JUDGMENT : S.R. KRISHNA KUMAR, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the impugned judgments and orders dated 02.04.2018 passed in Arbitration Application No. 2/2017 by the III Additional District Judge, Vijayapura (for short ‘the Trial Court’) whereby the interlocutory application I.A. No. 1 and the additional affidavit filed by the appellant for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 (for short ‘the Limitation Act’) were dismissed by the Trial Court which consequently also dismissed the aforesaid Application No. 2/2017 filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the said Act of 1996’). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are as under: The appellant, a society registered under the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act filed a claim petition against the respondent before the learned Sole Arbitrator (Former Judge of this Court) seeking specific performance of agreement dated 17.07.1997 and supplemental agreement dated 16.01.2001 said to have been entered into between the parties and in the alternative for compensation of Rs. 11,362.73 lakhs and for other reliefs. The said petition filed by the appellant was opposed and contested by the respondent who also put forth a counter claim. During the pendency of the arbitral proceedings before the Sole Arbitrator, the respondent filed an application I.A. No. 5 for framing of an additional issue and requesting the Arbitrator to treat the said additional issue as a preliminary issue. The said application having been opposed by the appellant herein, the learned Arbitrator allowed I.A. No. 5 and framed an additional issue regarding constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal and its jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claim put forth by the appellant. Thereafter, the learned Arbitrator treated the said issue as a preliminary issue and after having heard both sides, the Arbitrator proceeded to pass an award dismissing the claim petition on the ground that the Arbitral Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to proceed further and that the claim put forth by the appellant was barred by limitation. It is relevant to state that the said award was passed by the Arbitral Tribunal on 24.08.2016. 3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid award dated 24.08.2016, the appellant herein preferred an application/petition under Section 34 of the said Act of 1996 on 02.01.2017 before the Trial Court. It is relevant to state that the said award was passed by the Arbitral Tribunal on 24.08.2016. 3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid award dated 24.08.2016, the appellant herein preferred an application/petition under Section 34 of the said Act of 1996 on 02.01.2017 before the Trial Court. The said application/petition was filed by the appellant on 02.01.2017, i.e. the date on which the Trial Court reopened after the 2016 Winter/Christmas Vacations for the Trial Courts which was from 19.12.2016 to 01.01.2017. 4. In the aforesaid petition filed under Section 34 of the said Act of 1996, the appellant specifically stated at paragraph-26 of the application/petition relating to limitation that the Arbitral Tribunal having passed the award on 24.08.2016, the application/petition was out of time and that accordingly a separate application for condonation of delay was filed by the appellant. The said application I.A. No. 1 was filed by the appellant under Section 34(3) of the said Act of 1996 read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Section 151 CPC seeking condonation of delay of 24 days in filing the application/petition under Section 34 of the said Act of 1996. In the affidavit in support of the application, in addition to reiterating the facts of the case, at paragraph Nos.6 and 7, the Managing Director of the appellant - Co-operative Society stated that copy of the arbitral award dated 24.08.2016 was received by the appellant on 24.08.2016 itself and the same having been forwarded to the learned Senior Counsel for legal opinion which was furnished on 18.11.2016, the matter relating to challenging the arbitral award was placed before the Board of Management on 30.11.2016, on which day a decision was taken to file the aforesaid application/petition under Section 34 of the said Act of 1996; however, the process of obtaining permission from the Board of Management, approaching the earlier counsel and sending all the papers, documents, etc. to the counsel at Dharwad to file the application/petition under Section 34 of the said Act of 1996 consumed a lot of time; meanwhile, the Winter/Christmas Vacations for the year 2016 for the Trial Courts commenced on 19.12.2016 on account of which, the appellant could not file the Section 34 application/petition within the period of limitation which expired during Winter/Christmas Vacation and as such, the Section 34 application/petition was filed on 02.01.2017, the reopening day for the Trial Courts after completion of the Winter/Christmas Vacations. 5. Appellant contended that the delay in filing the Section 34 application/petition by the appellant was due to administrative reasons and that the same was not deliberate or intentional and due to bona-fide reasons, unavoidable circumstances and sufficient cause; that the appellant had a good case to urge on merits and that the balance of convenience was in favour of the appellant and if the delay in filing the Section 34 application/petition was not condoned, appellant would be put to irreparable injury and hardship and that consequently, it was necessary to condone the delay in filing the Section 34 application/petition which deserves to be heard and disposed of on merits. 6. The said application was opposed by the respondent who filed a detailed statement of objections to the application. 7. Subsequently, appellant filed an additional affidavit in support of I.A. No. 1 referred to supra; in the said additional affidavit, the deponent, i.e. the Managing Director of the appellant-Society who had filed the earlier affidavit in support of I.A. No. 1 further stated that he was incharge of the case on behalf of the appellant and on 24.08.2016, the arbitral award was passed against the appellant; that during August, 2016, since he was preoccupied, he could not contact the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and the matter was being looked after by a learned counsel for the appellant residing at Bengaluru; that after the learned Senior Counsel furnished his opinion on 18.11.2016 opining that the arbitral award was incorrect and erroneous and was liable to be challenged, only the legal opinion of the learned Senior Counsel was furnished to the appellant without the original award copy. It was averred that since the original award copy was not available, the aforesaid learned counsel for the appellant at Bengaluru made a request on 29.12.2016 to the learned Arbitrator for another copy of the award pursuant to which, a fresh copy was furnished to the appellant. It was therefore contended that the appellant had not received the award dated 24.08.2016 till the end of December, 2016 and consequently, the petition/application filed by the appellant on 02.01.2017 within the prescribed period from the date on which the award was received by the appellant was very much within time and there was no delay in filing the Section 34 application/petition by the appellant. Under these circumstances, it was contended that though to avoid technicalities, the appellant had filed an application I.A. No. 1 for condonation of delay, there was actually no delay in filing the petition which was well within time from the date on which the award copy was received by the appellant. It was therefore contended on behalf of the appellant that the additional affidavit be received on record and the Trial Court proceed to hear the Section 34 application/petition filed by the appellant on merits. 8. The respondent filed its objections to the additional affidavit also and inter-alia pointed out that the contentions and allegations put forth in I.A. No. 1 and its accompanying affidavit as well as the additional affidavit dated 13.01.2018 were mutually inconsistent, contradictory and destructive to one another particularly when the additional affidavit was a clear after thought filed after one year of presentation of the Section 34 application/ petition by the appellant. It was submitted that even according to the appellant, it received the award on 24.08.2016 on the day the award was made itself and merely because the award was misplaced and another copy was obtained on 29.12.2016, the said circumstance cannot be relied upon by the appellant either to seek condonation of delay or to contend that there was no delay in filing the Section 34 application/petition by the appellant. The respondent contended that in the light of several decisions of the Apex Court and this Court to the effect that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to applications/petitions filed under Section 34 of the said Act of 1996 after the expiry of 120 days (90 days + 30 days), the Section 34 application/petition filed by the appellant beyond the aforesaid period of 120 days was not condonable and the Trial Court did not have jurisdiction, power or authority of law to entertain or consider I.A. No. 1 filed by the appellant. It was further contended that apart from the fact that neither valid nor sufficient cause was shown by the appellant to seek condonation of delay, Section 4 of the Limitation Act which enables filing of a petition/application on the reopening day in cases where the prescribed period of limitation expired during court vacations was not applicable to the extended period of limitation of 30 days as contemplated in the proviso to Section 34(3) of the said Act of 1996 and consequently, even the additional affidavit and I.A. No. 1 were liable to be dismissed. It was pointed out that under the guise of the additional affidavit, it was not open for the appellant to withdraw/resile from its admission in the Section 34 application/ petition and/or I.A. No. 1 and its accompanying affidavit wherein the appellant had clearly admitted that it had received the arbitral award on 24.08.2016 itself. It was therefore contended that there was no merit in the application as well as the main petition and that the same were liable to be dismissed. 9. It was therefore contended that there was no merit in the application as well as the main petition and that the same were liable to be dismissed. 9. After hearing the parties, the Trial Court proceeded to reject I.A. No. 1 on the ground that as held by the Apex Court and this Court in several decisions, having regard to the specific language employed in Section 34(3) of the said Act of 1996 and the proviso appended thereto, it was not permissible for the appellant to seek condonation of delay beyond a period of 30 days which was maximum period for which the delay in filing the Section 34 application/petition by the appellant could be condoned; that as per the specific provisions contained in Section 34(3) of the said Act of 1996, the Trial Court did not have jurisdiction, power or authority of law to entertain any application/petition beyond the period of 120 days from the date of receipt of the award; that the appellant had itself admitted that it had received the copy on 24.08.2016 itself and consequently, the Section 34 application/petition filed by the appellant on 02.01.2017 after the expiry of the period of 120 days which ended on 23.12.2016 was not maintainable; that in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. Subash Projects and Marketing Limited, (2012) 2 SCC 624 which arose out of identical facts and circumstances in relation to applicability of Section 4 of the Limitation Act to the proviso to Section 34(3) of the said Act of 1996, the Section 34 application/petition filed by the appellant was liable to be dismissed. 10. 10. Insofar as the additional affidavit dated 13.01.2018 filed by the appellant before the Trial Court was concerned, it was held by the Trial Court that the said additional affidavit was a vain attempt on the part of the appellant to nullify the earlier admission of facts which were already on record in the affidavit in support of I.A. No. 1; that no compelling circumstances or genuine reasons were shown as to why an additional affidavit was sought to be filed which was contrary to the earlier affidavit; that filing of the additional affidavit was merely an attempt by the appellant to alter or modify the statement of admission already on record in the affidavit in support of I.A. No. 1 which was not permissible in law; that appellant had failed to invoke any statutory provision or cite any precedent which permits him to file the aforesaid additional affidavit which was contrary to the contents of the earlier affidavit. Under these circumstances, the Trial Court proceeded to reject the additional affidavit filed by the appellant also. 11. Aggrieved by the impugned order passed by the Trial Court rejecting I.A. No. 1 as well as the additional affidavit, appellant is before this Court by way of the present appeal. 12. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondent and perused the material on record. 13. In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in the appeal and referring to the material on record, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Trial Court erred in rejecting I.A. No. 1 filed by the appellant as well as the additional affidavit in support of the said application filed by the appellant for condonation of delay. 13. In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in the appeal and referring to the material on record, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Trial Court erred in rejecting I.A. No. 1 filed by the appellant as well as the additional affidavit in support of the said application filed by the appellant for condonation of delay. It is submitted that the Trial Court failed to consider and appreciate that the delay in filing the Section 34 application/petition by the appellant was due to bona-fide reasons, unavoidable circumstances and sufficient cause; that the Trial Court has adopted a hyper technical approach in rejecting the application I.A. No. 1 and the additional affidavit filed by the appellant without appreciating that in the light of the undisputed fact that the period of 30 days contemplated in the proviso to Section 34(3) of the said Act of 1996 expired on 23.12.2016 on which day, it was physically impossible for the appellant to file the Section 34 application/petition since the Trial Court was closed for Winter/Christmas Vacation from 19.12.2016 to 01.01.2017 and consequently, having regard to Section 4 of the Limitation Act and/or Section 10 of the General Clauses Act 1897, the appellant was entitled to file the instant Section 34 application/petition on the reopening day i.e. 02.01.2017 which was perfectly and legally permissible in law. 14. It is submitted that the decision of the Apex Court in Assam Urban Water Supply’s case supra was not applicable to the facts of the instant case particularly in view of the additional affidavit filed by the appellant which clearly establishes that the appellant received the copy of the award only on 29.12.2016 and not earlier and the averment made in the earlier affidavit in support of I.A. No. 1 had been sufficiently and satisfactorily explained by the appellant in the subsequent additional affidavit and failure to consider this has resulted in erroneous conclusion. Learned counsel submitted that the appellant has a good case to urge in the Section 34 application/petition filed before the Trial Court and consequently it is necessary that a justice oriented approach is adopted in the matter and an opportunity is granted in favour of the appellant to prosecute the Section 34 application/petition on merits failing which the appellant would be put to irreparable injury and hardship and justice would suffer. 15. 15. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent would support the impugned judgment and order passed by the Trial Court and submits that there is no merit in the appeal and that the same is liable to be dismissed. It is submitted that as held by the Apex Court, this Court and other High Courts, neither the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Limitation Act nor Section 10 of the General Clauses Act are applicable to the extended/discretionary/ condonable period of 30 days contemplated in the proviso to Section 34(3) of the said Act of 1996 and consequently, the trial court was fully justified in dismissing the Section 34 application/petition filed by the appellant and the impugned order does not warrant interference by this Court in the present appeal. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the following decisions: (a) Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. Subash Projects and Marketing Limited, (2012) 2 SCC 624 (b) Sagufa Ahmed and Others vs. Upper Assam Polywood Products Private Limited and Others, (2021) 2 SCC 317 (c) Eagle MPCC (JV) vs. Union of India, W.P. No. 39483/2016, dated 27.02.2019 (d) General Manager Southern Railway vs. Eagle Omega, 2020 SCC Online Mad. 24354 (e) Obulapuram Mining Company Pvt. Ltd. vs. JSW Steel Ltd. 2019 SCC Online Bom. 556 (f) State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Sanjay Chauhan, MANU/HP/1233/2021 (g) Union of India vs. Popular Construction Co. (2001) 8 SCC 470 (h) Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 455 (i) State of Maharashtra vs. Ramdas Construction Co. (2006) 6 Mh. L.J. 678 (j) Government of Maharashtra vs. M/s Borse Brothers, 2021 SCC Online SC 233 (k) Union of India vs. Varindera Constructions Limited, (2020) 2 SCC 111 (l) N.V. International vs. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 (m) Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. Irrigation Department, (2008) 7 SCC 169 (n) P. Radha Bai and Others vs. P. Ashok Kumar and Another, AIR 2018 SC 5013 16. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions and perused the material on record. 17. The following points arise for our consideration in the present appeal: (1) Whether the Trial Court was justified in dismissing the additional affidavit dated 13.01.2018 filed by the Appellant in support of its application, I.A. No. 1 filed for condonation of delay in filing the Section 34 petition/application? 17. The following points arise for our consideration in the present appeal: (1) Whether the Trial Court was justified in dismissing the additional affidavit dated 13.01.2018 filed by the Appellant in support of its application, I.A. No. 1 filed for condonation of delay in filing the Section 34 petition/application? (2) Whether the Trial Court was justified in dismissing the application I.A. No. 1 filed for condonation of delay in filing the Section 34 petition/application and consequently dismissing the said petition/application? Point No. 1: 18. The facts leading to the appellant filing the petition/application under Section 34 of the said Act of 1996 before the Trial Court are not in dispute; the sequence of events are as under: (i) Arbitral Award was passed on 24.08.2016. (ii) The period of 90 days prescribed under Section 34(3) expired on 24.11.2016. (iii) The appellant was entitled to a further extended/discretionary/condonable period of 30 days from 23.11.2016 onwards in terms of the proviso to Section 34(3) according to which appellant was entitled to file the Section 34 application/petition on or before 24.12.2016. (iv) The Trial Courts were closed on account of Winter/Christmas Vacations from 19.12.2016 to 01.01.2017. (v) The extended/discretionary/condonable period of 30 days as contemplated in the proviso to Section 34(3) expired 24.12.2016 on which day the Trial Court was closed as stated supra on account of Winter/Christmas Vacations. (vi) Both the Section 34 application/petition as well as the application, I.A. No. 1 for condonation of delay were filed on the reopening day, i.e. on 02.01.2017. 19. In his Section 34 application/petition and his application I.A. No. 1 for condonation of delay and the accompanying affidavit, appellant stated that he received the Award on the date of the award itself, i.e. 24.08.2016; however, the additional affidavit in support of I.A. No. 1 was filed by the Appellant on 13.01.2018. 20. In the additional affidavit, appellant stated that the award received by it earlier was misplaced and that on 29.12.2016, the appellant applied for a fresh/additional copy of the award and after receiving the same, the Section 34 application/petition was filed on 02.01.2017, upon reopening of courts after Winter/Christmas Vacations; it was contended that there was no delay in filing the Section 34 application/petition and even if there was any delay, the same deserves to be condoned having regard to the reasons stated in the additional affidavit. 21. 21. A perusal of the Section 34 application/petition discloses that at paragraph 25 dealing with limitation, appellant has categorically admitted that the application/petition was out of time and that I.A. No. 1, an application for condonation of delay had been filed; in the affidavit in support of I.A. No. 1, appellant had clearly admitted that the arbitral award had been received on 24.08.2016 itself; it is relevant to state that in the additional affidavit also, except alleging that the said arbitral award (received on 24.08.2016) had been misplaced, the earlier admission made in the affidavit in support of I.A. No. 1 had neither been withdrawn nor explained by the appellant; to put it differently, the clear, definite, certain, unequivocal and unambiguous admission on the part of the appellant that the arbitral award had been received on 24.08.2016 itself was confirmed, reinforced and affirmed in the additional affidavit also. 22. In the case of P. Radha Bai and Others vs. P. Ashok Kumar and Another, AIR 2018 SC 5013 , the Apex Court held that Section 34(3) reflects the principle of un-breakability, i.e. the period of limitation under Section 34(3) is ‘unbreakable’ and is meant to run continuously; it was held that once a party receives the arbitral award, the limitation period under Section 34(3) commences. In the light of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case which clearly establish that the period of limitation under Section 34(3) of the said Act of 1996 commenced from 24.08.2016 on which date the Appellant undisputedly received the arbitral award, merely because the appellant is said to have misplaced the award and obtained a fresh copy (that too on 29.12.2016), after the maximum period of 120 days commencing from 24.08.2016, none of the contentions urged in the additional affidavit could have been relied upon by the appellant in order to contend that there was no delay in filing the Section 34 application/petition or that the delay deserves to be condoned. 23. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, the contentions and allegations put forth in I.A. No. 1 and its accompanying affidavit were mutually inconsistent, contradictory and destructive to the additional affidavit which was a clear after thought having been filed on 13.01.2018 after a lapse of more than one year from 02.01.2017 when the Section 34 application/petition was filed by the appellant. While dealing with the aforesaid additional affidavit, the Trial Court has come to the correct conclusion that the said additional affidavit was nothing but a vain attempt on the part of the appellant to nullify the earlier admission of facts which were already on record in the affidavit in support of I.A. No. 1; that no compelling circumstances or genuine reasons were shown as to why an additional affidavit was sought to be filed which was contrary to the earlier affidavit; that filing of the additional affidavit was merely an attempt by the appellant to alter or modify the statement of admission already on record in the affidavit in support of I.A. No. 1 which was not permissible in law; that appellant had failed to invoke any statutory provision or cite any precedent which permits him to file the aforesaid additional affidavit which was contrary to the contents of the earlier affidavit. In our considered opinion, the impugned order passed by the Trial Court dismissing the additional affidavit does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity nor can the same be said to be perverse or erroneous warranting interference by this Court and consequently, the Trial Court was fully justified in dismissing the said additional affidavit. Point No. 1 is accordingly answered against the appellant. Point No. 2: 24. As stated supra, in the Section 34 application/petition, the appellant admitted that the arbitral award having been received on 24.08.2016, the appellant had filed the Section 34 application/petition on 02.01.2017 which was after the period of 90 days as provided under Section 34(3) as well as the extended/discretionary/condonable period of 30 days as contemplated under the proviso to Section 34(3) of the said Act of 1996. Accordingly, the Section 34 application/petition ought to have been filed before the expiry of 120 days (90 days + 30 days) which expired on 24.12.2016. Under these circumstances, there was a delay of 9 days in filing the Section 34 application/petition by the appellant which was sought to be condoned by filing I.A. No. 1 by the appellant by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 25. Under these circumstances, there was a delay of 9 days in filing the Section 34 application/petition by the appellant which was sought to be condoned by filing I.A. No. 1 by the appellant by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 25. The question with regard to applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to a Section 34 application/petition in the light of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is no longer res integra in the light of several decisions of the Apex Court, this Court and other High Courts commencing from the decision in the case of Union of India vs. Popular Construction Co. (2001) 8 SCC 455 and reiterated in the recent decision of the Three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Mahindra and Mahindra Financial Services Ltd. vs. Maheshbhai Tinabhai Rathod and Others, 2021 SCC Online SC 1315 wherein it has been consistently held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable to an application/petition against an arbitral award which was filed beyond the period of 120 days (90 days + 30 days) as contemplated under Section 34(3) of the said Act of 1996. It was also held that the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to Section 34 application/petition was excluded as provided under Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act and consequently, the Trial Court dealing with Section 34 application/petition did not have jurisdiction or authority of law to entertain any application/petition filed beyond the period of 120 days. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court and the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to an application/petition filed by a party challenging an arbitral award under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Court before whom such an application is filed does not have jurisdiction or authority of law to entertain any application/petition filed beyond the period of 120 days (90 days + 30 days) from the date of receipt of a copy of the arbitral award. 26. The next question that arises for consideration is as to whether Section 4 of the Limitation Act and/or Section 10 of the General Clauses Act would be applicable to an application/petition filed under Section 34 of the said Act of 1996. 26. The next question that arises for consideration is as to whether Section 4 of the Limitation Act and/or Section 10 of the General Clauses Act would be applicable to an application/petition filed under Section 34 of the said Act of 1996. As stated supra, the arbitral award having been passed on 24.08.2016, the period of 90 days expired on 24.11.2016 whilst the extended/discretionary/condonable period of 30 days as contemplated in the proviso to Section 34(3) of the said Act of 1996 expired on 24.12.2016 on which day the Trial Court was closed for Winter/Christmas Vacations; it is the specific contention of the appellant that it was physically impossible for the appellant to file a Section 34 application/petition after 19.12.2016 on account of the Courts being closed due to Winter/Christmas Vacations and consequently, the appellant would be entitled to the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act which enables/entitles the appellant to file the said Section 34 application/petition on the reopening day; it is therefore contended that in view of the undisputed fact that the prescribed period of 30 days being the extended/ discretionary/condonable period expired on 24.12.2016 on which day the Trial Court was closed on account of Winter/Christmas Vacations, the appellant was fully entitled to file the Section 34 application/petition when the Court reopened on 02.01.2017 and as such, the said application/petition was perfectly legal, proper and maintainable in law. 27. A perusal of the impugned order will indicate that the Trial Court has placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in Assam Urban Water Supply’s case supra, wherein while dealing with applicability of Section 4 of the Limitation Act to the extended/ discretionary/condonable period of 30 days contained in the proviso to Section 34(3) of the said Act of 1996, the Apex Court held as under: “10. The facts in the present case are peculiar. The arbitral awards were received by the appellants on 26-08-2003. No application for setting aside the arbitral awards was made by the appellants before elapse of three months from the receipt thereof. As a matter of fact, three months from the date of the receipt of the arbitral award by the appellants expired on 26-11-2003. The District Court had Christmas vacation for the period from 25-12-2003 to 01-01- 2004. No application for setting aside the arbitral awards was made by the appellants before elapse of three months from the receipt thereof. As a matter of fact, three months from the date of the receipt of the arbitral award by the appellants expired on 26-11-2003. The District Court had Christmas vacation for the period from 25-12-2003 to 01-01- 2004. On reopening of the court i.e. 02-01-2004, admittedly, the appellants made applications for setting aside those awards under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. If the period during which the District Court, Kamrup, Guwahati, remained closed during Christmas vacation, 2003 is extended and the appellants get benefit of that period over and above the cap of thirty days as provided in Section 34(3), then the view of the High Court and the District Judge cannot be sustained. But this would depend on the applicability of Section 4 of the 1963 Act. 11. The question, therefore, that falls for our determination is whether the appellants are entitled to extension of time under Section 4 of the 1963 Act in the above facts? 12. Section 4 of the 1963 Act reads as under: “4. Expiry of prescribed period when court is closed - Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court reopens. Explanation: A court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning of this section if during any part of its normal working hours it remains closed on that day.” The above Section enables a party to institute a suit, prefer an appeal or make an application on the day the court reopens where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on the day when the court is closed. 13. The crucial words in Section 4 of the 1963 Act are “prescribed period.” What is the meaning of these words? 14. 13. The crucial words in Section 4 of the 1963 Act are “prescribed period.” What is the meaning of these words? 14. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act defines: “2(j) “period of limitation” [which] means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule and “prescribed period” means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act when read in the context of Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, it becomes amply clear that the prescribed period for making an application for setting aside arbitral award is three months. The period of 30 days mentioned in proviso that follows sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is not the “period of limitation” and, therefore, not “prescribed period” for the purposes of making the application for setting aside the arbitral award. The period of 30 days beyond three months which the court may extend on sufficient cause being shown under the proviso appended to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act being not the “period of limitation” or in other words “prescribed period” in our opinion, Section 4 of the 1963 Act is not, at all, attracted to the facts of the present case. 15. Seen thus, the applications made by the appellants on 2-1-2004, for setting aside the arbitral award dated 26-08-2003 were liable to be dismissed and have rightly been dismissed by the District Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati, as time-barred.” 28. The said decision was reiterated by a 3 Judge Bench of the Apex Court which also dealt with Section 10 of the General Clauses Act in the case of Sagufa Ahmed and Others vs. Upper Assam Polywood Products Private Limited and Others, (2021) 2 SCC 317 wherein it was held as under: “16. To get over their failure to file an appeal on or before 18.03.2020, the appellants rely upon the order of this Court dated 23.03.2020 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020. It reads as follows: “1. To get over their failure to file an appeal on or before 18.03.2020, the appellants rely upon the order of this Court dated 23.03.2020 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020. It reads as follows: “1. This Court has taken Suo Motu cognizance of the situation arising out of the challenge faced by the country on account of Covid-19 Virus and resultant difficulties that may be faced by litigants across the country in filing their petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under Special Laws (both Central and/or State). 2. To obviate such difficulties and to ensure that lawyers/litigants do not have to come physically to file such proceedings in respective Courts/Tribunals across the country including this Court, it is hereby ordered that a period of limitation in all such proceedings, irrespective of the limitation prescribed under the general law or Special Laws whether condonable or not shall stand extended w.e.f. 15th March 2020 till further order/s to be passed by this Court in present proceedings. 3. We are exercising this power under Article 142 read with Article 141 of the Constitution of India and declare that this order is a binding order within the meaning of Article 141 on all Courts/Tribunals and authorities. 4. This order may be brought to the notice of all High Courts for being communicated to all subordinate Courts/Tribunals within their respective jurisdiction. 5. Issue notice to all the Registrars General of the High Courts, returnable in four weeks.” 17. But we do not think that the appellants can take refuge under the above order. What was extended by the above order of this Court was only “the period of limitation” and not the period upto which delay can be condoned in exercise of discretion conferred by the statute. The above order passed by this Court was intended to benefit vigilant litigants who were prevented due to the pandemic and the lockdown, from initiating proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed by general or special law. It is needless to point out that the law of limitation finds its root in two latin maxims, one of which is Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt which means that the law will assist only those who are vigilant about their rights and not those who sleep over them. 18. It is needless to point out that the law of limitation finds its root in two latin maxims, one of which is Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt which means that the law will assist only those who are vigilant about their rights and not those who sleep over them. 18. It may be useful in this regard to make a reference to Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which reads as follows: “10. Computation of time (1) Where, by any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any Court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the Court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the Court or office is open: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any act or proceeding to which the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877), applies. (2) This section applies also to all [Central Acts] and Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887.” 19. The principle forming the basis of Section 10(1) of the General Clauses Act, also finds a place in Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which reads as follows: “4. Expiry of prescribed period when court is closed - Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court reopens. Explanation: A court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning of this section if during any part of its normal working hours it remains closed on that day.” 20. The words “prescribed period” appear in several Sections of the Limitation Act, 1963. Though these words “prescribed period” are not defined in Section 2 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the expression is used throughout, only to denote the period of limitation. We may see a few examples: 20.1 Section 3(1) makes every proceeding filed after the prescribed period, liable to be dismissed, subject however to the provisions in Sections 4 to 24. Though these words “prescribed period” are not defined in Section 2 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the expression is used throughout, only to denote the period of limitation. We may see a few examples: 20.1 Section 3(1) makes every proceeding filed after the prescribed period, liable to be dismissed, subject however to the provisions in Sections 4 to 24. 20.2 Section 5 enables the admission of any appeal or application after the prescribed period. 20.3 Section 6 uses the expression prescribed period in relation to proceedings to be initiated by persons under legal disability. 21. Therefore, the expression “prescribed period” appearing in Section 4 cannot be construed to mean anything other than the period of limitation. Any period beyond the prescribed period, during which the Court or Tribunal has the discretion to allow a person to institute the proceedings, cannot be taken to be “prescribed period.” 22. In Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. Subash Projects and Marketing Limited, (2012) 2 SCC 624 , this Court dealt with the meaning of the words “prescribed period” in paragraphs 13 and 14 as follows: “13. The crucial words in Section 4 of the 1963 Act are “prescribed period.” What is the meaning of these words? 14. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act defines: “2(j) “period of limitation” which means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule and “prescribed period” means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act when read in the context of Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, it becomes amply clear that the prescribed period for making an application for setting aside arbitral award is three months. The period of 30 days mentioned in proviso that follows sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is not the “period of limitation” and, therefore, not “prescribed period” for the purposes of making the application for setting aside the arbitral award. The period of 30 days beyond three months which the court may extend on sufficient cause being shown under the proviso appended to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act being not the “period of limitation” or, in other words “prescribed period” in our opinion, Section 4 of the 1963 Act is not, at all, attracted to the facts of the present case.” 23. Therefore, the appellants cannot claim the benefit of the order passed by this Court on 23.03.2020, for enlarging, even the period up to which delay can be condoned. The second contention is thus untenable. Hence the appeals are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, they are dismissed.” 29. The decision of the Apex Court in Assam Urban Water Supply’s case supra has been followed by this Court and others High Courts: (a) Eagle MPCC (JV) vs. Union of India, W.P. No. 39483/2016, dated 27.02.2019 (b) General Manager Southern Railway vs. Eagle Omega, 2020 SCC Online Mad. 24354 (c) Obulapuram Mining Company Pvt. Ltd. vs. JSW Steel Ltd. 2019 SCC Online Bom. 556 (d) State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Sanjay Chauhan, MANU/HP/1233/2021 30. In view of the law laid down in the aforesaid decisions, we are of the considered opinion that both Section 4 of the Limitation Act and/or Section 10 of the General Clauses Act are not applicable to the extended/discretionary/condonable period of 30 days contained in the proviso to Section 34(3) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 31. Our attention is drawn to the decision of the Chennai High Court in the case of Stanford Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. vs. Centaur Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. and Another, A.S. No. 2056/2020 dated 20.04.2021 in order to contend that subsequently the Madras High Court has followed the order passed by the Apex Court in Suo Moto Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3/2020 dated 08.03.2021 to come to the conclusion that even the extended/discretionary/ condonable period can be excluded for the purpose of computing limitation on account of the Covid-19 Pandemic; it is contended that the said decision of the Madras High Court was confirmed by the Apex Court vide order dated 04.01.2022. 32. In this context it is relevant to state that in the aforesaid order in Suo Moto Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3/2020 dated 08.03.2021, the Apex Court held as under: “3. The period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Section 23(4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe periods of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the Court or Tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings.” 33. As can be seen from the aforesaid order passed by the Apex Court, in view of specific reference only to Sections 23(4) and 29A of the said Act of 1996, it is clear that the Apex Court was neither dealing with a Section 34 application/petition nor come to the conclusion that the exclusion of the period of 30 days as contemplated in the proviso to Section 34(3) was permissible on account of the Covid-19 Pandemic; further, in addition to the fact that the Apex Court was dealing with limitation being extended/excluded/condoned on account of the Covid-19 Pandemic, the applicability of the said exclusion was not extended by the Apex Court to a Section 34 application/petition which was filed prior to the Covid-19 Pandemic; on the other hand, in Sagufa Ahmed’s case supra, the Apex Court has not only affirmed its earlier decision in Assam Urban Water Supply’s case supra, but has also held that neither Section 4 of the Limitation Act and/or Section 10 of the General Clauses Act are applicable to a Section 34 application/petition filed after expiry of the extended/ condonable/discretionary period of 30 days as contemplated in the proviso to Section 34(3) of the said Act of 1996. In other words, if the period of 90 days as provided in Section 34(3) of the said Act of 1996 expires on a day on which the Court is closed, the period during which the court is closed would stand excluded and a party would be entitled to file an application on the reopening day without any necessity of seeking condonation of delay in view of Section 4 of the Limitation Act and/or Section 10 of the General Clauses Act. However, if the extended/discretionary/condonable period of 30 days as contemplated in the proviso to Section 34(3) of the said Act of 1996 expires on a day on which the court is closed, a party would not be entitled to the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act and in the event the said period of 30 days expires during the period when the court is closed, a party cannot take recourse to Section 4 of the Limitation Act and/or Section 10 of the General Clauses Act and file a Section 34 application/petition after the Court reopens and an application seeking condonation of delay under the proviso to Section 34(3) would not be maintainable; needless to state that as held in the aforesaid decisions, since neither Section 5 of the Limitation Act and/or Section 10 of General Clauses Act is applicable, any Section 34 application/petition filed after the expiry of the extended/discretionary period of 30 days which expires on a day the Court is closed would not be maintainable on the reopening day. 34. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and decisions referred to supra, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned order passed by the Trial Court dismissing the application for condonation of delay and consequently the Section 34 application/petition does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity warranting interference by this Court in the present appeal. Under these circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the Trial Court was fully justified in rejecting the application I.A. No. 1 for condonation of delay filed by the appellant and consequently dismissing the Section 34 application/petition filed by the appellant. Accordingly, Point No. 2 is also answered accordingly against the appellant. 35. In view of the foregoing, we do not find any merit in the appeal and the same is hereby dismissed.