JUDGMENT: A.S. Supehia, J. 1. The present petition has been filed inter alia challenging the order dated 02.05.2016, whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from service. 2. At the outset, learned advocate Mr. A.S. Asthavadi appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and learned advocate Mr. Manish Patel appearing for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 have submitted that the writ petition cannot be entertained in view of the statutory remedy available before the Tribunal as per the provisions of the Gujarat Primary Education Act, 1947 (for short "the Act"). FACTS 3. The petitioner was serving as a Teacher in the respondent No. 2-School and she has been appointed on 11.07.1988. It appears that the petitioner wanted to visit USA and accordingly, she had filed an application informing the respondent-School in this regard. However, she left to USA, without getting her leave sanctioned and ultimately she is dismissed from service for such misconduct. SUBMISSIONS 4. Learned advocate Mr. Japee appearing for the petitioner has submitted that after the petitioner had made an application, a certificate dated 26.02.2016 was issued by the Principal of the respondent-School stating that the School has no objection with her visit to USA to meet her son and daughter since she was having 90 days leave in balance and accordingly the petitioner applied for the leave on 16.03.2016 to the President of the Trust requesting to grant her leave from 29.03.2016 to 30.04.2016. He has submitted that vide communication dated 19.03.2016, the petitioner was informed that her request for leave has been rejected and she cannot be permitted to visit abroad since it would be detrimental to the interest of the students. It is submitted that the aforesaid communication also refers to some proceedings before this Court as it appears that the petitioner had challenged her transfer before this Court. He has submitted that thereafter, vide communication dated 21.03.2016, the petitioner requested the respondent-School to reconsider her case as she has to visit USA. 4.1. Learned advocate Mr. Japee has submitted that thereafter, the petitioner left for USA and when she returned from USA, she was not allowed to resume on duty as it appears that during intervening period, the respondent-Trust had dismissed her service by the impugned order. 4.1. Learned advocate Mr. Japee has submitted that thereafter, the petitioner left for USA and when she returned from USA, she was not allowed to resume on duty as it appears that during intervening period, the respondent-Trust had dismissed her service by the impugned order. He has also placed reliance on the communication/order dated 09.06.2016, whereby the District Primary Education officer has directed the respondent-School to sanction leave of the petitioner from 29.03.2016 to 30.04.2016 and accordingly, also to grant her benefit of vacation and treat her in service. It is submitted by him that despite the aforesaid order, the petitioner was not reinstated in service and accordingly, she also informed the same to the District Primary Education officer vide letter dated 21.06.2016 asking him to direct the respondent-School to reinstate her in service. 4.2. Learned advocate Mr. Japee has submitted that a notice dated 15.06.2016 was issued by the petitioner to the respondent-School in this regard, which was replied by the respondent-School on 21.06.2016 that she is already dismissed from service. Learned advocate has submitted that the first line of paragraph No. 5 of the said reply dated 21.06.2016 will clarify that the impugned order dated 02.05.2006 dismissing the petitioner is a fabricated and concocted document and the same is passed as an afterthought. He has submitted that in fact the aforesaid impugned order is predated by the respondent, and had been passed after the reply dated 21.06.2016. Thus, the learned advocate has submitted that the writ petition may be allowed since the petitioner cannot be relegated to alternate remedy to approach the Tribunal as the order itself is ex facie illegal and without authority of law. 5. In response to the aforesaid submissions, learned advocate Mr. Asthavadi appearing for the respondent-School, while placing reliance on the affidavit filed by it, has submitted that after the application seeking leave of the petitioner was rejected, the respondent-School had issued a show-cause notice on 31.03.2016 through R.P.A.D. It is submitted that the application of the petitioner was subsequently refused stating that she cannot leave for abroad. Ultimately, he has submitted that a public notice was issued by the respondent-School in the daily newspaper on 27.04.2016, and when she did not appear in the departmental proceedings, the respondent-School had passed the impugned order dismissing her service. Ultimately, he has submitted that a public notice was issued by the respondent-School in the daily newspaper on 27.04.2016, and when she did not appear in the departmental proceedings, the respondent-School had passed the impugned order dismissing her service. It is submitted that the certificate dated 26.02.2016 is only issued for the purpose of VISA and passport. It is submitted by the learned advocate that the petitioner has left, without there being any approval from the respondent-School and hence, the same would constitute very grave misconduct. It is submitted that the respondent-School is not a grant-in-aid school and the petitioner could not have left the school, without there being any sanction of leave. 5.1. Learned advocate Mr. Asthavadi has further submitted that as per the provision of Section 40F of the Act, the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to entertain the dispute between the respondent-School and the petitioner. It is submitted that the allegations made with regard to the predating the order are also incorrect and in fact the respondent-School had passed the impugned order dismissing the petitioner service as she did not resume on her service. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Manish Patel appearing for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 has not disputed the fact that the petitioner has an alternate remedy to approach the Tribunal challenging the action of the respondent-School. 7. Heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and also perused the documents as pointed out by them. CONCLUSION 8. The facts, as narrated hereinabove, would suggest that the petitioner was a Teacher working under the respondent-School and she wanted to visit USA and accordingly, a certificate dated 26.02.2016 was issued by the Principal of the respondent-School, which only addresses "To whom it may concern". It says that " We have no objection with her abroad visit to U.S.A. to meet her son and daughter and family over there. She is having 90 Days Leave in Balance which includes her 35 days vacation period". Thereafter, the petitioner applied for leave vide communication dated 16.03.2016 seeking leave from 29.03.2016 to 30.04.2016, however, the application was rejected by the respondent-School on 19.03.2016. Thereafter, the petitioner made a representation dated 21.03.2016 to the respondents to reconsider her case, as she has to leave for USA. Thereafter, the petitioner applied for leave vide communication dated 16.03.2016 seeking leave from 29.03.2016 to 30.04.2016, however, the application was rejected by the respondent-School on 19.03.2016. Thereafter, the petitioner made a representation dated 21.03.2016 to the respondents to reconsider her case, as she has to leave for USA. However, no decision was communicated in this regard to the petitioner and despite the rejection of her application; she visited USA and returned on 06.06.2016 i.e. after reopening of the school. It appears that the respondent authority-District Primary Education officer vide communication dated 09.06.2016 had asked the respondent-School to sanction leave of the petitioner from 29.03.2016 to 30.04.2016. When the petitioner was abroad, the respondents issued various notices and public notice to the petitioner to join the school. Since, she did not appear pursuant to the notices, she was dismissed vide order dated 02.05.2016. It is the case of the petitioner that despite the aforesaid, the respondent authorities have not passed any order reinstating her in service. 9. It would be apposite to notice that the petitioner has specifically doubted the impugned order dated 02.05.2016, as being fabricated and an afterthought. In fact the prayer clause 7(b) and 7(c) of the writ petition refer to the impugned order as a fabricated document. It is alleged that the aforesaid order was not passed, till the petitioner returned from the USA. The petitioner has heavily placed reliance on the reply dated 21.06.2016, more particularly paragraph No. 5 thereof and tried to impress this Court that a bare perusal of the aforesaid reply would reveal that the impugned order dated 02.05.2016 was yet not passed and it is passed thereafter by predating it. 10. At this stage, I may refer to the provision of Section 40F of the Act: 40F. (1) There shall be constituted by the State Government by an order published in the official Gazette one or more Tribunals for the purpose of this Chapter. (2) A Tribunal shall have jurisdiction for such area as may be specified by the State Government in the order referred to in sub-section (1). (3) The State Government shall appoint a District Judge or a person who has been or is qualified to be a Judge of a High Court, or to be a District Judge to be the Tribunal. (3) The State Government shall appoint a District Judge or a person who has been or is qualified to be a Judge of a High Court, or to be a District Judge to be the Tribunal. (4) It shall be the duty of the Tribunal to entertain and decide, disputes of the nature referred to in section 40E and to deal with and decide all applications and proceedings made or transferred to it under sub-section (2) of section 40G and also to entertain and decide appeal made under sub-section (5) of section 40B. (5) The Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the State Government may by general order direct. (6) The Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 when try a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely:-- (a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) compelling the production of documents and materia objects; (c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses; (d) such other matters as may be prescribed; and every inquiry or investigation by the Tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceedings within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. (7) The Tribunal shall be deemed to be a court for the purpose of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. (8) The decision of the Tribunal shall be final and no suit shall lie in any civil court in respect of the matters decided by it. (9) Where any order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a teacher of a recognised private primary school is decided by the Tribunal to be wrong, unlawful or otherwise unjustified, the Tribunal may pass an order directing that the teacher concerned shall be reinstated in service or, as the case may be, restored to the rank which he held immediately before his reduction in rank, by the manager, and the manager shall forthwith. comply with such direction." 10.1 The Act specifically stipulates the remedy for a teacher serving in a private school to approach the Tribunal in case of any dispute with the management. comply with such direction." 10.1 The Act specifically stipulates the remedy for a teacher serving in a private school to approach the Tribunal in case of any dispute with the management. Section 40F of the Act refers that where any order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a teacher of a recognized private primary school is decided by the Tribunal to be wrong, unlawful or otherwise unjustified, the Tribunal may pass an order directing that the teacher concerned shall be reinstated in service 11. Thus, this Court while exercising its power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot deal or examine the disputed issues which require leading of evidence to establish that the impugned order dated 02.05.2016 is fabricated or is an afterthought. Thus, there is an efficacious alternative statutory remedy available to the petitioner to establish that the impugned order of dismissal is fabricated or concocted. There is also dispute with regard to the certificate dated 26.02.2016. the respondent-School has contended that it was only issued for the purpose of VISA and Passport, whereas the petitioner has construed it as sanction of leave. Such disputed question can only be examined by the Tribunal. The Tribunal can also examine the case of the petitioner whether such removal has been passed de hors the order dated 09.06.2016 passed by the District Primary Education officer. The issue with regard to violation of the statutory provisions can also be examined. 12. Hence, the writ petition is accordingly dismissed. It is clarified that the Tribunal may decide such application if filed by the petitioner, without being influenced by the present order. Rule is discharged.