State Of Rajasthan Through Executive Engineer v. R. R. Constructions Company Through S. K. Damani
2022-10-13
ANOOP KUMAR DHAND
body2022
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. Instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act of 1996’) against the order dated 14.03.2016 passed by the Court of Additional District Judge No. 3, Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur (for short, ’the Court below’) by which the objections filed by the appellant against the award dated 16.12.2003 have been rejected. 2. The facts, in brief, of the case are that the appellant issued a tender notice dated 23.01.1991 for the development of the Sikar Road in four lane from Military Canteen to Municipal Limit 237 KM to 247 KM. The tender offered by the respondent was accepted and thereafter the work order was issued in favour of the respondent and the agreement was also executed. The work was to be commenced with effect from 26.03.1991 and it was supposed to be completed till 25.03.1992. The respondent had completed the work of amount of Rs. 34,51,573 when the amount was released the dispute arose between the parties and in terms of the agreement clause mentioned in the agreement the matter was referred to the Arbitrator for resolving the dispute between the parties. After considering the documents, facts and material available on the record the Learned Arbitrator passed an award in favour of the respondent directing the appellant to pay an amount of Rs. 71,573/- with interest @ 12% per annum with effect from 20.06.1995 till 15.12.2003 and thereafter, further direction was issued to pay interest @ 18 % per annum from the date of the award till the date of actual payment . 3. Feeling aggrieved and dis-satisfied by the impugned award dated 16.12.2003, the appellant submitted objections before the Court of Additional District Judge No.3, Jaipur Metropolitan Jaipur under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 and those objections were rejected by the Court below vide order dated 14.03.2016 by observing that the interest was awarded by the Tribunal looking to the commercial contract between the parties. 4. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 14.03.2016, the appellant has submitted the instant appeal before this Court on a limited submission that the interest @ 18% per annum awarded by the Arbitrator from the date of passing of the award till the actual date of payment is excessive. 5.
4. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 14.03.2016, the appellant has submitted the instant appeal before this Court on a limited submission that the interest @ 18% per annum awarded by the Arbitrator from the date of passing of the award till the actual date of payment is excessive. 5. Perusal of the impugned award indicates that the dispute arose between the parties in the year 1995 and when the same was not resolved then the matter was referred to the Arbitrator and after considering the evidence and material available on the record, the Arbitrator directed the appellant to pay an amount of Rs. 71,573 with interest @ of 12 % per annum with effect from 20.06.1995 till 15.12.2003 that is the day prior to passing of the award and direction was issued to the appellant to pay interest @ 18 % per annum from the date of the award that is 16.12.2003 till the actual date of payment. The directions issued by the Arbitrator appears to be just and reasonable looking to the contract and the amount involved and the Court below has not committed any error in rejecting the objections submitted by the appellant. As per the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Project Director, National Highways Vs. M. Hakeem and Another: reported in (2021) 9 SCC 1 , a limited jurisdiction has been provided to the Court under Section 34 of the Act of 1996. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M.Hakeem (Supra) has held that the Court should not modify the award unless and until illegality is there, in para 48 which has been observed as under:- "48. Quite obviously if one were to include the power to modify an award in Section 34, one would be crossing the Lakshman Rekha and doing what, according to the justice of a case, ought to be done. In interpreting a statutory provision, a Judge must put himself in the shoes of Parliament and then ask whether Parliament intended this result. Parliament very clearly intended that no power of modification of an award exists in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. It is only for Parliament to amend the aforesaid provision in the light of the experience of the courts in the working of the Arbitration Act, 1996, and bring it in line with other legislations the world over." 6.
Parliament very clearly intended that no power of modification of an award exists in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. It is only for Parliament to amend the aforesaid provision in the light of the experience of the courts in the working of the Arbitration Act, 1996, and bring it in line with other legislations the world over." 6. Similarly in the case of MMTC Ltd. Vs. Vedanta Limited reported in (2019) 4 SCC 163 and in the case of McDermott International Inc. Vs. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and Ors. reported in (2006) 11 SCC 181 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has taken the same view. 7. Thus, in view of the matter, this Court is of the considered view that the scope of interference in this appeal under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is very limited as per the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of MMTC (Supra) and McDermott International Inc. (Supra). 8. Hence, the case of the appellant does not call for any interference by this Court. 9. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the appellant stands dismissed. 10. All pending application(s), if any, also stand dismissed. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that in pursuance of the directions issued by this Court, the appellant has deposited a demand draft before the Court below and the validity of the same has been expired. Counsel submits that a direction be issued to the Court below to return the aforesaid demand draft to the appellant so that a fresh demand draft may be prepared. 12. The Court below is directed to return the demand draft to the appellant and the appellant is further directed to prepare a new demand draft in favour of the respondent within two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.