JUDGMENT (Prayer: The Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of CPC, against the judgment and decree made in A.S.No.42 of 1997 dated 31.08.2000 on the file of the Sub Court, Kallakurichi reversing the judgment and decree made in O.S.No.934 of 1989 dated 31.10.1996 on the file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Kallakurichi.) 1. The plaintiff, N.S. Chokkanatha Chettiar who filed O.S. No. 934 of 1989 before the Principal District Munsif Court, Kallakurichi, against the Assistant Commissioner, H.R. & C.E., Cuddalore and the Inspector H.R. & C.E., Kllkurichi, seeking a declaration that Sri Vasavi Kannika Parameswari Amman Temple at Kallakurichi belongs to the Arya Vysya community and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with administration of the temple was the appellant. 2. Pending the second appeal, the appellant, N.S. Chokkanatha Chettiar died and B. Subramaniam was brought on record to prosecute the appeal further. 3. By judgment dated 31.10.1996, the learned Principal District Munsif, Kallakurichi decreed the suit. 4. The defendants then filed A.S. No. 42 of 1997 before the Sub Court at Kallakurichi. By judgment dated 31.08.2000, the learned Sub Judge allowed the appeal suit, thus dismissing O.S. No. 934 of 1989 necessitating the plaintiff to file this second appeal. 5. The second appeal had been admitted on the following substantial questions of law : “1. Whether in law the lower appellate court did not errin not even framing one point for determinationas contemplated under Or. 41 Rule 31 CPCand as set out in 1997 (1) LW 704 (DB) ? 2. Whether in law the lower appellate Court was right in overlooking that the respondents had not taken any proceedings under Sec. 17 of the T.N.H.R.&C.E. Act ? 3. Whether in law the lower appellate court was not wrong in overlooking that the respondents had not exercised any power under Sec. 49 of the T.N.H.R.&C.E. Act ?” 6. In the plaint in O,S. No. 934 of 1989, the plaintiff, N.S. Chokkanatha Chettiar, claiming to be the community trustee of Sri Vasavi Kanniga Parameswari Temple at Kallakurichi, stated that the temple was constructed by the Arya Vysya community of Kallakurichi, and was not a religious institution coming within the purview of the T.N. Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959. It was worshipped by the members of that community alone. It was worshipped by the members of that community alone. Furthedr, the temple does not own any property and the expenditure for the daily poojas were met with contributions from members of that community alone. The idol was originally installed in the Arya Vysya Choultry. Thereafter, with contributions from that community people, the temple was consecrated on 28.01.1983. It was asserted that the temple was a private temple and not a public temple and that the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board has no right or lien over the temple. 7. It had been further stated that the 1st defendant, the Commissioner, H.R.&C.E. Department, Cuddalore by proceedings dated 08.06.1988 had stated that the 2nd defendant, Inspector, H.R.&C.E., Kallakurichi had been appointed as temporary trustee and directed the plaintiff to handover the management of the temple. The 2nd defendant had also issued a notice on 13.09.1989 on the same lines. It was under such circumstances that the suit was filed seeking a declaration that the temple is a private temple belonging to the Arya Vysya Community of Kallakurichi and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the management of the temple and for costs. 8. A written statement was filed by the defendants denying and disputing the averments stated in the plaint. It was asserted that the temple was a public temple. It was further stated that the Arya Vysya community was a part of the Hindu community and they cannot claim exclusive management or administration of the temple. It was further asserted that the defendants have a right to regulate the management and it was therefore urged that the suit should be dismissed. 9. The defendants filed an additional written statement claiming that the general public worshipped the temple. It was also stated that the temple was actually constructed with donations received from the general public temple and not exclusively from the Arya Vysya community. It was also stated that the temple was situated on government land. It was also stated that the plaintiff himself had been recognized as a non-heriditary trustee by the 1st defendant and his term was also extended by proceedings of the 1st defendant. It was also stated that the civil court had no jurisdiction to examine the issues raised. It was again urged that the suit should be dismissed. 10. A reply statement was then filed by the plaintiff. It was also stated that the civil court had no jurisdiction to examine the issues raised. It was again urged that the suit should be dismissed. 10. A reply statement was then filed by the plaintiff. Jurisdiction of the civil court was asserted. It was denied that the general public worshipped in the temple or that the temple was situated on government land. It was again reiterated that the defendants have no right to control the administration of the temple. It was prayed that the suit should be decreed. On the basis of the above pleadings, the Principal District Munsif, Kallakurichi framed the following issues : “1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the declaratory relief as sought ? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction as sought ? 3. To what other reliefs is plaintiff entitled to ?” 11. The following additional issues were also framed : “1. Whether the civil court has jurisdiction to examine the issues in the suit ? 2. Whether the temple is a private temple or a public temple ? 3. Whether the temple is under the control of the H.R.&C.E. Board ?” 12. During trial, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and also examined two other witnesses as P.W.2 and P.W.3. The 2nd defendant, Inspector, H.R.&C.E., was examined as D.W.1. 13. The plaintiff marked Exs. A1 to A4. Exs. A1 and A4 related to the consecration of the temple. Exs. A2 and A3 were communications issued by the 2nd defendant. 14. The defendants marked Exs. B1 to B22. Ex. B1 was an extract from Ex. A1. Exs. B2, B5, B10, B18 – B20 and Ex. B22 were proceedings issued by the defendants. Exs. B3, B4, B12 – B14 and B21 were applications seeking recognition as trustee. 15. On analysis of the facts pleaded and the oral and documentary evidence produced, the learned Principal District Munsif held that the civil court had jurisdiction to try the issues raised and also found as a fact that the temple was consecrated by the Arya Vysya community and that they worshiped in the temple and that there were precedents when temples of similar nature have been recognized as private temples belonging exclusively to a particular community. It was also observed that the defendants had not produced any document to show that they had initiated proceedings under sections 29 or 49 or 71 of the T.N. H.R.&C.E. Act, 1959. The admission of D.W.1 that there were no documents to establish that the temple was a public temple was also noted. The learned Principal District Munsif decreed the suit as prayed. 16. The defendants then filed A.S. No. 42 of 1997 before the Sub Court at Kallakurichi. By judgment dated 31.08.2000, the learned Sub Judge, however reversed the findings of the trial court, allowed the appeal suit and thereby dismissed the original suit. 17. The plaintiff had then filed the present second appeal. 18. Heard arguments advanced by Mr. T. Chezhiyan for the appellant and Mr. E. VijAy Anand, learned Additional Government Pleader for the respondents. 19. In view of the 1st substantial question formulated at the time of admission of the second appeal, I will necessarily have to tread carefully while examining the merits of the second appeal. 20. The 1st substantial of law relates to non-framing of points of consideration by the first appellate court while disposing A.S. No. 42 of 1997. A reading of the judgment shows that points as required to be framed have not been framed. 21. In Manjula v. Shyamsundar, (2022) 3 SCC 90 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed and held as follows : “8. Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short “CPC”) provides for filing of an appeal from the decree passed by a court of original jurisdiction. Order 41 Rule 31 CPC provides the guidelines to the appellate court for deciding the appeal. This rule mandates that the judgment of the appellate court shall state: (a) points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. Thus, the appellate court has the jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. It is settled law that an appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings. The appellate court's jurisdiction involves a rehearing of appeal on questions of law as well as fact. The first appeal is a valuable right, and, at that stage, all questions of fact and law decided by the trial court are open for reconsideration. It is settled law that an appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings. The appellate court's jurisdiction involves a rehearing of appeal on questions of law as well as fact. The first appeal is a valuable right, and, at that stage, all questions of fact and law decided by the trial court are open for reconsideration. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect conscious application of mind and must record the court's findings, supported by reasons for its decision in respect of all the issues, along with the contentions put forth and pressed by the parties. Needless to say, the first appellate court is required to comply with the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and nonobservance of these requirements lead to infirmity in the judgment. “9. In the instant case, the High Court has not complied with any of the aforesaid requirements. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court has to reconsider the matter in the light of the observations made above.” 22. The first appellate court, in the instant case had not framed the points for consideration. This has, “lead to infirmity in the judgment.” 23. The facts in the instant case raise issues where a particular community are asserting their rights over a temple, while the defendants dispute that they have any such right over the temple. It would only be appropriate that the matter is remanded back for fresh consideration of such issues in manner known to law by the first appellate court. 24. I am of the firm opinion that it would be extremely inappropriate to examine the 2nd and 3rd substantial questions of law. I would be treading on the merits of the case and any discussion thereon or opinions expressed may be prejudicial to either one of the two parties. The parties must be granted the privilege of advancing arguments before the first appellate Court and it is hoped that the first appellate Court would realize the significance of the issues involved, and proceed to pronounce judgment in manner known and approved by law. 25. In view of the above reasoning, the second appeal is allowed. The parties must be granted the privilege of advancing arguments before the first appellate Court and it is hoped that the first appellate Court would realize the significance of the issues involved, and proceed to pronounce judgment in manner known and approved by law. 25. In view of the above reasoning, the second appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree dated 31.08.2000 of the Sub Court, Kallakurichi in A.S. No. 42 of 1997 is set aside and the appeal suit is remanded back to the Sub Court, Kallakurichi to be re-heard on the available evidence and for pronouncing judgment keeping in mind the stipulations under Or. 41 Rule 31 CPC. The parties are specifically not permitted to adduce any further oral or documentary evidence. 26. On receipt of the records from the High Court and after learned counsels had entered appearance, the learned Sub Judge, Kallakurichi may endeavour to dispose of the said A.S. 42 of 1997 within a period of 4 months from the first date of commencement of effective hearing in the appeal suit. 27. In the result : i). The second appeal is allowed, but in the circumstances, without costs. ii). The judgment and decree dated 31.08.2000 in A.S. No. 42 of 1997, on the file of the Sub Court, Kallakurichi is set aside. iii). A.S. No. 42 of 1997 is remanded back for fresh disposal in manner known to law and in accordance with the directions given above.