JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. Kaushik Sarkhel, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and Mr. L.C.N. Shahdeo, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party. 2. Both these petitions have been heard together with consent of the parties. 3. By order dated 13.06.2017 Cr. Revision No.218 of 2017 has been directed to be tagged along with Cr.M.P.No.1153 of 2016. 4. An I.A. being I.A. No.1690 of 2017 in Cr.Rev.No.218/17 has been filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 245 days. 5. In view of the reasons assigned in the criminal revision petition, the same has been accepted the delay of 245 days is hereby condoned. 6. I.A. being I.A. No.1690 of 2017 in Cr.Rev.No.218/17 for condonation of delay is allowed and disposed of. 7. In both these petitions, the same cognizance order is under challenge. Since, cognizance has not been taken under section 3(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,1989 and that is why, the criminal revision has been preferred by the complainant and the Cr.M.P. petition has been filed by the petitioner for quashing of the entire proceeding including the order taking cognizance dated 15.03.2016 passed by the learned C.J.M., Saraikela whereby cognizance has been taken against the petitioners u/s 420/504/506/34 of the I.P.C in connection with P.C.Case No.324/2015, pending in the court of learned C.J.M., Saraikela. 8. 8. The complaint case was filed stating therein- (a) That the complainant namely Guru Charan Nayak filed a complaint petition before the learned C.J.M., Saraikela alleging therein that complainant is the labour supplier in the name and style of G.C. Enterprises, Gamharia of M/s Craftsman Automation Pvt. Ltd. (b) That it has further been alleged that the complainant had his ancestral property acquired by AIADA but the complainant was regularly cultivating the land before leasing out the same to the said company and the complainant in lieu of that used to provide labourers being labour supplier; (c) That it has further been alleged that the complainant was regularly supplying labourers to the company and the company issued a certificate issued by the petitioner no.1 to the complainant; (d) That it has further been alleged that complainant is the labour supplier vide licence no.328 dated 11.04.2008 issued by the labour superintendent, Saraikela, Kharsawan wherein Principal employer M/s Craftsman Automation Pvt. Ltd was indicated; (e) That it has further been alleged that the complainant was given work order by the petitioner no.3, who is the Asst. General Manager (Operations); (f) That it has further been alleged that as per the order supervisor has to be paid Rs.365/- per day for 8 hours a day but management was taking 12 hours duty from the supervisor and it was orally agreed by the company that the payment for extra work will be paid to the supervisor through the contractor; (g) That it has further been alleged that on 12.10.2015 the complainant went to the office of the petitioner no.1 to demand the payment for the extra work but the petitioner no.1 asked for the commission but the complainant denied on which the petitioner no.1 agreed and abused the complainant using filthy languages taking caste name of the complainant; (h) That it has further been alleged that on 13.10.2015 when the complainant went to the factory gate, the complainant was not allowed to enter into the factory premise but the supervisor and the labourers were allowed to work; (i) That on 19.10.2015 the petitioner no.1 at about 3.30 P.M called the complainant on his phone and asked him to come to the company and the complainant was allowed to enter without gate pass and the petitioner no.3 forced the complainant to sign on a blank paper but the complainant denied to sign on which petitioner no.3 got angry and abused the complainant in filthy language taking caste name; and (j) That is has further been alleged that on 14.10.2015 petitioner no.3 has told to the supervisor to say to the complainant to give commission otherwise both will be out of the company. 9. Mr. Sarkhel, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in the Cr.M.P. petition, submits that the cognizance has been taken under sections 420/504/506/34 of the I.P.C. He submits that no ingredients of those sections are there and inspite of that the cognizance has been taken by the learned court under those sections. He submits that the company M/s Craftsman Automation Pvt. Ltd. has issued some work order in favour of the complainant and in course of that, Rs.8 lakhs has been paid to the complainant from the company for payment of ESI/EPF which has not been paid by the complainant to the labourers and for not paying the amount to the concerned workmen, the company has filed the Money Suit No.7/2016 which was decreed in favour of the company. He submits that all these facts have been disclosed and complaint was filed in Gamharia P.S. He submits that after the complaint by the petitioner after much delay this complaint has been filed which is in retaliation and this is a malicious prosecution. He submits that the officers of the company have been made accused whereas the company is not made accused. He submits that in absence of the company, the proceeding is bad in law. To buttress his this argument, he relied in the case of “Ravindranatha Bajpe v. Mangalore Special Economic Zone Ltd. and Ors.”, AIR 2021 SC 4587 . Paragraph nos. 8 and 8.1 are quoted herein below : “8. In the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal (supra), it is observed by this Court in paragraphs 42 to 44 as under: "(iii) Circumstances when Director/person in charge of the affairs of the company can also be prosecuted, when the company is an accused person 42. No doubt, a corporate entity is an artificial person which acts through its officers, Directors, Managing Director, Chairman, etc. If such a company commits an offence involving mens rea, it would normally be the intent and action of that individual who would act on behalf of the company. It would be more so, when the criminal act is that of conspiracy. However, at the same time, it is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides so. 43. Thus, an individual who has perpetrated the commission of an offence on behalf of a company can be made an accused, along with the company, if there is sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with criminal intent. Second situation in which he can be implicated is in those cases where the statutory regime itself attracts the doctrine of vicarious liability, by specifically incorporating such a provision. 44. When the company is the offender, vicarious liability of the Directors cannot be imputed automatically, in the absence of any statutory provision to this effect. One such example is Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 44. When the company is the offender, vicarious liability of the Directors cannot be imputed automatically, in the absence of any statutory provision to this effect. One such example is Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. In Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661 : ( AIR 2012 SC 2795 ), the Court noted that if a group of persons that guide the business of the company have the criminal intent, that would be imputed to the body corporate and it is in this backdrop, Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has to be understood. Such a position is, therefore, because of statutory intendment making it a deeming fiction. Here also, the principle of "alter ego", was applied only in one direction, namely, where a group of persons that guide the business had criminal intent, that is to be imputed to the body corporate and not the vice versa. Otherwise, there has to be a specific act attributed to the Director or any other person allegedly in control and management of the company, to the effect that such a person was responsible for the acts committed by or on behalf of the company." 8.1. In the case of Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 5 SCC 668 : (AIROnline 2007 SC 332), in paragraph 13, it is observed and held as under: "13. Where a jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint petition filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind. The Penal Code does not contain any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the part of the Managing Director or the Directors of the Company when the accused is the company. The learned Magistrate failed to pose unto himself the correct question viz. as to whether the complaint petition, even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety, would lead to the conclusion that the respondents herein were personally liable for any offence. The Bank is a body corporate. Vicarious liability of the Managing Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the statute. Statutes indisputably must contain provision fixing such vicarious liabilities. The Bank is a body corporate. Vicarious liability of the Managing Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the statute. Statutes indisputably must contain provision fixing such vicarious liabilities. Even for the said purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the complainant to make requisite allegations which would attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability." 10. He further submits that since the petitioner has already complained before the Gamharia P.S. and after much delay this complaint has been filed which is in retaliation and accordingly it is malicious proceeding against the petitioner. To buttress his this argument, he has relied in the case of “Deo Lakhan Paswan v. State of Jharkhand and Ors.”, 2012(1) JLJR 206 (SC). He further submits that cognizance has been taken under section 504/420/506 and 34 IPC. He submits that ingredients under those sections are not made out. He submits that there is no discuss of fraudulent intention from the very beginning which is one of the ingredient to be looked into for making out the case under section 420 I.P.C. He submits that in identical nature of case, it has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Mitesh Kumar J. Sha v. The State of Karnataka and Ors.”, AIR 2021 SC 5298 . Paragraph nos. 44 and 45 are quoted belew : “44. Furthermore, in the landmark judgment of State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors. regarding exercise of inherent powers under section 482 of CrPC, this Court has laid down following categories of instances wherein inherent powers of the High Court can be exercised in order to secure the ends of justice. These are:- 9. (1992) SCC (Cri) 426 : ( AIR 1992 SC 604 ). v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors. regarding exercise of inherent powers under section 482 of CrPC, this Court has laid down following categories of instances wherein inherent powers of the High Court can be exercised in order to secure the ends of justice. These are:- 9. (1992) SCC (Cri) 426 : ( AIR 1992 SC 604 ). "(1) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; (2) where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code; (3) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or 'complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused; (4) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code; (5) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (6) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party; (7) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 45. Applying this dictum to the instant factual matrix, it can be safely concluded that the present case clearly falls within the ambit of first, third and fifth category of the seven categories enlisted in the above said judgment. The case therefore warrants intervention by this Court, and the High Court has erred in dismissing the petition filed by the Appellants under section 482 CrPC. We find that there has been attempt to stretch the contours of a civil dispute and thereby essentially impart a criminal color to it.” 11. Mr. L.C.N. Shahdeo, the learned counsel appearing in criminal revision petition for the petitioner and O.P.No.2 in Cr.M.P petition, submits that cognizance under Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is not taken and that is why criminal revision has been preferred. He further submits that the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is the subject matter of trial and this Court may not interfere under section 482 Cr.P.C. 12. In the light of the above facts and submission of the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties as well as the judgments relied, the Court has gone through the materials on record. It is an admitted fact that the work order was issued in favour of the complainant by M/s Craftsman Automation Pvt. Ltd. The officers of the company have been made accused in the complaint case whereas, the company has not been made accused. It is well settled that if the offence is made by the company, making the company as one of the accused is essential as has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Ravindranatha Bajpe v. Mangalore Special Economic Zone Ltd. and Ors.”(supra). The petitioner has filed a complaint before the Gamharia P.S. with regard to misdeed of the O.P.No.2 and thereafter after much delay this complaint has been filed by the complainant which shows that this is a counter-blast case against the petitioner, as the workmen were not allowed to go to the work place of the company. Thus, there is no hesitation to come to the conclusion that this is a case of malicious prosecution. The money suit filed by the petitioner has been decreed in favour of the petitioner and for the same dispute the complainant has also instituted a Title Suit being Title Suit No.59/2016 which is still pending. Thus, there is no hesitation to come to the conclusion that this is a case of malicious prosecution. The money suit filed by the petitioner has been decreed in favour of the petitioner and for the same dispute the complainant has also instituted a Title Suit being Title Suit No.59/2016 which is still pending. Thus, the entire dispute seeking detailed determination of the issue which is of civil in nature, pursuant to which the respondent no.2 has also instituted the title suit. In view of that, the criminal colour given in the complaint case is fit to be interfered with by this Court. So far the cognizance order is concerned with regard to calling the accused persons for the evidence under section 3(x) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,1989 is concerned that has been rightly not taken in view of the fact that the ingredients of those sections are not there. Thus, contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner made in the criminal revision for interfering with the cognizance order is not a good ground. The company has not been arrayed as party by the complainant. The criminal proceeding initiated against the officers of the company, moreso, where there was no specific allegation against them, even the allegations made were of the fake nature and considering the proceeding by way of money suit and the title suit, it is crystal clear that the complaint filed by the complainant was a malicious one. 13. In view of the above discussions and the reasons and analysis, the Court comes to the conclusion that this is a fit case for interference. 14. Accordingly, the entire criminal proceeding including the order taking cognizance dated 15.03.2016 passed by the learned C.J.M., Saraikela whereby cognizance has been taken against the petitioners in connection with P.C.Case No.324/2015, pending in the court of learned C.J.M., Saraikela is hereby quashed. 15. Cr.M.P. No.1153 of 2016 stands disposed of. 16. In Criminal Revision No.218 of 2017, no case for interference has been made out as the ingredients of section 3(x) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 have not been disclosed and the concerned court has also not taken cognizance and, in that view of the matter, the instant criminal revision petition is dismissed. 17. I.A., if any, also stands disposed of.