JUDGMENT : Heard the parties. 2. Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for quashing the order of punishment dated 04.01.2013, passed by respondent No. 5, whereby he has removed the petitioner from his service. Petitioner has further prayed for quashing the appellate order dated 26.02.2013, passed by respondent No. 4 and revision order dated 07.10.2015, passed by respondent No. 3, by which the order of punishment has been affirmed by the said two forums. Petitioner has also prayed that after quashment of the aforesaid orders, the respondents be directed to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits considering the break in service as period spent on medical leave. 3. As per the factual matrix, the petitioner was appointed as Constable in the Central Industrial Security Force vide Appointment Offer dated 19.08.2008 and subsequently, the petitioner joined the said post. Thereafter, while the petitioner was discharging his duties, certain unfortunate events took place in his family one after the other like death of his father on 02.05.2012, divorce of petitioner with his wife in July 2012 in addition to that as petitioner had not got his salary for 10 months continuously, as he was mentally depressed. In such medical condition, the petitioner was transferred from CISF Unit PPT Paradip to CISF Unit BCCL Dhanbad and petitioner reported at the transferred place on 20.08.2012. It is the case of the petitioner that respondents were fully aware of the mental condition of petitioner and hence, the mother of the petitioner was called by the respondents to visit at Dhanbad, as Psychiatrist of Central Hospital, BCCL Dhanbad needed the detailed information about petitioner from his own relative for treatment of petitioner. On the request of the respondents, the mother of the petitioner along with his brother-in-law visited Dhanbad and requested the respondent-authorities to relieve petitioner on leave so that they can take care of him and start appropriate treatment, but her request was turned down by the respondents and regardless of his mental condition, the concerned respondents did not hospitalize him rather he was forced to perform his regular duties. 4. It is the further case of the petitioner that on 19.10.2012, a chargesheet was issued against the petitioner for an incident which took place on 17.10.2012. 4. It is the further case of the petitioner that on 19.10.2012, a chargesheet was issued against the petitioner for an incident which took place on 17.10.2012. Thereafter, an enquiry was conducted against the petitioner for the said charges and on the basis of enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority had issued order of punishment dated 04.01.2013, removing the petitioner from his service and further took a decision that petitioner would not be given salary and other allowances, save and except the subsistence allowance for the period of suspension. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of punishment, the petitioner preferred appeal and revision, which also stood rejected and hence, the petitioner has been constrained to knock the door of this Court. 5. Ms. Rakhi Rani, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner assiduously argues that the enquiry conducted against the petitioner is void ab initio, as principle of natural justice has not been followed in its true sense inasmuch as, due to his mental condition during the relevant period, the petitioner was not able to defend himself properly. Learned counsel submits that it is well settled principle of law that any enquiry conducted in violation of principle of natural justice, is vitiated. Learned counsel further submits that being fully aware about the mental condition of petitioner, the act of the respondents in taking regular duty instead of providing proper treatment to the petitioner, is illegal and not justified. Learned counsel further submits that since the principle of natural justice was not followed in its true sense, the punishment of removal from service being a major penalty under CISF Rules, 2001, is not tenable in the eyes of law. Learned counsel further submits that even if the entire allegation levelled against the petitioner was accepted as true, being fully aware of the mental condition of petitioner, the respondents ought to have constitute a Medical Board before commencement of the Enquiry or during the Enquiry to ascertain the medical condition of the petitioner, which would go to show that petitioner has deliberatly committed the alleged act of misconduct or due to his state of mind at the relevant time, the said incident took place. Learned counsel further argues that Charge No. 2 levelled against the petitioner is not sustainable in the eyes of law, as for this charge petitioner has already been punished and any further proceeding by reopening of the same charge would amount to double jeopardy. 6. Per contra, counter-affidavit has been filed. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that petitioner is not entitled for any reliefs, since as per terms and conditions of service every member of Force is expected to maintain absolute discipline and integrity and his conduct should always be honest and upright. The petitioner has been rightly punished by the Disciplinary Authority for his grave and proven misconduct and the action taken by the Disciplinary Authority is entirely within the purview of existing rules and sustainable in the eyes of law. Learned counsel further argues that petitioner has been given ample opportunity to put forward his defence and thereafter, the impugned order has been passed strictly in accordance with the statutory provisions. Learned counsel further argues that a member of the force is considered to be fit for duty until he is declared unfit by a Medical Officer. The petitioner never produced such medical certificate in support of such ailments which declared him unfit for duty and thus, he being fit was continuously deployed for duties. Since the charges levelled and proved against the petitioner were of very serious nature, his removal from service was inevitable and thus, the disciplinary authority rightly adjudged his case and awarded the penalty of removal from service, which is just and fair and also well commensurate with the gravity of his proven delinquencies. Learned counsel further submits that since the order of punishment has also been approved by the Appellate Authority and Revisional Authority hence, the writ petition is fit to be dismissed. 7. Be that as it may, having heard the rival submissions of the parties and upon perusal of the documents brought on record, this Court is of the considered view that no interference is warranted in the instant writ petition for the following facts and reasons: (I) From the charges levelled against the petitioner it appears that petitioner, while on duty, was found in drunken stage abusing his colleagues and senior officers and terrorizing the entire premises threatening to kill the colleagues. The said act of the petitioner amounts to gross misconduct. The said act of the petitioner amounts to gross misconduct. (II) The enquiry officer conducted the enquiry as per the procedure, giving ample opportunity to the petitioner to defend his case. It is not a case that enquiry proceeding was full of procedural lacuna and as such, amounts to violation of principle of natural justice. (III) The findings of the Enquiry Officer was accepted by Disciplinary Authority and after providing ample opportunity of hearing, the order of punishment was inflicted against the petitioner, which was affirmed by the Appellate Authority as well as Revisional Authority. (IV) No illegality has been pointed-out by the petitioner in the orders of Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority and Revisional Authority, save and except that petitioner was not in sound state of mind, rather, he was suffering from mental illness. It is not a case of the petitioner that ever he made any application or he got himself treated in any mental hospital and Doctor had advised earlier also for treatment of mental illness, which was not accepted by the respondent-authorities and as such, he was compelled to perform his duties in the said state of mind. (V) The petitioner belongs to a disciplined force and member of disciplined force are required to maintain discipline. The very act of the petitioner indulging himself in consumption of liquor while on duty amounts to gross misconduct. His past conduct also reflects that he was in habit of consumption of liquor in duty hours and misbehaving with his fellow colleagues and the senior officers. Such type of person that also in a disciplined force cannot be allowed to continue in his duty. 8. The arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner is not at all acceptable to this Court that the order of punishment is disproportionate to the gravity of charges. The Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 238 of 2015 (Shilendra Singh Rathore Vs. the Union of India & Ors.) disposed of on 02.06.2016, has clearly held that in a disciplined force, there is no room for such type of employee. The said order was followed by this Court in LPA No. 684 of 2015 (Kahhaiya Lal Vs. Union of India & Ors.), disposed of on 10.05.2016. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of State of Bihar & Ors. Vs. The said order was followed by this Court in LPA No. 684 of 2015 (Kahhaiya Lal Vs. Union of India & Ors.), disposed of on 10.05.2016. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of State of Bihar & Ors. Vs. Phulpari Kumari, reported in 2019 SCC Online 1563 had held that interference with the orders passed pursuant to departmental proceeding can only be in case of no evidence. Sufficiency of evidence not with the realm judicial review. 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 has held as under: “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. 13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not : (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” Further, in case of State of A.P. Vs. S. Sree Rama Rao [ AIR 1963 SC 1723 ], the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that, “………..But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.” Further, in case of State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao [ (1975) 2 SCC 557 ] the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: “21. ……………….. ……………….. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion.” Further, in case of Railway Board v. Niranjan Singh [ (1969) 1 SCC 502 ], it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that, “This Court held that the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority should prevail and the High Court should not have interfered with the conclusion.” Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [ AIR 1964 SC 477 ] has held that, “The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal”. In case of State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh [ (1977) 2 SCC 491 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that, “Of course, fair play is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good.” Again, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Railway Board v. Niranjan Singh (supra) has held that, “the High Court does not interfere with the conclusion of the disciplinary authority unless the finding is not supported by any evidence or it can be said that no reasonable person could have reached such a finding”. 10. It was never pleaded by the petitioner that the findings arrived by the enquiry officer is perverse. Since the order of punishment has been affirmed by the Appellate Authority as well as Revisional Authority, no interference is warranted in the same. 11. The writ petition being devoid of any merit is hereby dismissed. 12. No order as to costs.