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2022 DIGILAW 2596 (MAD)

Renganayaki (died) v. Ammayiammal (died)

2022-08-08

C.V.KARTHIKEYAN

body2022
JUDGMENT (Prayer: The Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of CPC, against the judgment and decree made in A.S.No.151 of 1997 on the file of the I Additional District Court -cum- Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Coimbatore, reversing the judgment and decree made in O.S.No.332 of 1987 dated 31.01.1997 on the file of the III Additional District Munsif Court, Coimbatore.) 1. The plaintiff in O.S.No.332 of 1987 on the file of the III Additional District Munsif Court, Coimbatore, was the appellant herein. 2. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant died and her legal representatives had been brought on record as 2nd to 6th appellants. 3. O.S.No.332 of 1987 had been filed by Renganayaki originally against her brother Narayanasamy and against Kannammal, the widow of her another brother Natarajan and also against the Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition, Housing Scheme No.III, Coimbatore, seeking declaration that she was legal representative of her late mother Rangammal and entitled to a share in the property left behind by Rangammal and in consequence thereof for permanent injunction. 4. By judgment dated 31.01.1997, the III Additional District Munsif, Coimbatore, decreed the suit. Pending the suit, the 1st defendant Narayanasamy had died and his legal representatives had been brought on record as 4th to 9th defendants. Questioning the judgment of the Trial Court, the 4th defendant, Ammayiammal wife of Narayanasamy filed A.S.No.151 of 1997 before the I Additional District Court / Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Coimbatore. By judgment dated 26.02.1999, the appeal suit was allowed and the judgment and decree of the Trial Court was set aside, which indicated that the suit in O.S.No.332 of 1987 was dismissed. 5. Aggrieved by that judgment, the plaintiff, Renganayaki filed the present Second Appeal. Pending the Second Appeal, the 1st respondent, Ammayiammal died, but her legal representatives were already on record as 4th to 8th respondents. The 2nd respondent Kannammal also died and that was also recorded. 6. The Second Appeal had been admitted on the following two substantial questions of law on 17.04.2001. “1. Pending the Second Appeal, the 1st respondent, Ammayiammal died, but her legal representatives were already on record as 4th to 8th respondents. The 2nd respondent Kannammal also died and that was also recorded. 6. The Second Appeal had been admitted on the following two substantial questions of law on 17.04.2001. “1. Whether in law the Lower Appellate Court erred in holding that Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, would not apply to the case on hand overlooking that the appellant's mother on her own funds, acquired the suit property, the possession of which was given to her back even after the execution of Settlement Deed and passing of Decree in O.S.No.197/46 and therefore her estate got blossomed into full ownership as laid down in the dictum reported in AIR 1996 Mad 436 , 1991 III CCC 157 and 1993 I CCC 479. 2. Whether in law the Lower Appellate Court erred in holding that the appellants claim can only be considered by the Tahsildar in application filed under Land Acquisition Act overlooking that the question of declaration declaring the appellant's status as legal representative of her mother could only be decided by way of suit.” 7. Subsequently, by order dated 15.04.2019, the following three additional substantial question of law had been framed:- “1. Whether in law the Lower Appellate Court erred in overlooking that the compromise decree in O.S.No.107 of 1946 is non est in the eye of law, in view of the fact that the same was not registered as per the judgment reported in 1995 5 SCC 709 ? 2. Whether in law the Lower Appellate Court erred in overlooking that the compromise decree is collusive, as it was with a view to defeat the right of others who had bonafide claim over the property? 3. Whether in law the Lower Appellate Court erred in overlooking that when the first clause in the compromise decree granting absolute estate, the second clause restricting it or contrary to the same and being repugnant is not enforceable and operative?” O.S. No. 332 of 1987 (III Additional District Munsif Court, Coimbatore): 8. 3. Whether in law the Lower Appellate Court erred in overlooking that when the first clause in the compromise decree granting absolute estate, the second clause restricting it or contrary to the same and being repugnant is not enforceable and operative?” O.S. No. 332 of 1987 (III Additional District Munsif Court, Coimbatore): 8. The suit was originally filed by Renganayaki against her brother Narayanasamy and Kannammal, the widow of her another brother Natarajan and also against the Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition, Housing Scheme No.III, Coimbatore, seeking declaration that she was a legal heir to the estate of Rangammal along with the 1st defendant and for consequential permanent injunction restraining the 3rd defendant from proceeding further in any manner whatsoever and for costs of the suit. 9. The plaintiff and the 1st defendant Narayanasamy and the late husband of the 2nd defendant Natarajan were the children of Rangammal and Rangasamy Naidu. Rangasamy Naidu died in 1960. Rangammal had executed a Will on 23.10.1944 and executed another Will on 19.11.1944 and also executed a further Will on 09.11.1945 and got involved in a suit with her sons. She had died on 10.06.1985. One of her sons Natarajan predeceased her. The plaintiff claimed that she and the 1st defendant, Narayanasamy were her only legal representatives. Rangammal was possessed all properties, which were described as schedule of land measuring 3 acres and 32 cents in G.S.No.27/1, Ganapathy Village, Coimbatore. 10. The 3rd defendant, Special Tahsildar, had initiated land acquisition proceedings. The suit had been filed claiming a right to a share in the compensation as determined by the 3rd defendant, in such land acquisition proceedings. The plaintiff, therefore, sought a declaration that she was a legal representative of Rangammal, along with the 1st defendant. 11. The 1st and 2nd defendants filed a written statement disputing all the averments made in the plaint. The 1st and 2nd defendants claimed that Rangammal had executed a gift deed with respect to the suit property and another property in their favour. They were also put in possession. There was a suit filed by Rangammal in O.S.No.107 of 1946 disputing the very gift deed executed by her. That suit ended in a compromise. In the compromise, she was given a restricted share with right to enjoy the property. They were also put in possession. There was a suit filed by Rangammal in O.S.No.107 of 1946 disputing the very gift deed executed by her. That suit ended in a compromise. In the compromise, she was given a restricted share with right to enjoy the property. The defendants claimed that her right was restricted and therefore, on her death only the 1st and 2nd defendants were entitled to the property. They claimed that the suit should be dismissed. 12. On the basis of the pleadings, the learned III Additional District Munsif, Coimbatore, framed the following issues: “1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration of relief as sought? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction as sought? 3. To what other reliefs is the plaintiff entitled to?” 13. During the course of trial, the plaintiff examined herself as PW-1 and the 4th defendant who had been impleaded as one of the legal representatives of the 1st defendant examined herself as DW-1. 14. The plaintiff marked Exs.A1 to A4. Ex.A1 was the sale deed dated 19.11.1934 in favour of Rangammal. Ex.A3 was the legal heirship certificate of Rangammal. The defendants marked Exs.B1 to B6. Exs.B1 and B2 were the decree and a petition in O.S.No.107 of 1946. Ex.B6 was the proceedings of the Tahsildar, with respect to acquisition of lands. 15. On the basis of the pleadings and evidence adduced, the learned III Additional District Munsif, Coimbatore had examined the terms of the compromise decree in O.S.No.107 of 1946, which was a suit instituted by Rangammal against two of her sons seeking revocation of settlement deed, which she had executed in their favour. In that particular compromise, it was very specifically mentioned that she was entitled to the property and she was put in possession of the house. It was therefore stated after her death, only her two sons would be entitled to her property. The learned III Additional District Munsif correctly found that such a clause was repugnant to the rule of Succession. Since Rangammal was entitled to the property, she was at liberty to deal with them and if she does not, then such property would devolve to all the legal representatives. Holding as above, the suit was decreed. A.S.No.151 of 1997 (I Additional District Court / Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Coimbatore):- 16. The widow of the 1st defendant then filed the said appeal suit. Holding as above, the suit was decreed. A.S.No.151 of 1997 (I Additional District Court / Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Coimbatore):- 16. The widow of the 1st defendant then filed the said appeal suit. The First Appellate Court then proceeded to frame points for consideration namely, whether the appeal suit should be allowed or not. It was observed that in the compromise decree in O.S.No.107 of 1946, it had been mentioned that Rangammal and her husband would be entitled to the property. It it had been very specifically stated that after them the property would devolve to her two sons. It was therefore observed that it was a restricted right and would not flower into an absolute right and on that reasoning, the First Appellate Court reversed the findings of the Trial Court, allowed the Appeal Suit and thereby dismissed the Original Suit. Second Appeal No.536 of 2001: 17. The Second Appeal had been admitted on the following two substantial questions of law on 17.04.2001: “1. Whether in law the Lower Appellate Court erred in holding that Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, would not apply to the case on hand overlooking that the appellant's mother on her own funds, acquired the suit property, the possession of which was given to her back even after the execution of Settlement Deed and passing of Decree in O.S.No.197/46 and therefore her estate got blossomed into full ownership as laid down in the dictum reported in AIR 1996 Mad 436 , 1991 III CCC 157 and 1993 I CCC 479. 2. Whether in law the Lower Appellate Court erred in holding that the appellants claim can only be considered by the Tahsildar in application filed under Land Acquisition Act overlooking that the question of declaration declaring the appellant's status as legal representative of her mother could only be decided by way of suit.” 18. Subsequently, by order dated 15.04.2019, the following three additional substantial question of law had been framed:- “1. Whether in law the Lower Appellate Court erred in overlooking that the compromise decree in O.S.No.107 of 1946 is non est in the eye of law, in view of the fact that the same was not registered as per the judgment reported in 1995 5 SCC 709 ? 2. Whether in law the Lower Appellate Court erred in overlooking that the compromise decree in O.S.No.107 of 1946 is non est in the eye of law, in view of the fact that the same was not registered as per the judgment reported in 1995 5 SCC 709 ? 2. Whether in law the Lower Appellate Court erred in overlooking that the compromise decree is collusive, as it was with a view to defeat the right of others who had bonafide claim over the property? 3. Whether in law the Lower Appellate Court erred in overlooking that when the first clause in the compromise decree granting absolute estate, the second clause restricting it or contrary to the same and being repugnant is not enforceable and operative?” 19. As a matter of fact, all the substantial questions revolve around the interpretation of the compromise decree / Ex.B2, whereby, the deceased Rangammal was stated to be entitled to the suit property. It is to be mentioned that particular phraseology used 'entitled' would mean that absolute right had been vested on her. The compromise decree also stated that thereafter, probably indicating that on her death, only her two sons would get a right over the property. 20. The terms of the compromise in Ex.B2 necessitated the framing of the first two substantial questions of law namely, whether Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act or Section 14(2) of the same Act applies. 21. The additional substantial question of law also relate to the same issue, but viewed it from a different angle, namely, whether a compromise decree could contain two contrary clauses repugnant to each other, one granting entitlement and the other, indicating the mode of succession for the property, for which entitlement was granted. 22. Before examining the the substantial questions of law it would be prudent to examine the facts. 23. The plaintiff who filed O.S.No.332 of 1987, Renganayaki and the 1st defendant Narayanasamy and the late husband of the 2nd defendant, Natarajan, all siblings were the children of Rangammal and Rangasamy Naidu. Rangasamy Naidu died in the year 1960. Rangammal apparently had a penchant to write Wills and to revoke them. In that manner, she revoked three separate Wills. 23. The plaintiff who filed O.S.No.332 of 1987, Renganayaki and the 1st defendant Narayanasamy and the late husband of the 2nd defendant, Natarajan, all siblings were the children of Rangammal and Rangasamy Naidu. Rangasamy Naidu died in the year 1960. Rangammal apparently had a penchant to write Wills and to revoke them. In that manner, she revoked three separate Wills. She had apparently also executed a gift cum settlement deed bequeathing the property involved in the litigation namely, land measuring 3 acres and 32 cents in G.S.No.27/1, Ganapathy Village, Coimbatore, in favour of her two sons viz., Narayanasamy and Natarajan. She then wanted to cancel the settlement deed and therefore, instituted O.S.No.107 of 1946. That suit ended in a compromise and Ex.B2 is the compromise entered into among the parties. The terms of the compromise is as follows:- “1. The plaintiff is entitled to the suit properties as stated hereunder. She will be entitled to possession of the house from the 3rd defendant. 2. After the life time of the plaintiff and her husband the defendants 1 and 2 will be absolutely entitled to the properties in equal shares. The plaintiff or her husband should not alienate or dispose of the properties during their lief time. 3. Subject to this the plaintiff is entitled to a decree. 4. Each party will bear her or his own costs.” 24. The suit property then came to be acquired by the 3rd defendant / Special Tashildar. The property which was probably dry waste land was now assessed in terms of the monetary compensation which could be fetched for such acquisition and this had triggered institution of the suit by the plaintiff seeking a declaration that she is also one of the heirs of her mother and for permanent injunction against the 3rd defendant / Special Tahsildar. The suit was resisted on the ground that under the compromise decree, the mother had only a restricted right. 25. The Trial Court found that there was no such restriction, since it had been clearly mentioned that the mother Rangammal was entitled for the suit property and once that statement is made and accepted, she becomes the absolute owner of the suit property. Therefore, the subsequent clause limiting the legal representatives to just the sons is void and non est in the eyes of law. Therefore, the subsequent clause limiting the legal representatives to just the sons is void and non est in the eyes of law. The Trial Court therefore had granted a decree as sought for with respect to declaration. 26. The First Appellate Court had reversed the said findings, stating that it is not correct. 27. The decree had been extracted above. It is quite clear that the mother / Rangammal was stated to be entitled to the property. This would mean that her right is not restricted in any manner whatsoever. Once she has a right over the property, then on her death, all the legal representatives will get a share in the properties. Such share cannot be restricted only to the male members and denied to the female members. 28. The application of law on Section 14(1) (2) of the Hindu Succession Act, need not be examined at all since the terms of the compromise are very clear that the right of Rangammal for entitlement of the property had been recognized. 29. The Additional substantial questions of law addresses the issue in a more focused manner relating to the subsequent clauses restricting that right which flowed to all the legal representatives. It has to be answered that such clause is actually non est. 30. The only conclusion which could be arrived from the above discussion is that, on the death of the mother Rangammal, her daughter and her two sons / their legal representatives would get an equal share in the said property. This is the declaration which the plaintiff had sought and I hold that she is entitled for such declaration. 31. It is seen that the plaintiff had also sought for permanent injunction with respect to land acquisition proceedings. If as on date, the land acquisition proceedings had been completed and compensation amount had been deposited, then a direction is issued that all the legal representatives, of the daughter and two sons of Rangammal would get an equal share in accordance with the shares of their respective mother / fathers. 32. Thus, the first substantial question of law is answered that Rangammal was entitled to the suit property and therefore, on her death, her daughter and two sons / their legal representatives would get an equal share in the property. 33. 32. Thus, the first substantial question of law is answered that Rangammal was entitled to the suit property and therefore, on her death, her daughter and two sons / their legal representatives would get an equal share in the property. 33. The second substantial is answered that the suit had been filed only for declaration as legal representative and such a declaration has to be granted and that there cannot be any injunction against the Tahsildar from proceeding further with the land acquisition proceedings. 34. The first, second and third additional substantials question of law are answered that the compromise decree in O.S.No.107 of 1946 will have to be viewed in entirety. It had very clearly been stated that Rangammal was entitled to the property, which would mean that she had become the absolute owner of the properties and on her death, if she had died intestate, the property would devolve equally to her daughter and two sons / legal representatives. 35. In the result, i) The Second Appeal is allowed, however without costs. ii) The judgment and decree in A.S.No.151 of 1997 on the file of the I Additional District Court cum Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Coimbatore, dated 26.02.1999 is set aside. iii). O.S.No.332 of 1987 on the file of the III Additional District Munsif, Coimbatore, which had been decreed on 31.01.1997 is partly decreed with respect to the relief of declaration and dismissed with respect to the relief of permanent injunction.