JUDGMENT : 1. Both first appeals have arisen out of two separate civil suits for pre-emption, wherein parties are common and some of issues related to law of pre-emption are also common, although facts and properties are slightly different but both appeals are tagged and with consent of learned counsel for both parties, have been heard together and, would stand decide by this common judgment. 2. Relevant facts, in nutshell to give rise both appeals are as under:- 2.1 One Damodar Lal (original plaintiff) claimed a right of preemption in properties sold by Chhoti Devi and Nirmala Devi (defendants No.2 and 3) situated in haveli three storied bearing Municipal No.1236, Khejron Ka Rasta, Chowkri Topkhana Desh, Jaipur on the ground of having common chowk, pole, nall, ravish etc. plaintiff claimed that he is a co-sharer in the haveli and has a right of pre-emption to purchase the another portion of haveli, sold by defendants NO.2 and 3 (who are also another co-sharers in the haveli) to vendees other persons namely, Kewal Chand and one Smt. Patasi Devi through different registered sale deeds. Hence, the plaintiff filed two separate civil suit for pre-emption & for possession. 2.2 Initially Damodar Lal instituted civil suit No.19/1976 (14/1980) on 22.01.1976 against Kewal Chand purchaser and Chhoti Devi and Nirmala Devi, vendors impleading them as party defendants No.1, 2 and 3. It was stated that the portion of haveli detailed in para No.3 of the plaint has been sold by defendants No.2 and 3 through registered sale deed dated 07.01.1975 to defendant No.1-Kewal Chand but sale deed was endorsed in books of Sub-registrar on 25.01.1975. It was stated that since plaintiff has a right of pre-emption and was/is agreed to purchase the sold out portion of haveli, but the sale deed was executed without his knowledge and without giving any prior notice of sale to him. Further it is stated that in the sale deed valuation has been shown as Rs.24,999/-, which is mentioned incorrectly and ostentatiously just to divest the right of pre-emption of the plaintiff whereas the actual sale consideration of Rs.12,999/- was paid by the purchaser defendant No.1- Kewal Chand, which is the actual value of the suit property. Further it is stated that in the sale deed valuation has been shown as Rs.24,999/-, which is mentioned incorrectly and ostentatiously just to divest the right of pre-emption of the plaintiff whereas the actual sale consideration of Rs.12,999/- was paid by the purchaser defendant No.1- Kewal Chand, which is the actual value of the suit property. The plaintiff-Damodar Lal claimed that he is ready to pay the actual sale consideration of Rs.12,999/- or whatever the amount, directed by the court and his suit for pre-emption be decreed in his favour and possession of suit property be directed to delivered to the plaintiff. 2.2.1 Kewal Chand, the purchaser, defendant No.1 submitted his separate written statement and denied the right of pre- emption of plaintiff and also contended that the suit has been wrongly valued as Rs.12,999/- whereas the actual sale consideration is Rs.24,999/- which is rightly mentioned in the sale deed. The defendant No.1 contended that after purchasing the suit property through sale deed dated 07.01.1975, he has incurred huge amount in carrying out addition/alteration and repairing/maintenance work in the suit property, which is well within knowledge of the plaintiff. The plaintiff never asserted his right of pre-emption, as such plaintiff has waived his right of preemption and further suit is also barred by law of limitation. The defendant No.1 also raised a defence that the suit for pre-emption has been instituted for partial property and not for the entire sold out property, therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed with cost. 2.2.2 Smt. Chhoti Devi and Smt. Nirmala Devi, the vendors and defendants No.2 and 3 submitted joint written statement and contested the suit stating inter alia that before selling out the suit property to defendant No.1, an oral offer was given to the plaintiff to purchase the suit property but he expressed his unability to purchase the suit property against sale consideration, as agreed to pay by defendants No.1 and thereafter only the suit property has been sold to defendants No.1, against consideration of Rs.24,999/- by executing a sale deed dated 07.01.1975 and possession has already been delivered, therefore, the present suit for pre-emption filed by the plaintiff is barred by the principle of estoppel and acquiescence. It was also contended that the suit is undervalued and barred by limitation. 2.2.3 Trial court framed issues. It was also contended that the suit is undervalued and barred by limitation. 2.2.3 Trial court framed issues. Both parties adduced their evidence and after full dressed trial of this suit, trial court has held that the plaintiff has a right of pre-emption but his suit is barred by limitation and therefore, the suit has been dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 23.03.1990, where-against the first appeal No.104/1990 has been preferred by legal representatives of the original plaintiff. 2.3 The original plaintiff-Damodar Lal instituted one another civil suit for pre-emption on 02.02.1978 (bearing suit No.15/1980) against defendant No.1-Kewal Chand, defendants No.2 and 3 Chhoti Devi & Nirmala Devi (vendors) and defendant No.4 Patasi Devi (purchaser) impleading them as defendants No.1 to 4. In his subsequent suit, the plaintiff has claimed his right of pre-emption in relation to the portion of haveli sold out by defendants No.2 and 3 to Patasi Devi defendant No.4 through registered sale deed dated 09.09.1975, registered on 10.09.1975. 2.3.1 It has been stated inter alia that the plaintiff came to know about this sale deed dated 09.09.1975 of Patasi Devi, when the defendant No.1-Kewal Chand moved one application dated 04.04.1977 under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC for seeking amendment in his written statement, in his previously instituted suit No.19/1976. Through this application for amendment, defendant No.1 disclosed that the defendants No. 2 and 3 sold another portion of haveli to one Smt. Patasi Devi and thereafter, the defendant No.1 instituted a civil suit for pre-emption against Patasi Devi (purchaser) on the ground that since the defendant No.1 had already purchased the another portion of haveli vide sale deed on 07.01.1975, the sell of other portion of haveli to Patasi Devi vide sale deed dated 09.09.1975, therefore, defendant No.1 has acquired a right of preemption over the portion of Patasi Devi. The suit for pre-emption was decreed vide judgment dated 22.01.1977 in favour of defendant No.1 and in compliance thereof, the defendant No.1 has paid Rs.34,999/- to Smt. Patasi Devi and has acquired ownership and possession of the portion of Patasi Devi on 09.03.1977. The suit for pre-emption was decreed vide judgment dated 22.01.1977 in favour of defendant No.1 and in compliance thereof, the defendant No.1 has paid Rs.34,999/- to Smt. Patasi Devi and has acquired ownership and possession of the portion of Patasi Devi on 09.03.1977. 2.3.2 The plaintiff stated that after filing of the application for amendment dated 04.04.1977 by defendant No.1 in the first suit No.19/1976, he inquired about the entire fact and then came to know that the defendants No.2 and 3 sold another portion of haveli by executing a sale deed dated 09.09.1975 (registered on 10.09.1975) against sale consideration of Rs.25,000/- in the name of Patasi Devi and thereafter the defendant No.1 instituted a collusive suit for pre-emption and obtained a decree dated 22.01.1977 in his favour in relation to the portion sold to Patasi Devi. The plaintiff stated that in fact Patasi Devi happens to be the Bhabhi of defendant No.1 and the sale deed dated 09.09.1975 in the name of Patasi Devi is fictitious and indeed the another portion was also purchased by defendant No.1 in the name of his Bhabhi Patasi Devi and thereafter by playing a fraud and misrepresentation, the defendant No.1 has procured a decree of pre-emption dated 22.01.1975 in his favour by way of compromise, which is null and void qua the plaintiff. 2.3.3 The plaintiff also submitted that in fact the actual value of the portion of haveli sold to Patasi Devi through registered sale deed dated 09.09.1975 is 11,000/- but in the sale deed the sale amount has been shown as Rs.24,999/-, which is incorrect and ostentatious. The plaintiff stated that he has primary and preferential right of pre-emption to purchase the portion of haveli for which the sale deed dated 09.09.1975 has been executed by the defendants No.2 and 3 in favour of defendant No.4-Patasi Devi and therefore, stating all such averments he prayed that his civil suit for pre-emption and the possession, in relation to the property sold out to Smt. Patasi Devi be decreed in his favour. 2.3.4 In the subsequent suit for pre-emption, defendant No.1 has submitted his written statement and contended that the defendant No.1 has an equivalent right of pre-emption vis-a-vis to the plaintiff in relation to the portion of haveli sold out to Patasi Devi, since prior to that he had purchased the portion of haveli through sale deed dated 07.01.1975 and his suit for pre-emption has been decreed in his favour. Therefore, plaintiff can’t claim right of pre-emption against defendant No.1 and his suit is not maintainable. Other objections were also raised including limitation and it was contended that the plaintiff’s suit for preemption is liable to be dimissed. 2.3.5 Defendants No.2 and 3 set ex parte in this suit. 2.3.6 Defendant No.4 Smt. Patasi Devi the purchaser submitted her separate written statement and denied the plaintiff’s claim of pre-emption. She submitted that the suit property was purchased by her through registered sale deed dated 09.09.1975 against sale consideration of Rs.25,000/- and obtained possession but thereafter the defendant No.1, filed civil suit for pre-emption, which was decreed in his favour and therefore, ownership has transferred to defendant No.1 and the possession has been delivered to defendant No.1, after receiving an amount of Rs.34,999/-, finally it was prayed that the suit deserves to be dismissed. 2.3.7 In this subsequent civil suit No.15/1980 instituted by plaintiff Damodar Lal, issues were framed and evidence was recorded separately. Therefore, this suit for pre-emption has also been dismissed on merits vide judgment and decree dated 14.09.1992 and thereagainst, the civil first appeal No.02/1993 has been filed by legal representatives of original plaintiff-Damodar Lal. 3. During pendency of both civil suits, the original plaintiff Damodar Lal passed away and in his place his son Kunj Bihari Lal was substituted. Kunj Bihari Lal filed both first appeals and during first appeals, he has also passed away, therefore, his legal representatives have been substituted, who are the present appellants in both appeals would be referred to as “plaintiff”. In first appeal No.104/1990, respondents No.4 to 9 and in first appeal No. 2/1993 respondents No.5 to 10 are other natural heirs of deceased Damodar Lal (original plaintiff) and they are proforma respondents. Respondent-defendant No.1 is alive and respondents No.2, 3, vendor and Patasi Devi has also passed away. Other respondents were contesting defendants before the trial court are hereinafter referred to as ‘defendants’. 4. Respondent-defendant No.1 is alive and respondents No.2, 3, vendor and Patasi Devi has also passed away. Other respondents were contesting defendants before the trial court are hereinafter referred to as ‘defendants’. 4. In both civil suits, the trial court has acknowledged the right of pre-emption of the plaintiff, being co-sharer in the haveli and having common chowk, pole, nall, ravish etc. but has dismissed the suits on the ground of limitation as well as on the basis of other grounds. 5. The Rajasthan Pre-emption Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act, 1966) is a special law which deals with the special branch of civil law relating to pre-emtpion and if the source of origin of present special law is examined then, it transpires that the same has originated out of customary law as recognized under the personal law of Muslim. This is a special law and its provisions includes substantial as well as procedural law and this law is local law and technical too. It’s main object is to prevent apprehended inconvenience to the person claiming right of pre-emption. Apart from the provisions enumerated under the Act of 1966, the law of pre-emption has also been developed by judicial precedents. According to the principle of judicial precedents, the right of preemption emerges under the Act of 1966 is of course a legal and statutory right but this has been considered as a weak right as firstly, this is not indefeasible right and secondly, this right can be defeated by all legitimate methods as permissible in law. 6. This court is exercising its jurisdiction in there appeals under Section 96 of Civil Procedure Code and would abide by the provisions of Order 41 CPC, meant to deal with appeals from the original decree. It is no more res integra that the first appeal is a valuable right of parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is open for re-hearing, both on questions of fact and law. S .B. Civil First Appeal No. 104/1990:- 7. Learned counsel for plaintiff argued that the trial court has rightly held while deciding the issue no.1 that the plaintiff has a right of pre-emption to purchase the suit property, however, committed an error of fact and law while deciding the issue No.4 related to limitation and has erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation. Learned counsel for plaintiff argued that the trial court has rightly held while deciding the issue no.1 that the plaintiff has a right of pre-emption to purchase the suit property, however, committed an error of fact and law while deciding the issue No.4 related to limitation and has erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation. He argued that although sale deed was executed on 07.01.1975 but it came to be registered in books of Sub-registrar on 25.01.1975, therefore, the civil suit for preemption filed on 22.01.1976 is well within limitation of one year, from the date of registration of sale deed. He submitted that the limitation should be counted from the date of registration of the sale deed i.e. 25.01.1975 and by applying second part of Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the plaintiff’s suit be treated within limitation as such the impugned judgment is liable to be quashed and the plaintiff’s suit for pre-emption deserves to be decreed. 8. Learned Senior Counsel for defendants would submit that a right of pre-emption is though a legal statutory right but it is a very weak right in sense that the same can be defeated by all legal means available to the vendee. He has urged following arguments from the record and with the aid of statutory provisions; to contend that suit is liable to be dismissed and has rightly been dismissed. (a) Suit is clearly barred by limitation, as first part of Article 97 applies and limitation starts from 07.01.1975, suit was filed after expiry of statutory limitation of one year from that date. (b) Suit for pre-emption was filed for partial property which is not maintainable by virtue of proviso to Section 11 (1) of the Act of 1966 and the trial court has committed error of law in allowing the application for amendment filed by the plaintiff to add one room and ravish in the suit property while passing the impugned judgment and decree dated 23.03.1990. He has urged that respondents have filed cross-objection, challenging the impugned judgment to the extent of allowing application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and deciding issue No.3 in favour of plaintiff and against defendants. He has urged that respondents have filed cross-objection, challenging the impugned judgment to the extent of allowing application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and deciding issue No.3 in favour of plaintiff and against defendants. (c) Plaintiff has instituted the present suit for preemption, including three shops in the suit property purchased by defendant No.1 under the sale deed dated 07.01.1975 and by virtue of Section 5 (1) (a) of the Act of 1966, right of pre-emption does not accrue against the shops. If the shops are excluded, the defendant No.1 becomes a co-sharer in the haveli and gets an equal status vis-a-vis to the plaintiff and therefore, right of pre-emption calimed by plaintiff is not enforceable against the defendant No.1 having acquired a similar status of co-sharer. (d) As per Section 15 of Act, 1966, the right of preemption claimed by the plaintiff must be subsisting at the time of passing the decree for pre-emption. The defendant No.1 had acquired status of co-owner in the haveli by obtaining ownership and possession of another portion of haveli from another vendee Patasi Devi, by virtue of a decree for pre-emption dated 22.01.1977 which has been executed on 09.03.1977 and the subsequent suit for pre-emption No.15/1980 instituted by plaintiff on 02.02.1978 has been dismissed on merits vide judgment dated 14.09.1992. The certified copy of judgment and decree dated 14.09.1992 has been produced on record alongwith the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. His application deserves to be allowed and now when the suit for pre-emption has been dismissed by the trial court, at the time of deciding the first appeal, the right of pre-emption claimed by the plaintiff does not subsist, therefore, suit for pre-emption cannot be decreed at this stage by virtue of Section 15 of the Act, 1966. (e) Right of pre-emption claimed by the plaintiff stands waived by the conduct of plaintiff, as such plaintiff has either lost his right of pre-emption or is estopped to enforce the same and therefore, his suit is not liable to be decreed on this count also. 9. Heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the material available on record as also go through the relevant statutory provisions of law and judgments cited by both the counsel. 10. 9. Heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the material available on record as also go through the relevant statutory provisions of law and judgments cited by both the counsel. 10. At the outset, it may be noticed that the learned trial court while deciding the issue No.1 has observed that the plaintiff has common chowk, pole, nall, ravish etc. in the haveli and this fact has also been admitted by the defendant No.1 in his cross-examination as also mentioned in the sale deed dated 07.01.1975 and therefore, plaintiff has right of pre-emption on this basis, issue No.1 has been decided in favour of plaintiff. Defendants have not challenged findings of issue No.1 to this extent but have contested that the plaintiff’s right for pre-emption is not liable to be succeed qua the defendant No.1 on account of various other legitimate grounds. The grounds raised by the defendant No.1 to decline the decree of pre-emption in favour of plaintiff would be discussed in later part of judgment. 11. It may also be noticed that initially in the plaint, the plaintiff disputed the valuation of suit property as narrated in the sale deed and therefore, issue No.2-a and 2-b were framed. The trial court has decided issue No.2-a and 2-b against the plaintiff observing that the plaintiff has miserably failed to prove that the actual market value of the suit property was 12,999/- and not Rs.24,999/- which is mentioned in the sale deed. The plaintiff, in this first appeal, has not assailed the findings of issue No.2-a and 2-b passed against him, therefore, the same do not fall for consideration by this Court. Issue No.5, pertains to improper valuation of suit and payment of less court fee and as per the findings of issue No.2-a and 2-b, issue No.5 also goes against the plaintiff but the same is not under challenged in the first appeal, hence, the findings of issue No.5 are not required to be interfered with. 12. As far as other issues, issue No.3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 including the issue of relief are concerned, the same would be answered while determining the points for determination, which arise for consideration by this Court in the present first appeal. 13. 12. As far as other issues, issue No.3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 including the issue of relief are concerned, the same would be answered while determining the points for determination, which arise for consideration by this Court in the present first appeal. 13. According to rival contentions of both parties and as per pleadings, evidence and other material on record, the following points for determination have emerged in the present first appeal for consideration by this Court:- “I) Whether plaintiff’s suit for pre-emption is within limitation? (II) Whether plaintiff’s suit for pre-emption remains for partial properties and cannot succeed? (a) Whether the trial court committed error of law in allowing the application for amendment in plaint and what is the effect of allowing or disallowing the application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC filed by the plaintiff? (b) What is the effect of inclusion of three shops in the present suit for pre-emption? (c) What is the effect of dismissal of another suit for pre-emption filed by the plaintiff in relation the properties purchased by Smt. Patasi Devi vide judgment and decree dated 14.09.1992, certified copy is produced alongwith application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC? (III) Whether plaintiff’s right of pre-emption is hit by the principles of acquiescence and waiver and plaintiff has lost his right or estopped from enforcing the same in law? POINT WISE DISCUSSION:- (I) LIMITATION 14. Plaintiff has instituted the present civil suit on 22.01.1976. The sale deed in question was executed and presented for registration on 07.01.1975 and was endorsed in the books of Subregistrar on 25.01.1975. According to the plaintiff, the limitation should be counted from 25.01.1975 when the sale was completed and sale deed was registered in the books of Sub-registrar and therefore, his suit filed on 22.01.1976 is well within period of limitation of one year. According to the plaintiff, the limitation should be counted from 25.01.1975 when the sale was completed and sale deed was registered in the books of Sub-registrar and therefore, his suit filed on 22.01.1976 is well within period of limitation of one year. Whereas according to defendants, the limitation should be started when the purchaser obtained the physical possession of the subject property under the sale and since the possession of suit property was obtained on 29.09.1974, 28.10.1974, 25.12.1974 and 07.01.1975, therefore at the most, the limitation starts w.e.f 07.01.1975 when the whole possession of suit property had been taken and sale deed was executed and presented for registration and by virtue of Section 21 of the Act of 1996 and as per the first part of article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the present civil suit stands barred by limitation. 15. Period of limitation and when limitation starts, to exercise the right of pre-emption is provided under section 21 of the Act of 1966 which, in turn refers to article 97 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963. For ready reference Section 21 reads as under:- "21. Special provision for limitation.- (1) Subject to the provisions contained in the proviso to sub-section (I) of section 5, the period of limitation, in any case not provided for by article 97 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 (Central Act 36 of 1963) for a suit to enforce the right of pre-emption under this Act shall, notwithstanding anything contained in article 113 of the said schedule of the said Act, be one year from the date on which,- (a) in the case of sale made without a registered sale deed. The purchaser takes under the sale physical possession of any part of the property sold, and (b) in the case of a foreclosure, the final decree for foreclosure is passed. (2) The period of limitation for a suit to enforce the right of pre-emption which has accrued before the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the said Limitation Act, in no case exceed one year from the commencement of this Act.” 16. (2) The period of limitation for a suit to enforce the right of pre-emption which has accrued before the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the said Limitation Act, in no case exceed one year from the commencement of this Act.” 16. Bare reading of the statutory provisions of Section 21 reveals that it is confined to following two sets of cases; (i) the disputed property is capable of delivery of physical possession; and (ii) where the property is one covered by a decree for foreclosure legally passed by a competent court of civil jurisdiction. This Section is silent as to a property which is not capable of delivery of physical possession but pertaining which a transfer deed is only executed and registered. To such cases, article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply. If a combined application of Section 21 of Act, 1966 and article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is considered, then the period of limitation would be computable according to the following table:- Nature of Transfer 1 Period of Limitation 2 Time from which period begins to run 3 1. In case of sale made without a registered sale deed One Year From the date of purchaser takes under the sale physical possession of whole or any part of the property sold. 2. In case of final decree foreclosure, one year From the date on which the final decree for foreclosure is passed 3.Where instrument of sale is registered One Year (I) When the purchaser takes under the sale sought to be impeached, physical possession of the whole or part of the property sold, or (ii) Where the subject mater of the sale does not admit of physical possession of whole or part of the property, when the instrument of sale is registered. Item (1 and 2) originated from Section 21 and item (3) comes out from article 97 of the Limitation Act. 17. In the case at hand, the sale deed dated 07.01.1975 is registered instrument and suit property is an immovable property and therefore, in the present case, Article 97 of Limitation Act comes in play. Item (1 and 2) originated from Section 21 and item (3) comes out from article 97 of the Limitation Act. 17. In the case at hand, the sale deed dated 07.01.1975 is registered instrument and suit property is an immovable property and therefore, in the present case, Article 97 of Limitation Act comes in play. As per item (3) of table where the instrument of sale is registered, limitation should be counted from the date when purchaser takes physical possession of the whole or part of the property under sale and in such cases first part of article 97 would apply. The second part of article 97 would apply where the subject matter of sale does not admit of physical possession of the subject property then, limitation would be counted from the date when the instrument of sale is registered. 18. In the present case, the sale deed dated 07.01.1975 (Exhibit-A/1) contains a recital that the vendor has handed over the actual and physical possession of the property to the purchaser. The sale deed is an admitted document between the parties. The original plaintiff-Damodar Lal(PW/1), in his evidence in chief nowhere disputed the transfer of physical possession of the property to the purchaser i.e. defendant No.1, by the time of execution of the sale deed dated 07.01.1975 rather admits in his cross-examination that he came to know about the sale of subject property, a week before the ‘Makar Sankranti’ prior to four years. His statement was recorded on 22.05.1979. By counting the period of four years and a week before the ‘Makar Sankranti’ festival from the date of recording his evidence, the date comes to 07.01.1975. ‘Makar Sankranti’ in Jaipur is celebrated on the fixed date of 14th January of each year. PW/1 also admits that the defendant No.1 started addition/alternation and repairing work in the suit property after purchasing the same. PW/2 to PW/6 are witnesses who deposed their evidence related to the valuation of the suit property and do not depose a single statement about the transfer of physical possession of suit property. 19. The defendant No.1, who is purchaser, deposed his statements as DW/4 has clearly stated that before the execution of sale deed dated 07.01.1975 (Exhibit-A/1), an agreement to sale was written on 29.09.1974 (Exhibit-A/3) and at that time, Rs.4,000/- was paid to vendors through receipt (Exhibit-A/4) and possession of one shop was delivered to him. 19. The defendant No.1, who is purchaser, deposed his statements as DW/4 has clearly stated that before the execution of sale deed dated 07.01.1975 (Exhibit-A/1), an agreement to sale was written on 29.09.1974 (Exhibit-A/3) and at that time, Rs.4,000/- was paid to vendors through receipt (Exhibit-A/4) and possession of one shop was delivered to him. DW/4 further states that Rs.16,000/- was paid to vendors through demand draft on 28.10.1974 (Exhibit-A/5) and possession of two rooms at ground floor and two room at first floor were taken and thereafter possession of one room was taken on 25.12.1974 when Rs.3,000/- was paid through receipt (Exhibit-A/6), lastly, full and final physical possession of remaining portion of property under sale was taken on 07.01.1975 i.e. on the date of execution of the sale deed. 20. Therefore, as per the evidence of both parties and according to material on record, it appears that the defendant No.1 (purchaser) has taken the physical possession of the suit property by 07.01.1975, under the sale deed dated 07.01.1975, which is sought to be impeached herein and plaintiff has nowhere disputed this factum of delivery of possession. 21. Learned counsel for both parties have relied upon a recent judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered in case of Raghunath (D) through LRs. Vs. Radha Mohan (D) through LRs. [(2020) SCC Online SC 828] wherein the provisions of Section 21 of the Act of 1963 and Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963 were discussed. In that case the issue of limitation for suit of pre-emption arose in context to execution of more than one sale deeds and issue for consideration was as to from which one of the date of sale deed, the limitation would start. Therefore, the ratio decidendi expounded in that judgment is not of immense help to either of the parties in the facts of present case. 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case of Goja Bai Vs. Ganga Bai Ramchandra Pawar and Ors reported in [ (1980)2 SCC 329 ] considered the issue of limitation for enforcement of the right of pre-emption, which in that case was conferred between the parties by way of a compromise decree in a partition suit. In that case, the suit for pre-emption was decreed by the trial court, however in appeal, the High Court dismissed the suit for preemption on the ground of limitation. In that case, the suit for pre-emption was decreed by the trial court, however in appeal, the High Court dismissed the suit for preemption on the ground of limitation. The High Court held that the suit for pre-emption was filed after the expiry of one year from the date of delivery of possession of the land by respondent No.1 to the respondent No.2 pursuant to the impugned sale. Such findings of the High Court were affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Thus, the period of limitation, for the purpose of enforcement of the right of pre-emption in case of immovable property was allowed to be counted from the date of delivery of possession of the property under sale sought to be impeached. 23. In case of Sardar Singh Vs. Daleep Kaur and Ors reported in [AIR(1981) Punjab and Haryana, 340], the Division Bench considered the issue of limitation under Article 97 of the Limitation Act for the suit for pre-emption. The point for consideration was whether for purpose of first part of Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963, physical possession of the property sold would be deemed to have passed on the date of execution of the sale deed even if delivered earlier under the intended sale. The court opined that the property under the sale was in possession of vendor, moment somebody else comes in possession of that property, wholly or in part, there is immediate notice of change of possession from the owner to a third person, giving notice to the pre-emptor to find out as to in what capacity the third person has come in possession of the property. If it is under a sale then the limitation for pre-emption would start from the date of taking of possession. The relevant paragraph No.8 of that judgment is being quote hereunder:- “8. On the interpretation made by us above, it has to be seen on the facts of the present case whether the first part, would apply or the second part. We are of the firm view that the first part wold apply and not the second part. In the present case, the sale deed was executed on 1st December, 1975, and the possession was also delivered on that day although before the execution of the sale deed. We are of the firm view that the first part wold apply and not the second part. In the present case, the sale deed was executed on 1st December, 1975, and the possession was also delivered on that day although before the execution of the sale deed. The moment the pre-emptor would come to know that the vendees have come in possession of the property, he will have to find out as to when did the occupiers purchased the property. The moment this equity is made, it would transpire that the sale deed was executed on 1st December, 1975, which there is a clear recital that physical possession of the property has been delivered to the vendees, which possession would be under the sale which is sought to be impeached. Therefore, the limitation would start from 1st December, 1975, and it would be wholly immaterial whether possession is taken before the sale deed was written or while it was being written by the petition writer or after it was completed and signed by the parties. In all the three eventualities the possession is being delivered under the sale which is sought to be pre-empted by the pre-emptor, On these facts, the second part of the Article cannot apply as on 1st December, 1975, the subject -matter of sale admitted of delivery of physical possession. As already pointed out, the second part applies only where the vendor is out of deliver physical possession of whole or part of it, it is impossible for him because somebody else is already in possession of the property under some colour of the either a tenant or mortgage etc. Once the second part would not apply and first applies, there can be no other interpretation of the first part than the one taken by us. Under the first part, the only other possibility is where the pre-emptor is able to show that possession was not delivered by the vendor to the vendee on the date of execution of the sale deed but was delivered some time thereafter. In that eventuality, the limitation would start neither from the date of execution of the sale deed nor from the date of registration thereof but from the date when physical possession of the sold land is proved on the record to have been delivered. In that eventuality, the limitation would start neither from the date of execution of the sale deed nor from the date of registration thereof but from the date when physical possession of the sold land is proved on the record to have been delivered. Therefore, if no such date is proved by the pre-emptor, it would always be the date of execution of the sale deed. Therefore, we have no doubt that in all cases where possession is delivered on the date of execution of the sale deed, whether before or during the execution thereof or soon thereafter on that day, it would be considered in law to be under the sale and the limitation would start from the execution of the sale deed.“ (emphasis supplied) 24. The Hon’ble Division Bench of High Court of Punjab and Haryana in case of Sardar Singh (Supra) considered the case of Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered in case of Ram Saran Lall and Ors. Vs. Domini Kuer and Ors [AIR(1961) SC 1747] which has been referred herein by learned counsel for appellants. It was observed that in that case which arose under the Mohammedan law, the provisions of Article 97 of the Act did not fall for consideration in that case. It was further observed that Article 97 provides for two starting points of limitation, first one being from the date of taking of possession and other being from the date of registration. This court has its concurrence with the view taken by the Division Bench and finds that the present case, where the physical possession of the suit property has been delivered by or before the execution of the sale deed dated 07.01.1975, the limitation would start from that date and not from the date, when the sale deed was registered in the books of Sub-Registrar. 25. Thus, the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Ramsaran Lal (supra) does not render any help the appellants in the present case. 26. In another case of Chhaju and Ors. Vs. Mst. 25. Thus, the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Ramsaran Lal (supra) does not render any help the appellants in the present case. 26. In another case of Chhaju and Ors. Vs. Mst. Bharpai reported in [AIR (1983) Punjab and Haryana 203], the Single Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court observed that limitation for the suit of pre-emption would start from the date of execution of sale deed, in those cases wherein the possession is delivered either before or during the execution or soon thereafter the execution of the sale deed on the same date and not from the date when the sale deed was endorsed in the books of registering authority. 27. Learned counsel for appellants has placed reliance on the judgment of Pepsu High Court, AIR (1956) Pepsu 17 in case of Mst. Phula Wanti & ors. Vs. Kashmiri La, wherein Article 10 of the old Limitation Act, 1908 was discussed. It was held in this judgment that the first thing to be considered in applying Article 10 is to see whether the subject of sale admits of physical possession, on the date of sale. If it does, limitation of one year starts from the time when the purchaser takes physical possession of the whole of the property sold. If, it does not then the second part of third column of Article will apply, in cases where there is a registered instrument of sale and the time will commence from the date of registration. Article 10 of the Old Limitation Act, 1908 is paramateria to Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963 except the changes that in present Article 97, additioning words “the whole or part of the property sold” are added, whereas under the old Article “only the whole property sold” was there. 28. Learned counsel for plaintiff has placed reliance upon a judgment of Division Bench dated 23.01.1993 passed in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No.3/1991 titled as Ishwar Kaur Vs. Majore Rajindra Kumar Kala and Anr. In that case the possession was delivered against an agreement to sale and therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the limitation for the pre-emption suit would start from the date when the sale was completed and when the sale deed was registered. Majore Rajindra Kumar Kala and Anr. In that case the possession was delivered against an agreement to sale and therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the limitation for the pre-emption suit would start from the date when the sale was completed and when the sale deed was registered. This court after going through the entire judgment has observed that in that case, there was no difference on the date of execution of sale deed and the date of registration of sale deed in the books of the Sub-registrar. Whereas in the present case at hand, the sale stands complete on the date of execution of the sale deed dated 07.01.1975 itself, when sale deed was presented for registration. Since entire sale consideration has been paid and the possession of suit property has also been delivered prior to and at least by the time of execution of the sale deed on 07.01.1975, therefore, sale stands completed on that day itself. The subsequent date i.e. 25.01.1975 when the sale deed was endorsed in the books of Sub-registrar, may not be taken for starting point of limitation because the terminus a quo for limitation is that factum of transfer of physical possession of property under the sale. In the facts of present case, the limitation starts under the first part of Article 97 when possession was taken by purchaser and therefore, this Judgment does not render support to appellants being on different facts. 29. Learned counsel for plaintiff has placed reliance upon the judgment of Radhakishan Laxminarayan Toshniwal vs. Shridhar Ramchandra Alshi and Ors. [AIR (1960) SC 1368]. In that case, the suit for pre-emption was filed on the basis of sale between the parties through an agreement to sale, therefore, the suit for pre-emption was not held maintainable. In the present case, sale sought to be impeached is a registered sale deed. 30. Learned counsel for plaintiff submitted that cause of action to enforce the right of pre-emption arises when the sale is complete and sale become complete only after registration of the sale deed. In support, he has referred the judgment of Patna High Court in the case of Domini Kuer Vs. Ramsaran Lal & Ors. [AIR (1957) Patna 545], Kumar Gonsusab & ors. vs. Mohammed Miyan Urf Baban and Ors. [ (2008)10 SCC 153 ] and Hiralal Agrawal, Etc vs Rampadarath Singh & Ors., Etc [AIR (1969) SC 244]. In support, he has referred the judgment of Patna High Court in the case of Domini Kuer Vs. Ramsaran Lal & Ors. [AIR (1957) Patna 545], Kumar Gonsusab & ors. vs. Mohammed Miyan Urf Baban and Ors. [ (2008)10 SCC 153 ] and Hiralal Agrawal, Etc vs Rampadarath Singh & Ors., Etc [AIR (1969) SC 244]. There is no disagreement about such proposition of law as expounded in judgments referred hereinabove. Nevertheless, the issue for consideration by this Court in the present case is as to when limitation would start for filing a suit for pre-emption in case where the physical possession of the suit property either whole or in part has been transferred and the sale is made through a registered instrument of sale. The issue falls within ambit of Article 97 of Limitation Act and has been answered in an unambiguous terms that if physical possession either whole or in part of the property under the sale is transferred to the purchaser, the limitation would start from that date but where the subject matter of the sale does not admit of physical possession either whole or part, limitation would start when the instrument of sale is registered. These judgments are not helpful for determining the issue of limitation, as arose in the present case. 31. Learned counsel for plaintiff has also argued that the factum of transfer of possession of the suit property may not be adjudicated solely on the basis of recital in the sale deed as that is a weak evidence. In support, reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court, in case of Sarmukh Singh And Anr. vs Karam Singh And Ors. [(1969)2 UJ 621 SC] and Mst. Phula Wanti & ors. Vs. Kashmiri La [AIR (1956) Pepsu 17]. It is no doubt that mere recital about the transfer of possession in the instrument of sale is solely not suffice to conclude the delivery of possession and some additional attendant circumstances are also required to be looked into. The principle of law as expounded in the aforementioned judgments is not in quarrel. Vs. Kashmiri La [AIR (1956) Pepsu 17]. It is no doubt that mere recital about the transfer of possession in the instrument of sale is solely not suffice to conclude the delivery of possession and some additional attendant circumstances are also required to be looked into. The principle of law as expounded in the aforementioned judgments is not in quarrel. But as far as the present case is concerned, the factum of delivery of physical possession of the suit property has been discussed and held proved after consideration of statements of witnesses of defendant No.3 and defendant No.1 (DW/4), and on the basis of admission of plaintiff (PW/1), apart from recital of transfer of possession in the sale deed dated 07.01.1975 which has not been denied or disputed by the plaintiff in any manner. It is not the case here that only on the basis of recital in the sale deed dated 07.01.1975, the court has concluded that the purchaser has taken the possession of the suit property under the sale sought to be impeached by or before the execution of the sale deed dated 07.01.1975. Thus, other contemporary and corroborative evidence is available on record, to prove the recital of transfer of possession of suit property as mentioned in the sale deed. 32. In the present case, the issue No.4 has been framed as to whether the suit filed by the plaintiff is barred by limitation. The trial court, while deciding the issue No.4 has recorded a fact finding that since the possession of the suit property has been transferred to the purchaser by or before the execution of the sale deed dated 07.01.1975 and the plaintiff Damodar Lal himself admits in his cross examination dated 22.05.1979 that he came to know about the sale of suit property a week before the ‘Makar Sankranti’ prior to four years from the date of his statement. The period touches to the date i.e. 07.01.1975, therefore, according to trial court also the limitation has been held to be started from 07.01.1975. Finally, the issue No.4 has been decided in favour of defendants and the suit has been held as barred by limitation by the trial court. The period touches to the date i.e. 07.01.1975, therefore, according to trial court also the limitation has been held to be started from 07.01.1975. Finally, the issue No.4 has been decided in favour of defendants and the suit has been held as barred by limitation by the trial court. This court fully concur with the findings of the trial court and concludes that the limitation for the present suit for preemption starts w.e.f. 07.01.1975 and therefore, the suit filed on 22.01.1976 i.e. after expiry of one year to the limitation as provided under Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963, cannot be treated within limitation. II. PRE-EMPTION’S SUIT FOR PARTIAL PROPERTY:- 33. As has been pointed by the counsel for respondent that proviso to Section 11 (1) of Act, 1966 envisages that suit to enforce right of pre-emption shall not lie under the Act of 1966, in respect of a portion only of the immovable property transferred, and exception to this rule of law is when, the property under sale includes some unpre-emptable property, then suit may lie in respect of the portion which is pre-emptable only. In the present case, plaintiff has not included the room with ravish at first floor which is included in property under sale and pre-emptable property but has included three shops at ground floor, against which right of pre-emption does not accrue and fall within the category of non pre-emptable property. The counsel for respondent has vehemently submitted that suit cannot be decreed in either way and deserves to be dismissed on this count also. 34. In the present case, defendant No.1 has raised an objection in the written statement that the plaintiff has filed the present suit for pre-emption for partial properties and which is not liable to succeed. On such objection, issue No.3 has been framed. Later on, after conclusion of evidence of the parties and at the stage of final arguments, plaintiff moved an application under Order 6 rule 17 CPC to add one room with ravish, situated at first floor in the haveli, to include in the suit property. On such objection, issue No.3 has been framed. Later on, after conclusion of evidence of the parties and at the stage of final arguments, plaintiff moved an application under Order 6 rule 17 CPC to add one room with ravish, situated at first floor in the haveli, to include in the suit property. This application was opposed by defendants but the trial court deferred the application to be considered at the time of final hearing and while deciding the suit finally vide judgment impugned dated 23.03.1990, allowed application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and permitted the plaintiff to include the room with ravish in the suit property and therefore, as a consequence the issue No.3 has been decided in the manner that after allowing amendment in plaint the left one portion of property under sale has been added in the suit property thereof, the suit does not remain for partial property as much as has been decided defendant No.1. 35. Defendant No.1-respondent No.1, by way of filing cross objection, has disputed findings of issue No.3 and has challenged the impugned judgment to the extent of allowing plaintiff’s application under Order 6 rule 17 CPC. That apart, learned counsel for defendants have argued that in the suit property, three shops at ground floor are included to which, the right of pre-emption does not accrue therefore, for this reason also, the plaintiff’s suit for pre-emption is not liable to be decreed. Defendants/respondents have also produced an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC to place on record the judgment and decree date 14.09.1992. Now the points, pointed out hereinabove, are being discussed hereunder one by one:- (a) Application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC of plaintiff. 36. The plaintiff moved an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC on 19.02.1980 when the suit was at the stage of final hearing, to include one southern side room with ravish situated at first floor in the suit property, therefore, it is not disputed that in the original plaint, instituted on 22.01.1976, the suit property does not include the entire property under sale to which right of pre-emption accrues and suit remains for partial property only. It is more than clear that on the date of filing the application for amendment i.e. 19.02.1980, a fresh suit for pre-emption in relation to the room sought to be added by way of this application, becomes time barred and therefore, a right has accrued in favour of defendants, firstly to contend that the original suit remains for partial property and secondly the belated amendment which has become time barred, could not have been allowed as the same violates the legal right accrued to defendants. 37. As per the material on record, it appears that in the sale deed dated 07.01.1975 (Exhibit-A/1), the room at first floor was not mentioned, though it was included in the property under sale and shown in the map appended with the sale deed. Later on, defendants got executed a corrigendum sale deed dated 09.09.1975 and the error of not indicating the room in the sale deed, was rectified. Defendants produced this corrigendum deed dated 09.09.1975 on record before the trial court on 18.03.1977 (Exhibit-A/2). The defendant No.1, when appeared as witness DW/4 on 05.07.1979 deposed evidence in support of his objection taken in the written statement and regarding which the issue No.3 was specifically framed, to the effect that the room with ravish situated at first floor has not been included by the plaintiff in the suit property. Thereafter when whole evidence of defendant was concluded and plaintiff has adduced his rebuttal evidence and suit was fixed for final hearing at that final stage of suit. The plaintiff moved an application under order 6 rule 17 CPC on 19.02.1980 to add that room with ravish in the suit property of plaint. 38. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case of Revajeetu Builders and Developers Vs. Narayanaswamy and sons and Ors [ (2009)10 SCC 84 , has elaborately discussed the factors to be taken into consideration while dealing with the applications for amendment. In Para No.63, six factors have been prescribed and out of which two factors are that as a general rule, the court should decline the amendment if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application and the amendment, if allowed should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money. This proposition of law is well settled and can be multiplied by other judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court referring the case of Ashutosh Chaturvedi Vs. Prno Devi @ Parani Devi and ors [ (2008)15 SCC 610 ], Vishwambhar and Ors. vs. Laxminarayan (Dead) through LRs. And Anr. [ (2001)6 SCC 163 ] and Radhika Devi Vs. Bajrangi Singh & Ors. [ (1996)7 SCC 486 ]. 39. Applying the aforestated proposition of law to the facts of present case, on the date of filing the application on 19.02.1980, the claim of plaintiff for pre-emption against the room sought to be added in the plaint, has become undoubtedly time barred. Further, before the proposed amendment, a valuable right has accrued to defendants to raise an argument that the present suit remains for the partial property, therefore by allowing the amendment, such legal and valuable right accrued to defendants stands infringed. The proposed amendment, otherwise also may not be treated as bona fide as there is no explanation for filing the application belatedly at the stage of final arguments, once the corrigendum sale deed dated 09.09.1975 had been produced on record on 18.03.1977. Firstly, the delay cannot be compensated to the defendant by way of awarding cost and secondly, application cannot be treated as bona fide, without explanation of delay and has been filed with ulterior motive to frustrate the right of defendants, accrued by virtue of proviso to Section 11 (1) of the Act, 1966 due to lapse of limitation to claim right of pre-emption by plaintiff in respect of room and ravish. The trial court, while allowing the application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC has not considered the factors referred hereinabove and has committed illegality and perversity in allowing the application for amendment. Keeping in mind the parameters of law discussed hereinabove and the factual matrix of present case, the application filed by the plaintiff under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the order of trial court, allowing the application under Order 6 rule 17 CPC while passing the impugned judgment dated 23.03.1990 is set aside and application is dismissed. 40. Accordingly, the order of trial court, allowing the application under Order 6 rule 17 CPC while passing the impugned judgment dated 23.03.1990 is set aside and application is dismissed. 40. The effect of disallowing the amendment in plaint is that the suit for pre-emption filed by the plaintiff without inclusion of the room with ravish situated at first floor, remains for partial property and stands violating to proviso of Section 11 (1) of Act of 1966, as such cannot be decreed. (b) Inclusion of three shops in suit and (c) Application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. 41. Before dealing with the point (b) and (c) of (II), this Court deems it just and proper to deal with the application filed by respondents under Order 41 rule 27 CPC as the same also relates to the similar kind of objection. By way of application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, respondents have produced certified copy of the judgment dated 14.09.1992 passed in the subsequent civil suit for pre-emption bearing No.15/1980 filed by the plaintiff Damodar Lal in relation to the portion situated in the same haveli sold out to Patasi Devi and which has later on came in the ownership and possession of the defendant No.1-Kewal Chand. By this judgment, the subsequent suit of plaintiff has been dismissed and therefore, the defendant No.1 has become a co-owner/co-sharer for the portion obtained from the Patasi Devi and learned counsel for respondents submits that having acquired a status of co-owner/co-sharer for another portion in the haveli, the right of pre-emption claimed by the plaintiff against the defendant No.1 has been lost. No reply to the application has been filed by appellants. The judgment dated 14.09.1992 has been passed post to the impugned judgment in the present appeal dated 23.03.1990. The judgment and decree is certified copy issued from the court record and it’s genuineness is undoubted. This judgment and decree is an undisputed document as the apellant-plaintiff himself has assailed this judgment in the connected first appeal No.2/1993. Further the judgment and decree is relevant and helpful to the court in deciding the present first appeal, therefore, keeping in mind the proposition of law as propounded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Wadi Vs. This judgment and decree is an undisputed document as the apellant-plaintiff himself has assailed this judgment in the connected first appeal No.2/1993. Further the judgment and decree is relevant and helpful to the court in deciding the present first appeal, therefore, keeping in mind the proposition of law as propounded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Wadi Vs. Amilal [ (2015)1 SCC 677 ], the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC is allowed and the certified copy of the judgment and decree dated 14.09.1992 is taken on record to be considered in the present appeal. 42. Learned counsel for defendant has applied the ratio of law, in relation to wrong inclusion of three shops purchased under the sale deed dated 07.01.1975, in the suit property of present plaint. He pointed out that since right of pre-emption does not accrue qua the three shops by virtue of Section 5 (a) of the Act of 1966, therefore, excluding these shops, the suit for pre-emption is not liable to be decreed as defendant No.1 being co-sharer in the haveli by virtue of acquiring title/ownership of the three shops situated therein, may defeat the plaintiff’s right of pre-emption for other properties. In counter, the counsel for plaintiff has placed reliance on the judgment of Rajasthan High Court, delivered by Single Bench in case of Kishan Chand Vs. Nand Kishore [(1980) RLW 650] and plaintiff has also relied upon the judgment in case of Maganbai and Jambu Kumar, LRs. Of Magan Lal Vs. Nasir Mohammad [ (1989)2 RLR 626 ]. 43. A perusal of the whole judgment in case of Kishan Chand (Supra) coupled with the proviso to Section 11 (1) of the Act of 1966, the legal possession stands clarified that the plaintiff could have instituted civil suit for pre-emption in relation to the portion of property under sale against which his right of pre-emption accrued by excluding the three shops as the same is permissible by virtue of the proviso to Section 11 (1) of the Act of 1966. This Court, in case of Kishan Chand (Supra), while dealing with the provisions of Section 5 (1) (a) vis-a-vis the proviso appended to Section 11 (1) of the Act of 1966, observed that if under the sale deed sought to be impeached, the immovable property transferred includes the property against which right of pre-emption accrues and the property against which right of pre-emption does not accrue under Section 5 (1) (a), the pre-emptor has to confine his suit only to the portion of such property relating to which his right of pre-emption accrues to him under Section 6 of the Act. It has been discussed that although, the act does not provide as to how the consideration of the sale would be apportioned in between the property pre-emptable and that portion of property which is not pre-emptable but in such cases, it is the duty of court to make an inquiry and find out as to what was the market value on the date of sale of the property, which is not pre-emptable and of the property, which is pre-emptable. The court placed reliance on the judgment of Allahabad High Court, delivered in case of Mt.Zainab Bibi Vs. Umar Hayat Khan And Ors. [AIR(1936) Allahabad 732]. 44. Since in the present case, the plaintiff has neither excluded the three shops from the suit property, to claim his right of preemption only against the house property to which his right of preemption accrues nor has made any pleadings or make out any case to confine his suit in relation to the properties for which his right of pre-emption accrues, therefore, the plaintiff cannot claim benefit of the proviso appended to Section 11 (1) of the Act of 1966 at the stage of appeal. 45. Simultaneously on the hand, if the three shops are excluded from the suit property, to which obviously the right of pre-emption of plaintiff does not accrue, then the defendant No.1 becomes the co-sharer of the haveli and acquires an equal status of co-owner like plaintiff. 46. In case of Kewal Kishan vs. Jain Brotherhood and Ors. [AIR (1939) Lahore 77], it was propounded that:- “It is difficult to add anything else to the arguments given by these Judges. 46. In case of Kewal Kishan vs. Jain Brotherhood and Ors. [AIR (1939) Lahore 77], it was propounded that:- “It is difficult to add anything else to the arguments given by these Judges. It has always been admitted that the vendee can defeat the rights of the preemptor by acquiring other property which gave him an equal right with the pre-emptor after his first purchase but before the institution of the suit. This was not disputed in the two Full Bench cases referred to. It has now been settled that a purchase of property after the institution of the suit, which has the effect of giving the vendee an equal right of preemption with the pre-emptor, is sufficient to defeat the suit, this principle having been approved by their Lordships of the Privy Council. Logically therefore there can be no reason why a purchase, simultaneous with the purchase of the house in dispute, should not defeat the pre-emptor's title. As Robertson J. remarked, it cannot be said that at the moment of the purchase the pre-emptor had any right of pre-emption over the property claimed, superior to that of the vendee and, unless he can show that he had, the burden lying upon him, the suit' must fail. Is it logical to say that though' he can defeat X's claim (by buying property prior or subsequent to the institution of the suit) he cannot defeat it by buying such other property simultaneously with the property in dispute? In our view there is no distinction.” (emphasis supplied) 47. The ratio of law propounded in case of Kewal Kishan (supra) has been followed by the Rajasthan High Court in case of Kishan Chand Vs. Nand Kishore [(1980) RLW 650] and Maganbai and Jambu Kumar, LRs. Of Magan Lal Vs. Nasir Mohammad [ (1989)2 RLR 626 ] can be referred wherein it is held that a right of pre-emption is a weak right and it should subsist up to the date of suit as well as on the date of passing the decree. Now the legal proposition about the right of pre-emption stands settled that the right of pre-emption not only should subsist on the date of purchase and that on the date of institution of the suit but should also subsist up to the date of decree. Now the legal proposition about the right of pre-emption stands settled that the right of pre-emption not only should subsist on the date of purchase and that on the date of institution of the suit but should also subsist up to the date of decree. IF in between, the vendee acquires another property and gains the similar status as of the plaintiff, he can defeat the right of pre-emption of the plaintiff. In support, judgment in case of Shankar Lal Vs. Poonam Chand [(1954) RLW 292], Division Bench held as:- “We are of opinion that the contention of learned counsel for the appellant is correct. The law is well settled that the pre-emptor must have subsisting right of pre-emption on all of the three following dates, namely (i) the date of sale, (ii) the date of institution of the suit, and (iii) date of the decree. In Ram Gopal vs. Piari Lal [(I.L.R. IV ALL. 441)], it was held as far back as 1899 that the right to preempt must exist not only on the date of sale, and the date of the institution of the suit, but also on the date of the decree. Reference in this case was made to an earlier decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Janki Prasad vs. Ishar Das [(1899)A.W.N. 127] where that Court had already held that the right must subsist on the date of sale as well as on the date of the institution of the suit. In Ramgopal's case (supra) that principle was extended to the date of the decree also. The reason for this is, in our opinion, quite clear. Pre-emption is a very weak right, and therefore before a court deprives a vendee of the property he has purchased, the pre-emptor must show that he has the right up to the time the decree is to be passed in his favour. If he loses that right in any way before the decree is passed in his favour his suit must be dismissed.” 48. Section 15 of the Pre-emption Act, 1966 also stipulates that the right of pre-emption, claimed by plaintiff must subsist at the time of passing of the decree provided that a voluntary transfer in favour of purchaser after the institution of suit for pre-emption, shall not defeat the right of plaintiff, which was subsisted on the date of suit. Section 15 of the Pre-emption Act, 1966 also stipulates that the right of pre-emption, claimed by plaintiff must subsist at the time of passing of the decree provided that a voluntary transfer in favour of purchaser after the institution of suit for pre-emption, shall not defeat the right of plaintiff, which was subsisted on the date of suit. Section 19 of the Pre-emption Act, 1966 postulates that no suit for pre-emption shall lie where prior to institution of such suit, the transferee of the property in dispute has acquired indefeasible interest or a right of pre-emption equal or superior to that of plaintiff. Therefore, accordingly, the statutory provisions of the Act of 1966 and as per the judicial pronouncement of the various High Courts and the Supreme Court, the proposition of law stands well settled that the plaintiff’s preferential right must not only exists at the time of sale but it should also be in existence at the time of suit as well as at the date of decree. 49. If the present case is examined on the anvil of proposition of law discussed hereinabove, it appears that the plaintiff’s right of pre-emption stands lost qua-defendant No.1 as on the date of filing of the suit, the plaintiff gets the ownership in relation to the three shops to which right of pre-emption does not arise and after institution of suit, the plaintiff has acquired ownership and possession on another portion in the haveli, which was obtained from the Patasi Devi. Thus, defendants have become a co-sharer in the haveli having equivalent right to the plaintiff as far as right of pre-emption in relation to the suit property in the present suit is concerned. In this view also, the plaintiff’ suit for pre-emption is not liable to be decreed at the time of deciding this first appeal. 50. Learned counsel for plaintiff has referred the judgment of High Court delivered in case of Mohan Lal Vs. Rasula & Ors. [AIR (1951) Raj. In this view also, the plaintiff’ suit for pre-emption is not liable to be decreed at the time of deciding this first appeal. 50. Learned counsel for plaintiff has referred the judgment of High Court delivered in case of Mohan Lal Vs. Rasula & Ors. [AIR (1951) Raj. 117] to contend that it is necessary for the plaintiff that he should have a subsisting right of pre-emption on the date of the suit but in this judgment, there is no discussion about the point that if post to date of suit, the vendee acquires equivalent right to defeat the right of pre-emption of the plaintiff, the same can also be considered at the time of passing the decree. Section 15 was not considered in that judgment as Act of 1966 has come in operation in the year 1966. Thus, this judgment does not speak contrary to the proposition of law as set out in subsequent judgments that the right of pre-emption must subsist up to the date of decree. Another judgment referred by learned counsel for appellants in Prema (Dead) through LRs. Vs. Surat Singh & Ors. [ (2003)3 SCC 46 ] pertains to section 21-A of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 and is not helpful to the present case where the court is dealing the provisions of Rajasthan Preemption Act, 1966. Therefore, the sub-points No. b and c of point No.II stand decided against plaintiff and for the discussion made hereinabove also, suit for pre-emption can not be decreed in favour of plaintiff. (III) Acquiescence/waiver of the right of pre-emption:- 51. Learned counsel for defendants pointed out that defendant No.1 in his written statement, para No.20 has taken specific plea that plaintiff, by his conduct has waived his right of pre-emption and is estopped from enforcing this right by way of filing the present suit. The counsel for defendants has submitted that if from the conduct of plaintiff and from other material on record, it stands established that the plaintiff acted inequitably and was not prompt enough to invoke his right of pre-emption, his right can be treated as lost or waived as the same is a weak right in this sense also. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Indira Bai Vs. Nand Kishore [ (1990)4 SCC 668 ] and Radhey Shyam Vs. Vinod Kumar & Anr [(2007)5 Western Law Cases Rajasthan 771]. 52. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Indira Bai Vs. Nand Kishore [ (1990)4 SCC 668 ] and Radhey Shyam Vs. Vinod Kumar & Anr [(2007)5 Western Law Cases Rajasthan 771]. 52. From the material on record, it transpires that the waiver of the right of pre-emption of plaintiff may be assumed in the following circumstances:- (i) Plaintiff was aware about the sale of suit property, prior to execution of the sale deed dated 07.01.1975. Plaintiff’s witness Gopal Singh (PW/5) corroborates this facts that one person Chhoga Lal property dealer proposed him to sell the suit property. (ii) The defendant No.3-Smt. Nirmala Sharma, who appeared as witness, also stated on oath that an oral offer to purchase the suit property, was given to plaintiff Damodar Lal but he declined to purchase against the sale price offered by the defendant No.1. (iii) Defendant No.1, purchaser, who appeared as DW/4 has also deposed his evidence in corroboration to the evidence of defendant No.3. No cross-examination of this part of evidence from these witnesses was made from the side of plaintiff. (iv) It is also reflected on record that the plaintiff was not agreed to purchase the suit property against consideration of Rs.24,999/-. The plaintiff (PW/1), has disputed the valuation of suit property as Rs.24,999/- and assessed his own value to the tune of Rs.12,999/-. PW/2-Kunj Bihari, in his evidence states that he was ready to purchase the suit property on reasonable price, which is according to him near about Rs.13,000/- and not Rs.24,999/-. All other evidences of plaintiff from PW/3 to PW/6 were produced to show that the cost of suit property was more than Rs.13,000/-. Per contra, the vendor herself who appeared as witness has stated that the suit property was sold against sale consideration of Rs.24,999/- and she received this consideration from the purchaser defendant No.1-Kewal Chand. The defendant No.1 (DW/4) also corroborates this evidence. The trial court has also concluded that the cost of suit property was Rs.24,999/- and plaintiff has made valuation on lower side. (v) As per judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in case of Radhey Shyam (Supra), it has been held that the notice under Section 8 of the Act, 1963 is not required to be in writing unless it is served through the civil court under Sub-Section (2) of Section 8 of Act, 1966. (v) As per judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in case of Radhey Shyam (Supra), it has been held that the notice under Section 8 of the Act, 1963 is not required to be in writing unless it is served through the civil court under Sub-Section (2) of Section 8 of Act, 1966. It was held that even an oral or constructive notice to the preemptor can be established in view of circumstances of the case. In case of Smt. Roopi Bai Vs. Mahaveer and Ors. reported in [AIR(1994) Rajasthan 133], learned Single Judge of High Court while relying upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Bishan Singh & Ors. Vs. Khazan Singh & Anr [AIR(1958)SC 838] observed that the right of pre-emption can be lost by estoppels and acquiescence where the property is alleged to have been offered to sell to plaintiff by vendor before it was sold to defendant/purchaser and if looking to the conduct of the plaintiff, the possibility of having acquiescence with the sale cannot be ruled out, then that would be sufficient to estopped the pre-emptor from claiming right of pre-emption. (vi) It has come on record that defendant No.1, after purchasing the suit property through registered sale deed dated 07.01.1975, carried out addition/alteration and repairing work in the suit property and incurred huge amount therein. The defendant No.1 in para No.20 of his written statement has stated that he had incurred an amount of Rs.8000/- in carrying out the addition and alteration in the suit property after its purchase. The plaintiff-Damodar Lal(PW/1) admits in his cross-examination that defendant started repairing and construction work after taking possession of the suit property. Defendant No.1 (DW/4) categorically deposed that after purchase of the house, he raised construction and carried out repairing work therein. He deposed that about Rs.8,000/- was incurred in such construction/repairing work. Bills/vouchers of the material, labour charges etc. were produced on record as Exhibit-A/7 to Exhibit/A/23. These bills and vouchers are all period from November, December, 1974 and January, February, 1975 etc. It has already been found that the defendant No.1 has got physical possession of the suit property by or before 07.01.1975 and the plaintiff has also come to know about this fact on 07.01.1975. (vii) The plaintiff issued first notice dated 20.05.1975 (Exhibit-2) invoking his right of pre-emption. It has already been found that the defendant No.1 has got physical possession of the suit property by or before 07.01.1975 and the plaintiff has also come to know about this fact on 07.01.1975. (vii) The plaintiff issued first notice dated 20.05.1975 (Exhibit-2) invoking his right of pre-emption. (viii) By all such evidence on record, it can be inferred that the plaintiff was not willing to purchase the suit property before the execution of the sale deed dated 07.01.1975 against price of Rs.24,999/- and further he kept silence for a long period during the course of carrying out the construction/repairing work by the defendant No.1 in the suit property. Thus, virtually waived his right of pre-emption, further his conduct estopped him to invoke the right of pre-emption. (ix) The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case of Indira Bai (Supra) has observed that courts in India are primarily the courts of equity, justice and good conscience, therefore cannot permit to invoke a right of pre-emption by pre-emptor, which is otherwise a weak and inequitable right, to defeat the right of purchaser over the suit property. (x) Considering the overall facts and circumstances discussed hereinabove, this Court is of opinion that plaintiff’s suit for pre-emption is hit by the principle of acquiescence estoppel and waiver and as such his suit is not liable to be decreed on this ground also. 53. The consequence of discussion is that all three points have been decided against the appellant-plaintiff and neither the plaintiff’s suit is found well within limitation nor his right of preemption is liable to be succeed being invoked in relation to partial property as well as not enforceable at least against the defendant No.1, the purchaser, who has also become co-sharer having equivalent right and status vis-a-vis to the plaintiff on account of having ownership of three shops on the date of the suit and later on acquiring ownership & possession of another portion in haveli sold out to Smt. Patasi Devi during course of suit and further the plaintiff by his conduct has waived his right of pre-emption. Therefore, the suit for pre-emption filed by the plaintiff is not liable to be decreed and no interference is called for in the impugned decree dated 23.03.1990 passed by the trial court dismissing the plaintiff’s suit for pre-emption. S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 2/1993:- 54. Therefore, the suit for pre-emption filed by the plaintiff is not liable to be decreed and no interference is called for in the impugned decree dated 23.03.1990 passed by the trial court dismissing the plaintiff’s suit for pre-emption. S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 2/1993:- 54. In this appeal, the counsel for plaintiff would argue that the plaintiff has a right of pre-emption for the portion of haveli sold by the defendant Nos.2 and 3 to defendant No.4-Patasi Devi vide sale deed dated 09.09.1975. He submitted that although the defendant No.1 instituted a civil suit for pre-emption against the defendant No.4 and obtained a decree of pre-emption on the basis of compromise on 22.01.1977 and pursuant to the compromise decree obtained ownership and possession of that property dated on 09.03.1977 but the issuance of decree for pre-emption in favour of defendant No.1 and transfer of ownership and possession to defendant No.1, does not defeat the right of plaintiff for pre-emption in relation to the portion of Patasi Devi. He submitted that from the date of knowledge i.e. 12.03.1977, the present suit instituted on 02.02.1978 be treated within limitation by applying Section 18 of the Limitation Act. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of Jagdish Rai and Anr. Vs. Suraj Kumar Singh [AIR(1939) Allahabad 311] and Mst. Phula Wanti & ors. Vs. Kashmiri La [AIR (1956) Pepsu 17]. 55. Per contra, learned counsel for defendant No.1 would submit that the defendant No.1 after purchase of the properties in haveli vide sale deed dated 07.01.1975 acquired the status of co-owner and as such he institute a civil suit for pre-emption against Patasi Devi in relation to portion of haveli sold to her through sale deed dated 09.09.1975. This suit for pre-emption was rightly decreed and thereafter the defendant No.1 has acquired ownership and possession of the portion of Patasi Devi w.e.f. 07.03.1977. This suit for pre-emption was rightly decreed and thereafter the defendant No.1 has acquired ownership and possession of the portion of Patasi Devi w.e.f. 07.03.1977. The decree for pre-emption dated 22.01.1977 passed in favour of defendant No.1 does not suffer from fraud or collusion and at the time when the plaintiff instituted the present civil suit on 02.02.1978, plaintiff does not have any pre-emption right at least qua defendant No.1 who was also one of co-sharer by virtue of purchasing the portion of haveli through his sale deed dated 07.01.1975 as much as a decree for pre-emption dated 22.01.1977 has already been passed in his favour in relation to the portion of Patasi Devi, subject matter of present civil suit. Learned counsel for defendant would further submit that the present suit for pre-emption, filed on 02.02.1978, claiming a right of pre-emption on the basis of sale deed dated 09.09.1975 (registered on 10.09.1975) is clearly barred by limitation of one year as provided under Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 56. As per rival contentions of learned counsel for both parties and the challenge made to the impugned judgment and decree dated 14.09.1992 following points emerged for determination by this Court:- I) Whether plaintiff’s suit for pre-emption bearing No.15/1980 is within limitation? II) Whether plaintiff’s right of pre-emption is enforceable qua defendant No.1 who was one of cosharer on the date of sale i.e. 09.09.1975 and in whose favour a decree of pre-emption has already been passed on 22.01.1977 before institution of present suit on 02.02.1978? (I) LIMITATION:- 57. The factual matrix is not in dispute that the present suit for pre-emption has been instituted on 02.02.1978, in relation to the said property sold by defendant No.2 and 3 venders Chhoti Devi and Nirmla Devi to defendant No.4 purchaser-Patasi Devi vide registered sale deed dated 09.09.1975 registered on 10.09.1975 (Exhibit-A/2). It is apparent that the suit has been instituted after expiry of one year, a period of statutory limitation as provided under Section 21 of the Act of 1966 and Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It is apparent that the suit has been instituted after expiry of one year, a period of statutory limitation as provided under Section 21 of the Act of 1966 and Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The plaintiff has tried to carry the limitation w.e.f. 12.03.1977, the alleged date from which the plaintiff claims to know about the sale deed dated 09.09.1975 and the decree for pre-emption passed in favour of defendant No.1 dated 22.01.1977 and has made an attempt to persuade the court that his suit instituted on 02.02.1978 falls within limitation. This Court is not agreeable with the contention of learned counsel for plaintiff and the present suit cannot be treated to be filed within limitation for multiple reasons. 58. Firstly, as per the evidence, the original plaintiff-Damodar Lal (PW/1) and the substituted legal representatives of plaintiff-Kunj Behari (PW/7), it has revealed on record that purchaser Smt. Patasi Devi came in possession of the suit property and carried out repairing as well as construction work in the suit property after purchase of the same through sale deed dated 09.09.1975. The evidence adduced from the side of plaintiff that the construction and repairing work in the suit property was carried out by the owner of the suit property has been countered by DW/4-Satya Narain who happens to be husband owner/vendor Smt. Nirmala Devi. DW/4 has deposed that after purchase of the suit property by Patasi Devi, she broke the partition wall to convert the small rooms in a big hall, changed the entire floor, made renovations in walls, plaster and got constructed one new latrine at third floor. The trial court is right to conclude that statements of plaintiff and other witnesses stand belied by the evidence of DW/4 and it was found proved that vendors have transferred the physical possession of suit property to Patasi Devi with the sale of suit property through sale deed dated 09.09.1975. 59. The issue of limitation has already been discussed in forging paragraphs of this judgment that in case of sale of immovable property through registered instrument, by virtue of Article 97 of the Limitation Act, limitation for the suit pre-emption starts from the transfer of physical possession of the property under sale and if subject matter of sale does not admit of physical possession, then from the date when the instrument of sale is registered. The statutory period of limitation is one year, therefore, the limitation for present suit starts from 09.09.1975 and the suit instituted on 02.02.1978 is not within limitation. Terminus a quo for start of limitation is transfer of physical possession of the immovable property even in case of a registered sale deed, if property under the sale has exchanged hands by way of transfer of physical possession wholly or partly. 60. Secondly, the claim of plaintiff is that limitation be counted from the date of knowledge i.e. 12.03.1977 cannot be countenanced and is not liable to be accepted. The plaintiff himself is one of co-sharer and was residing in the haveli in question and when the portion of haveli has been sold by other co-owners/vendors to Patasi Devi and she came in physical possession through sale deed dated 09.09.1975, as also construction and repairing work was also started in the suit property thereafter, the plaintiff could have easily come to know about the sale of subjection portion in the present suit in favour of Smt. Patasi Devi, if he had been vigilant and exercised due diligence. 61. On the date of execution of sale deed dated 09.09.1975, defendant No.1 who had already purchased another portion of haveli through sale deed dated 07.01.1975 was a co-sharer and therefore, the defendant No.1 instituted his civil suit for preemption against the purchaser Patasi Devi, which was decreed by way of a compromise vide judgment and decree dated 22.01.1977. The defendant No.1 after making sale consideration and other expenses etc. to the tune of Rs.34,999/- (receipt is Exhibit-A/4) acquired ownership and possession of suit property from Patasi Devi on 07.03.1977. The decree of pre-emption passed in favour of defendant No.1 though on the basis of compromise, cannot be treated to be collusive and by fraud merely due to non-impleadment of the plaintiff. The decree for pre-emption passed in favour of defendant No.1 is based on his own right of pre-emption, which obviously was vested with him at the time of sale deed dated 09.09.1975. The decree for pre-emption passed in favour of defendant No.1 is based on his own right of pre-emption, which obviously was vested with him at the time of sale deed dated 09.09.1975. Mere fact that the defendant No.1 is in relationship of the purchaser Patasi Devi is not suffice to assume the compromise decree of pre-emption as collusive or suffer from fraud, more particularly, in the backdrop of factual matrix where it has come on record that Patasi Devi purchased the suit property through registered sale deed dated 09.09.1975 paid sale consideration of Rs. 24,999/- and thereafter carried out construction and repairing work and her ownership and possession was substituted to defendant No.1 after payment of an amount of Rs.34,999/-. 62. The facts of present case do not permit the plaintiff to take resort of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, rather facts clearly attract the provisions of Article 97 of the Limitation Act. Judgments of Allahabad High Court, in case of Jagdish Rai (Supra) and Pepsu High Court, in case of Mst. Phula Wanti (Supra) relied upon by learned counsel for plaintiff do not render any support, in the facts of present case, to count the limitation from the date of knowledge and not from the date of delivering of physical possession of the subject property under sale or from the date of registration of sale deed. 63. The trial court is right in his approach that if the plaintiff had been acted due diligently and remained vigilant, he could have come to know about the sale deed dated 09.09.1975 executed in relation to the suit property, in favour of Patasi Devi. This Court does not find any infirmity and perversity in findings of the trial court passed while deciding the issue No.3 to the effect that the decree of pre-emption passed in favour of defendant No.1 does not suffer from any fraud. Therefore, this Court affirms fact findings of the trial court in relation to issue No.4, holding that the plaintiff’s suit is not within limitation. II) ENFORCEABILITY OF PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT OF PREEMPTION QUA DEFENDANT NO.1:- 64. In this regard issue No.6 was framed by the trial court and while deciding this issue, the trial court has held that in relation to the suit property purchased by Patasi Devi, the plaintiff and defendant No.1 both have equal right of pre-emption. 65. II) ENFORCEABILITY OF PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT OF PREEMPTION QUA DEFENDANT NO.1:- 64. In this regard issue No.6 was framed by the trial court and while deciding this issue, the trial court has held that in relation to the suit property purchased by Patasi Devi, the plaintiff and defendant No.1 both have equal right of pre-emption. 65. According to the facts of present case, the defendant No.1 had purchased the portion of haveli from vendors Chhoti Devi and Nirmala Devi through registered sale deed dated 07.01.1975 and has become co-sharer of the haveli, therefore, on the date of sale deed dated 09.09.1975, when vendors Chhoti Devi and Nirmala Devi sold another portion of haveli, to purchaser Patasi Devi, the defendant No.1 was also one of the co-sharer vis-a-vis the plaintiff who is another co-sharer. It is true that the plaintiffs suit for preemption in relation to the portion purchased by the defendant No.1 through sale deed dated 07.01.1975 was pending at that point of time. Nevertheless, at the time of passing the impugned judgment dated 14.09.1992, the previous suit of plaintiff has already been dismissed on merits vide judgment dated 23.03.1990. As per section 15 of the Act of 1966, the right of preemption must subsist at the time of passing the decree. The proviso appended to Section 15 of the Act of 1966 does not apply to the facts of present case. As even, on the date of sale of suit property to Patasi Devi dated 09.09.1975, the defendant No.1 had already acquired co-ownership in the haveli vis-a-vis to the plaintiff. In case of Thakur Madho Singh & Ors. Vs. James R.R. Skinner & Ors. [AIR(1941) Lahore 433] has observed as under :- “It is well settled that plaintiff’s preferential right must not only exist at the time of the sale but it should also be in existence at the time of the suit as well as at the date of decree” The judgment has been followed by Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court in case of Shankar Lal Vs. Poonam Chand [(1954) RLW 292]. Thus, at least on the date of deciding the present suit on 14.09.1992, the plaintiff’s right of pre-emption in relation to the portion of Patasi Devi did not subsist. 66. The issue can be analyzed from another aspect also. Poonam Chand [(1954) RLW 292]. Thus, at least on the date of deciding the present suit on 14.09.1992, the plaintiff’s right of pre-emption in relation to the portion of Patasi Devi did not subsist. 66. The issue can be analyzed from another aspect also. When the defendant No.1 was also one of the co-sharer in the haveli w.e.f. 07.01.1975 and possessed his right of pre-emption in respect of the portion sold to Patasi Devi through sale deed dated 09.09.1975, defendant No.1 instituted suit for pre-emption against Patasi Devi and in this suit, a decree for pre-emption was passed in his favour on 22.01.1977. Patasi Devi purchased the suit property against sale consideration of Rs.25,000/-, which has been proved in evidence and has also been acknowledged by vendors as also by purchaser Patasi Devi. A challenge to this valuation by the plaintiff that the actual value was Rs.11,000/- only and not Rs.24,999/- has not been proved and the issue No.1 has already been decided by the trial court against the plaintiff. Findings of issue No.1 are not under challenge nor have been disputed by learned counsel for plaintiff in the first appeal. The defendant No.1 has proved that pursuant to the decree for preemption dated 22.01.1977 passed in his favour, he paid Rs.34,999/- including the sale consideration and other expenses to Patasi Devi, for obtaining the ownership and possession of her portion and Exhibit-A/4 (receipt) is available on record. It has also been discussed and has been held in catena of judgments that a right of pre-emption is a weak right, which can be defeated by all legal means available to the vendee and defendant. In the present case, the defendant No.1 by procuring the decree of pre-emption in relation to the portion of Patasi Devi, which is subject matter in the present suit, has defeated the plaintiff’s right of pre-emption even before filing the present suit on 02.02.1978. 67. In this view, Section 19 of Pre-emption Act, 1966 prohibits the plaintiff’s suit for pre-emption against defendant No.1. Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, in the case of Abdul Razzaq Vs. Mumtaz Hussain and Ors. [25 All. 334 Indian High Courts Reports] has held that no suit for pre-emption lie, the basis of which, a decree for pre-emption in another suit. The decree for pre-emption passed in favour of defendant No.1 dated 22.01.1977 is a lawful and valid decree. Mumtaz Hussain and Ors. [25 All. 334 Indian High Courts Reports] has held that no suit for pre-emption lie, the basis of which, a decree for pre-emption in another suit. The decree for pre-emption passed in favour of defendant No.1 dated 22.01.1977 is a lawful and valid decree. As has already been observed by the trial court and discussed by this Court in forgoing paragraphs that this decree of pre-emption dated 22.01.1977 does not suffer from fraud or collusion, therefore, in this way also, the plaintiff’s right of pre-emption is not enforceable against the defendant No.1. 68. Issue No.2, 3, 4 and 6 stand answered against the plaintiff as per discussion made hereinabove. Issue No.1 and 5 have already been held by the trial court against the plaintiff and findings of these issues are not under challenge in the present first appeals, therefore, as a final result, this court affirms the judgment and decree dated 14.09.1992, dismissing the plaintiff’s suit for pre-emption. 69. The upshot of the discussion is that both first appeals have failed and are hereby dismissed. No costs. 70. Any other pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.