JUDGMENT : Legality, propriety and correctness of the order, dated 19.02.2021, passed by the learned Sessions-cum-Special Judge, POCSO, Bomdila in SC(BDL)POCSO Case No. 01/2020, under Sections 376(A)(B)/201/107/506 of the IPC read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act, is challenged in this Criminal Revision Petition, under Sections 401/397/ 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, by the petitioner Smti. Minu Nutung. It is to be noted here that vide impugned order dated 19.02.2021, the learned Sessions-cum-Special Judge, POCSO, Bomdila, has discharged respondent No.1 to 7 in the aforesaid case. 2. The factual background leading to filing of the present revision petition is briefly stated as under:- “On 16.04.2020, one Smti Minu Natung(petitioner) had lodged one F.I.R. before the Seppa Women Police Station, to the effect that her daughter, who is aged about 8(eight) years and is studying at Sunrise Residential School, Seppa was allegedly raped by one delinquent juvenile, a student of the same School, in one of the class room of the said School, in the month of November, 2019. The said incident was narrated to the petitioner by her elder daughter, who is also studing in the same school and also by victim. The elder sister of the victim had informed the incident first to a senior student and the said senior student had reported about the incident to the school authority, however, despite knowing the incident, the school authority did not inform the same to the family members of the victim. Instead, they had warned all the boarders of the hostel not to reveal the said incident to anyone else. On receipt of the aforesaid F.I.R., the Officer-in-Charge, Women Police Station, Seppa, has registered Seppa Women Police Station Case No. 01/2020, Under Sections 376(A) (B)/201/107/506 IPC read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act and started investigation, which culminated in submission of Charge-Sheet dated 29.05.2020, under Sections 176/201/120(B) IPC readwith Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act, against the present 7(seven) respondents along with main offender who happened to be a juvenile. But, the learned Court below, vide the impugned order, dated 19.02.2021, discharged respondent Nos. 1 to 7 after hearing ld. Advocates of both side on the point of Charge. 3. But, the learned Court below, vide the impugned order, dated 19.02.2021, discharged respondent Nos. 1 to 7 after hearing ld. Advocates of both side on the point of Charge. 3. Being highly aggrieved, the petitioner preferred the present petition on the following grounds:- (i) That, the learned Court below has failed to appreciate the evidence on record while passing the impugned order of discharge; (ii) That, the learned Court below has failed to appreciate the 161 statements of respondent No. 8, and Miss Angle Natung and Miss Yame Singhi and the 164 statements of both Miss Yame Singhi and the victim girl, which reveals prima facie case against all the respondents to sent them on trial; (iii) That the learned Court has failed to appreciate the facts and circumstances of the offence incident, medical examination and the age of victim girl; (iv) That, the learned Court below has failed to appreciate the prosecution story; (v) That, the learned Court below has failed to appreciate the 161 statements of Yame Singhi, Shri Roop Jyoti Kotoky, and Shri Chandra Baishnav, wherein they have stated that after the school authority got information regarding the sexual offence they warned the students not to tell anyone about the incident and pressurized Smti. Yame Singhi, to change her statement about the incident and not to disclose the incident to anyone and that Smti Linda Sema also instructed her to manipulate her statement. (vi) That, the learned Court below has failed to appreciate the prosecution story and 161 statements of all the respondents that they decided not to inform the said incident to any person including the Chairperson of the said school. (vii) That, the learned Court below has failed to appreciate that after getting the information regarding sexual offence, the said School teachers/authority gave strict direction to the victim and the students not reveal the incident to anyone else. Therefore, it is contended to set aside and quash the impugned discharge order, dated 19.02.2021, passed by the learned Sessions-cum-Special Judge, POCSO, Bomdila in SC(BDL)POCSO Case No. 01/2020, under Sections 376(A)(B)/201/107/506 of the IPC read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 4. The respondent No. 2, 3, 5, 6 & 7 have submitted their affidavit-in-opposition denying the averments made in the petition. 4. The respondent No. 2, 3, 5, 6 & 7 have submitted their affidavit-in-opposition denying the averments made in the petition. It is stated that from the statement of witnesses it becomes clear that respondent No.5, 6 and 7 were not connected with the alleged offence and though respondent No.1 and 4 have checked the victim yet they arrived at the conclusion that nothing has taken place as alleged. It is further stated that respondent No.3 did not take part in checking the victim and she was merely present in the room. It is further stated that the there is contradiction in the versions of witness Yame Singhi under section 164 and 161 Cr.P.C. It is also stated that in order to fasten criminal liability upon the respondents, there must have been ‘reason to believe’ and or ‘knowledge’ about commission of the alleged offence. And the same are absent here in this case and therefore it is contended to dismiss the petition. 5. The petitioner has submitted her reply to the above affidavit-in-opposition and controverted all the averments made therein. It is also stated that during the course of proceeding she came to know that respondent No.8 is a juvenile and as such he is not a necessary party and his name may be struck out from this revision petition. 6. I have heard Mr. M. Bagra, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also, I have heard Ms. N. Danggen, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 2, 3, 5, 6 & 7 and Mr. R. Millo, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 & 4. 7. Mr. M. Bagra, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that prima facie case is made out against the respondent nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 & 7 and they are all teachers and staff of the school where the victim and respondent No.8 was studying and that the victim and her elder sister and also her mother supported the allegations made in the F.I.R. and there is consistency in their version. The statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C is also consistent and there are sufficient materials to go for trial and as such, the impugned order passed by the learned Special Judge, discharging the respondent nos. 1 to 7, suffers from serious infirmities and therefore, contended to set it aside. 8. Per contra, Mr. The statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C is also consistent and there are sufficient materials to go for trial and as such, the impugned order passed by the learned Special Judge, discharging the respondent nos. 1 to 7, suffers from serious infirmities and therefore, contended to set it aside. 8. Per contra, Mr. R. Millo, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 & 4 submits that there is no eye witness to the occurrence and the medical report of the victim also not supported the allegation and there was only suspicion against the respondents nos. 1 & 4 and though the matter was reported to the respondent nos.1 & 4 yet they have not found anything abnormal in the behavior of the victim and the alleged offender/ respondent no. 8 and as such, no offence is made out against them to put them on trial. 9. Whereas, Ms. N. Danggen., learned counsel for the respondent nos. 2, 3, 5, 6 & 7 submits that though the respondents are charge-sheeted under Sections 176//201/ 120(B) IPC read with Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act, yet, there is no specific allegation against them and though they have checked the victim, yet, they have found nothing suspicious and as such, they have no ‘knowledge’ or ‘reason to believe’ that an offence has been committed and as such, it cannot be said that a prima-facie case under Section 176/201/120(B) Indian Penal Code, read with section 21(2) of the POCSO Act, is made out against the respondents as the ingredients of the said offences are not made out and as such, the impugned order of the learned Special Judge, POCSO, Bomdila, suffers from no infirmity requiring any interference of this Court. Ms. Danggen also referred one case law of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in passed in A.S. Krishnan and Ors. vs. State of Kerala, (2004) 11 SCC 576 , in support of her submission. 10. Having heard the submissions of the learned counsels of both sides, I have carefully gone through the impugned order passed by the learned Court below and also the record and the petition and the grounds taken therein and also the documents placed on record. 11. vs. State of Kerala, (2004) 11 SCC 576 , in support of her submission. 10. Having heard the submissions of the learned counsels of both sides, I have carefully gone through the impugned order passed by the learned Court below and also the record and the petition and the grounds taken therein and also the documents placed on record. 11. It appears that Seppa Women Police Station Case No. 01/2020, Under Sections 376(A)(B)/201/107/506 IPC readwith Section 6 of the POCSO Act is registered on the basis of one FIR lodged by Smti Minu Natung on 16.04.2020, wherein, she alleged that on 07.04.2020, her daughter Smti ‘X’ (name withheld), aged about 8(eight) years, complained of pain over her private part and when she enquired about the same, then her daughter told that during the academic session at Sunrise School, her senior Shri ‘X’ (name withheld) had forcefully committed sexual intercourse with her in the month of November. After the incident her daughter reported the matter to her elder sister, who is also a student of the said school and as such, her elder daughter reported the matter to Ms. Yame Singhi, a senior student of the school, who had scolded Shri ‘X’ and also reported the matter to school authority about the same and that the authority did not take any action against the offender and put the same under carpet. Upon the said FIR, the O/C, Women Police Station Seppa has registered the above noted case and investigated the same, which culminated in submission of Charge-sheet against the respondent nos. 1 to 7, Smti. Linda Sema, Shri. Ashish Bora Lyngdoh, Miss Papi Dada, Miss Lakhi Sinha, Miss July Atoa, Shri Chandra Baishnav, Shri Roopjyoti Kotoky, and against the respondent No. 8, the juvenile offender, to stand trial in the Court under Section 176, 201/120(B) IPC read with Section 21(2) POCSO Act. The respondents accordingly, appeared before the Court of the learned Special Judge, POCSO and the learned Special Judge vide order dated 19.02.2021, discharged respondent No. 1 to 7 from the offences under Section 120(B)/201/176 IPC read with Section 21(ii) of the POCSO Act. 12. While discharging the respondent nos. 1 to 7, the learned Court below has found that the initial information was received from the victim by her elder sister, who then reported the matter to the monitor, Ms. Yame Singhi and then, Ms. 12. While discharging the respondent nos. 1 to 7, the learned Court below has found that the initial information was received from the victim by her elder sister, who then reported the matter to the monitor, Ms. Yame Singhi and then, Ms. Yame Singhi reported the matter to Smti Linda Sema (respondent No.1), and then Smti Linda Sema took the victim to Ms. Leiki Sinha’s (respondent No.4) room and removed her undergarment and having checked, they found some sticky substance and also found bruise injury over her private part and thereafter, they disclosed the matter to the school authority and they took a decision not to reveal the same to any person and this part of the statement is the basic or initial point drawing incriminating statement against all the accused persons. The learned Court below further observed that on the other hand it is also noted in the prosecution story that all the accused admitted the complaint of the victim about misbehaving her by the delinquent juvenile on 22.11.2019, but there is no eye witness to the act and they did not think it appropriate to inform the matter to parents and police and as stated by accused, a team of four female faculties were directed by the Principal to keep vigil upon the victim and the juvenile under observation so as to verify whether the incident occurred or not and according to the investigation team, the victim was found absolutely fine with the juvenile and as such they concluded that nothing had happened and hence they did not think it necessary to inform the matter to parents and police. The learned Court below further held that the statement of the accused, Smti Linda Sema and Ms. Leiki Sinha, reveals that they checked the private part of the victim and found no marks and also enquired about delinquent juvenile about the occurrence and the delinquent juvenile denied the same and considering the above facts and circumstances, the learned Court below has opined that no primafaciecase is made out against the accused person to put them on trial and, accordingly, discharged them. 13. I have carefully gone through the record of the learned court below and the case diary, specially statement of the witnesses recorded by the I.O. during investigation, which are available on the record and I find that though Smti Linda Sema, respondent No. 1 and Ms. 13. I have carefully gone through the record of the learned court below and the case diary, specially statement of the witnesses recorded by the I.O. during investigation, which are available on the record and I find that though Smti Linda Sema, respondent No. 1 and Ms. Leiki Sinha, respondent No. 4, have checked the private part of the victim yet they have found nothing and they have also called the delinquent juvenile who also flatly denied the allegation and that they reported the matter to the school authority and the Principal then constituted team of teachers to keep vigil upon the victim and juvenile and they found the victim absolutely fine with the juvenile and as such, they have concluded that nothing has happened. The medical report which is also available on the record reveals that no sign and symptom of being sexually assaulted was present and hymen was intact and a rash, redness, swelling of labia was present. 14. Sub-Section 1 to Section 19 of the POCSO Act provides that Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 any person (including the child), who has apprehension that an offence under this Act is likely to be committed or has knowledge that such an offence has been committed, he shall provide such information to, (a) the Special Juvenile Police Unit; or (b) the local police. It is a fact that here in this case no information has been provided either to special juvenile police unit or the local police. But, criminal culpability of non-reporting is totally dependent on “knowledge” that the alleged offence took place. In the case in hand, though the respondent Nos. 1 and 4, in presence of respondent No. 3, Ms. Papi Dada, has checked the private part of the victim yet they have found nothing and the medical report also reveals no sign and symptom of being sexually assaulted and her hymen was intact though rash, swelling of labia was present. They have also called the juvenile offender and questioned him about the offence and then he flatly denied the same. They have also reported the matter to the school authority and school authority constituted a team of teachers to keep vigil upon the victim and the juvenile offender and they also found nothing. They have also called the juvenile offender and questioned him about the offence and then he flatly denied the same. They have also reported the matter to the school authority and school authority constituted a team of teachers to keep vigil upon the victim and the juvenile offender and they also found nothing. The place where the alleged occurrence took place is not covered under the CCTV also and as such, nothing was found by the I.O. while checking the CCTV footage and as such, the ‘knowledge’ or ‘reason to believe’ which are the ingredients of the offence under Section 19 of the POCSO Act cannot be said to be made out here in this case. 15. The learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6 & 7 has rightly pointed this out during argument and the ratio laid down in the case of A. S. Krishnan and Ors. (supra), referred by her also fully supported her submission. In the aforesaid case, Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “9. Under IPC, guilt in respect of almost all the offences is fastened either on the ground of "intention" or "knowledge" or "reason to believe". We are now concerned with the expressions "knowledge" and "reason to believe". "Knowledge" is an awareness on the part of the person concerned indicating his state of mind. "Reason to believe" is another facet of the state of mind. "Reason to believe" is not the same thing as "suspicion" or "doubt" and mere seeing also cannot be equated to believing. "Reason to believe" is a higher level of state of mine. Likewise "knowledge" will be slightly on higher plane than "reason to believe". A person can be supposed to know where there is a direct appeal to his senses and a person is presumed to have a reason to believe if he has sufficient cause to believe the same. Section 26 IPC explains the meaning of the words "reason to believe" thus: 26 -"Reason to believe": A person is said to have 'reason to believe' a thing, if he has sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise." 10. In substance what it means is that a person must have reason to believe if the circumstances are such that a reasonable man would, by probable reasoning, conclude or infer regarding the nature of the thing concerned. In substance what it means is that a person must have reason to believe if the circumstances are such that a reasonable man would, by probable reasoning, conclude or infer regarding the nature of the thing concerned. Such circumstances need not necessarily be capable of absolute conviction or inference; but it is sufficient if the circumstances are such creating a cause to believe by chain of probable reasoning leading to the conclusion or inference about the nature of the thing. These two Page No.# 12/14 requirements i.e. "knowledge" and "reason to believe" have to be deduced from various circumstances in the case.” 16. Since, the ‘knowledge’ or ‘reason to believe’ cannot be attributed to the respondent Nos. 1, 3 & 4, criminal liability under Section 19, to the considered opinion of this Court, cannot be attributed to them. 17. Also having gone through the record, I find the absence of ingredients of the offence under Sections 176/120(B)/201 IPC as the ‘intention’ and ‘knowledge’ which are the basic requirement of the Section 176/201 IPC have not been found out from the materials collected by the I.O. during investigation. 18. It is a fact that the complainant-mother of the victim and the victim and her elder sister and witness Yame Singhi has corroborated each other in respect of the alleged offence. But, the same may be sufficient for putting the juvenile offender into trial, but not sufficient for the rest of the respondents to put them into trial and as such, it cannot be said that the impugned order of the learned Court below suffers from any illegality or impropriety, requiring interference of this Court. It is a settled proposition of law that when two views are possible and the learned Court below has taken one of the views, the Revisional Court cannot substitute its own view with that of the Trial Court. 19. It is a settled proposition of law that when two views are possible and the learned Court below has taken one of the views, the Revisional Court cannot substitute its own view with that of the Trial Court. 19. In the case Sajjan Kumar –vs.-Central Bureau of Investigation: (2010) 9 SSC 368, Hon’ble Supreme Court, having taken into account various cases decided by it earlier on the subject of framing of charge, has summarized the principle which are to be kept in mind by the Court at the stage of framing of charge for discharge of accused under Sections 227 and 228 of the Cr.P.C. “(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. ii) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. iii) The Court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the Court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the Court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the Court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging there from taken at their face value discloses the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. It is also held that:- a. It is clear that at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which led the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; b. If the evidence, which the prosecution possess to adduce, proves the guilt of the accused, even if fully accept before it is challenge in cross-examination or reverted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. 20. Application of the aforementioned principle to the factual matrix of the case in hand would reveal that the evidence, which the prosecution possess to adduce, to proves the guilt of the accused, even if the same is accepted before it is challenge in cross-examination, failed to show or to give raise strong suspicion that the respondents have committed the offence, and as such there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. In the given facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that a prima-facie case is made out against the respondent No.1 to 7, so as to put them to trial under section 120(B)/201/176 Indian Penal Code, read with Section 21(ii) of the POCSO Act. Thus, having tested the impugned order, on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles, it cannot be said that the same suffers from any illegality or impropriety requiring any interference of this court. 21. In the result I find no merit in this petition and accordingly, the same stands dismissed. The parties have to bear their own cost. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.