JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. Nikam, learned counsel appearing for the Appellant and Mr. Kolekar, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent. 2. Mr. Nikam submitted that the following substantial questions of law are involved in the Second Appeal: “A. Whether both the Ld. Lower courts were justified in not appreciating that the subject sale deed dated 09/04/2007 is null and void for non-payment of consideration amount? B. Whether both the Ld. Lower courts were justified in holding the validity of the subject sale deed dated 09/04/2007 merely by holding that the execution of the same is proved? C. Whether both the Ld. Lower courts were justified in assuming payment of consideration in respect of subject sale deed when the evidence of the Defendant clearly demonstrates otherwise? D. Whether both the Ld. Lower courts were justified in appreciating and upholding the theory of permissive possession raised by the Defendant in absence of any specific and sufficient evidence to prove the same?” 3. The Appellant is original Plaintiff. The Plaintiff filed suit simplicitor for permanent injunction. In the said suit, the Respondent/Defendant filed counterclaim seeking possession. It is the case of the Appellant that his father by registered Sale Deed dated 9th April 2007, sold the suit property to the Respondent. Mr. Nikam submitted that the said Sale Deed is contrary to Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and the same is without consideration and therefore, null and void. To substantiate his contention, he has relied on the decision of Supreme Court in Kewal Krishan vs. Rajesh Kumar & Ors., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1097. 4. In the present case, both the learned Trial Court and the learned Appellate Court have concurrently held that the consideration was paid to the Appellant’s father by the Respondent. The learned Trial Court has considered the said evidence extensively in paragraph 20. Learned Appellate Court has also considered the payment of consideration in paragraph 8. 5. Mr. Nikam has relied on the cross-examination of the Respondent to substantiate his contention that the said Sale Deed is without any consideration and therefore, null and void. The said cross-examination reads as under:- 6. By appreciating the above evidence, the Courts below concurrently found that consideration of Rs.7,00,000/- has been paid to the father of the Appellant. 5. Mr. Nikam has relied on the cross-examination of the Respondent to substantiate his contention that the said Sale Deed is without any consideration and therefore, null and void. The said cross-examination reads as under:- 6. By appreciating the above evidence, the Courts below concurrently found that consideration of Rs.7,00,000/- has been paid to the father of the Appellant. It is further significant to note that the said Sale Deed dated 9th April 2007 executed by the Appellant’s father in favour of the Respondent is registered Sale Deed and said Sale Deed specifically states as follows:- 7. By considering the recitals and terms and conditions of the said Sale Deed, which is registered, the learned Courts have concurrently held that the payment of consideration has been made by the Respondent to the Appellant’s father. Nothing has been pointed out to demonstrate that said finding is perverse. 8. As far as the reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kewal Krishan (supra), it is to be noted that the factual position in that case is totally different. The factual position in that case is noted in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the said decision, which reads as follows:- “3. The appellant Kewal Krishan executed a power of attorney in favour of Sudarshan Kumar on 28th March 1980. Acting on the basis of the said power of attorney, two sale deeds were executed by Sudarshan Kumar on 10th April 1981. The first sale deed was executed by him by which he purported to sell a part of the suit properties to his minor sons. The sale consideration was shown as Rs.5,500/-. The other sale deed was executed by Sudarshan Kumar in favour of his wife in respect of remaining part of the suit properties. The consideration shown in the sale deed was of Rs.6,875/-. The respondents are Sudarshan Kumar, his wife and his sons. 4. Two separate suits were instituted by the appellant on 10th May 1983. One was against Sudarshan Kumar and his two sons and the other one was against Sudarshan Kumar and his wife. Both the suits, as originally filed, were for injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the appellant and from alienating the share of the appellant in the suit properties. In the alternative, a prayer was made for passing a decree for possession. Both the suits, as originally filed, were for injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the appellant and from alienating the share of the appellant in the suit properties. In the alternative, a prayer was made for passing a decree for possession. On 23rd November, 1985, the plaint in both the suits was amended by incorporating the relief of declaration that the power of attorney and sale deeds were null and void. A prayer was also incorporated for a money decree for the share of the appellant in the compensation awarded in respect of a tube well on the suit properties.” 9. By appreciating the evidence on record, in Kewal Krishan (supra), Supreme Court came to the conclusion that although both the Sale Deeds record that the consideration has been paid, it is the specific case made out in the plaint that the Sale Deeds are void as the same are without consideration. It is pleaded that same are sham as the purchasers who were minor sons and wife of Sudarshan Kumar had no earning capacity. No evidence was adduced by Sudarshan Kumar about the payment of the price mentioned in the Sale Deeds as well as the earning capacity at the relevant time of his wife and minor sons. Hence, the Sale Deeds were held to be void being executed without consideration. Hence, in the facts of that case, the Sale Deeds were held to be void being executed without consideration. 10. Mr. Kolekar submitted that in the present case, the Sale Deed was executed by the father of the Appellant in favour of the Respondent. There is no declaration sought by the Appellant regarding said Sale Deed. He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the decision of Anathula Sudhakar vs. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) By LRS. & Ors., (2008) 4 SCC 594 . He submitted that as there was cloud on the title of the Appellant, it was necessary that the Appellant should have sought declaration that the said Sale Deed is sham and bogus. 11. The Appellant who is original Plaintiff has in the plaint itself stated that the Sale Deed executed by his father is sham and void. Reference to the same is made in the plaint itself. 11. The Appellant who is original Plaintiff has in the plaint itself stated that the Sale Deed executed by his father is sham and void. Reference to the same is made in the plaint itself. In this particular case, therefore, Appellant ought to have prayed for declaration regarding the Sale Deed executed by his father in favour of the Respondent. 12. In the decision of the Supreme Court on which Mr. Nikam has heavily relied in Kewal Krishan (supra), it is to be noted that subsequently by amending relief of the declaration that power of attorney and Sale Deed were null and void was incorporated. Thus, there is no substance in the substantial questions of law raised at point Nos. A, B, and C. 13. As far as the substantial question raised in point No. D is concerned, there is evidence on record to show that possession of the Appellant is permissive possession. Both the Courts below have found the same. The learned Courts have specifically held that although Respondent is in permissive possession, it is necessary that his possession can be taken only by following due procedure of law. The Respondent has filed counterclaim in the suit filed by the Appellant and possession decree has been passed by allowing the counterclaim. There is no perversity or illegality shown in the impugned Judgments and Decrees. Therefore, the Second Appeal is dismissed, however with no order as to costs. 14. In view of the dismissal of the Second Appeal, nothing survives in the Interim Application and same is disposed of as such.