JUDGMENT : DEVASHIS BARUAH, J. 1. Heard Mr. R. Iralu, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. L. Iralu for the petitioner and Mr. Kekhriengulie, learned Additional AG for the respondent. 2. This is an application under Rule 32 of the Rules for the Administration of Police and Justice in Nagaland, 1973 against the impugned order dated 07.08.2019, passed in Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2015 by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Kohima, Nagaland. The brief facts of the instant case is that the petitioner claims to be the owner of a plot of land at Keziekie, North Block, Kohima measuring 150 ft. x 150 ft. vide allotment No. Rev 21/65, dated 16.12.1963 issued by the then Deputy Commissioner (DC), Kohima. It is the case of the petitioner that the said allotment order dated 16.12.1963 was originally issued in favour of the petitioner’s grandfather, namely, Mr. Kerisal Kenyao, when he was working at the Office of the Deputy Commissioner as Peshkar and the said land has been in possession of the family of the petitioner since 1963 and the petitioner after the expiry of his father and grandfather had developed the said land. It is the further case of the petitioner that sometime in the year 2015, the respondent herein out of nowhere started to forcibly encroach upon the land of the petitioner which prompted the petitioner to file a complaint to the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima, in terms with Rule 23A of the Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in Nagaland, 1937 (in short ‘the 1937 Rules’) and a case was registered as Pol/Case No. 5/2015. The Dobashis after hearing the parties and their witnesses at length, in addition to conducting spot verification of the disputed land pronounced its decision vide order dated 29.07.2015 in favour of the petitioner. 3. Being aggrieved by the said order, the respondent herein preferred an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner under Rule 31 of the Rules, and the same was endorsed by the Deputy Commissioner to the Court of the Additional Deputy Commissioner (ADC), Kohima, which was registered as Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2015. The Additional Deputy Commissioner after hearing the parties, by order dated 17.05.2017 ruled in favour of the petitioner upholding the judgment and order of the Dobashis Court. 4. The Additional Deputy Commissioner after hearing the parties, by order dated 17.05.2017 ruled in favour of the petitioner upholding the judgment and order of the Dobashis Court. 4. Further, being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner dated 17.05.2017, the respondent filed a Revision petition under Rule 32 of the 1973 Rules which was registered as Civil Revision Petition No. 12(K) of 2017 before this Court and by a judgment and order dated 25.05.2018, this Court remanded the matter back for reconsideration by quashing and setting aside the order dated 17.05.2017, passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner. In doing so, this Court was also of the opinion that the Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2015 should be adjudicated by a competent Court in accordance with law and accordingly, the Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2015 was transferred from the Court of the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Kohima to the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Kohima, whereby a time frame of 6(six) months was fixed for disposal of the said Civil Appeal. 5. While the said matter stood pending for disposal before the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, a Review Petition was filed before this Court by the petitioner which was registered and numbered as Review Petition No. 11(K) of 2018. The ground on which the Review Petition was sought for was that the transfer of Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2015 from the Court of the Additional Deputy Commissioner to the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division was contrary to the Notification No. LAW/ACT-13/97 dated 22.05.2008, whereby the nomenclature of various Courts in Nagaland were changed and as such it was the case of the petitioner in the Review petition that the Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2015 ought to be heard by the District and Sessions Judge or the Additional District and Sessions Judge and not the Civil Judge, Senior Division. This Court vide an order dated 23.01.2019, reviewed the earlier direction and thereby directed that the Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2015, be transferred from the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Kohima to the Court of the District Judge, Kohima. 6. This Court vide an order dated 23.01.2019, reviewed the earlier direction and thereby directed that the Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2015, be transferred from the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Kohima to the Court of the District Judge, Kohima. 6. The said Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2015 was therefore heard by the District Judge on 07.08.2019 and on the same day the impugned order was passed whereby the order passed by the Dobashis Court dated 29.05.2015, passed in Pol/Case No. 5 of 2015 was set aside on the ground of not framing issues by the Dobashis Court and the Principal District and Sessions Judge was of the view that denovo trial is a must for the interest of justice. The petitioner herein being the plaintiff was directed to file his plaint afresh before the court within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the said order. It is against the said order dated 07.08.2019 passed in the Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2015, that the petitioner has approached this Court. 7. Mr. R. Iralu, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order passed by the Court below dated 07.08.2019 in Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2015 is a cryptic order by which the order passed in favour of the petitioner has been set aside without any reason. It is the submission of Mr. R. Iralu, learned Senior counsel that framing of issues in a proceeding before the Dobashis Court is completely foreign to the Rules. He submits that a perusal of the impugned order shows that the Court below had set aside the decision of Dobashis Court dated 29.07.2015, only on the ground of not framing of issues by the Dobashis Court. He further submits that it is a different case that the Court below had authority in terms with Rule 31 of the 1937 Rules, if the Court sees reasons to doubt the justice of the decision but that does not mean that the Court would set aside the said order on the ground that it proposes to go for a denovo trial. He submits that going for a denovo trial is based on the satisfaction that the Court has reasons to doubt the decision and merely doubting cannot result in completely wiping out the decision of the Dobashis Court. 8. On the other hand Mr. He submits that going for a denovo trial is based on the satisfaction that the Court has reasons to doubt the decision and merely doubting cannot result in completely wiping out the decision of the Dobashis Court. 8. On the other hand Mr. Kekhriengulie, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent had submitted that the impugned order passed by the Court below is in accordance with law in as much as the Court below had reason to doubt the justice of the decision rendered in the order dated 29.07.2015 passed by the Dobashis Court, and as such the Court was of the opinion to try the case denovo and had rightly set aside the said order dated 29.07.2015. He further submits that framing of issues is required to arrive at a right decision and in that regard refers to a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Vimedo Angami vs. Ziekruoo Angami, (1983) 1 GLR (NOC) 34, wherein it has been held that framing of issues is necessary for the Court to get a grip of the case, which enable it to determine the material propositions affirmed by the one party and denied by the other. In the said judgment it is also mentioned that issues need to be framed in a civil action even in Nagaland where civil proceedings are governed by the Rules. He also referred to another judgment of this Court in the case of Onger Luen vs. Tongpangchiba, 1998 (1) GLT 135, wherein at Para No. 9, the manner in which denovo trial is to be conducted has been mentioned. On the basis of the above, it is therefore the case of the respondent that there is no illegality passed in the order by the Court below. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and given my anxious consideration to the matter. Let this Court first take into consideration as to whether the Court below was right in setting aside the order of the Dobashis Court dated 29.07.2015 on the ground that the said decision was arrived at without framing any issues. Rule 26 of the 1937 Rules, stipulates the manner in which the Dobashis Court is required to administer civil justice. The said Rule is quoted herein-below: “26. Rule 26 of the 1937 Rules, stipulates the manner in which the Dobashis Court is required to administer civil justice. The said Rule is quoted herein-below: “26. All proceedings shall be Viva voce and the Mauzadars, gaonburas, chiefs, headmen of Khels, Dobashis or other duly recognized village authorities shall not be called upon to make either record or registry of their decision. After hearing both parties and their witness, if any, they shall pronounce a decision forthwith.” A perusal of the said Rule would show that all proceedings before the Dobashis and other authorities as mentioned in the said Rule shall be Viva voce meaning thereby orally rather than written. The said Dobashis while administering justice shall not be called upon to make either record or registry of their decision. What they need to do is, after hearing both the parties and the witness, if there is any, pronounce a decision forthwith. Under such circumstances, it is the opinion of this Court that for proceedings which are to be in Viva voce mode, it is difficult to comprehend as to how issues could be framed. It is a different thing that the Dobashis while pronouncing its decision may cull out the points for determination for arriving at a just decision in the case. This can be done taking into consideration that the Dobashis Court tries and decides civil cases on the basis of reference made under Rule 23 A of the Rules. 10. On a perusal of the decision dated 29.07.2015 passed by the Dobashis Court, it would appear that the Dobashis Court had taken into consideration that on one hand, the petitioner had claimed rightful ownership over the land in question and on the other hand, the respondent had claimed that the said land has been ancestral and on the basis thereof had come to a finding. As the matter is pending before the Court below, this Court would not like to give any opinion as regards to the legalities of the finding arrived at by the Dobashis Court, however it is apparent from a perusal of the said decision of the Dobashis Court that the point of determination was duly taken into consideration. As the matter is pending before the Court below, this Court would not like to give any opinion as regards to the legalities of the finding arrived at by the Dobashis Court, however it is apparent from a perusal of the said decision of the Dobashis Court that the point of determination was duly taken into consideration. In such circumstances, as it is not the requirement in terms of Rule 26 or in the other provisions of the Rules that the Dobashis Court is required to frame any issues, this Court is therefore of the opinion that the Court below had committed a jurisdictional error in setting aside the decision dated 29.07.2015, on the ground that the Dobashis Court did not frame the issues. 11. At this stage, the judgment referred to by the learned counsel for the respondent may be taken into consideration. The judgment in the case of Onger Luen vs. Tongpangchiba, 1998 (1) GLT 135 is in reference to the exercise of jurisdiction under Rule 31 of the Rules as could be clearly seen from Para 9 of the said judgment. As would be seen from the subsequent paragraphs of the instant judgment, it is the requirement of law that while exercising a denovo trial the procedure encompassed in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is required to be followed. However, framing of issues in proceedings before the Dobashis Court is completely foreign more so in view of Rule 26 of the said Rules. The judgment of this Court in Vimedo Angami vs. Ziekruoo Angami, (1983) 1 GLR (NOC) 34, though observes that framing of issues in a manner laid down in Order XIV of the Code of Civil Procedure is essential and necessary in Nagaland as the principles governing under the Rules are of universal application but until Rule 26 of the Rules continue to hold the field whereby the proceedings before the Dobashis Court would be Viva Voce mode it is difficult to comprehend as to how issues can be framed sans pleadings. The entire body of the said judgment in the case of Vimedo Angami vs. Ziekruoo Angami, (1983) 1 GLR (NOC) 34, has not been placed before this Court; what has been placed is only Notes of Case (NOC) and from that it cannot be ascertained as to whether the decision rendered therein is in reference to appeal proceedings under Rule 31 or as to whether Rule 26 was at all taken into consideration. 12. Moreover, the decision of the Appellate Court to set aside the decision of the Dobashis Court on the basis of a doubt for which a denovo trial is ordered does not inspire this Court as a decision of an authority can only be set aside after firmly coming to the conclusion that the said order is erroneous and requires interference. The denovo trial to which the Appellate Court can resort to under Rule 31 of the Rules is only to dispel the doubt which had arisen as regards the justice of the decision and upon the culmination of the denovo trial the said doubt can be dispelled. This Court is therefore of the view that the decision of the Dobashis Court shall continue to remain in operation during the denovo trial proceedings as conceptualized under Rule 31, however, subject to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Appellate Court, to stay the operation of the decision of the Dobashis Court in terms with Order XLI Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 13. Now, the next question which arises for consideration is as to whether the Court below was justified in directing denovo trial in the instant matter. At this stage, it may be relevant to take into consideration Rule 31 of the said Rules which is quoted herein-below: “31. An appeal shall lie from the decision of the mauzadar, gaonbura, chief, headman of khels, dobhasis or other duly recognized village authority to the tribal court whenever constituted on otherwise to the Deputy Commissioner or his Assistant. A record shall be made of the matter in dispute and the decision of the village authorities. If necessary, the Court shall examine the parties, and if the decision appears to be just, shall affirm and enforce it as one of its own. A record shall be made of the matter in dispute and the decision of the village authorities. If necessary, the Court shall examine the parties, and if the decision appears to be just, shall affirm and enforce it as one of its own. If the Court sees reason to doubt the justice of the decision, it will try the cases denovo, or refer it to a panchayat as above.” 14. A perusal of the said provision would show that the appeal lies from the decision of Dobashis amongst others to the tribal Court wherever constituted or otherwise to the Deputy Commissioner or his Assistant. It further appears that a record shall be maintained of the matter in dispute and the decision of the village authorities. If necessary, the Court shall examine the parties, and if the decision appears to be just, shall affirm and enforce it as one of its own. However, if the Court sees reason to doubt the justice of the decision, it will try the cases denovo, or refer to a panchayat as above, meaning thereby that the Court of the Deputy Commissioner or his Assistant would be the Appellate authority/Appellate Court from the decision of the Dobhasis and if the said Appellate Court has reasons to doubt the justice of the decision, it has the power to try the cases denovo. As per the Notification No. LAW/ACT-13/97 dated 22.05.2008, the Court of Deputy Commissioner (Judicial), would now be known as District and Sessions Judge and similarly, the Court of Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial), will now be known as Additional District and Sessions Judge. 15. The decision to go ahead with the denovo trial is absolutely within the discretion of the Appellate Court if the Appellate Court sees reasons to doubt the justice of the decision. A perusal of the impugned order reveals that the Court below was of the view that denovo trial is a must for the interest of justice and accordingly had directed the petitioner who was the plaintiff to file a plaint before the Court within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the said order. A perusal of the impugned order reveals that the Court below was of the view that denovo trial is a must for the interest of justice and accordingly had directed the petitioner who was the plaintiff to file a plaint before the Court within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the said order. As it is the discretion of the Appellate Court to decide as to whether it would try the case denovo on the basis that the Appellate Court sees reasons to doubt the justice of the decision, this Court in exercise of its revisionary jurisdiction would not like to interfere with the said observation to proceed with the denovo trial. It has been stated in the Bar that in any proceeding before the Principal District and Sessions Judge, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable and as such the direction of the Court below to the petitioner who is the plaintiff to file a plaint within the period stipulated cannot be said to be an error in exercise of jurisdiction for this Court to interfere. More so when without pleadings of the parties, the question of framing of issues does not arise and if the trial of a case of civil nature is to be carried out before the Court of the Principal District and Sessions Judge or the Additional District and Sessions Judge, issues have to be framed. 16. This Court is therefore of the opinion that the direction given by the Court below to proceed with the denovo trial and a further direction to the petitioner/plaintiff to file his plaint does not suffer from any jurisdictional error calling for interference from this Court. Consequently, this Court partially interferes with the impugned order in so far as setting aside the impugned order dated 29.07.2015 by the Dobashis Court but affirms the impugned order in so far as the Court below decided to proceed with the denovo trial of the case and the direction to the petitioner/plaintiff to file his plaint within a period of 30 days. Accordingly, taking into consideration that while filing the instant petition, this Court had vide its order dated 21.10.2019, stayed the impugned order and as the instant petition stands partially allowed in terms with the observations made herein above, the interim order passed by this Court on 21.10.2019 stands vacated thereby directing the Court below, i.e., the Principal District and Session Judge, Kohima to proceed with the denovo trial of the dispute in the Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2015 upon receipt of the records. It is made clear that the decision of the Dobashis Court dated 29.07.2015 is reinstituted and shall continue to remain enforceable unless stayed by the Appellate Court in accordance with law. 17. It is further directed that the petitioner/plaintiff shall file his plaint within a period of 30 days from the date of the instant order and thereafter the Court below shall proceed with the trial in accordance with the procedure established. The Registry is directed to expeditiously return the LCR within a period of 15 days from today. 18. With the above observations, the instant petition stands disposed off.