the presence of other persons without taking any precaution is not convincing. (3) There is no acceptable reason as to why Ambar Prasad who had promised to give the bribe money on 8.11.79 came even on 5.11.79 with the vigilance party. (4) Though Ambar Prasad agreed to pay Rs. 15/-, he paid only Rs. 10/-. (5) The application said to have been presented by Ambar Prasad is not found. (6) No evidence whatsoever was produced to show that Ambar Prasad required a backward class certificate for getting the scholarship in the month of November. (4) Though Ambar Prasad agreed to pay Rs. 15/-, he paid only Rs. 10/-. (5) The application said to have been presented by Ambar Prasad is not found. (6) No evidence whatsoever was produced to show that Ambar Prasad required a backward class certificate for getting the scholarship in the month of November. The sum and substance of the above reasonings go to show that there is no acceptable and clinging evidence proving that there was a demand of bribe and that the respondent accepted the amount in question as a motive or reward for doing an official act or showing a favour to Ambar Prasad in expertise of his official function. On going through the impugned judgment of the High Court, we are of the view that the facts and circumstances of this case do not warrant interference. In the result, the appeal is dismissed” 16.3 Ayyasami Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1992) 1 SCC 304 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court made the following observations:- “The High Court found that the witnesses who were associated in the conduct of the raid for recovery of tainted money from the appellant could not be termed as independent who could be associated with such raids. The High Court further expressed doubt about veracity of the witness who claimed that money was actually handed over in his presence. The High Court, however, drew an adverse inference against the appellant from the circumstance that the, bill which was delayed for unreasonable period had suddenly been passed by the appellant On an overall assessment the High Court entertained some suspicion about the credibility of the prosecution witnesses but at the same time did not find the suspicion to be strong enough to raise doubt about the guilt of the appellant. We agree with the learned Counsel for the appellant that in the face of the finding that the witnesses who formed part of the raiding party were not independent and the evidence regarding handing over money to the appellant being unbelievable, the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained. The guilt of the appellant has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and as such the benefit must go to him.” 16.4 Meena Vs. The guilt of the appellant has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and as such the benefit must go to him.” 16.4 Meena Vs. The State of Maharashtra (2000) 5 SCC 21 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court made the following observations:- “Law has always favoured the presence and importance of a shadow witness in the trap party, not only to facilitate such witness to see but also overhear what happens and how it happens also. The other person, who was present at the place of occurrence though cited initially as witness, was not examined by the prosecution but later was got examined as DW-1 and evidence of this person completely belies the prosecution story. The corroboration essential in a case like this for what actually transpired at the time of the alleged occurrence and acceptance of bribe is very much wanting in this case. Even the other panch witness, PW-5, categorically admitted that even as the Inspector of Police, PW-6, arrived, the appellant gave the same version that PW-1 tried to force into her hands the currency note which she turned down by pushing it away, and his evidence also does not lend credibility to the case of the prosecution. It is an obligation of judicial conscience to correct errors, where the same are manifest. The judgments of the courts below suffer from serious infirmities and manifest errors on account of unwarranted inferences liberally drawn by the courts below against the appellant, overlooking the fundamental principle of presumption of innocence of an accused till the charge leveled and his guilt is established beyond all reasonable doubt. The courts below have failed to consider the adverse impact on the prosecution case from the evidence of PW-2 and the withholding of the lady constable and Jagdish Bokade, two material witnesses. The materials on record in this case are not sufficient to bring home the guilt of the appellant. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence of the appellant is set aside and the fine, if any, paid shall be refunded to the appellant.” 16.5 Seema Silk and Sarees and Ors. Vs. Directorate of Enforcement and Ors. (2008) 5 SCC 580 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court, with regard to presumption made against the accused, made the following observations:- “The presumption raised against the trader is a rebuttable one. Vs. Directorate of Enforcement and Ors. (2008) 5 SCC 580 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court, with regard to presumption made against the accused, made the following observations:- “The presumption raised against the trader is a rebuttable one. Reverse burden as also statutory presumptions can be raised in seevral statutes as, for example, the Negotiable Instrumetns Act, Prevention of Corruption Act, TADA, etc. Presumption is raised only when certain foundational facts are established by the prosecution. The accused in such an event would be entitled to show that he has not violated the provisions of the Act.” 17. This Court also takes into consideration the following passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Hon’ble Court in Ulfat Rai Arya Vs. State of Rajasthan 2007 CriLJ 1846 decided by a Coordinate Bench of this Court on 07.12.2006, wherein the following observations were made:- “A plain reading of the above provision makes it clear that when the accused accepted the gratification, the presumption immediately comes into play that he accepted it as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in Section 161, IPC. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of T. Shankar Prasad's case, (2004 Cri LJ 884) (supra) held that it has to be presumed that the accused accepted the gratification as a motive or reward for doing or for bearing to do any official act etc. if the condition envisaged in the former part of the section is satisfied. The only condition for drawing such a legal presumption under Section 4 of the Act is that during trial it should be proved that the accused has accepted or agreed to accept any gratification. In M. Narsinga Rao's case (supra) it was held that where the receipt of gratification was proved, the Court was under a legal obligation to presume that such gratification was accepted as a reward for doing the public duty. In Gulam Mahmood A. Malek's case 1980 CriLJ 1096 (supra) it was held that while appreciating the evidence the background of the case should not be lost sight of it was also laid down that past conduct of the complainant should not be ignored. In Gulam Mahmood A. Malek's case 1980 CriLJ 1096 (supra) it was held that while appreciating the evidence the background of the case should not be lost sight of it was also laid down that past conduct of the complainant should not be ignored. In Suraj Mai's case (supra) it has been observed that in a case of bribery, mere recovery of money divorced from the circumstances under which it is paid is not sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. In Kesaram's case (supra) it has been held that when accused at the earliest disclosed the fact of receiving Rs. 100/- against the money due in the brother of the complainant and the defence version has been supported by the prosecution witnesses, the appellant has succeeded in probising the defence. In Duraisami's case (supra), it was held that when the explanation given by the accused is found to be true and genuine then case set up by the defence has to be accepted.” 18. At the cost of repetition, this Court deems it proper to summarise the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned precedent laws in the following manner:- 18.1 For offences under the Sections 7 and 13 (1) (d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Act of 1988, it is fundamental that a Demand and Recovery of the same is proven against the accused. 18.2 The presumption under Section 20 of the Act of 1988, operates against the accused, and places the burden of proof upon the accused, unless he rebuts the same to the satisfaction of the competent Court, and whether the rebuttal was made at the appropriate stage. 18.3 Owing to the fact that in old cases, wherein the technology of audio/voice recording, transcripts of conversations etc. proving the existence of Demand rests solely in the realm of witness testimony and other material evidences placed on record before the concerned Court. 18.3 Owing to the fact that in old cases, wherein the technology of audio/voice recording, transcripts of conversations etc. proving the existence of Demand rests solely in the realm of witness testimony and other material evidences placed on record before the concerned Court. 18.4 And that, an appellate Court may interfere with an order of conviction, under the Act of 1988, only after a re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record and thereafter, if the appellate Court finds the reasons as laid out by the Court below, in convicting the accused, under the Act of 1988, to be bad or unsustainable in the eye of law, then it may interfere and accordingly, reverse the conviction into an acquittal. 19. Now adverting to the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court makes the following observations :- 19.1 The written report lodged by the complainant at the concerned police stations, at Ex. P/10, will reveal that their electricity connection was not operational, owing to non payment of outstanding dues, and that even though the payment was made, the connection was not restored. And that, the accused sought a bribe from the complainant for the same, of Rs. 2,500/- of which Rs. 2,000/- was paid by him but when the accused sought the remainder of the sum from him, he lodged a complaint with the concerned A.C.D. authorities. 19.2 When the accused was apprehended, Rs. 500/- of the total Rs. 600/- of the tainted currency as used in the trap proceedings was recovered from him. The currency notes were found to be the same notes which were smeared with phenolphthalein powder, and upon testing the hands of the accused were also found to have tested positive. The recovery from the accused is not challenged, however, it was the contention of the petitioner that the money was not towards a bribe/illegal gratification but towards payment of dues towards labourers engaged to remove broken trees interefering with the electricity connection in question. 19.3 The A.C.D. authorities initiated the trap proceedings on the basis of the transcript of a tape recorder which was used to verify that a demand of illegal gratification was made by the accused from the complainant, which is placed on the record, and duly dealt with by the learned Court below. 19.3 The A.C.D. authorities initiated the trap proceedings on the basis of the transcript of a tape recorder which was used to verify that a demand of illegal gratification was made by the accused from the complainant, which is placed on the record, and duly dealt with by the learned Court below. 19.4 Furthermore, the accused when apprehended by the concerned A.C.D. authorities was asked whether he received the bribe amount from the complainant, to which he refused but the same was recovered from his shirt pocket. 19.5 Prosecution sanction against the accused, who was a government servant, was also duly sought. 19.6 The testimony of the complainant, and the shadow witness, being Constable Shravan Kumar, also corroborate the story of the prosecution. 19.7 Moreover, the testimony of P.W. 8 Nisar Hussain Masuri reveals that that the accused did not have the authority, owing to his post of helper who duty was merely to cut and reconnect the electricity line, to issue receipts of any kind, and therefore could not in any official capacity receive fees or payment as he claimed. 19.8 The demand and recovery of the sum of money is not disputed. The purpose of the same was disputed, and it was contended that the same was towards a lawful purpose, as discussed above, however, the same fails owing to the above made observations. To that extent, the defence of the petitioner fails. 19.9 With regard to the demand, the same, in addition to the above, is fortified from the transcript placed on the record, on the basis of which the trap was conducted. 20. This Court, therefore, finds that the learned Court below has categorically dealt with the evidences placed on record, and after a thorough scrutiny and appreciation of the same, rightly found the accused guilty for the offences under the Sections Section 7, 13 (1) (d) and 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 21. This Court, therefore, finds that the impugned judgment of conviction dated 28.11.2015, passed by the learned Court below, does not suffer from any legal infirmity, and therefore, the same is upheld and affirmed. 23. Resultantly, the appeal is dismissed. Since the accused herein (represented in this case by his LRs) has passed away, there is no need to make any observations regarding his sentence. Accordingly, all pending applications, if any, are disposed of.