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2022 DIGILAW 2506 (RAJ)

Pabudan Singh v. Union Of India

2022-09-22

FARJAND ALI, SANDEEP MEHTA

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JUDGMENT Sandeep Mehta, J. - The petitioner has approached this court through this petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for assailing the order dated 20.02.2020 passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Jodhpur Bench, Jodhpur rejecting the Original Application No. 290/00286/2013 filed by the petitioner on the ground of limitation. 2. Brief facts relevant and essential for disposal of the writ petition are noted herein below:- 3. The petitioner was initially appointed in the respondent Railways as Khallasi on 25.12.1958. He was given officiating appointment on the post of Mason Grade-III on 04.02.1975 and was regularized on the said post w.e.f. 04.05.1990. The respondents introduced a scheme named Assured Career Progression Scheme (for short, 'ACP Scheme') with effect from 01.10.1999. The scheme proposed a safety net to deal with the problem of stagnation and hardships faced by the employees due to lack of promotional avenues. It was proposed to grant financial up gradation under the ACP Scheme to Group B, C and D employees on completion of 12 and 24 years of service, in case no regular promotion had been granted to such employee. The petitioner superannuated on 01.10.2000. 8 years later, he submitted a representation dated 31.03.2008 to the respondents, followed by a legal notice dated 07.09.2009, claiming financial up gradation under the ACP Scheme. This claim of the writ petition was denied by the respondents by order dated 18.09.2009. Claiming that the denial of financial up gradation gave a recurring cause of action, the petitioner served yet another legal notice dated 25.06.2013 upon the respondents and after receiving a communication dated 10.07.2013 turning down the prayer made in the said legal notice. Thereupon, the petitioner filed the Original Application in question, which came to be rejected by the order dated 20.02.2020 on the ground that the application had been filed after the stipulated period of one year as prescribed under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The said order is assailed in this writ petition. 4. Mr. S.K. Malik, learned counsel representing the petitioner, vehemently and fervently contended that denial of financial up gradation under the ACP Scheme causes repeated loss of salary to the petitioner and hence, the same gives rise to recurring cause of action. The said order is assailed in this writ petition. 4. Mr. S.K. Malik, learned counsel representing the petitioner, vehemently and fervently contended that denial of financial up gradation under the ACP Scheme causes repeated loss of salary to the petitioner and hence, the same gives rise to recurring cause of action. He placed reliance on the following judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme court and urged that the Original Application of the petitioner should not have been thrown out solely on the ground of limitation:- (1) B.S. Sheshagiri Setty & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. [ (2016) 2 SCC 123 ] (2) Union of India & Ors. v. Tarsem Singh [ (2008) 8 SCC 648 ] (3) State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO & Ors. [ (2005) 3 SCC 752 ] (4) M.R. Gupta v. Union of India & Ors. [ (1995) 5 SCC 628 ] (5) Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Khatiji & Ors. [ AIR 1987 SC 1353 ] 5. Per contra, Mr. Bhanu Pratap Bohra, learned Senior Panel Counsel for the respondent Union of India, vehemently and fervently opposed the submissions advanced by the petitioner's counsel. He urged that Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 prescribes a limitation of one year from the date, the cause of action arises for entertaining an original application. The petitioner's grievance that he was denied the benefit of the ACP Scheme arose in the year 2000, but the first representation against this so-called illegal denial was submitted by the petitioner after 8 years on 31.03.2008, which was followed by a legal notice dated 07.09.2009. Admittedly, a communication dated 18.09.2009 was sent to the petitioner turning down his claim with apposite reasons indicating that he was not entitled to the benefit of ACP Scheme because the pay scale, which he was drawing at the time of his retirement was higher than what he would have attained under the financial upgradation stipulated under the ACP Scheme. Mr. Bohra submitted that the petitioner has not made any assertion in his original application or the writ petition that the reasons assigned by the respondents in the orders rejecting the representations of the petitioner that he was already drawing higher pay scale than what would devolve upon him by virtue of the ACP Scheme and thus, Mr. Mr. Bohra submitted that the petitioner has not made any assertion in his original application or the writ petition that the reasons assigned by the respondents in the orders rejecting the representations of the petitioner that he was already drawing higher pay scale than what would devolve upon him by virtue of the ACP Scheme and thus, Mr. Bohra urged that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief on the ground of the original application having been filed after the stipulated period of limitation and so also on merits. In support of his contentions, Mr. Bohara has placed reliance on the following judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court:- (1) IFCI Limited v. Sanjay Behari & Ors. [ (2020) 18 SCC 511 ] (2) Jai Dev Gupta v. State of H.P. & Anr. [ (1997) 11 SCC 13 ] (3) Administrator of Union Territory of Daman and Diu & Ors. v. R.D. Valand [1995 Supp (4) SCC 593] (4) Secretary to Govt. of India & Ors. v. Shivram Mahadu Gaikwad [1995 Supp (3) SCC 231] (5) Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India & Ors. [1994 Supp (2) SCC 1995] 6. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the impugned order and the material placed on record. 7. At the outset, we may note that the petitioner's assertion that he was prevented from taking recourse of the legal remedy against the alleged wrongful denial of the ACP Scheme on account of his illiteracy is absolutely unacceptable. Suffice it to say that admittedly the petitioner took recourse of legal advice in the year 2009, when he forwarded legal notice dated 07.09.2009 to the respondents raising a grievance against the so-called wrongful denial of benefit under the ACP Scheme. A communication dated 18.09.2009 was sent to the petitioner in response to the legal notice, wherein it was clearly indicated that the petitioner was initially appointed as IOW/Khallasi on 25.12.1958 in the pay scale of Rs. 70-85/196-232/750-940/2550-3200 and he was directly granted officiating appointment on the post of Mason Grade-III on 04.02.1975 in the pay scale of Rs. A communication dated 18.09.2009 was sent to the petitioner in response to the legal notice, wherein it was clearly indicated that the petitioner was initially appointed as IOW/Khallasi on 25.12.1958 in the pay scale of Rs. 70-85/196-232/750-940/2550-3200 and he was directly granted officiating appointment on the post of Mason Grade-III on 04.02.1975 in the pay scale of Rs. 260-400/950-1500/3050-4590, whereas he should have been first promoted on the post of Semi-skilled Mason or Helper Khallasi in the pay scale of 210-290/800-1150/2650-4000 and if fictionally the petitioner is treated under this channel of promotion, he would be drawing the pay scale Rs. 1010 as on 01.08.1989, whereas due to being treated in the channel of Mason in the pay scale of Rs. 950-1500-3050-4590, he was already drawing the pay scale of Rs. 1275 as on 04.05.1990. Hence, as on the date of retirement, the petitioner was actually drawing higher pay than what he would draw if he had been given the benefit of ACP Scheme. This reasoning assigned by the respondents in the letter/communication dated 18.09.2009, which was reiterated in the subsequent letter/communication dated 10.07.2013, is valid and logical. While filing the Original Application before the Tribunal, no assertion/pleading was made by the petitioner for questioning/controverting factual/legal opinion expressed in the communication, whereby his claim for benefit under the ACP Scheme was turned down. Apparently, thus, the petitioner acquiesced to the reasoning assigned by the respondents that he was already drawing higher pay than what he could claim by virtue of the ACP Scheme. 8. Even during the course of arguments before this court, learned counsel Mr. Malik was requested to address the court on this aspect, but he could not offer any argument to question the legality of this reasoning as communicated in the letters dated 18.09.2009 and 10.07.2013. Thus, even on merits, the petitioner has not been able to show any justification for questioning the orders, whereby his highly belated claim for grant of benefit of ACP Scheme was turned down. 9. The Original Application before the Tribunal was filed after a gross delay of nearly 14 years. We may note that the petitioner was having active access to legal assistance because he served a legal notice to the respondents on 07.09.2009, to which a reply in negative was received on 18.09.2009. However, the petitioner took no steps whatsoever to challenge the said order. We may note that the petitioner was having active access to legal assistance because he served a legal notice to the respondents on 07.09.2009, to which a reply in negative was received on 18.09.2009. However, the petitioner took no steps whatsoever to challenge the said order. 4 years later, a fresh legal notice was served by the petitioner upon the respondents, apparently with an intention to somehow or the other extend the limitation period for filing original application in the Tribunal. Law is well-settled that limitation cannot be extended by repeated representations. As per Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, the stipulated time for filing an original application before the Tribunal is one year. Thus, we are of the firm view that the Tribunal was perfectly justified in rejecting the original application filed by the petitioner on the ground of delay. 10. In addition thereto, we have already recorded a satisfaction that even on merits, the petitioner has no ground to seek the relief sought for in the original application. It may be reiterated that on the date of his retirement, the petitioner was already drawing higher pay than what he could claim by virtue of the ACP Scheme. Manifestly, thus, there was no reason for the Tribunal to have interfered in the impugned orders even on merits. The impugned orders passed by the Tribunal and the respondent authorities do not suffer from any infirmity or illegality whatsoever warranting interference. 11. Hence, the writ petition fails and is dismissed as being devoid of merit.