JUDGMENT : MANISH MATHUR, J. 1. Heard Mr. Sukhveer Singh, learned counsel for petitioner and learned State Counsel for the opposite parties. 2. The petition has been filed assailing order dated 01.07.1991 whereby petitioner's objections filed against the alleged second notice given to him under Section 10(2) of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on land Holdings Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as Act of 1960) has been rejected. A further prayer for issuing a direction to opposite parties not to proceed for re-determination of petitioner's holdings in terms of second notice has also been made. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that initially, a general notice under Section 9 of Act of 1960 was issued on 11.06.1973 whereafter a specific notice under Section 10(2) of the Act was issued to petitioner on 23.04.1974. Since there was no adequate receipt of the said notice, a subsequent notice was issued to petitioner whereafter his land was determined to be surplus and was adjusted as per the petitioner's option. It is submitted that aforesaid determination made on 13.01.1975 declaring an area of 5 Bighas, 8 Biswas in terms of irrigated land became final qua the petitioner. It is submitted that the surplus land was thereafter taken possession of by State since neither party preferred any appeal. 4. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that thereafter a second notice was issued in July, 1989 under Section 10(2) of Act of 1960 proposing declaration of other properties held by petitioner as surplus. Petitioner filed his objections to aforesaid notice on 01.08.1989 in which the primary objection advanced was that the fresh/second notice was barred by limitation under provisions of Section 13A of Act of 1960 as well as Section 31(3) of Amending Act no. 18 of 1972. Additionally, objections were also taken specifically stating that petitioner was not in possession of any property belonging to one Smt. Sarswati Devi as Benami transaction. It was said that the said Sarswati Devi was step mother of petitioner and had separate holdings which were independent of petitioner and as such her holdings could not have been clubbed with that of petitioner. 5. Aforesaid objections were rejected by means of impugned order dated 01.07.1991 against which petition has been preferred. Initially vide order dated 19.01.2006, a preliminary objection had been taken regarding maintainability of petition due to availability of Appeal under Section 13 of Act of 1960. 5. Aforesaid objections were rejected by means of impugned order dated 01.07.1991 against which petition has been preferred. Initially vide order dated 19.01.2006, a preliminary objection had been taken regarding maintainability of petition due to availability of Appeal under Section 13 of Act of 1960. The said preliminary objection was rejected by this Court holding the writ petition to be maintainable. Prior to aforesaid, impugned proceedings had been stayed by means of interim order dated 20.08.1991. 6. Learned counsel for petitioner has laid much emphasis on the fact that a second notice is not provided for under the provisions of the Act and only re-determination under Section 13-A of Act of 1960 can be made in case of any mistake apparent on the face of record. It is submitted that a fresh notice can however be issued but that can be only in terms of provisions of Sections 29 and 30 of Act of 1960, which are necessarily required to be fulfilled and indicated in the notice itself. It has further been submitted that impugned notice even otherwise is barred by limitation indicated in the Act. 7. Learned State Counsel appearing on behalf of opposite parties have refuted the submissions advanced by learned counsel for petitioner on the basis of counter affidavit filed in the petition. It is submitted that the alleged second notice was in fact a fresh notice under Section 10(2) of Act of 1960 and was issued since petitioner was found to be in possession of the land recorded in the name of Smt. Sarswati Devi, alleged step mother of petitioner. It is submitted that considering aforesaid, notice had been issued to petitioner under provisions of Sections 5 and 30 of Act of 1960 and is therefore maintainable. It has been further submitted that impugned order has considered all the objections taken by petitioner and that the notice is perfectly legal and not barred by limitation. It has been further submitted that impugned proceedings have been initiated in pursuance of notice under Section 10(2) of Act of 1960 and is not a re-determination of surplus land under provisions of Section 13-A of Act of 1960. Even otherwise it is submitted that petition has been filed only against a show cause notice to which petitioner can very well submit reply and final decision may be taken by authorities concerned. 8. Even otherwise it is submitted that petition has been filed only against a show cause notice to which petitioner can very well submit reply and final decision may be taken by authorities concerned. 8. Considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of record, it is apparent that the present petition has been filed against proceedings initiated against petitioner in terms of notice under section 10(2) of Act of 1960 and which has been alleged by petitioner to be a second notice. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others, (1998) 8 SCC 1 has clearly indicated the exceptions where writ petition is maintainable even despite availability of alternative remedy. Such exceptions being enforcement of fundamental rights, violation of principles of natural justice, where order or proceedings are without jurisdiction and where vires of an Act is challenged. 9. As such, it is quite evident that a show cause notice such as a notice under Section 10(2) of the Act can be adjudicated upon by this Court only in case a plea of jurisdiction or incompetence of authority concerned has been taken by petitioner. 10. In objections filed by petitioner to the said notice, it has been clearly stated tat he was earlier issued a notice under Section 10(2) of Act of 1960 which culminated in passing of final order dated 13.01.1975 whereby certain land in possession of petitioner was declared surplus. It has been further stated in the objections that once earlier land belonging to petitioner has already been declared surplus, a second notice pertaining to same is not maintainable. A specific plea has also been taken that properties belonging to Smt. Sarswati Devi are separate and independent from the holdings of petitioner. As such, it is evident that the plea of jurisdiction and competence of the authorities concerned for issuance of impugned notices under Section 10(2) of Act of 1960 has been taken by petitioner. The same pleadings have also been reiterated in the present writ petition. 11. In view of aforesaid, the writ petition would be maintainable against impugned proceedings initiated pursuant to notice under Section 10(2) of Act of 1960 particularly since objections filed by petitioner against the said notice have been rejected by means of impugned order. 12. The same pleadings have also been reiterated in the present writ petition. 11. In view of aforesaid, the writ petition would be maintainable against impugned proceedings initiated pursuant to notice under Section 10(2) of Act of 1960 particularly since objections filed by petitioner against the said notice have been rejected by means of impugned order. 12. In the counter affidavit, opposite parties have neither denied the fact that earlier notices under Section 10(2) of Act of 1960 were issued to petitioner nor is the fact that pursuant to earlier notices, land belonging to petitioner has been declared surplus by order dated 13.01.1975. In paragraph-6 of counter affidavit, however, it has been stated that a fresh notice under Section 10(2) of Act of 1960 was issued since petitioner was found to be in possession of land recorded in the name of Smt. Sarswati Devi and, therefore notice was issued in terms of Sections 5 and 30 of the Act. 13. A perusal of Sections 29 and 30 of Act of 1960 indicate that the provisions pertain to subsequent declaration of further land as surplus land and determination of surplus land regarding future acquisition respectively. The provisions of aforesaid sections are as follows: “29. Subsequent declaration of further land as surplus land - Where after the date of enforcement of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1972: (a) any land has come to be held by a tenure-holder under a decree or order of any court, or as a result of succession or transfer, or by prescription in consequence of adverse possession, and such land together with the land already held by him exceeds the ceiling area applicable to him. (b) any un-irrigated land becomes irrigated land as a result of irrigation from a State irrigation work or any grove-land loses its character, as grove-land or any land exempted under this Act ceases to fall under any of the categories exempted - the ceiling area shall be liable to be re-determined and accordingly the provisions of this Act, except Section 16, shall mutatis mutandis apply.” “30. Determination of surplus land regarding future acquisition: (1) Where any land has become liable to be treated as surplus land under Section 29, the tenure-holder shall, within such period as may be prescribed, submit a statement to the Prescribed Authority in the form and in the manner laid down under Section 9 indicating in the statement the plot or plots which he would like to retain as a part of his ceiling area. (2) (a) Where the statement submitted under sub-section (1) is accepted by the Prescribed Authority, it shall proceed to determine the surplus land accordingly. (b) Where a tenure-holder fails to submit a statement required to be submitted under sub-section (1) or submits an incomplete or incorrect statement the Prescribed Authority shall proceed in the manner laid down under Section 10. (c) The provisions of this Act in respect of declaration, acquisition, disposal and settlement of surplus land, shall mutatis mutandis, apply to surplus land covered by this section.” 14. For the purposes of a fresh notice under Section 10(2) of Act of 1960 pertaining to subsequent declaration of further land as surplus land after the enforcement of Amendment Act of 1972, it is imperative that the land has come to be held by a tenure holder under a decree or order of any Court, or as a result of succession or transfer, or by prescription in consequence of an adverse possession, and such land together with the land already held by him exceeds the ceiling area applicable to him or that any other un-irrigated land becomes irrigated land as a result of irrigation under certain conditions. 15. Once the said conditions of Section 29 are fulfilled, the provisions of Section 30 of the Act become applicable. From a perusal of aforesaid proceedings, it is clear that for issuance of a fresh notice under Section 10(2) of Act of 1960, the conditions stipulated under section 29 of Act of 1960 are compulsorily required to be fulfilled. 16. As a consequence, in the considered opinion of this Court while issuing a fresh notice under Section 10(2) of Act of 1960, prima-facie subjective satisfaction of the authority is required to be recorded in the subsequent notice under Section 10(2) of Act of 1960 that either of the two conditions under Section 29 of the Act is fulfilled. 16. As a consequence, in the considered opinion of this Court while issuing a fresh notice under Section 10(2) of Act of 1960, prima-facie subjective satisfaction of the authority is required to be recorded in the subsequent notice under Section 10(2) of Act of 1960 that either of the two conditions under Section 29 of the Act is fulfilled. A second or a fresh notice under Section 10(2) of Act of 1960 by the authority cannot be issued cursorily without adverting to the conditions for issuance of a fresh notice. Failure to adhere to mandatory statutory conditions under Section 29 of Act of 1960 would lead to arbitrariness at the behest of authorities concerned. 17. In the present case, it is apparent no such prima-facie satisfaction has been recorded by the authority concerned as required under Section 29 of Act of 1960. Even the Prescribed Authority while rejecting petitioner's objections vide order dated 01.07.1991 has not at all adverted to the requirements for issuance of fresh notice under Section 10(2) of Act of 1960. In fact, the objections have been rejected by a virtually non-speaking order merely indicating the fact that petitioner is in possession of surplus land. No subjective satisfaction by the authority concerned has been recorded while passing the impugned order, which is unreasonable and arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 18. With regard to orders passed by the authorities concerned requiring reasoning, Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. vs. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496 has held that reasons are the soul of an order without which an order is clearly vitiated. The relevant portions of aforesaid decision are as follows: “47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. [See: David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor, (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-737]. (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. [See: Ruiz Torija vs. Spain, (1994) 19 EHRR 553 and Anya vs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ. (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. [See: Ruiz Torija vs. Spain, (1994) 19 EHRR 553 and Anya vs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ. 405 (CA)] wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, “adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions.” (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due process.” 19. Considering aforesaid facts, this Court reaches to a conclusion that the proceedings under challenge are violative of the mandatory conditions of Section 29 of Act of 1960 and is therefore unsustainable. 20. Consequently, impugned order dated 01.07.1991 as well as notice issued under Section 10(2) of Act of 1960 are hereby quashed by issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari. 21. In view of aforesaid, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. Parties to bear their own costs.