ORDER : 1. A “sincere” senior most I.A.S. officer, who is working as Special Chief Secretary to the Government, Y.Srilakshmi, who is familiar to the public of both states i.e. Andhra Pradesh and Telangana for her honesty while discharging her duties, filed this petition with a request to two judges out of three judges viz. Justice M.Satyanarayana Murthy and Justice D.V.S.S.Somayajulu to recuse/withdraw from hearing the writ petitions and to prove their qualification to hear the lis pending before this Court on the ground that two judges i.e. Justice M.Satyanarayana Murthy and Justice D.V.S.S.Somayajulu were allotted house plot of an extent of 600 Sq.Yards each by the Government in Nelapadu, which is within the limits of Capital Region Development Authority, now Amaravati Metropolitan Region Development Authority and thereby have financial interest in the subject matter. There is a possibility of increase or decrease of value of the land depending upon the result of the writ petitions and proposed shifting of High Court from Nelapadu to Kurnool will have its own impact on the value of the property possessed by two judges on allotment by the then Government, requested to recuse/withdraw from hearing of the case. 2. The major ground urged before this Court is that two judges i.e. Justice M.Satyanarayana Murthy and Justice D.V.S.S.Somayajulu have a “pecuniary interest” in the litigation. It is no doubt true that these judges purchased property by paying Rs.30,00,000/- i.e. prevailing market value. The land was not allotted by the State on a concessional price to these two Judges alone, but is based on the market value and is the result of an allotment to 14 Judges in all. The State executed a sale deed in favour of two judges as alleged in the petition along with sale deeds in favour of other twelve judges as a policy decision. Would it create any pecuniary interest in the litigation is to be examined by this Court in view of the serious allegations made against the two judges? At this stage, it is necessary to refer to the contents of various documents filed before this Court. 3. Would it create any pecuniary interest in the litigation is to be examined by this Court in view of the serious allegations made against the two judges? At this stage, it is necessary to refer to the contents of various documents filed before this Court. 3. Background facts which are not mentioned in the affidavit : On 08.12.2018, the Secretary to Government (Political), General Administration Department, A.P. Secretariat addressed a letter vide Ltr.No.GAD01PERSOMISC/194/SC.E/2018 to the Common High Court proposing to allot house sites to the Hon’ble Judges, Judicial Officers and Staff working in the High court of Andhra Pradesh. In response to the said letter, the Registrar General addressed a letter to the Secretary to Government (Political), General Administration Department, A.P.Secretariat stating that the proposal to allot house sites to the Hon’ble Judges, Judicial Officers and staff working in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh was accepted by the Administrative Committee on 14.02.2019, and the decision of the Administrative Committee was also placed before Full Court and the Full Court has approved the decision of the Administrative Committee on 20.02.2019. 4. State Government issued G.O.Ms.No.34 Municipal Administration and Urban Development (CRDA.2) Department dated 24.01.2019. A copy of it is annexed to the petition. The said G.O.Ms.NO.34 dated 24.01.2019 was issued to allot house sites to various officials and the preamble of the said Government Order is as follows: “Consequent to bifurcation of the state and creation of the new state of Andhra Pradesh, the new capital city area is notified in 29 villages of Guntur district and named as Amaravati. Amaravati is being developed and the High Court, Legislature, Secretariat, Government heads of departments, State Public Sector Undertakings and State level institutions are being established in the new capital. Buildings of the Secretariat, Legislature, heads of departments etc. are coming up in the ‘Government city’ while the High Court and related institutions are coming up in the ‘Justice city’ of Amaravati capital city area. About 10,000 staff will be re-located to the new city to work in these institutions. The entire Amaravati capital city area of about 54,000 acres is pooled by AP CRDA under CRDA Act. As the city is a new area still under development there is lack of housing stock in the new capital. About 10,000 staff will be re-located to the new city to work in these institutions. The entire Amaravati capital city area of about 54,000 acres is pooled by AP CRDA under CRDA Act. As the city is a new area still under development there is lack of housing stock in the new capital. It is observed that earlier greenfield state capital cities in India have been struggling to attract human settlement even after 2 to 3 decades of their development. Therefore, in order to kick start city development it is necessary to promote settlement of this category of people. For this purpose of facilitating settlement of all this category of people in the new greenfield capital city, a housing policy for Amaravati Capital City Area is required. Accordingly in reference read above, the cabinet has approved the Employees Housing Policy for Amaravati Capital City Area.” 5. The main ‘aim’ mentioned in G.O.Ms.No.34 dated 24.01.2019, is as follows. 2.1. AIM: The aim of housing policy in Amaravati Greenfield capital city is to encourage settlement of first settlers (Judiciary functionaries/employees, Government functionaries/employees, Legislature employees, press etc.,) in the new city for rapid city development and its smooth functioning. Many new institutions are being allotted lands in Amaravati on concessional terms for kick starting the new city as it is a new area. There is a need to create a social environment by providing housing and incentivising housing investment into creation of housing stock by the first settlers of Amaravati city. 6. As is visible from the preamble and aim of G.O.Ms.No.34 dated 24.01.2019; it is the State alone, which decided to provide house sites due to lack of housing in the new capital area. In order to kick start the city development and to promote settlement of officers of various departments, the State issued the above G.O.Ms.No.34 dated 24.01.2019 to provide house site to various officers including I.A.S, I.P.S. officers and other bureaucrats. The State framed the policy under the said Government Order, and fixed the eligibility criteria. 7. As per clause 2.4 (b) General Conditions of allotment, the time for completion of house/flat construction by the allottees will be three (3) years from the date of land allotment. Similarly, clause 2.4 (c) deals with prohibition on resale. According to it, an employee who is allotted a house site/flat shall not sell such site for a minimum period of fifteen (15) years. Similarly, clause 2.4 (c) deals with prohibition on resale. According to it, an employee who is allotted a house site/flat shall not sell such site for a minimum period of fifteen (15) years. 8. On 13.02.2019, the Government issued another G.O.Ms.No.66 Municipal Administration and Urban Development (CRDA.2) Department dated 13.02.2019 for allotment of house site to various employees working in different departments repeating the preamble of G.O.Ms.No.34 dated 28.01.2019 in paragraph No.5 and proposed to allot house site of 200 Sq.yards each to Government Gazetted Employees at the rate of Rs.4,500/- per sq.yard as freehold and house site of 175 Sq.yards each to Government Non-Gazetted Employees at the rate of Rs.4,000/- per sq.yard as freehold. 9. On the basis of correspondence between the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and the Government of Andhra Pradesh, the State issued Memo No.827506/CRDA.2/2019 dated 01.03.2019 based on G.O.Ms.No.34 dated 24.01.2019 and G.O.Ms.No.66 dated 13.02.2019, finalised allotment of 600 Sq.yards to Judges, 500 Sq.yards to Registrar General and Registrars, 200 Sq.yards to Gazetted Officers of the High Court, 175 Sq.yards to Non-Gazetted Officers of the High Court. 10. Based on the said Memo, on payment of valuable sale consideration of Rs.30,00,000/-, house site of 600 Sq.yards was allotted to each of the judges working in the High Court as on 24.01.2019. Fourteen (14) judges were allotted house site plots and the Commissioner, Capital Region Development Authority executed 14 registered sale deeds on payment of Rs.30,00,000/- each besides payment of registration charges on 24.04.2019. This consideration was paid from a Bank Loan obtained by mortgaging the title deed by the Judges. 11. Before execution of sale deed, letter of allotment was issued by the Commissioner, Capital Region Development Authority, Vijayawada incorporating general conditions of allotment. Condition No.2 prohibits alienation of land for a period of 15 years from the date of allotment of plot while fixing 3 years period for completion of construction of house in the allotted plot, from the date of allotment. But till date, none of us can physically identify the land on ground and possession was not physically delivered to the allottees. As mentioned earlier, it is purchased with a bank loan and the property is fully mortgaged. 12. But till date, none of us can physically identify the land on ground and possession was not physically delivered to the allottees. As mentioned earlier, it is purchased with a bank loan and the property is fully mortgaged. 12. In view of the prohibition as per clause (2) of allotment letter and clause 2.4 (b) of G.O.Ms.No.34 dated 24.01.2019, the allottees of land including the two Judges have the remotest possibility to have pecuniary gain at least during their lifetime. 13. The purpose of purchase of the plot is to facilitate people to settle at Amaravati in view of lack of housing within Amaravati area, only at the instance of the Government and not at the instance of any of the Judges working as on 24.01.2019 in the new High Court of Andhra Pradesh. 14. The test to be applied to determine the pecuniary interest is “likelihood of pecuniary interest”. In view of the interdict contained in terms of allotment letter and G.O.Ms.No.34 dated 24.01.2019, and the subsisting mortgage/restriction on sale etc., the two judges or any other judge, to whom the plots were purchased, cannot sell the same and the question of realising any amount more than the amount invested for purchase does not arise. Therefore, there is no ‘immediate likelihood of pecuniary gain’ on account of decision likely to be taken by the Full Bench of the High Court in the writ petition. There is no financial interest at all also since what is necessary as per settled law is “financial interest in the outcome of the case”. These two plots of land are not subject matter of the batch of writ petitions. The allocation of the two plots is not the subject matter of the litigation either. The essential issue raised is about the repeal of Act 27 and of Act No.28 of 2020 and the action of the State Government in general in announcing ‘three capitals’ instead of one capital. Thus, there is clearly no “direct financial interest in the outcome of the case.” One possible outcome is for the bench to uphold the repeal and the other possible outcome is to set aside the repeal. Hence, it is clear that any order passed will not lead to “financial interest” in the outcome. 15. Even otherwise it is clear that the respondent – State is taking clearly divergent stands. Hence, it is clear that any order passed will not lead to “financial interest” in the outcome. 15. Even otherwise it is clear that the respondent – State is taking clearly divergent stands. In the common counter affidavit filed in the batch of writ petitions, it is stated and reiterated many times that the entire land pooling scheme including the annuities etc., payable to the land losers is intact and that they will be given all the benefits/accretions as per the schemes. Therefore, the deponent states on oath that the farmers etc., who surrendered lands will not lose anything at all. It is stated that the land pooling scheme etc., will be continued and that the development of the Amaravati area will continue with adequate infrastructure; employment opportunities etc. They state that the State shall ensure optimal utilisation of the land in AMRDA to realise its full potential and that there is no deprivation. 16. Judges of the High Court are Constitutional functionaries and appointed under the Constitution. The State has to provide necessary amenities to discharge their duties as judges. The building, where the High Court is located is provided by the State. The cars in which the Judges are travelling are provided by the State. The accommodation obtained on lease entering into agreement with the owners of the Villas is being provided by the Government including the chair, where the Judge is sitting and discharging his duties and the pen, with which the Judge is signing orders are being provided by the State. The salaries of the judges are being paid by the Government. Merely because the Judges are being paid or provided everything, it is difficult to conclude that they have pecuniary interest in the transaction. If that is the case, no judge can discharge his/her duties effectively and mostly High Court judges are deciding the litigation’s where the State is a party. Therefore, the question of raising ground of pecuniary interest by the State on account of allotment of sites to the Judges is a strange contention not only to browbeat the Judges in discharging their duties but also to create fear complex in the minds of the judges. 17. When once the petitioner attributed disqualification to the two judges to decide the lis on account of pecuniary interest, it is for the petitioner to establish ‘immediate likelihood of pecuniary gain’ to the Judges. 17. When once the petitioner attributed disqualification to the two judges to decide the lis on account of pecuniary interest, it is for the petitioner to establish ‘immediate likelihood of pecuniary gain’ to the Judges. Even without looking into clauses in the allotment letter and G.O.Ms.No.34 dated 24.01.2019 she made such allegations to demean the judicial institution in the eye of public, slinging mud on the credibility of very judicial institution itself. 18. The law is well settled that judge may recuse to hear the lis pending before him on his own or at the request of any party to the lis subject to establishing the pecuniary interest by the person, who sought recusal. But the State is also not supposed to call upon two judges out of three judges hearing the writ petition to recuse/withdraw from hearing of the writ petition. Apart from that, the duty of the Government Pleader is to assist the Court and not expected to represent the Court like a private counsel. 19. In the alternative, even if there is any pecuniary interest as alleged, if it is minimum, that is not a ground to recuse from hearing of the case. There is lot of change in the law regarding ‘pecuniary interest’ on the basis of the principle ‘de minimis’. The term ‘de minimis’ is taken from the extended latin phrase ‘de minimis non curat lex’, which translates to ‘the law cares not for small things’. De minimis is a legal principle which allows for matters that are small scale or of insufficient importance to be exempted from a rule or requirement. It can be used by the courts as an exclusionary tool to dismiss trivial matters from litigation. 20. Thus, as a matter of policy, the law does not encourage the parties to raise such issues of ‘de minimis’. To disqualify a judge to hear any matter before him/her and to recuse himself/herself at the instance of any person, if the alleged pecuniary interest likely to be gained by the Judge is minimum, it can also be ignored. In the facts of the present case, the petitioner did not state anything about the quantum of pecuniary interest likely to be gained by the two Judges. The petitioner made bald allegations in an irresponsible manner to tarnish the image of very institution, particularly the Judges. In the facts of the present case, the petitioner did not state anything about the quantum of pecuniary interest likely to be gained by the two Judges. The petitioner made bald allegations in an irresponsible manner to tarnish the image of very institution, particularly the Judges. If such practice is allowed, there will not be any need for filing petition by either of the parties to demand recusal by the Judges from hearing the case. It is nothing but bench hunting tactics being adopted by the private parties. In the present case, the tactics adopted by the State are to say the least not correct. 21. Time and again, the Supreme Court considered as to when a Judge can recuse and when he cannot. 22. A Five judge bench judgment of Supreme Court in “Indore Development Authority (Recusal Matter – 5 J) v. Manoharlal, (2020) 6 SCC 304 ” strongly deprecated the practice of recusal by the Judges at the instance of litigant before them and held that: “……..rendering a decision on any issue of law and the corrective procedure of it cannot be said to be ground for recusal of a Judge; otherwise, no Judge can hear a review, curative petition, or a reference made to the larger bench. ….A judge rendering a judgment on a question of law would not be a bar to her or his participation if in a larger Bench if that view is referred for reconsideration. Recusal has been prayed for on the ground of legal predisposition. Where recusal is sought on the ground, various questions arise for consideration. Firstly, legal predisposition is the outcome of a judicial process of interpretation, and the entire judicial system exists for refining the same. There is absolutely nothing wrong in holding a particular view in a previous judgment for or against a view canvassed by a litigant. No litigant can choose, who should be on the Bench. He cannot say that a Judge who might have decided a case on a particular issue, which may go against his interest subsequently or is part of a larger Bench should not hear his case. Furthermore, if a party or his Counsel can at length argue on the question of recusal of the Judge before him, he can also successfully question the correctness of a judgment rendered by him. Furthermore, if a party or his Counsel can at length argue on the question of recusal of the Judge before him, he can also successfully question the correctness of a judgment rendered by him. A litigant has got the right to make arguments which suit his cause before a Judge/Judges having taken a contrary view earlier. Moreover, if it is open to one litigant to seek recusal and recusal is permitted, then the right has to be given to the opposite party to seek recusal of a Judge who may have decided a case against his interest. In case it is permitted to either side, that would end the “judicial independence”. Then parties will be choosing Benches. In that case, the Judges holding a view can be termed to be disqualified. In case the submission of recusal is accepted, the Judges having either side view, cannot hear the matter and have to recuse from hearing. In that case to find neutral Judges would be difficult to find and that would be subvert to the very concept of independent judicial system. If litigants are given the right to seek recusal of a judge on the ground that in a smaller Bench, a view has been taken by the Judge, the correctness of which has to be decided by the larger Bench, which includes the same Judge, then on a parity of reasoning recusal might be sought on the ground of the judge having taken a view one way or the other even in a different case in which similar issues are involved if the judge has decided similar issues earlier, in the same Court or in a different Court. This would open the flood gates of forum shopping. Recusal upon an imagined apprehension of legal pre-disposition would, in reality amount to acceding to the request that a Judge having a particular view and leanings in favour of the view which suits a particular litigant, should man the Bench. It would not only be allowing Bench hunting but would also be against the judicial discipline and will erode the confidence of the common man for which the judicial system survives. ….The entire judicial system is based on sound constitutional principles. It would not only be allowing Bench hunting but would also be against the judicial discipline and will erode the confidence of the common man for which the judicial system survives. ….The entire judicial system is based on sound constitutional principles. The roster making power is bestowed on the Chief Justice of India so that litigants are not able to choose the Judges before whom they have to argue a matter, and he is a constitutional functionary who has been enjoined with this task at the highest pedestal to exercise the power of roster making. He is the repository of faith. Once he has exercised his power, it is not for the Judges to choose. As per their oath, they have to discharge their duties without fear and favour and in a dispassionate manner without any ill will, bias towards litigants, or a cause. The question which arises is whether merely delivering a judgment of which correctness is to be examined, would disqualifying a Judge from being part of the larger Bench. The answer to the question has to be in the negative as there is a consistent practice of this Court which has evolved that the Judges who have rendered a decision earlier in smaller combination, have also formed part of the larger Bench, and there are umpteen occasions as mentioned above when Judges have overruled their own view. In “John Patrick LITEKY v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994)”, the United States Supreme Court has held that rather it may be advantageous to have them on a Bench hearing the matter as judgments are rendered after hearing the arguments of learned Counsel for the parties. There is always a scope to further develop the law and to correct the errors, and this can better be done by having Judges on the Bench, who have earlier rendered judgments with respect to the subject-matter to which of the parties the view taken suits is not relevant. ….If requests for recusal are acceded to for the asking, litigants will be unscrupulously taking over the roster making powers of the Chief Justice and that would tantamount to interference with the judicial system, by the mighty to have a particular Bench by employing several means and putting all kinds of pressures from all angles all around. ….If requests for recusal are acceded to for the asking, litigants will be unscrupulously taking over the roster making powers of the Chief Justice and that would tantamount to interference with the judicial system, by the mighty to have a particular Bench by employing several means and putting all kinds of pressures from all angles all around. It is the test of the ability of the judicial system to withstand such onslaught made from every nook and corner. Any recusal in the circumstances is ruled out, such prayer strengthens the stern determination not to succumb to any such pressure and not to recuse on the ground on which recusal sought because for any reason, such a prayer is permitted, even once, it would tantamount to cowardice and give room to big and mighty to destroy the very judicial system. Moreover, recusal in such unjustified circumstances, would become the norm. ….There may not be even one Judge in this Court who has not taken a view one way or the other concerning Section 24 of the Act of 2013, either in this Court or in the High Court. If the submission is accepted, no Judge will have the power to decide such a matter on the judicial side. Judges have to deal with the cases every day in which similar or somewhat different questions are involved concerning the same provision. For having taken a view once, if recusal is to be made, it would be very difficult to get a Judge to hear and decide a question of law. Judges have to correct the decision, apply the law, independently interpret the provisions as per the fact situation of the case which may not be germane in the earlier matter. 23. During hearing, learned senior Counsel Dushyant Dave referred to a judgment of Supreme Court in “Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. (Recusal Matter) v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 808 ”. The said judgment was referred in “Indore Development Authority (Recusal Matter – 5 J) v. Manoharlal” (referred supra) and noted that, for recusal the first principle is that the Judge should be impartial. Merely having a legal opinion has no connection with impartiality. It may be within the purview of the legal correctness of the opinion. The second test is Latin maxim nemo judex in re sua i.e., no man shall be a Judge in his own cause. Merely having a legal opinion has no connection with impartiality. It may be within the purview of the legal correctness of the opinion. The second test is Latin maxim nemo judex in re sua i.e., no man shall be a Judge in his own cause. A judgment rendered by a Judge is not in his own cause. A Judge could only be disqualified for a “direct pecuniary interest” or consanguinity, affinity, friendship or enmity with a party or because he was or had been a party's advocate. 24. But, in the present case, two Judges who are asked to recuse or withdraw have no direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case. If purchase of 600 Sq.yards house plot from the Government itself creates a pecuniary interest, most of the judges in the High Court i.e. 14 judges, who were allotted house sites are not entitled to decide any lis, where the State is a party. The petitioner does not answer the question if the writs involve a “pecuniary interest” at all. Bald allegations are made; without any basis. 25. On the other hand, judges are appointed under Article 217 of the Constitution of India and they have been administered oath of the office under Article 219 of the Constitution of India. They are required to discharge their duties without fear or favour by virtue of oath administered by them. If judge is recused to hear the matter, it is nothing but violating the oath of the office administered in terms of constitutional mandate. 26. In “Subrata Roy Sahara v Union of India, AIR 2014 SC 3241 ” the Apex Court recorded the observations of Delhi High Court as follows: "The path of recusal is very often a convenient and a soft option. This is especially so since a Judge really has no vested interest in doing a particular matter. However, the oath of office taken under Article 219 of the Constitution of India enjoins the Judge to duly and faithfully and to the best of his knowledge and judgment, perform the duties of office without fear or favour, affection or ill will while upholding the constitution and the laws. However, the oath of office taken under Article 219 of the Constitution of India enjoins the Judge to duly and faithfully and to the best of his knowledge and judgment, perform the duties of office without fear or favour, affection or ill will while upholding the constitution and the laws. In a case, where unfounded and motivated allegations of bias are sought to be made with a view of forum hunting / Bench preference or brow-beating the Court, then, succumbing to such a pressure would tantamount to not fulfilling the oath of office." 27. In fact, the observations of the High Court of Delhi and those of the Apex Court reflected, exactly how the Judges felt, when learned Counsel addressed the Court, at the commencement of the hearing. If it was learned Counsel's posturing antics, aimed at bench-hunting or bench-hopping (or should we say, benchavoiding), we would not allow that. Affronts, jibes and carefully and consciously planned snubs could not deter us, from discharging our responsibility. We could at any time, during the course of hearing, walk out and make way, for another Bench to decide the matter, if ever we felt that, that would be the righteous course to follow. We did not do so as we were determined to decide the matter dispassionately and on its own merits. Whether or not, it would be better for another Bench to hear this case, will emerge from the conclusions, we will draw, in the course of the present determination. 28. The Apex Court in “Seema Sapra v. Court On Its Own Motion, AIR 2019 SC 4020 ” again reiterated the opinion expressed by the Delhi High court and the Apex Court (extracted above) and remind the dictum of Lord Denning who observed in “R.v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex p. Blackburn (1968) 2 AII ER 319” as under: “All we would ask is that that those who criticize us will remember that, from the nature of our office, we cannot reply to their criticism. We cannot enter into public controversy. Still less into political controversy. We must rely on our conduct itself to be its own vindication. We cannot enter into public controversy. Still less into political controversy. We must rely on our conduct itself to be its own vindication. Exposed as we are to the winds of criticism, nothing which is said by this person or that nothing which is written by this pen or that, will deter us from doing what we believe is right; nor, I would add, from saying what the occasion requires provided that it is pertinent to the matter in hand. Silence is not an option when things are ill done.” 29. In the instant case, the Government being provider of finance to the State to run the Courts and providing amenities to all the judges made serious allegations against two judges out of three judges hearing the matter, demanding them to withdraw from bench. Such demand amounts to interference with the power of Chief Justice and cause to a dent to judicial independence. 30. One of us viz. Justice M.Satyanarayana Murthy was member of the Division Bench (1st Court) from 01.01.2019 to 19.06.2019 and 08.07.2019 to 13.10.2019 and passed various orders while sitting in the Division Bench, which were challenged in the Supreme Court. But the State never raised any objection (similar or otherwise) at that time. In fact, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while refusing to entertain SLP.No.9374 of 2020 clearly mentioned that the matter needs ‘early decision’ by the High Court (orders dated 26.08.2020). Apart from that, the present matter was heard by the Bench consisting of the then Chief Justice J.K.Maheshwari, Justice M.Satyanarayana Murthy and Justice N.Jayasurya from 02.11.2020 to 14.12.2020, but due to sudden transfer of the then Chief Justice J.K.Maheshwari, the matter could not be disposed of finally. No such objection was raised in this period also. Having failed to raise such objection during the hearing of the present matter from 02.11.2020 to 14.12.2020 the State took a serendipitous decision now to challenge the eligibility of two Judges to hear the writ petition by making a brazen attempt against the judicial institution to tarnish its image and judicial independence. Unless such attempts are dealt with sternly, it is difficult for any judge to discharge the duties and the same view is expressed by the Apex Court in “Indore Development Authority (Recusal Matter – 5 J) v. Manoharlal” (referred supra). Unless such attempts are dealt with sternly, it is difficult for any judge to discharge the duties and the same view is expressed by the Apex Court in “Indore Development Authority (Recusal Matter – 5 J) v. Manoharlal” (referred supra). In the said judgment, the Apex Court held that: “a litigant has got the right to make arguments which suit his cause before a Judge/Judges having taken a contrary view earlier. Moreover, if it is open to one litigant to seek recusal and recusal is permitted, then the right has to be given to the opposite party to seek recusal of a Judge who may have decided a case against his interest. In case it is permitted to either side, that would end judicial independence. Then parties will be choosing Benches to their liking. In that case, the Judges holding a view can be termed to be disqualified. In case the submission of recusal is accepted, the Judges having either side view, cannot hear the matter and have to recuse from hearing. In that case to find neutral Judges would be difficult to find and that would be subvert to the very concept of independent judicial system. If litigants are given the right to seek recusal of a judge on the ground that in a smaller Bench, a view has been taken by the Judge, the correctness of which has to be decided by the larger Bench, which includes the same Judge, then on a parity of reasoning recusal might be sought on the ground of the judge having taken a view one way or the other even in a different case in which similar issues are involved if the judge has decided similar issues earlier, in the same Court or in a different Court. This would open the flood gates of forum shopping. Recusal upon an imagined apprehension of legal pre-disposition would, in reality amount to acceding to the request that a Judge having a particular view and leanings in favour of the view which suits a particular litigant, should man the Bench. It would not only be allowing Bench hunting but would also be against the judicial discipline and will erode the confidence of the common man for which the judicial system survives.” 31. It would not only be allowing Bench hunting but would also be against the judicial discipline and will erode the confidence of the common man for which the judicial system survives.” 31. The Apex Court further held that: “the plea cannot be termed anything other than Bench hunting, if it is said that until and unless the one which suits a litigant is found the matters are not to be argued. It also passes comprehension whether in a Constitution Bench, consisting of five Judges, prayer for recusal of a Judge who has taken a particular view earlier, is justified? The Bench consists of five Judges. Each Judge may have his own view. They would not succumb to a view held by one of the judges. They may also have their own view in the matter. Are they also to be disqualified? In case the Petitioner's prayer is to be allowed, then they may want a Bench of 5:0 in their favour or 4 in favour and 1 against or 3 in favour and 2 against. That is not how the system can survive. The very idea of seeking recusal is inconceivable and wholly unjustified, and the prayer cannot be acceded to.” 32. In the Court on its own motion known as R.K. Anand's case of the year 2007 (Court on its own motion v. State (Crl.M. No. 9955 of 2007 in W.P (Crl.) No. 796 of 2007 dated 04.10.2007) the division bench of Delhi High Court in dealing with a recusal application filed by learned Senior Advocate Sri R.K. Anand, held as follows: “The path of recusal is very often a convenient and a soft option. This is especially so since a Judge really has no vested interest in doing a particular matter. However, the oath of office taken under Article 219 of the Constitution of India enjoins the Judge to duly and faithfully and to the best of his knowledge and judgment, perform the duties of office without fear or favour affection or ill will while upholding the constitution and the laws. In a case, where unfounded and motivated allegations of bias are sought to be made with a view of forum hunting / Bench preference or brow-beating the Court, then, succumbing to such a pressure would tantamount to not fulfilling the oath of office.” 33. In a case, where unfounded and motivated allegations of bias are sought to be made with a view of forum hunting / Bench preference or brow-beating the Court, then, succumbing to such a pressure would tantamount to not fulfilling the oath of office.” 33. The Apex Court in appeal against the above expression, vide “R.K. Anand v. Delhi High Court, (2009)8 SCC 106 ” by approving the Delhi High Court observations categorically held that bench hunting or bench hoping or bench avoiding could not be allowed. In this regard, it is relevant to extract the observation of the Apex Court that: "we are constrained to pass here for a moment and to express grave concern over the fact that lately such tendencies and practices are on the increase. We have come across instances where one could simply throw a stone on a Judge (who is quite defenceless in such matters!) and later on cite the gratuitous attack as the ground to ask to recuse himself from hearing a case in which he would be appearing. Such conduct is bound to cause deep hurt to the Judge concerned, but what is of far greater importance is that it defies the very fundamentals of administration of justice. A motivated application for recusal therefore needs to be dealt with sternly and should be viewed ordinarily as interference in the due course of justice leading to penal consequences". 34. In addition to the above facts, it is necessary to state that one of us Justice M.Satyanarayana Murthy is likely to retire within a few months and he is not bothered about the result of the writ petition as there is no possibility of holding Court after retirement. The other judge viz. Justice D.V.S.S.Somayajulu is likely to retire one year thereafter. Therefore, both are unmindful of the result of the lis pending before us and we are bound to discharge our duties without fear, favour, fervour or ill-will and as per the oath we took under Article 219 of the Constitution of India. 35. We find no merits in this application (I.A.No.1 of 2021), which is therefore dismissed.