JUDGMENT : SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, J. 1. The present writ appeal is arising out of an order dated 03.08.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.26398 of 2008. 2. The facts of the case reveal that the respondent No.1/writ petitioner No.1, who was the owner of the tanker lorry bearing No.AP 23T 2158, engaged the said lorry for transportation of 12.9 metric tones of molasses from Ramakrishna Khandsari Sugar Factory, Toopran, Medak District, and on 25.12.2002 when the respondent No.1/writ petitioner No.1 got loaded the vehicle with 12.9 metric tones of molasses, it was intercepted and seized by the Prohibition and Excise Inspector, Prohibition & Excise Station, Secunderabad. The driver and cleaner of the vehicle were arrested and a case was registered in Crime No.187 of 2002-2003 under Section 34(e) of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act. The learned XI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad, in C.C.No.838 of 2004 sentenced the driver, cleaner and owner of the molasses under Section 34(e) of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act and they were inflicted with six months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5,000/- with a default clause. Thereafter, an appeal was also preferred in the matter i.e., Crl.A.No.17 of 2007 and the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, has allowed the appeal vide judgment of acquittal dated 04.07.2007. In the meanwhile, the criminal case was going on and a show cause notice was issued on 09.01.2002 to the respondents/writ petitioners to show cause as to why the vehicle should not be confiscated and the respondents/writ petitioners did submit a reply to the show cause notice within the time stipulated therein and finally an order of confiscation was passed on 23.06.2003. An appeal was preferred in the matter before the Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise and a writ petition was also preferred i.e., W.P.No.9595 of 2004, and this Court, by an order dated 17.06.2004 in W.P.M.P.No.12150 of 2004 in W.P.No.9595 of 2004, directed the respondents therein not to sell the said vehicle along with molasses. Subsequently, the writ petition was disposed of directing the appellate authority to pass orders. The appellate authority has passed an order on 20.02.2006 dismissing the appeal and confirming the order of confiscation. Thereafter, a writ petition was preferred again i.e., W.P.No.26398 of 2008 and the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition setting aside the order of confiscation dated 23.06.2003. The appellate authority has passed an order on 20.02.2006 dismissing the appeal and confirming the order of confiscation. Thereafter, a writ petition was preferred again i.e., W.P.No.26398 of 2008 and the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition setting aside the order of confiscation dated 23.06.2003. The Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise, Telangana State at Hyderabad, along with two others have preferred the present writ appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants/State has argued before this Court that the order passed by the learned Single Judge deserves to be set aside on the ground that molasses is used to manufacture liquor and keeping in view Section 13 of the Telangana Excise Act, 1968 (for short, “the Act”), any article which is prohibited can be seized, if a person, who is in possession of the article, does not have a licence for the same. Learned counsel has also argued before this Court that the molasses seized by the Excise Department was being transported for the purpose of manufacture of illicit liquor and the same can be seized by the Excise Department, if the Excise Department is having reasons to believe that the molasses is being transported only for the purpose of manufacture of illicit liquor. It has also been argued once again that under Section 13 of the Act, the molasses is a material for manufacturing the illicit liquor. He has also argued that the learned Single Judge has erred in law and facts in allowing the writ petition. 4. This Court has carefully gone through the order passed by the learned Single Judge and the statutory provisions of the Act which are necessary to decide the present writ appeal are reproduced as under:- (Sections 2(22-A) & (22-B), 13 and 34(a) & (e)) “2(22-A) “Material” includes molasses, wash and such other substances as the State Government may, by notification, specify; 2(22-B) “Molasses” means the heavy dark coloured residual syrup drained away in the final stage of the manufacture of jaggery or sugar or Khandasari sugar cane or gur containing solution or suspension, sugars which can be fermented and includes any product formed by the addition to such syrup of any ingredient which does not substantially alter the character of such syrup but does not include any article which the State Government may, by notification, declare not to be molasses, for the purpose of this Act; 13. Manufacture etc., of excisable articles prohibited except under a licence:-(1) No person shall – (a) Manufacture or collect an intoxicant, (b) Cultivate hemp plant, (c) Tap an excise tree or draw toddy from any such trees, (d) Construct or work a distillery or brewery, (e) Bottle liquor for sale, or (f) Use, keep or have in his possession, any materials, still, utensils, implements, apparatus, whatsoever for the purpose of manufacturing any intoxicant other than toddy; except under the authority and subject to the terms and conditions of a licence granted by such officer, not below the rank of a District Prohibition and Excise Officer, as may be prescribed; Provided that the provisions of this sub-section, in so far as they relate to establishing, continuing or licensing a distillery shall apply only to those distilleries which manufacture spirits for potable purpose and regulatory provisions relating to regulation and supervision, shall be applicable to all distilleries. (2) A licence granted under this section shall extend to and cover servants and other persons employed by the licensee and acting on his behalf. (3) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1) the Government may, by notification, direct that in such areas as may be specified therein, it shall not be necessary to take out a licence for the manufacture of liquor for bonafide home consumption of the manufacturer. 34. Penalties for illegal import, export etc. :-Whoever, in contravention of this Act or of any rule, notification or order made, issued or passed there under or of any licence or permit granted or issued under this Act, - (a) Imports, exports, transports, manufacturers, collects or possesses or sells any intoxicant; or (b) to (d) xxx (e) uses, keeps or has in his possession any materials, stills, utensils, implements or apparatus whatsoever for the purpose of manufacturing any intoxicant other than toddy; or …” 5. The aforesaid statutory provisions of law make it very clear that in case a person is in possession of excisable articles prohibited under the Act, he can be punished under Section 34 of the Act. 6. The aforesaid statutory provisions of law make it very clear that in case a person is in possession of excisable articles prohibited under the Act, he can be punished under Section 34 of the Act. 6. Heavy reliance has been place upon the definition clause and the contention of the learned counsel for the State Government is that Section 2(22-A) of the Act defines “Material”, which includes molasses, and the word “material” finds place under Section 13(f) of the Act, and therefore, any person who is transporting molasses (material) can be punished under Section 34(a) of the Act. 7. Learned Government Advocate is certainly justified in canvassing the aforesaid arguments in the present scenario. However, the facts of the case establish that Section 2(22-A) and (22-B) of the Act were brought on the statute book only on 08.04.2005. The incident in the present case is dated 25.12.2002 and at the relevant point of time, molasses was certainly not at all included within the meaning of term “material”. 8. The necessity to amend the Act arose only on account of a judgment delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.2209 of 1998 and batch, dated 08.05.2002. The operative paragraph of the judgment passed by the Division Bench in the said case is reproduced as under:- “We have referred to several judgments on the point. But we are of the considered view that the judgments rendered in Sitaram’s case ( 1995(1) SCC 257 ) and SIEL’s case ( 1998 (7) SCC 26 ) are more relevant and nearer to the point in issue. In the judgment of Sitaram’s case (supra) the Supreme Court reading the provisions of the Rajasthan Excise Act, 1950, including the amending Act there of, it was held that there was no repugnancy between the Central Act, 1951 and the Rajasthan Excise Act. In the judgment of Sitaram’s case (supra) the Supreme Court reading the provisions of the Rajasthan Excise Act, 1950, including the amending Act there of, it was held that there was no repugnancy between the Central Act, 1951 and the Rajasthan Excise Act. The exact source of legislative power for enacting Section 18(1) (g) of the Central Act, 1951, was not discussed in Sitaram’s case (supra) but in SIEL’s case (supra) it is clearly held by the Supreme Court that the legislative power for enacting Section 18(1)(g) of the Central Act, 1951, flows from entry 33 of List-III and as such both the Central government and the State government are entitled to legislate on the said subject, but so long as the Central Act stands on the said subject, the State Act will be inoperative unless the assent of the President is received. What is most significant in SIEL’s case is that U.P. Sheera Niyantran Adhinayam, 1964 is dealing with molasses, and as there was no violation of Article 254(2) of the Constitution it was held that the Uttar Pradesh Act was valid. But coming to the instant cases and the provisions of AP Excise Act, 1968, there is no such statutory provision dealing with the molasses. In this scenario the only option for the State Government is to legislate on the molasses if it wants to impose any restrictions on the said product. As on this date, no such statutory provision has been enacted. Hence, the analogy of the cases of Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh which were upheld by the Supreme Court in Sitaram’s case and SIEL’s case (supra) is not applicable. In view of what is state above, while we uphold the argument that the State is not debarred from making any legislation with regard to the molasses, we hold that since no such legislation has been made by the State of AP, regarding the subject of molasses, the impugned orders of the respondents are unconstitutional, illegal and nonest. Accordingly, the Writ Appeals are dismissed and the Writ Petitions are allowed.” 9. At the relevant point of time when the judgment was passed by the Division Bench, the definition clause was not including molasses and the molasses was certainly not at all included within the meaning of the term “material”. Accordingly, the Writ Appeals are dismissed and the Writ Petitions are allowed.” 9. At the relevant point of time when the judgment was passed by the Division Bench, the definition clause was not including molasses and the molasses was certainly not at all included within the meaning of the term “material”. The State Government became wiser only after the judgment was delivered by the Division Bench in the aforesaid case and the statute was amended. 10. In the present case, this Court is dealing with the statute which is penal in nature, meaning thereby, the statute, which provides for punishment for transporting molasses. It is true that by virtue of an amendment, molasses has been included under the statute and the amendment cannot be made applicable with retrospective effect. 11. Hon’ble Sri Justice G.P.Singh in the Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 12th Edition 2010, page 545 under the heading “Penal Statutes” has observed as under:- “(f) Penal Statutes Penal statutes which create offences or which have the effect of increasing penalties for existing offences will only be prospective by reason of the constitutional restriction imposed by Article 20 of the Constitution[West Ramnad Electric Distribution Co. Ltd. v. State of Madras, AIR 1962 SC 1753 , pp. 1758, 1760: 1963 (2) SCR 747 ; State of Maharashtra v. K.K.S. Ramaswamy, AIR 1977 SC 2091 : 1977 (3) SCC 525 ; Soni Devrajbhai Babubhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1991 SC 2173 : (1991) 4 SCC 298 (Section 304B of the Penal Code provides a new offence of Dowry death and is not retrospective): Kalpnath Rai v. State, AIR 1998 SC 201 , p. 210. (1997) 8 SCC 733 (All the ingredients of the offence must happen after the new offence comes into force. Case relating to section 3(5) of TADA). Article 20 corresponds to Article 7(1) of the European Convention, the second limb of which provides: 'Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed'. It was held by the House of Lords that penalty 'applicable' referred to the maximum sentence for the offence]. Even otherwise they are construed prospective “because it manifestly shocks one’s sense of justice that an act, legal at the time of doing it, should be made unlawful by some new enactment.”[ Midland Rly. Co. It was held by the House of Lords that penalty 'applicable' referred to the maximum sentence for the offence]. Even otherwise they are construed prospective “because it manifestly shocks one’s sense of justice that an act, legal at the time of doing it, should be made unlawful by some new enactment.”[ Midland Rly. Co. v. Pyre, (1861) 142 ER 419, p. 424 (ERLE, C.J.); referred to in State of Bombay v. Vishnu Ramchandra, AIR 1961 SC 307 , p. 309: (1962) 2 SCR 26; See further Waddington v. Miah, (1974) 2 All ER 377, p. 379 (HL). (Retrospective Criminal Legislation is against Article 11(2) of the Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations and Article 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom); R. v. Kirk, (1985) 1 All ER 453 (EEC Court) (The principle that penal provisions may not have retroactive effect is one which is common to all the legal orders of the member States); Re, Barretto, (1994) 1 All ER 447, p. 453 (CA) (Any provision which increases the penalty particularly if coupled with an additional liability to imprisonment cannot be construed retrospective). The rule against retrospectivity of penal statutes may also apply to "any law that alters the legal rules of evidence, thus accepting less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender": Aly Mokhtar, 'Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, Aspects and Prospects' 26 (2005) Statute Law Review 41, p. 48. ] Therefore, it an Act creates a new offence it will bring into its fold only those offenders who commit all ingredients of the offence after the Act comes into operation.[ R. v. Griffiths, (1891) 2 QB 145, p. 148 (LORD COLERIDGE, C.J.); But see Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 464 , p. 468: 1964 (4) SCR 630 ; Sajjan Singh was followed in State of Maharashtra v. Krishnarao Dudhappa Shinde, (2009) 4 SCC 219 : (2009) 2 JT 216 (The case of Krishnarao relates to the offence of criminal misconduct in discharge of official duty by a public servant under section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 ‘if he or any person on his behalf is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession, for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income'. Clause (e) in section 5(1) was added by Act 40 of 1964. Formerly it was in the form of presumption as section 5(4) It was held in Krishnarao following Sajjan Singh that income received and property acquired prior to the enactment of section 5(1)(e) can be taken into account for a prosecution for that offence which must necessarily be after that provision came into force. The reasoning is that this is not a new offence of criminal misconduct but only prescribes a new rule of evidence for proving criminal misconduct. Sajjan Singh was decided before amendment of the section in 1964 when possession of assets disproportionate to public servant's know sources of income was only in the shape of a rule of evidence providing a presumption of criminal misconduct. But after amendment of 1964 it became a substantive offence in the shape of section 5(1)(e) when Krishnarao was decided. Sajjan Singh was decided before amendment of the section in 1964 when possession of assets disproportionate to public servant's know sources of income was only in the shape of a rule of evidence providing a presumption of criminal misconduct. But after amendment of 1964 it became a substantive offence in the shape of section 5(1)(e) when Krishnarao was decided. This difference does not seem to have been noticed in deciding Krishnarao.)] The same and Article 7(1) was not violated when there was a change in the release regime between the date of the offence, which permitted unconditional release subject to good behaviour after serving a part of the sentence whereas the release regime when he was convicted permitted his release after the same period but under a licence which was placed him under supervision and imposed certain restrictions on his freedom on failure of which he could be recalled to serve the remaining sentence: R. (on the application of Uttley v. Secretary of State for Home Department, (2004) 4 All ER 1 (HL). principle has been applied while dealing with a law which affects the power of grant of pardon or remission. Section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which requires that where a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction of a person for an offence for which death is one of the punishments, such person shall not be released from prison unless he had served at least fourteen years of imprisonment, has been held to be applicable to sentences imposed after the coming into force of the section and not to person convicted before its coming force.[ Maruram v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 2147 , pp. 2167, 2168 : (1981) 1 SCC 107 ; State of Haryana v. Ram Diya, AIR 1990 SC 1336 , pp. 1338, 1339: (1990) 2 SCC 701 ] Similar principle has been applied to cases where an offence compoundable when committed was later made non-compoundable. Offence of voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons punishable under Section 324 of the Penal Code was compoundable with the permission of the court before 23-5-2006 when it was made non-compoundable by Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005. In construing this amendment it was held by the Supreme Court that an offence committed before 23-6-2006 could yet be compounded with the permission of the court and the accused acquitted.{ Mohd. In construing this amendment it was held by the Supreme Court that an offence committed before 23-6-2006 could yet be compounded with the permission of the court and the accused acquitted.{ Mohd. Abdul Sufan Laskar v. State of Assam, (2008) 9 SCC 333 paras 16, 17: (2008) 9 JT 252 } The prohibition of Article 20 of the Constitution to enact retrospective penal laws has no application to a law which only mollifies the rigour of an existing penal law. Indeed, Article 15.1 of the International covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 which was ratified by India on 10-4-1979 and which is included in the definition of Human Rights in Section 2(d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, in addition to the safeguards contained in Article 20 of the Constitution, provides: ‘If subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby'.{ The courts in India have not paid much attention to this provision. This provision has incorporated in the Hongkong Bill of Rights was construed by the Privy Council in Chau Chihung v. R. (1996) 1 All ER 914 (PC). It was held that when the new law in force at the time of trial had no exact counterpart in the former law in force when the offence was committed the question to be determined would by what range of sentences would have been open to the court to impose if the defendant had been convicted and sentenced under new law. } The question whether a penal law which mollifies the rigour of an existing penal law is retrospective and to what extent will depend upon the construction of the Act having regard to the well settled rules of construction.{ Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 444 , p. 446.} In Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab,{ Ibid.} the Probation of the Offenders Act, 1958 did not apply to the area where the offence was committed at the time of commission of the offence or even when the accused was convicted but it was extended to that area where his appeal was pending before the Sessions Judge yet the Supreme Court held that the benefit of the Act could be given to the accused. In State v. Gian Singh,{ AIR 1999 SC 3450 : (1999) 9 SCC 312 } the accused was convicted for the offence under Section 3(1) of the TADA Act, 1985 for commission of a terrorist act resulting in death of a person for which the only punishment was death sentence under section 3(2) of the Act. The TADA Act, 1985 expired by efflux of time on 22-5-1987 but the proceedings were continued by a saving clauses under the Act. The Act of 1985 was replaced by the TADA Act, 1987. In this Act in the corresponding Section 3(2) the harshness of the sentence was diluted and the accused could be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. The question before the Supreme Court, where the appeal of the accused and the reference for confirmation of death sentence were pending, was whether the benefit of the dilution of the harshness of death sentence in section 3(2) of the 1987 Act could be given to the accused and his sentence of death could be replaced by sentence for life imprisonment. The Supreme Court in these circumstances gave the benefit of Section 3(2) of the 1987 Act to the accused and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court gave two reasons for applying section 3(2) of the 1987 Act. The Supreme Court in these circumstances gave the benefit of Section 3(2) of the 1987 Act to the accused and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court gave two reasons for applying section 3(2) of the 1987 Act. The court first applied a general principle in the case which was stated as follows: "If any subsequent legislation would down grade the offence, it would be a salutory principle for administration of criminal justice to suggest that the said legislative benevolence can be extended to the accused who awaits judicial verdict regarding sentence.”{ Ibid, p. 3455 (para 32)} The second reason that the Supreme Court gave was that the continued operation of the 1985 Act after expiry under a saving clause for continuance of criminal proceedings in respect of offences committed when the Act was in force became inconsistent, in so far the sentence part of same section 3(2) was concerned, with section 3(2) of the 1987 Act and could not be given effect to in view section 25 of the 1987 Act which gave an overriding effect to the Act over any enactment in case of inconsistency.[ Ibid, p. 3455 (para 34)] However, the benefit of mollification of sentence by amendment cannot be allowed to pending appeals when the amending Act expressly provides that it shall have no effect to the pending appeals.{ Jawahar Singh v. State of GNCT of Delhi, (2009) 6 SCC 490 , p. 495: AIR 2009 SC 2391 .} But the benefit of mollification of ingredients of the substantive offence after conviction during pendency of appeal has not been allowed to the accused. Thus, a notification making a distinction between a small quantity and commercial quantity of brown sugar and thereby making possession of a small quantity of brown sugar not an offence under Section 2 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 has not been applied in a case where the notification was issued after commission of the offence and also after the accused was sentenced.[P.P. Fathima v. State of Kerala, (2003) 8 SCC 726 : (2003) 8 JT 527 ] Similarly, benefit of mollification of prescribed standard of mineral oil in relation to hard boiled sugar confectionery by a notification which came into force during pendency of appeal against conviction was not allowed to the accused.[Dayal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 5 SCC 721 : AIR 2004 SC 2608 ] It is open to the Legislature to make a provision in the law amending and mollifying existing penal law that the amending Act will apply in cases pending trial but will not apply to cases pending in appeal.[Basheer alias N.P. Basheer v. State of Kerala, (2004) 3 SCC 609 : AIR 2004 SC 2757 ] By Section 4(1) of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Amendment) Act, 2001 which rationalised the sentencing structure by providing graded sentences linked to the quantity of Narcotic Drug, made the amended provisions applicable to cases pending before the court or under investigation but excluded the application of the Act to cases pending in appeal. This provision was held to be valid.[ Ibid. See further, Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2005) 3 SCC 551 , pp. 570 (para 32), p. 587-89: AIR 2005 SC 2731 [Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children Act, 2000, which repealed Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, in Section 20 gives benefit of the new Act in pending cases to those who were Juvenile under the new Act when the new Act came into force though they may have ceased to be juvenile under the old Act. This was held to be consistent with Article 20 of the constitution]] The procedure prescribed for trial of offence in a new Act may be applied for trial of similar offences under a repealed Act. This was held to be consistent with Article 20 of the constitution]] The procedure prescribed for trial of offence in a new Act may be applied for trial of similar offences under a repealed Act. Thus sanction for prosecution granted under the provisions of the new Act will be good for prosecution of an offence requiring sanction under the repealed Act, for sanction pertains to procedure.[Kapur Chand v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 993 , pp. 997, 998: 1959 SCR 250 ] But the question whether a law which does not affect the punishment but applies a procedure, which is prejudicial to the accused by curtailing his procedural right, can be retrospectively applied to offences taking place earlier and is not violative of Article 20 of the Constitution has been referred to a Constitution Bench.[Transmission Corporation of A.P. v. Ch. Prabhakar, (2004) 5 SCC 551 : AIR 2004 SC 3368 ] The enforcement of the Human Rights Act, 1998 in England from 2nd October 2000, section 7 of which enables the victim of an unlawful act by a public authority to rely on the Act in 'proceedings brought by or at the investigation of a public authority whenever the act in question took place’ was held not to apply when the person complaining had been convicted before the enforcement of the Act, though his appeal was pending when the Act came into force.[R v. Lambert. (2001) 3 All ER 577 (HL)] But this decision was not unanimous and was later followed with considerable hesitation.[ R v. Kansal (No. 2), (2002) 1 All ER 257 (HL)] In Pyare Lal Sharma v. Managing Director, Jammu & Kashmir Industries Ltd.,[ AIR 1989 SC 1854 : (1989) 3 SCC 448 ] Regulation 16.14 of the Jammu & Kashmir Industries Employees Service Rules which was amended on April 20, 1983 came for consideration. The amendment added certain more grounds for termination of service of an employee and one of the grounds so added was: If he (the employee) remains on unauthorised absence. In construing the Regulation the Supreme Court held that the period of unauthorised absence prior to the date of amendment could not be taken into consideration for terminating the services of an employee. In construing the Regulation the Supreme Court held that the period of unauthorised absence prior to the date of amendment could not be taken into consideration for terminating the services of an employee. In so construing the Regulation the court observed: "It is the basic principle of natural justice that no one can be penalised on the ground of a conduct which was not penal on the day it was committed."[ Ibid, p. 1860.] This case shows that the rule of construction against retroactivity of penal laws is not restricted to Acts providing for criminal offences but applies also to laws which provide for other penal consequences of a severe nature, e.g., termination of service. Similarly a statute or statutory regulation enabling imposition of restrictions on carrying on business guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution e.g. by preventing access to capital market will be treated as a penal provision and will be presumed to be prospective and will not apply to a case where the conduct inviting penal action was complete before its enforcement.[ Ritesh Agarwal v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, (2008) 8 SCC 205 para 25: (2008) 7 JT 289 ]” 12. The case law discussed above makes it very clear that a penal statute which creates an offence or which has an effect of increasing the penalties for the existing offence will only be prospective by reason of constitutional restriction imposed by Article 20 of the Constitution of India. 13. In the considered opinion of this Court, the retrospective effect as observed aforesaid. Therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge was justified in allowing the writ petition. This Court does not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 14. The writ appeal is accordingly dismissed. 15. The miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.