JUDGMENT : Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This is an Appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 (c), Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 against an order dated 10.01.2020 passed by Ist Additional District Judge, Rishikesh, Dehradun in Misc. Case No. 13 of 2019. By the said order, delay condonation application filed by appellants with their application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC, has been rejected. Consequently, the restoration application filed by appellants too has been rejected. 3. Perusal of the impugned order reveals that the delay condonation application filed by appellants has been rejected only on the ground that appellants’ counsel was present before the Court on 03.01.2019, when the next date was fixed for 08.01.2019, therefore, the plea raised by appellants that due to mistake the next date was noted as 08.02.2019, is not believable. 4. Learned counsel for appellants submits that appellants’ non-appearance on 08.01.2019 was due to a bonafide mistake, as the next date fixed in the suit was noted as 08.02.2019; while, actually the date fixed was 08.01.2019, and due to this inadvertent mistake, they could not appear before the Trial Court on the date fixed. He further submits that restoration application with delay condonation application was filed immediately when appellants came to know about dismissal of the suit. He further submits that appellants acquired knowledge about dismissal on 15.03.2019 and restoration application was filed on 08.04.2019 with delay condonation application. He further submits that the appellants had filed the said suit seeking relief of specific performance, in 2012, since valuable property right of appellants is involved in the suit, therefore, their non-appearance on the date fixed cannot be said to be deliberate. 5. Per contra, Mr. Aditya Singh, learned counsel for respondent-defendant supports the order passed by learned Trial Court by contending that appellants had knowledge of the date fixed, as their counsel was present on 03.01.2019, thus their non-appearance before the Trial Court was deliberate. 6. In the delay condonation application, stand taken by appellants is that they learnt about dismissal of the suit only on 15.03.2019 and certified copy of dismissal order was received by them on 05.04.2019; restoration application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC was filed thereafter on 08.04.2019, thus, there was no delay, if seen from the date of knowledge of the order of dismissal. 7. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants contends that even if limitation is calculated from date of dismissal of the suit, then also, there is delay of only 39 days, after adjusting the time spent in obtaining certified copy of the order. He further contends that learned Trial Court, instead of confining itself to the merits of the delay condonation application, considered extraneous fact, namely reason for non-appearance on 08.01.2019. Thus, according to him, appellants had shown sufficient cause for condoning the delay and learned Trial Court was not justified in rejecting the delay condonation application, which has resulted in miscarriage of justice. 8. Learned Trial Court has rejected the delay condonation application by holding that on the previous date, i.e. 03.01.2019, case was adjourned on an application filed by the lawyer appearing on behalf of the appellants, therefore, the stand taken by them in their delay condonation application regarding lack of knowledge about the next date fixed, i.e. 08.01.2019, cannot be believed. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that stand taken by his clients was that their counsel, due to bonafide mistake, noted 08.02.2019 as the next date fixed, which led to their non-appearance before the Trial Court on 08.01.2019. 10. Bonafide mistake by lawyer can be a valid ground for condonation of delay, as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Punjabi University and others v. Acharya Swami Ganesh and another, reported in (1973) 3 SCC 800 . In the case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Subrata Borah Chowlek, reported in (2010) 14 SCC 419 , Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that while considering sufficient cause for condonation of delay, Courts generally follow the liberal approach particularly when no negligence, inaction or mala fides can be imputed to the party. 11. Similarly, in the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 , Hon’ble Supreme Court summarized the law on the point, as under:- “12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari1 and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality. 13. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari1 and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality. 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.” 12. Thus, it is well settled that while considering delay condonation application, liberal and justice oriented approach should be adopted, especially, when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides are attributable to the defaulting party. 13. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sesh Nath Singh v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Coop. Bank Ltd., reported in (2021) 7 SCC 313 has summarized the legal position in the following words:- “59. The condition precedent for condonation of the delay in filing an application or appeal, is the existence of sufficient cause. Whether the explanation furnished for the delay would constitute “sufficient cause” or not would be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be any straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting the explanation furnished by the appellant applicant for the delay in taking steps. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception, when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. 60. There cannot be any straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting the explanation furnished by the appellant applicant for the delay in taking steps. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception, when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. 60. It is true that a valuable right may accrue to the other party by the law of limitation, which should not lightly be defeated by condoning delay in a routine manner. At the same time, when stakes are high, the explanation should not be rejected by taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter, causing thereby irreparable loss and injury to the party against whom the lis terminates. The courts are required to strike a balance between the legitimate rights and interests of the respective parties. 61. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not speak of any application. The section enables the court to admit an application or appeal if the applicant or the appellant, as the case may be, satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application and/or preferring the appeal, within the time prescribed. Although, it is the general practice to make a formal application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in order to enable the court or tribunal to weigh the sufficiency of the cause for the inability of the appellant applicant to approach the court/tribunal within the time prescribed by limitation, there is no bar to exercise by the court/tribunal of its discretion to condone delay, in the absence of a formal application. 62. A plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act makes it amply clear that, it is not mandatory to file an application in writing before relief can be granted under the said section. Had such an application been mandatory, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would have expressly provided so. Section 5 would then have read that the court might condone delay beyond the time prescribed by limitation for filing an application or appeal, if on consideration of the application of the appellant or the applicant, as the case may be, for condonation of delay, the court is satisfied that the appellant applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Alternatively, a proviso or an Explanation would have been added to Section 5, requiring the appellant or the applicant, as the case may be, to make an application for condonation of delay. However, the court can always insist that an application or an affidavit showing cause for the delay be filed. No applicant or appellant can claim condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as of right, without making an application.” 14. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah, Bhurey, reported in AIR 1955 SC 425 has held that rules of procedure are grounded on the principle of natural justice, which requires that men should not be condemned unheard and decision should not be reached behind their back; that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and they should not be precluded from participating in them. It was further held that there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to; but taken by and large, subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle. 15. In the case of Robin Thapa v. Rohit Dora, reported in (2019) 7 SCC 359 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “7. Ordinarily, a litigation is based on adjudication on the merits of the contentions of the parties. Litigation should not be terminated by default, either of the plaintiff or the defendant. The cause of justice does require that as far as possible, adjudication be done on merits.” 16. Thus, viewed in the light of aforesaid legal principles, the order impugned in this appeal cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. A litigant cannot be made to suffer on account of a mistake of his lawyer. To err is human, and if the lawyer notes down 08.02.2019 is the next date, in place of 08.01.2019, and due to this mistake, his client is unable to appear on the date fixed, then it cannot be said that his client despite knowledge about the correct date, deliberately did not appear. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, the present Appeal deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. The order dated 10.01.2020 passed by learned Ist Additional District Judge, Rishikesh, Dehradun is set aside. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, the present Appeal deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. The order dated 10.01.2020 passed by learned Ist Additional District Judge, Rishikesh, Dehradun is set aside. Delay condonation application filed by appellants under Section 5 of Limitation Act and also the application filed by them under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC are allowed, however, subject to payment of cost of Rs. 10,000/, to be deposited with Uttarakhand High Court Bar Association Advocate Welfare Fund, within four weeks from today. 18. As the suit was filed in 2012 and pleadings have been exchanged, therefore, learned Trial Court is requested to make endeavor to decide the suit, as early as possible.