ORDER : Satyen Vaidya, J. By way of instant revision petition petitioner/tenant has assailed judgment dated 11.6.2004 passed by learned Appellate Authority, Una in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 5 of 2003 whereby order dated 30.8.2003 passed by learned Rent Controller-I, Una in RRA No. 4 of 1998 was affirmed. 2. The parties hereinafter shall be referred to as landlord and tenant for clarity and convenience. 3. Tenant has suffered eviction order on the grounds of arrears of rent and bonafide requirement of landlord for rebuilding and re-construction of the building. Learned Rent Controller-I, Una, passed the aforesaid eviction order on 30.8.2003, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 14 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, (for short ‘the Act’). Tenant preferred an appeal to the Appellate Authority under Section 24 of the Act but remained unsuccessful, hence the instant petition. 4. Brief facts of the case are that landlord filed petition for eviction of tenant under Section 14 of the Act, on following grounds :- i) Arrears of rent; ii) Sub-letting, iii) Building having been rendered unsafe and unfit for human habitation; iv) Bonafide requirement of landlord for the purpose of re-building and re-construction. 5. Learned Rent Controller allowed the petition on the grounds of arrears of rent and bonafide requirement of landlord for re-building and re-construction of the building. The grounds of sub-letting and the building having become unfit and unsafe for human habitation were held not proved. The findings returned by learned Rent Controller were affirmed by learned Appellate Authority. 6. By way of instant petition, tenant has raised contention that the impugned order passed by learned Appellate Authority, affirming the order of learned Rent Controller, is not sustainable on the grounds, firstly that both the authorities below had carved out a new case in favour of landlord, whereas, there were no pleadings in support of the bonafide requirement of landlord for re-building and reconstruction; and secondly the impugned orders were vitiated, as the satisfaction as to existence of bonafides of landlord recorded by both the authorities below, was merely on subjective consideration. 7. 7. It has further been contended on behalf of tenant that during the pendency of instant petition an amendment has been carried out in Section 14 (3) (c) of the Act, whereby a proviso has been added, vesting tenant with a right of reentry on new terms of tenancy on the basis of mutual agreement between landlord and tenant, in the re-built building equivalent in area to the original premises and the tenant in the instant case has also become entitled to the benefit of such provision. 8. I have heard Mr. Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the landlord as well as Mr. R. K. Gautam, learned Senior Counsel for the tenant and have also gone through the record carefully. 9. This Court derives revisional powers from sub-Section (5) of Section 24 of the Act, which reads as under :- “(5) The High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party or on its own motion call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in relation thereto as it may deem fit.” 10. It is more than settled that in exercise of revisional powers under sub-section (5) of Section 24 of the Act, this Court will not sit as the Court of appeal. The scope of revisional powers, so conferred on this Court is restrictive. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in Kewal Krishan Sehgal & others vs. Rajeshwar Kumar & another, 2019 (1) Shimla Law Cases, 323 has expounded the scope of revisional powers of this Court under the Act as under:- “8. At the outset, the scope of revisional jurisdiction which Court can exercise must borne in mind, as the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78 laid down certain broad principles for exercise of revisional jurisdiction which can be summarized as under: (i) The term ‘propriety’ would imply something which is legal and proper. (ii) The power of the High Court even though wider than the one provided under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not wide enough to that of the appellate Authority. (ii) The power of the High Court even though wider than the one provided under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not wide enough to that of the appellate Authority. (iii) Such power cannot be exercised as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. (iv) Issues raised in the original proceedings cannot be permitted to be reheard as a appellate Authority. (v) The expression “revision” is meant to convey the idea of much narrower expression than the one expressed by the expression “appeal”. The revisional power under the Rent Control Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power under Section 115 of the CPC but certainly it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second court of first appeal. While holding so the Court reiterated the view taken in Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate vs. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagawal, (1975) 2 SCC 246 . (vi) The meaning of the expression “legality and propriety” so explained in Ram Dass vs. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131 was only to the extent that exercise of the power is not confined to jurisdictional error alone and has to be “according to law”. (vii) Whether or not the finding of fact is according to law or not is required to be seen on the touch stone, as to whether such finding of fact is based on some legal evidence or it suffers from any illegality like misreading of the evidence; overlooking; ignoring the material evidence all together; suffers from perversity; illegality; or such finding has resulted into gross miscarriage of justice. Court clarified that the ratio of Ram Dass (supra) does not exposit that the revisional power conferred upon the High Court is as wide as an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a finding contrary to the findings returned by the authority below. (vii) In exercise of its revisional jurisdiction High Court shall not reverse findings of fact merely because on reappreciation of the evidence it may have a different view thereupon. (viii) The exercise of such power to examine record and facts must be understood in the context of the purpose that such findings are based on firm legal basis and not on a wrong premise of law. (ix) Pure findings of fact are not to be interfered with. (viii) The exercise of such power to examine record and facts must be understood in the context of the purpose that such findings are based on firm legal basis and not on a wrong premise of law. (ix) Pure findings of fact are not to be interfered with. Reconsideration of all questions of fact is impermissible as Court cannot function as a Court of appeal. (x) Even while considering the propriety and legality, high Court cannot reappreciate the evidence only for the purposes of arriving at a different conclusion. Consideration of the evidence is confined only to adjudge the legality, regularity and propriety of the order. (xi) Incorrect finding of fact must be understood in the context of such findings being perverse, based on no evidence; and misreading of evidence.” 9. In the aforesaid decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, T. N. Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 and Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973. The incongruity in the decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rukmini Amma Saradamma vs. Kallyani Sulochana, (1993) 1 SCC 499 and Ram Dass (supra) was the backdrop in which the Constitution Bench was called upon to decide the scope of the revisional jurisdiction and the expression “legality and propriety” provided in the relevant statues. The essential question being as to whether in exercise of such powers, the revisional authority could reappreciate the evidence or not. Finally the Hon’ble Supreme Court answered the reference by making the following observations:- “43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court/first appellate authority because on reappreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the court/authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by court/authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to reappreciate or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers.” 11. The contention raised on behalf of the tenant, as noticed above, needs to be considered in the backdrop of aforesaid exposition of law, 12. The landlord vide paragraph 18 (a) (iv) of the petition averred as under:- “That the construction is totally outlived and is in dilapidated condition with no pucca roof and walls and the shop is required by the petitioner for the purpose of re-building, which cannot be carried out without premises being vacated by the tenant.” 13. It is on the strength of aforesaid pleadings that a contention has been raised by tenant that requisite pleadings and proof as to bonafide requirement of landlord for rebuilding was not available and the authorities below had carved out a new case for the landlord. 14. It is on the strength of aforesaid pleadings that a contention has been raised by tenant that requisite pleadings and proof as to bonafide requirement of landlord for rebuilding was not available and the authorities below had carved out a new case for the landlord. 14. Section 14 (3) (c) of the Act reads as under:- “(c) in the case of any building or rented land, if he requires it to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or local authority or any Improvement Trust under some improvement or development scheme or if it has become unsafe or unfit for human habitation or is required bonafide by him for carrying out repairs which cannot be carded out without the building or rented land being vacated or that the building or rented land is required bona-fide by him for the purpose of building or re-building or making thereto any substantial additions or alterations and that such building or re-building or addition or alternation cannot be carried out without the building or rented land being vacated; [Provided that the tenant evicted under this clause shall have the right to re-entry on new terms of tenancy, on the basis of mutual agreement between the landlord and the tenant, to the premises in the re-built building equivalent in area to the original premises for which he was a tenant: Provided further that in case of nonresidential premises, the landlord shall not compel the tenant for a change of business under the new terms of tenancy.]” 15. Perusal of above noted provision clearly reveals that it includes more than one ground on which landlord can seek eviction of the tenant. Each ground, so included in Section 14 (3) (c) of the Act is independent of the other. Thus, the ground that building has become unsafe and unfit of human habitation is distinct than the ground that building is bonafide required by landlord for the purpose of reconstruction and re-building, which cannot be carried without the building being vacated by the tenant. 16. Though, the landlord pleaded both the grounds by not making separate heads but that does not lead to an inference that the landlord did not intend to seek the eviction of tenant on both the grounds separately. 16. Though, the landlord pleaded both the grounds by not making separate heads but that does not lead to an inference that the landlord did not intend to seek the eviction of tenant on both the grounds separately. Plain reading of paragraph-18 (a)(iv) of the petition reveals that unfit and unsafe condition of the building was pleaded as a ground distinct than the requirement for re-construction and rebuilding. The landlord has used the word “and” for carving out distinction between the pleaded grounds of eviction. It was not the case of landlord that re-building or reconstruction was required only because the building had become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. 17. Perusal of reply submitted by tenant before learned Rent Controller to the petition filed by the landlord also does not show that the tenant had any misgiving or misconception as to the grounds raised by the landlord. It is evident from the issues framed by learned Rent Controller that both the grounds of eviction were considered separately and distinctly by the parties and, therefore, issues No. 3 and 4 were framed as under:- “3 Whether the disputed premises is un-sage and unfit for human habilitation? OPP 4. Whether the premises in dispute is required for re-building and which cannot be carried out without the building being vacated? OPP” 18. Thus, the objection raised by tenant before this Court for the first time is not tenable. Tenant had not raised such a ground even before learned Appellate Authority. 19. It has further been contended on behalf of the tenant that the landlord had failed to prove his bonafide as neither the approval of plan by Municipal Corporation nor the financial means of landlord to enable him to re-construct the building have been proved. Keeping in view the restrictive revisional jurisdiction of this Court, this court will not reappreciate the evidence as no perversity in the findings recorded by both the learned authorities has been pointed out. Learned Rent Controller has rightly concluded that the eviction of a tenant will not always be readily available to the landlord. The legal recourse takes considerable time. In the instant case, the eviction proceedings were instituted on 30.8.2003. More than 19 years have elapsed the landlord has not been able to secure finality to the fate of his claim. Learned Rent Controller has rightly concluded that the eviction of a tenant will not always be readily available to the landlord. The legal recourse takes considerable time. In the instant case, the eviction proceedings were instituted on 30.8.2003. More than 19 years have elapsed the landlord has not been able to secure finality to the fate of his claim. In such circumstances, mere fact that landlord had not obtained the permission from Local Authorities to re-construct the building cannot be considered a factor to doubt the bonafide of landlord. Learned Rent Controller has further held that landlord has sufficient means to re-construct the building. Even otherwise, the arrangement of finance for the purpose of re-construction is not a big deal in modern commercial world, where the facility of financial assistance by the banks or banking institutions is available without much difficulty. 20. In view of above discussion, there is no merit in the revision petition. No ground has been made out by the tenant for interference with the order passed by the learned Appellate Authority affirming the order of learned Rent Controller. 21. The Act has been amended in the year 2012 i.e. during the pendency of this petition and a proviso as noticed above has been appended to Section 14 (iii) (c) of the Act, which vests the tenant with a right of re-entry in the premises in re-built building having equivalent area to the original premises subject, however, to new terms of tenancy to be mutually decided between the landlord and tenant. 22. Keeping in view such amendment, the tenant in the instant case has also earned a right in terms of aforesaid amended provision. Therefore, the eviction order passed by learned Rent Controller against tenant on the ground of bonafide requirement of landlord to re-build and re-construct the building and affirmed by learned Appellate Authority is modified only to the extent that such order of eviction will be subject to the right of tenant to re-enter the premises equivalent to what he had prior to eviction in the re-built building, subject to mutually settling new terms of tenancy with the landlord. 23. The petition is accordingly disposed of. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. Records be sent back forthwith.