JUDGMENT : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J 1. This criminal appeal preferred by the Appellant herein under Section 374 (2) of Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 19.11.2014 passed by the II Additional Sessions Judge, Durg, District Durg (C.G.), in S.T. No.213/2012 by which the Appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.5000/, and on failure to pay the fine amount, additional sentence of R.I. for one year has been imposed against the appellant herein. 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 23.09.2012 at around 22.45 hours, the appellant herein attacked and caused injury to Vinay Kumar Yadav by knife over his left ear, jaw, cheek and eyebrow. Looking to the injuries sustained, injured Vinay Kumar Yadav was taken by Ramesh Chandra Beldar (PW/4) to the room of Raja Ram Dhurv and information was given to the police control room. During that time, injured Vinay Kumar Yadav, with the help of nearby people, was taken to J.L.N. Hospital & Research Center, Bhilai, where Dr. Meenakshi Dave (PW/1) examined injured and gave her report Ex.P/1 in which it has also been recorded that injured Vinay Kumar Yadav was assaulted by appellant herein namely Arvind Kumar Verma. M.L.C. report of injured was also prepared vide Ex.P/2 in which as many as five incised wounds on abdomen, eyebrow, left side of face were noticed. 3. It is the case of the prosecution that deceased Vinay Kumar Yadav had told complainant Ramesh Chandra Beldar (PW/4) that appellant Arvind Kumar Verma, with an intention to kill him attacked him by knife and caused injury to him. Upon information of complainant (PW/4), Head Constable Kamlesh Kumar Sahu (PW/10) registered dehati nalishi (Ex.P/5) at Sector9 Hospital and in order to determine whether the injured Vinay Kumar Yadav, who was alive, was in condition to give statement, wrote a letter (Ex.P/18) to Assistant Surgeon of Sector – 9 Hospital, upon which, Kamlesh Kumar Sahu (PW/10) was informed that Vinay Kumar Yadav is in a condition to give statement and accordingly, the statement of injured Vinay Kumar Yadav was recorded in presence of two witnesses namely Shyamendra Kumar Yadav (PW/9) and Deepak (not examined). Thereafter, Shyamendra Kumar Yadav (PW/10) came to the police station and lodged FIR under Section 307 of IPC, however, due to the fatal injury, Vinay Kumar Yadav died on 24.09.2012 at early in the morning, which has been informed by the Sector – 9 Hospital vide Ex.P/15 to police station Sector 6. Thereafter, Merg intimation (Ex.P/16) was recorded, inquest was conducted vide Ex.P/7 & dead body of Vinay Kumar Yadav was subjected to postmortem examination, which was conducted by Dr. R.K. Nayak (PW/3) who gave his report Ex.P/4, according to which, Vinay Kumar Yadav died of shock due to extensive visceral injuries and hemorrhage. Thereafter, the Appellant was arrested and his memorandum statement was recorded vide Ex.P/20, pursuant to which, bloodstained clothes of appellant and knife were recovered at his instance vide Ex.P/21 and Ex.P/22 respectively. Bloodstained bed sheet, on which the deceased was lying, was seized from the house of Rajaram Dhruv and clothes of injured/deceased Vinay Kumar Yadav were also seized vide Ex.P/8. The seized articles were sent for chemical examination to F.S.L., Raipur, vide Ex.P/29, and as per FSL report (Ex.P/32), human blood was found on the articles seized from the Appellant, however, blood group could not be ascertained. 4. After completion of usual investigation, charge sheet for commission of offence under Sections 307 and 302 of IPC was filed before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg, who in turn, committed the case to the Court of Sessions for hearing and disposal in accordance with law. After filing of the charge sheet, the trial Judge framed the charge against the accused/appellant for offence under Section 302 IPC. 5. In order to prove the guilt of the accused/appellant, the prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses and exhibited 32 documents from Exs.P/1 to Ex.P/32. Statement of the accused/appellant was also recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. The Appellant abjured his guilt, pleaded innocence and false implication & entered into defence stating that he has not committed the offence. 6. The trial Court, after hearing learned counsel for the respective parties and considering the oral and documentary evidence on record, has convicted the Appellant herein holding that the deceased Vinay Kumar Yadav had given dying declaration (Ex.P/17) voluntarily and sentenced him for period as mentioned in para 1 of the judgment against which the instant appeal has been preferred. 7. Mr. 7. Mr. B.P. Singh, learned counsel for the appellant would submit as under: (i) That, though the dying declaration was recorded in the hospital and it was the duty of the prosecution to get the dying declaration recorded in presence of Doctor after valid certification by him that the declarant is in a fit state of mind to give the dying declaration but in the instant case, there is no justification from the police officer who recorded the statement particularly when the Doctor was available in the hospital and deceased, Vinay Kumar Yadav was also in the hospital for not recording the statement by doctor. To buttress his submission, he would rely upon the decisions of Supreme Court in the matters of Maniram V. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1994 (2) SC 840 & State Delhi Administration V. Laxman Kumar and Others and Indian Federation of Woman Lawyers and Others V. Shakuntala (Smt.) And Others, 1985 SCC (4) 476. (ii) That, the dying declaration in question Ex.P/17 has neither been signed by the deceased nor contained the date and time of recording the dying declaration, as such, the same is not reliable and trustworthy. He would rely upon the decision of Supreme Court in the matter of Panchdev Singh V. State of Bihar, AIR 2002 SC 526 & State of U.P. Vs. Shishupal Singh, 1994 CRI.L.J. 617. (iii) That, in the instant case, dying declaration (Ex.P/17) has been recorded by the Investigating Officer, which has not been endorsed by the Doctor present there in the hospital, therefore, the same is suspicious and creates doubt. To buttress his submission, he would rely upon the decision of Supreme Court in the matter of Brundaban Moharana and Another Vs. State of Orissa, 2010 (13) SCC 381 . (iv) That, dying declaration (Ex.P/17) in question was recorded in violation of Regulation 742 (c) (4) of the Chhattisgarh Police Regulations. In support of his submission, he would rely upon the decision of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Kadwa and Another Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2018 (2) CDHC 718 (MP). (v) Learned counsel would submit that blood was found on the seized articles but the same could not be classified whether it was human blood or not, therefore, on this basis, the Appellant cannot be convicted. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2018 (2) CDHC 718 (MP). (v) Learned counsel would submit that blood was found on the seized articles but the same could not be classified whether it was human blood or not, therefore, on this basis, the Appellant cannot be convicted. To buttress his submission, he would rely upon the decisions of Supreme Court in the matter of Debapriya Pal Vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 2017 SC 1246 & Sonvir alias Somvir V. State of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2018 SC 3131 . (vi) Learned counsel would lastly submit that conviction cannot be awarded solely on the evidence of suspicious dying declaration (Ex.P/17). He would rely upon the decision of this Court in the matter of Shankar Bareth Vs. State of C.G., 2013 (3) CG.L.J. 109 . As such, the instant appeal be allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and the appellant be acquitted of the charge under Section 302 of the I.P.C. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Ashish Tiwari, learned G.A. for the State would submit that in the dying declaration (Ex.P/17), deceased Vinay Kumar yadav had voluntarily and truthfully stated that due to previous enmity with Appellant, he was attacked. He would further submit that Jagriti Thakur (PW/2) had proved the motive of the accused/appellant to cause death of deceased Vinay Kumar Yadav. Learned counsel would also submit that Dr. Meenakshi Dave (PW/1) has also supported the case of the prosecution who had treated the deceased when he was brought to the hospital on 23.09.2012, and even in Doctor Consultation Slip (Ex.P/1), it has been recorded by her that deceased Vinay Kumar Yadav was assaulted by the accused/appellant by knife and she has maintained her statement before the trial Court. Learned counsel would further submit that Shyamendra Kumar Yadav (PW/9), being independent witness, has stated that deceased Vinay Kumar Yadav has informed to him directly in conscious state of mind that the accused/appellant caused injury to him by knife, and knife has been seized pursuant to the memorandum statement (Ex.P/20) and in FSL report (Ex.P/32), blood was found, as such, the prosecution has fully proved the offence against the accused/appellant and the learned trial Court has rightly convicted him for the offence under Section 302 of IPC. To buttress his submission, he would rely upon the decisions of Supreme Court in the matters of Hiraman V. State of Maharashtra, 2013 (12) SCC 586 , Ashabai & Anr. V. State of Maharashtra, 2013 (2) SCC 224 & Paras yadav and Others V. State of Bihar, (1999) 2 SCC 126 . 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein above and went through the record with utmost circumspection. 10. The learned trial Court has relied upon the dying declaration (Ex.P/17) to base the conviction of the appellant herein, which has seriously been questioned on behalf of the appellant. 11. The first question would be whether the dying declaration (Ex.P/17) is voluntary and truthful statement made by deceased Vinay Kumar Yadav, which states as under : ^^eS mijksDr irs ij jgrk gwW lsDVj 6 daVªksy :e esa vkj{kd nwjlapkj ds in ij dk;Zjr gWw A fnukad 23@09@2012 dks esjh 22%00 cts V.H.F. :yj iqfyl daVªksy :e esa M;wVh Fkh rks esa M;qVh 22%00 cts vkus ds ckn [kkuk ogh [kk;k Fkk blfy;s lquhy ekdZ.Ms dh eksVj lkbZfdy dks ysdj jes'k pan ds ?kj ls 6/AVD/2/N fHkykbZ esa jkf= 22%45 cts igqapk ogkW ij jes'k pan Fkk tks Qksu ij lquhy ekdZ.Ms ls ckr dj [kkuk [kkus ds fy;s cqyk;s rc eSa jes'k pan dks cksyk fd eSa lquhy ekdZ.Ms dh eksVj lkbZdy dks ysdj vk;k gWw] mls eSa ysdj vkrk gw] dgdj lhढh ls uhps mrjk rks ogk ij vjfoan oekZ vdsys [kMk Fkk ftlls esjh iqjkuh jaft'k py jgh Fkh rks og ,dk,d esjs ikl vk;k vkSj pkdw ls gR;k djus dh uh;r ls cka;s dku] xky] tcMk] eLrd ,oa isV esa yxkrkj okj dj pksV igqpkus yxk rks eSa uhps ls gh jes'k pan ,oa fot; dks tYnh uhps vkvksa eq>ls >xMk dj pkdw ls vjfoan oekZ ekj jgk gS cksydj lhfढksa ls mij tkus yxk ,oa jes'k pan] fot; uhps vk jgk gw dgdj uhps vkus yxs rks vjfoan oekZ Fkkuk x;k rks eS mij nwljh eafty ij x;k rks eq>s jes'k pan o fot; feys tks eq>s jktk jke /kqoz ds dejk ys tkdj fyVk;s fQj ek:fr oSu ls lsDVj 9 ch-,l-ih- vLirky esa ykdj HkrhZ fd;s gS A eq>s vjfoan oekZ iqjkuh jaft'k ds dkj.k pkdw ls gR;k djus dh uh;r ls izk.k?kkrd geyk dj pksV igqWpk;k gSA^^ 12. Admittedly, the aforesaid dying declaration (Ex.P/17) was recorded in the hospital but it has not been recorded by the Doctor and it has also been not recorded in the question answer form & there is no certificate attached with the said dying declaration (Ex.P/17) that the deceased/declarant was in a fit state of mind at the time of its recording and was able to make correct statement of the events which had taken place on the date of incident. 13. In the matter of Maniram (supra), the dying declaration was recorded by the Sub-Inspector and no attestation by the Doctor was taken certifying that the patient was conscious or not and even the signature or thumb impression of the declarant was not obtained. It has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the dying declaration was highly doubtful in nature. Similarly, in the matter of Laxman (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court relying upon the judgment of Dilip Singh V. State of Punjab, (1979) 4 SCC 332 , have held that though a dying declaration recorded by the Police Officer during the course of investigation is admissible under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, in view of the exception provided in sub section (2) of Section 162 Cr.P.C., it is better to leave such dying declaration out of consideration until and unless the prosecution satisfies the Court as to why it was not recorded by the Magistrate or by the Doctor. In the matter of Mannu Raja V. State of M.P., (1976) 3 SCC 104 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that the practice of Investigating Officer himself recording the dying declaration during the course of investigation ought not to be encouraged. 14. In the matter of Shishupal Singh (supra), Supreme Court has taken note of the fact that the dying declaration doesn't contain signature of the deceased/declarant therein and no explanation has been offered by the prosecution that the declarant was not in a position to put his signature & date and time was also not mentioned in the dying declaration. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the dying declaration suffers from suspicious circumstances and creates a doubt in the mind of the Court about its genuineness. 15. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the dying declaration suffers from suspicious circumstances and creates a doubt in the mind of the Court about its genuineness. 15. In the matter of Brundaban (supra), dying declaration made by the declarant to the Investigating Officer was supported by PW3 and PW7 therein. Their Lordships of Supreme Court finding the statement of PW3 and PW7 who allegedly supported the dying declaration was doubtful and did not approve the judgment of the High Court, as such is not in any way helpful to the appellant herein. The decision relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant in Panchdeo (supra) & Shankar Bareth (supra) is not helpful to the appellant herein in view of finding recorded herein above and distinguishable to the facts of the present case. 16. Reverting to the facts of the instant case in the light of aforesaid legal position, it is quite vivid that the dying declaration (Ex.P/17) was recorded by Kamlesh Kumar Sahu (PW/10) – Head Constable, though as per clause 742 (c) (4) of the Chhattisgarh Police Regulations, the dying declaration was required to be recorded by Investigating Officer and it has to be in question answer form and it is also not recorded in question answer form, but the date has been mentioned by Kamlesh Kumar Sahu (PW/10), Head Constable, who recorded the dying declaration and time has been mentioned by the witness to dying declaration (Ex.P/17) namely Shyamendra Kumar Yadav (PW/9) while signing the dying declaration as witness. In the considered opinion of this Court, though there is some infirmity in the dying declaration that his statement was not recorded by the Doctor & it has also not been countersigned by the deceased/declarant though he was in conscious condition and it has not been recorded in question answer form, but that will not make the dying declaration suspicious in view of the fact that one witness to the dying declaration namely Shyamendra Kumar Yadav (PW/9) has been examined by the prosecution, who has stated in para 1 of his examination-in-chief that the deceased had informed him that it is the appellant who gave knife blow to him (deceased) and his statement remained uncontroverted in his crossexamination. As such, there is minor infirmity in the dying declaration (Ex.P/17), but considering the urgency involved, the statement of deceased Vinay Kumar Yadav was recorded and deceased thereafter died on 24.09.2012 at 7.00 AM. As such, on the basis of infirmity pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, it cannot be held that the dying declaration is a suspicious document and it cannot be relied upon to rest the conviction of the appellant herein. Apart from the said fact, after occurrence of the incident which took place on 23.09.2012, deceased Vinay Kumar Yadav, at 11.30, was firstly taken to the Jawaharlal Nehru Hospital, Sector – 9 Hospital, Bhilai, where he was examined by Dr. Meenakshi Dave (PW/1) and in doctor consultation slip (Ex.P/1), it has been specifically mentioned by Dr. Meenakshi Dave (PW/1) that stab injury was caused to deceased Vinay Kumar Yadav by appellant Arvind Kumar Verma. It is pertinent to mention here that in consultation slip (Ex.P/1), the time and place of incident, as narrated by deceased Vinay Kumar Yadav, has also been mentioned by Dr. Meenakshi Dave (PW/1), who in her statement before the Court categorically stated that injured Vinay Kumar Yadav had told her about the incident that appellant Arvind Kumar Verma assaulted him at 11.00 pm. and she (PW/1) has recorded the said fact in MLC/doctor consultation slip (Ex.P/1). As such, from the statement of Dr. Meenakshi Dave (PW/1), which is supported by doctor consultation slip (Ex.P/1), it is clearly established that it is the appellant who had caused stab injury to deceased Vinay Kumar Yadav. 17. Next contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that blood was found on the seized articles but the same could not be classified whether it was human blood or not, therefore, in view of the decisions rendered in the matters of Debapriya and Sonvir alias Somvir (supra), the appellant is entitled for acquittal. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant had relied upon para 7 of the judgment in the matter of Debpriya (supra), which states as under : “7. As far a recovery of blood stained clothes is concerned, two public witnesses are examined who, purportedly, were the witnesses to the seizure list of wearing apparels of the appellant. These are PW12 and PW13. Learned counsel for the appellant had relied upon para 7 of the judgment in the matter of Debpriya (supra), which states as under : “7. As far a recovery of blood stained clothes is concerned, two public witnesses are examined who, purportedly, were the witnesses to the seizure list of wearing apparels of the appellant. These are PW12 and PW13. According to their deposition, they saw the policemen along with the accused person going to the house of the appellant and they also joined the police party. It is how they became the witness and were associated with the recovery. For the sake of argument, we are presuming that they were present at the time when the appellant brought blood stained clothes from his house and gave the same to the police. What is material is the reliance on these blood stained clothes for the culpability of the appellant herein. As per the prosecution, the blood group on these blood stained clothes matched with the blood on the bed sheet on which the body of one of the deceased person is found. The record reveals that though blood of both the deceased persons was drawn and sent for examination, it is not known as to what was the report thereupon and what was the blood group of the deceased persons. No such blood report has been produced. So much so, blood group of the accused persons was also not ascertained. Even if we presume that the blood on the bed sheet was that of the deceased, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the same blood group as of the accused appellant thereof. Therefore, mere matching of the blood group on the blood stained clothes, which was even on the bed sheet, would not lead to the conclusion that it is the appellant who had committed the crime. Same reasoning goes with the recovery of laptop as well. Merely because laptop belonging to the sister of the deceased Anusha Sarkar is not indicative that the appellant is responsible for the commission of the crime. Under Section 27 of the Evidence Act only so much of recovery, as a result of the disclosure statement, which directly pertains to the commission of crime is relevant. Otherwise, such an evidence is barred under Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Recovery of laptop does not have any bearing. Under Section 27 of the Evidence Act only so much of recovery, as a result of the disclosure statement, which directly pertains to the commission of crime is relevant. Otherwise, such an evidence is barred under Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Recovery of laptop does not have any bearing. It is neither the weapon of crime nor it has any cause of connection with the commission of crime. The law on this aspect is succinctly said in the case 'Jaffar Hussain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra (1969) 2 SCC 872 : ( AIR 1970 SC 1934 ) in the following manner: “5. Under Section 25 of the Evidence Act no confession made by an accused to a police officer can be admitted in evidence against him. An exception to this is however provided by Section 26 which makes a confessional statement made before a Magistrate admissible in evidence against an accused notwithstanding the fact that he was in the custody of the police when he made the incriminating statement. Section 27 is a proviso to Section 26 and makes admissible so much of the statement of the accused which leads to the discovery of a fact deposed to by him and connected with the crime, irrespective of the question whether it is confessional or otherwise. The essential ingredient of the section is that the information given by the accused must lead to the discovery of the fact which is the direct outcome of such information, Secondly, only such portion of the information given as is distinctly connected with the said recovery is admissible against the accused. Thirdly, the discovery of the fact must relate to the commission of some offence.” 19. In Sonvir alias Somvir (supra), it has been held by the Supreme Court relying upon its two earlier judgments in Prakash v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 12 SCC 133 and Debapriya (supra) that while deciding cases based on circumstantial evidence, mere matching of the blood group cannot lead to the conclusion of culpability of accused in absence of detailed serologist comparison; since millions of people would have the same blood group. 20. 20. However, in the matter of Balwan Singh V. State of C.G., (2019) 7 SCC 781 , the Supreme Court has considered the issue of failure to establish the origin of blood as human blood and/or its blood group and laid down the principle of law in this regard, as under : “14. It is also important to note the following observations made by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Raghav Prapanna Tripathi V. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 74 (AIR p. 78, para 21) “21. In this connection, reference may also be made to Circumstances 9 and 10, relating to the recovery of the bloodstained earth from the house. The bloodstained earth has not been proved to be stained with human blood. Again, we are of opinion that it would be farfetched to conclude from the mere presence of bloodstained earth that earth was stained with human blood and that the human blood was of Kamla and Madhusudhan. These circumstances have, therefore, no evidentiary value.” (emphasis supplied) Therefore, the five Judge Bench had ruled that in that case the prosecution needed to prove that the bloodstains found on the earth or the weapons were of a human origin and were of the same blood group as that of the deceased.” 22. The cases discussed above highlight the burden that the prosecution would ordinarily have to discharge, depending on the other facts and circumstances of the case, for the evidence relating to recovery to be considered against the accused. At the same time, as mentioned above, we are conscious of the fact that it may not always be possible to inextricably link the bloodstains on the items seized in recovery to the blood of the deceased, due to the possibility of disintegration of bloodstains on account of the time lapse in carrying out the recovery. For this reason, in Prabhu Dayal V. State of Rajasthan, (2018) 8 SCC 127 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 517, where one of us (Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J.) had the occasion to author the judgment, this Court, relying on Teja Ram, (1999) 3 SCC 507 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 436, had held that the failure to determine the blood group of the bloodstains collected from the scene of offence would not prove fatal to the case of the prosecution. In Prabhu Dayal Case, although the FSL report could not determine the blood group of the bloodstains on account of disintegration, the report clearly disclosed that the bloodstains were of human origin, and the chain of circumstantial evidence was completed by the testimonies of the other witnesses as well as the reports submitted by the ballistic expert and the forensic science laboratory regarding the weapon used to commit murder.” 23. From the aforementioned discussion, we can summarise that if the recovery of bloodstained articles is proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, and if the investigation was not found to be tainted, then it may be sufficient if the prosecution shows that the blood found on the articles is of human origin though, even though the blood group is not proved because of disintegration of blood. The court will have to come to the conclusion based on the facts and circumstances of each case, and there cannot be any fixed formula that the prosecution has to prove, or need not prove, that the blood groups match.” 21. Coming to the facts of the case in the light of principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Balwan Singh (supra), it is quite vivid that bloodstained knife was recovered from the possession of the appellant herein pursuant to memorandum statement of accused (Ex.P/20) and in FSL report (Ex.P/32) blood was found in knife, merely because blood group could not be ascertained, FSL report (Ex.P/32) cannot be ignored. 22. In view of the aforesaid discussion and finding arrived at herein, we are of the considered opinion that merely on the basis of some infirmity in the dying declaration (Ex.P/17) that it does not contain signature of declarant and it is not recorded by the Doctor or Magistrate, dying declaration (Ex.P/17) cannot be solely discarded particularly when the date and time has duly been recorded in the dying declaration & one of the witnesses namely Shyamendra Kumar Yadav (PW/9) to the dying declaration has been examined to prove the dying declaration. All that apart, Dr. Meenakshi Dave (PW/1) who has firstly examined the deceased on 23.09.2012 at 11.30 pm, has duly recorded the fact in consultation slip (Ex.P/1) that deceased Vinay Kumar Yadav had informed that he was assaulted by the appellant herein, which finds corroborated by the evidence of Dr. All that apart, Dr. Meenakshi Dave (PW/1) who has firstly examined the deceased on 23.09.2012 at 11.30 pm, has duly recorded the fact in consultation slip (Ex.P/1) that deceased Vinay Kumar Yadav had informed that he was assaulted by the appellant herein, which finds corroborated by the evidence of Dr. Meenakshi Dave (PW/1) before the Court. 23. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the trial Court, relying upon the dying declaration (Ex.P/17), is absolutely justified in holding that it is only and only the appellant who has caused the death of the deceased and further justified in holding him guilty & sentencing him for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. 24. We do not find any merit in the appeal and the same deserves to be and is, accordingly, dismissed.