ORDER : 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has challenged the notice dated 17/5/2022 (Annexure P/1) issued by the Collector and Designated Officer, District Janjgir-Champa (CG) for convening a special meeting with regard to no confidence motion against the petitioner, who is the President of Nagar Panchayat, Rahod, in accordance with Section 43-A(2)(ii) of the CG Municipalities Act, 1961 (in short “the Act, 1961”). 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned notice is arbitrary, illegal and contrary to law and the same has been issued by the Collector, Janjgir-Champa (CG) without application of mind and in a mechanical manner. Since certain Elected Councillors of the Nagar Panchayat, Rahod have submitted information about the no confidence motion against the petitioner, the impugned notice dated 17.5.2022 convening the meeting on 30.5.2022, was issued. The petitioner is an elected President of Nagar Panchayat, Rahod. Some other elected Councillors were having ill-will against the petitioner, therefore, they have moved such no confidence motion before respondent No.2 on fake charges and thereby, tried to kill the spirit of the Constitution of India in the pretext of not fulfilling their illegal demands. The copy of the information given to the Collector by the Elected Councillors is annexed with the petition as Annexure P/2. The petitioner has also filed an application for cancellation of no confidence motion and explaining her situation, sought dismissal of the motion before the Collector. Learned counsel further submits that the Councillor of Ward No.1 namely Dayashankar Gond has issued a letter in favour of the petitioner stating that his signature was obtained in a deceitful manner. The petitioner has not been afforded any opportunity of hearing before taking any action, therefore, learned counsel prays to quash the impugned notice or grant interim relief by staying the effect and operation of the impugned notice till pendency of the writ petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner has mainly contended that the list of allegations or charges have not been communicated to the petitioner as contained in Annexure P/2 and the Collector has also failed to make any enquiry on such allegations, therefore, there is violation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner has also explained the circumstances, under which, the motion has been passed against her. The petitioner has also explained the circumstances, under which, the motion has been passed against her. He also submits that till date, no FIR has been registered against the petitioner and there is no charge of corruption against her and the impugned notice is mainly issued on account of her misbehaviour, therefore, on such score, an enquiry is needed, but the Collector has failed to record any satisfaction about the misbehaviour of the petitioner before issuing the impugned notice. He further contended that in the information given to the Collector, one of the members has totally denied his signature and stated that his signature has been obtained in a fraudulent manner. He also submits that in an identical case also i.e. WA No.272 of 2022 (Smt. Anjana Rajesh Thakur Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others), wherein, interim relief was granted vide order dated 24.5.2022 by the Hon'ble the Division Bench of this Court, the list of allegations were not supplied along with the notice. Hence, the other arguments were thrown away and the interim relief was granted in favour of the petitioner therein. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner refers to the law laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the matter of Royal Orchid Hotels Limited and another Vs. G. Jayarama Reddy and others, (2011) 10 SCC 608 , wherein, in para 34, it has been held that the basic postulate of judicial discipline is that a Single Bench is bound by the judgment of the Division Bench. Therefore, considering all these aspects, learned counsel for the petitioner prays to stay the effect and operation of the impugned notice till the final adjudication of the case. 4. Mr. Rahul Jha, learned Government Advocate accepts notice on behalf of respondents 1 & 2/State and Mr. Anish Tiwari and Mr. Atul Kesharwani, accept notice on behalf of respondent No.4. 5. Mr. Rahul Jha, learned Government Advocate for the State/respondents 1 & 2, countering the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner, refers to the statutory provisions under Section 43-A (2)(ii) of the Act, 1961, in which, it is provided that notice of such a meeting is required to be dispatched by the Collector before ten clear days before the meeting. He further submits that out of the twelve Councillors, only one has given the letter in favour of the petitioner, still the no confidence motion is passed against the petitioner. He further submits that out of the twelve Councillors, only one has given the letter in favour of the petitioner, still the no confidence motion is passed against the petitioner. Therefore, in such a case, the other Councillors must be impleaded as necessary parties to meet out the requirements of the principles of natural justice and on such score, the petition is liable to be dismissed at the threshold. He further submits that as per the statutory requirements, only in two circumstances i.e. in case where two years from the date on which the Vice -President enters upon his office ; and (ii) one year from the date on which the previous motion of no-confidence motion was rejected, such motion was not maintainable. He submits that in the present case, no such circumstances were available. He further contended that under the statutory requirements, nothing has been stipulated about the satisfaction of the Collector before issuing of the notice and as such, only despatch of notice is required. He also submits that there is no violation of the principles of natural justice in this case as during the meeting, the petitioner had ample opportunity to show/speak about her conduct and demonstrate her majority to face the motion. Therefore, there is no irregularity in issuing the impugned notice which can be said to be bad in law. He further submits that the petitioner was much aware about the allegations and she herself filed Annexure P/2 with the petition. However, there is no such requirement in law that the copy of the allegations is required to be supplied with the notice. He also submits that the order of the Division Bench of this Court in the above-mentioned case is only an interim order and the same has been passed based on the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case, which cannot be applied as a binding precedent. 6. Mr. Anish Tiwari, learned counsel for respondent No.4 has adopted the arguments of Mr. Rahul Jha, learned Government Advocate for the State. He further submits that in the photocopies of the order sheets of the Collector, Janjgir-Champa dated 4.5.2022 & 17.5.2022, which have not been disputed by anyone, it has been specifically recorded that the two signatures were not tallying and the signatures of other Councillors have been verified and they have stated that they have put their signatures voluntarily. He further submits that in the photocopies of the order sheets of the Collector, Janjgir-Champa dated 4.5.2022 & 17.5.2022, which have not been disputed by anyone, it has been specifically recorded that the two signatures were not tallying and the signatures of other Councillors have been verified and they have stated that they have put their signatures voluntarily. He submits that the President, who has lost his majority, has no right to hold the post, howsoever, in the meeting, if she is able to prove her majority, then, she can remain on the post, hence, there is no violation of principles of natural justice. 7. Learned counsel further refers to the judgment passed in the matter of Benedic R. Marak Vs. State of Meghalaya and others, 2022 SCC OnLine Megh 6, in which, by referring to the observations made by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, it has been held that in the event of conflicting alliances or claims, a floor test can be directed to avoid uncertainty and to ensure smooth running of a democratic institution which would in turn ensure stability. He submits that in the present case, there is no reason to interfere with the impugned notice or cause any delay in holding the no confidence motion as the same is the part and parcel of a democratic process, which strengthens the democratic values. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. He submits that in the present case, there is no reason to interfere with the impugned notice or cause any delay in holding the no confidence motion as the same is the part and parcel of a democratic process, which strengthens the democratic values. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. In case at hand, Section 43-A of the Act, 1961 with regard to no confidence motion is relevant and the same is reproduced hereunder : “Section 43-A. No-confidence motion against Vice President - (1) A motion of no-confidence may be moved against the Vice President by any elected Councillor at a meeting specially convened for the purpose under subsection (2) and if the motion, is carried by a majority of two thirds of the elected Councillors present and voting in the meeting and if such majority is more than half of the total number of elected Councillors constituting the Council, the office of the Vice President, shall be deemed to have become vacant forthwith a copy of such motion shall be sent by the Chief Municipal Officer to the Collector forthwith for filling up the vacancy : Provided that no such resolution shall lie against the Vice-President within a period of – (i) two years from the date on which the Vice-President enters upon his office; (ii) one year from the date on which the previous motion of no-confidence was rejected. (2) For the purpose of sub-section (1), a meeting of the Council shall be convened and presided over by the Collector or a Class-I Officer in case of a Municipal Council and a Class II Officer in case of Nagar Panchayat as nominated by him, in the following manner, namely :-- (i) the meeting shall be convened forthwith on a requisition signed by not less than one sixth of the total number of elected Councillors constituting the Council for the time being; (ii) the notice of such a meeting specifying the date, time and place shall be despatched to the President and every Councillor ten clear days before the meeting; (iii) the no confidence motion moved under this Section shall be decided through secret ballot.” 9. In the matter of Vijay Ramchandra Katkar v. Group Gram Panchayat, 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 710 : (2010) 4 Mah LJ 497, the following has been held : “32. I have carefully considered these contentions. In the matter of Vijay Ramchandra Katkar v. Group Gram Panchayat, 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 710 : (2010) 4 Mah LJ 497, the following has been held : “32. I have carefully considered these contentions. The observations of this Court in Mandabai's case and reference therein to what was held by the Full Bench in Chaitram's case were meant to emphasise that once notice of no-confidence motion is given, it takes precedence over every other business and hence has to be deliberated upon within 7 days. Merely issuing a notice within 7 days, convening the meeting, say after a month, would result in allowing a person who had lost confidence to continue in office merely because a meeting was not convened. The judgment therefore clarified that the 7 days limit was not only for issuing a notice, but actually holding a meeting. The petitioner is trying to take advantage of a rule, which was meant to protect, recognise and respect the Will of majority to effectively nullify the majority. This is impermissible. Again at the cost of repetition it has to be pointed out that meeting was convened within 7 days. The question is only of transacting further business at the meeting on a later date because of defects in the procedure followed. This could be compared to an adjournment. 33. The question therefore is whether such a meeting could be adjourned. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dayandev Mohiniraj Nipunage v. State of Maharashtra, 2000 (2) BCR 849 where the Court was considering the question of adjournment of a meeting. In that case Tahsildar had convened a meeting for considering a no-confidence motion. The Sarpanch sent a letter to Tahsildar stating that she was ill and unable to attend the meeting. The Upsarpanch also wrote to the Tahsildar stating that he had to attend a funeral and therefore, it was not possible to attend the meeting. The Tahsildar, however, did not adjourn the meeting and a resolution of no confidence was passed by requisite majority. The Collector and the Commissioner also did not find in favour of the Sarpanch and Upsarpanch and hence they approached the High Court. The observations of the High Court in paragraphs 12 and 14 of the judgment may be usefully reproduced as under— “12. The Collector and the Commissioner also did not find in favour of the Sarpanch and Upsarpanch and hence they approached the High Court. The observations of the High Court in paragraphs 12 and 14 of the judgment may be usefully reproduced as under— “12. No doubt, there is no specific provision under the Bombay Village Panchayat Act, 1958, prohibiting the Tahsildar from adjourning the meeting which is called under sub-section (2) of section 35. However, it has to be noted that it is a special meeting called for the consideration of no-confidence motion. Section 35 requires that the members, Sarpanch and Upsarpanch be served with the notice regarding no-confidence motion and once it is brought to their notice that such a meeting is to be held for consideration of no-confidence motion, that is sufficient compliance of the provisions of section 35. It is upto the concerned member or the Sarpanch or the Upasarpanch to attend the meeting or not to attend the meeting, to take part in the meeting or not to take part in the meeting, to vote or not to vote. If the Sarpanch or Upasarpanch fail to avail the opportunity for any reason, the meeting cannot be considered illegal. It also cannot be held that they were not allowed to exercise right to speak and right to vote at the time of meeting. 13.… 14. It also has to be noted that once a meeting of the Gram Panchayat or any other local authority is called, then if there is coram to conduct the business of the meeting, then meeting has to take place. There is no provision under any law applicable to Grampanchayat, Zilla Parishad, Municipal Council, the local authorities, that such a meeting can be adjourned only because a member or two request that the meeting be adjourned. Only on certain specified grounds, the meetings are adjourned. But such meetings are never adjourned on the ground that a member or two not being able to attend the meeting. If that is the position with general meetings of the local bodies, then it must be more strict with respect to special meeting called for consideration of no-confidence motion. If the meeting is conveyed to transact the business, then the meeting has to be held and the motion must be put for discussion.” (Emphasis Supplied) 10. If that is the position with general meetings of the local bodies, then it must be more strict with respect to special meeting called for consideration of no-confidence motion. If the meeting is conveyed to transact the business, then the meeting has to be held and the motion must be put for discussion.” (Emphasis Supplied) 10. The Division Bench of the M.P. High Court in the matter of Bal Krishan Patel Vs. Brijendra Patel and Others{ 1985 MPLJ 332 } has held thus:- "It is the settled view of this Court that if there is substantial compliance of this provision, a motion cannot be defeated for technical reasons and it is undemocratic to keep a person on the post when he lost majority. This Court in Bensilal Motilal v. Collector, West Nimar (supra) has held that on passing a no confidence motion against the Sarpanch, the post of Sarpanch is automatically vacated; this effect cannot be arrested even by the operation of the stay order passed by the High Court. Such must be effect when a no confidence motion is passed in substantial compliance to section 18 of the Act. So, this Court in Motilal Ramchandra v. Gram Panchayat, Jamburdiarvar {1983 MPLJSN 8} has held that when a no confidence resolution against Sarpanch carried by overwhelming majority, the case is not fit for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution even if there was irregularity in the service of the notice of the meeting. This Court in Babulal Vs. State of M.P. (Supra) has held that the Collector or any other authority had no power to stay the effect of the no confidence motion passed under the Municipalities Act. The motion of no confidence is not an executive order and the resolution takes effect from the moment it is passed. That was a case under section 331 of the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961 but that provision is not similar to section 83 or 86 or the present Act. The motion of no confidence is not an executive order and the resolution takes effect from the moment it is passed. That was a case under section 331 of the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961 but that provision is not similar to section 83 or 86 or the present Act. In that context this Court held that even the State had no power to stay the effect of the no confidence motion because under section 331 it had only the power to call for and examine the record of any proceeding under that Act in respect of a case and so it was held that this provision did not cover a no confidence motion the proceeding of which was not a case but now in the present enactment there is a power in the Collector or the Additional Collector to entertain a revision against a no confidence motion and even to pass an order of stay. But before passing an order, normally a no confidence motion cannot be defeated for technical reasons, even when there is sufficient compliance to section 18." 11. In Krishna Jaiswal v. State of U.P., 2005 SCC OnLine All 2042, while dealing with the notice relating to no confidence motion, finally concluded as under : “39. Our conclusions are as follows: (a) Section 28 of the Act (the UP Kshetra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats Adhiniyam) is constitutional. (b) The part of section 28(3)(ii) of the Act, providing holding of meeting in such manner as may be prescribed, is directory. A meeting cannot be invalidated merely on the ground that information was not sent in the prescribed proforma, provided the information sent contains the necessary ingredients namely, purpose of the meeting, date place, and the time of the meeting. (c) In the present case, necessary information was there, there was substantial compliance. (d) Fifteen days notice is required between the date of the meeting and giving of notice. The notice is given on the date it is despatched. It is not connected with the date on which notice is received. 12. The legal position about satisfaction of the prescribed authority before issuing notice, has been squarely settled by the authority of the Hon'ble Division Bench as reported in 2015 (1) CHN (Cal) 445. The notice is given on the date it is despatched. It is not connected with the date on which notice is received. 12. The legal position about satisfaction of the prescribed authority before issuing notice, has been squarely settled by the authority of the Hon'ble Division Bench as reported in 2015 (1) CHN (Cal) 445. The Hon'ble Division Bench considered the conflicting views of two Hon'ble Single Benches on the issue and agreed with the view in Firoza Begam v. State of West Bengal as reported in 2013 (3) CHN (Cal) 241 and, held as follows:— (27) In view of the discussion above we are of the opinion that it was not the intention of the legislation to impose any obligation on the Prescribed Authority to record satisfaction regarding legal acceptability of a motion submitted under Section 12 (2) of the said Act before issuance of a notice of meeting under Section 12 (3) of the said Act. We are of the view that it is not necessary for the Prescribed Authority to record any such satisfaction and we agree with the view of the Ld. Judge in the case of Firoza Begam (Supra) that issuance of notice of meeting itself indicates such satisfaction. We answer the question of law referred to us accordingly.” 13. Reverting back to the present case, having gone through the aforesaid principles, even accepting all the facts mentioned in the writ petition, it appears that there is no prima facie ground which satisfies the conscious of this Court to hold that the Collector has not applied his mind before issuing such notice. 14. When the statutory compliance has been made, this Court is of the view that a motion cannot be defeated for any technical reasons though it is not demonstrated satisfactorily before this Court. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that the Collector has issued a proper and legal notice and there is no violation of the principles of natural justice, and no satisfaction or preliminary enquiry is needed in law and all the statutory requirements have been fulfilled. 15. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that the Collector has issued a proper and legal notice and there is no violation of the principles of natural justice, and no satisfaction or preliminary enquiry is needed in law and all the statutory requirements have been fulfilled. 15. Reliance of the petitioner in the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Smt. Anjana Rajesh Thakur referred to above, is not a ratio decidendi, which is binding, as the interim relief has been granted in the said case purely considering the facts and circumstances of that case. Therefore, this Court does not find any good ground to interfere with the impugned notice while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 16. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed in limine. Certified copy today itself.