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2022 DIGILAW 260 (GAU)

Lalrempuii Fanai D/o F. Pahnuna v. State of Mizoram

2022-03-14

NELSON SAILO

body2022
JUDGMENT : NELSON SAILO, J. 1. Heard Mr. A.R. Malhotra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. C. Zoramchhana, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Also heard Mr. J.C. Lalnunsanga, learned Standing counsel, MPSC for respondent No. 3. 2. By filing this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the impugned Order dated 30.08.2013 (Annexure-24), by which the disciplinary authority in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 12 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 imposed upon her a major penalty of reduction to lower rank and Grade Pay of Rs. 6600/- per month under Rule 11(vi) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 for a period of 3 years with cumulative effect while restricting her pay to the amount of subsistence allowance drawn during the suspension period. 3. Brief facts of the case essential for disposal of the instant writ petition is that the petitioner who is a State Civil servant and posted as the Director, SIRD, Kolasib at the relevant time was placed under suspension with immediate effect vide Order dated 27.11.2009 (Annexure-1) pending drawal of the departmental proceeding against her. Following this, a Memorandum of Charge dated 09.04.2010 (Annexure-2) was issued to her, levelling as many as 4 (four) Article of charges upon her, while directing her to submit her written statement of defence within 10 days of receipt of the Memorandum of Charge. Since we are concerned only with the charge under Article II, the same is abstracted hereunder: “ARTICLE II That the said Pi Lalrempuii Fanai, MCS, while functioning as Director, SIRD, Kolasib in the said office during the aforesaid period, the said Pi Lalrempuii Fanai, MCS placed supply order to M/S The Emperor, Lalbuaia Shopping Centre, Zarkawt vide No. D. 15013/2/2007 - SIRD/76 dated 31.10.2008 for supply of 150 sets of Computer + UPS 600 VA + HP Laser Jet Printer without quoting the rate. She accorded expenditure sanction of Rs. 15,00,000/- for advance payment vide order No. N. 11019/2/2008 - SIRD dated 12.11.2008. The investigation conducted by the ACB revealed that the amount was not paid to the supplier. Again, the said Pi Lalrempuii Fanai, sanctioned an amount of Rs. 60,00,000 + 15,00,000 advance) was sanctioned from Central Assistance amounting to Rs. 200 lakhs under Backward Region Grant Fund (BRGF) released by the Govt. The investigation conducted by the ACB revealed that the amount was not paid to the supplier. Again, the said Pi Lalrempuii Fanai, sanctioned an amount of Rs. 60,00,000 + 15,00,000 advance) was sanctioned from Central Assistance amounting to Rs. 200 lakhs under Backward Region Grant Fund (BRGF) released by the Govt. of Mizoram, Rural Development Department vide No. J. 12012/6/08-RD(BRGF) dated 15.10.2008. During the course of investigation conducted by the ACB, Pu Davy Lalnunthara, the Proprietor, M/S the Emperor disclosed that he had supplied 150 nos. of Computer sets+600VA UPS+HP Desk Jet (1560 Printer) to SIRD, Kolasib at the rate of Rs. 25,000/- per computer set. The said Pi Lalrempuii Fanai sent a middle man named Lalduhawma (Delta Sound) to Pu Davy Lalnunthara to request and prepare voucher for 150 sets of Computer as if it were supplied @ Rs. 50,000/- per set. Pu Davy Lalnunthara insisted re-imbursement of 4% Value Added Tax if he is to prepare fake voucher/Bill. The said Pi Lalrempuii Fanai then agreed to pay 4% VAT for 150 sets of Computers. On 16.12.2008, Pu Davy Lalnunthara, Proprietor, M/S The Emporor went to the office of Pi Lalrempuii Fanai and handed over Invoice/Bill No. 1027 dated 15.12.2008 for 150 sets of Computer @ Rs. 50,000/- per set amounting to Rs. 75,00,000/- minus Rs. 15,00,000/- advance as if it was received by him. He was asked to put his signature in the Cash Book as if he received Rs. 60,00,000/-. However, Pu Davy Lalnunthara disclosed before the ACB that the actual amount received by him from the said Pi Lalrempuii Fanai was Rs. 37,50,000/- only for 150 sets of Computers @ Rs. 25,000/- per set and that 4% VAT was also not re-imbursed to him. The remaining amount to Rs. 37,50,000/- was therefore misappropriated by the Pi Lalrempuii Fanai, the then Director, SIRD, Kolasib. By the above act, the said Pi Lalrempuii Fanai, MCS exhibited lack of integrity and devotion to duty which is unbecoming of a Government servant in violation of sub-rule (i) (ii) and (iii) of Rule 3 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.” 4. Following the issuance of the Memorandum of Charge against the petitioner, a detailed enquiry was conducted by the appointed Commissioner of Enquiry and the petitioner also participated in the enquiry process. Following the issuance of the Memorandum of Charge against the petitioner, a detailed enquiry was conducted by the appointed Commissioner of Enquiry and the petitioner also participated in the enquiry process. Consequently, the Commissioner of Enquiry concluded the enquiry by submitting his finding in the form of an enquiry report vide communication dated 13.04.2011 (Annexure-6), addressed to the Secretary to the Government of Mizoram, DP&AR (CSW). As per the enquiry report, the Commissioner of Enquiry concluded that the charges against the petitioner in respect of Article I, III and IV were found to be not proved, while the charge against the petitioner in respect of Article II was found to be proved. The petitioner was then furnished with a copy of the enquiry report vide communication dated 24.06.2011 (Annexure-7) and she was asked to submit her written representation if any, within 15 days from the date of receipt of the report. The petitioner then requested for 5 days extension for submitting her representation, which was allowed and she accordingly submitted her written representation on 04.07.2011 (Annexure-10). 5. The sum and substance of the written representation of the petitioner was that according to the Commissioner of Enquiry, Article II of the charge memorandum was proved mainly on the basis of the statements made by SW-8, Mr. Davy Lalnunthara who supplied 150 computers to the SIRD. The petitioner contended that she was not present on the day when SW-8 gave his deposition due to an injury sustained by her on her leg. As a result, SW-8 was not cross examined and the Defence Assistant who was appointed to defend the petitioner on his part also did not cross examine the said witness. As such, the petitioner requested that the findings made against her in respect of Article II be set aside with a finding that the charges are not proved against her. 6. In response to the representation submitted by the petitioner, she was asked as to whether she desired to cross examine Mr. Davy Lalnunthara vide communication dated 22.08.2011 (Annexure-11) and to which, she replied in the affirmative vide her letter dated 29.08.2011 (Annexure-12). 6. In response to the representation submitted by the petitioner, she was asked as to whether she desired to cross examine Mr. Davy Lalnunthara vide communication dated 22.08.2011 (Annexure-11) and to which, she replied in the affirmative vide her letter dated 29.08.2011 (Annexure-12). Accordingly, an Order dated 05.09.2011 (Annexure-13) was issued by the respondent authority concerned remitting the matter back to the Commissioner of Enquiry for conducting fresh enquiry in respect of Article II of the article of charge framed against the petitioner with a specific direction that the petitioner should be allowed to cross examine SW-8, Mr. Davy Lalnunthara and thereafter, to submit the findings in respect of Article II within a month from the date of receipt of the order. 7. What followed thereafter was that the Commissioner of Enquiry by stating that the petitioner was given due opportunities to cross examine not only SW-8 but all the other witnesses returned the concerned file to the respondent authority in the DP&AR (CSW). However, after a series of communication between the Commissioner of Enquiry and the DP&AR (CSW), the Commissioner of Enquiry agreed to conduct a fresh enquiry in respect of Article II of the Memorandum of Charge by summoning SW-8, Mr. Davy Lalnunthara. SW-8 was summoned by the Commissioner of Enquiry for 3 (three) consecutive times but SW-8 failed to appear before him and left with no option, the Commissioner of Enquiry returned his finding to the Secretary to the Government of Mizoram, DP&AR (CSW) vide his letter dated 30.05.2012 (Annexure-19), by reversing his earlier finding in respect of Article II that the same was not proved by giving the petitioner the benefit of doubt. 8. The report submitted by the Commissioner of Enquiry was however not accepted by the Disciplinary Authority and accordingly, the second report submitted by the Commissioner of Enquiry was furnished to the petitioner vide communication dated 22.04.2013 (Annexure-20), while asking her to submit a written representation within 15 days of receipt of the same. 8. The report submitted by the Commissioner of Enquiry was however not accepted by the Disciplinary Authority and accordingly, the second report submitted by the Commissioner of Enquiry was furnished to the petitioner vide communication dated 22.04.2013 (Annexure-20), while asking her to submit a written representation within 15 days of receipt of the same. The petitioner did not submit her written representation within the stipulated time but nevertheless, she submitted her representation which was received by the Department on 14.06.2013, wherein she stated that the statements made by the SW-8 having not been put to cross examination by her, the same should not be relied upon for proving Article II of the charge against her and that the said charge made against her be dropped. 9. After the petitioner submitted her representation, the respondent authority concerned referred the matter to the Mizoram Public Service Commission (respondent No. 3) vide communication dated 22.07.2013 (Annexure-22). The respondent No. 3 vide reply dated 13.08.2013 (Annexure-23) wrote back that after due deliberation, it was of the opinion that the proposed penalty to be awarded to the petitioner under Rule 11(vi) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 was found to be commensurate with the offence committed by her. Thereafter, vide the impugned Order dated 30.08.2013 (Annexure-24), a major penalty as already stated hereinabove was inflicted upon the petitioner. Although the petitioner preferred an appeal under Rule 23 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 before the Chief Secretary, Government of Mizoram on 18.10.2013 (Annexure-25) but she was informed vide Communication dated 03.02.2014 (Annexure-26) that an appeal against the order made by the President/Governor does not lie in terms of Rule 22 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and therefore, the appeal submitted by her was regretted. Aggrieved, the petitioner is before this Court. 10. Mr. A.R. Malhotra, learned counsel for the petitioner by referring to the communication dated 22.04.2013 (Annexure-20) submits that although the petitioner was asked to submit her written representation against the non-acceptance of the second enquiry report by the Disciplinary Authority but the said Authority did not give any reason for having the tentative view that the charge against the petitioner in respect of Article II was established. He further submits that according to the Disciplinary Authority, the Commissioner of Enquiry in his first report found charge against Article II to be proved from the evidence given by SW-8. He further submits that according to the Disciplinary Authority, the Commissioner of Enquiry in his first report found charge against Article II to be proved from the evidence given by SW-8. However, the fact remains that the petitioner did not have the opportunity to cross examine SW-8 and without such cross examination, the evidence of SW-8 was not safe to be relied upon. In support of his submission, the learned counsel relies upon the case of Gopal Saran vs. Satyanarayana, (1989) 3 SCC 56 . 11. The learned counsel further submits that the respondents have violated Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Referring to Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, the learned counsel submits that the Disciplinary Authority is required to forward a copy of the report of the Enquiring Authority together with its own tentative reasons for disagreement if any, with the finding of the Enquiring Authority on any article of charge of the Government servant and in response thereof, the Government servant may submit his written representation for submission before the Disciplinary Authority. By further referring to Rule 15 (3)(b) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, the learned counsel submits that in case the advice of the Public Service Commission is sought for, a copy of the advice of the Public Service Commission has to be given to the Government servant with an opportunity to submit his written representation to the Disciplinary Authority within a specified time. However, in the present case, the petitioner was not given a copy of the advice given by the respondent No. 3 and therefore, the provision under reference has clearly been violated by the respondent authorities. Mr. A.R. Malhotra by further referring to the Government of India’s decision below Rule 32 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 submits that pursuant to the Judgment of the Apex Court dated 16.03.2011 in Civil Appeal No. 5341/2006 (Union of India and Others vs. S.K. Kapoor), wherein it was held that it was a settled principle of natural justice that if any material is to be relied upon in a departmental proceeding, a copy of the same must be supplied in advance to the charge sheeted employee so that he may have a chance to rebut the same. Therefore, based on the law laid down by the Apex Court, the supply of the Public Service Commission’s advice to the Charge Officer is a must. He therefore submits that the advice of the respondent No. 3 having not been supplied to the petitioner prior to the decision taken by the Disciplinary Authority for imposition of a major penalty upon her, the impugned order of penalty cannot be sustained. He also submits that the Disciplinary Authority prior to giving an opportunity to the petitioner to submit her written representation had on 11.04.2013 come to a finding that in view of the proved charge in respect of Article II, the petitioner should be inflicted with a major penalty of reduction in rank in the Lower Grade pay of Rs. 6600/- per month under Rule 11 (vi) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and therefore, the ultimate penalty imposed upon her vide Order dated 30.08.2013 cannot be sustained. Accordingly, he prays that the same should be set aside. In support of his submissions, Mr. A.R. Malhotra relies upon the following authorities: (i) Union of India and Others vs. B.V. Gopinath, (2014) 1 SCC 351 (ii) Union of India and Others vs. R.P. Singh, (2014) 7 SCC 340 (iii) Oriental Bank of Commerce vs. S.S. Sheokand, (2014) 5 SCC 172 (iv) Union of India and Others vs. Debal Roy, 2021 (2) GLT 749 (v) Basab Bijoy Bhattacharjee vs. Gauhati High Court and Others, 2017 (4) GLT 857 12. Mr. C. Zoramchhana, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on the other hand submits that from a bare perusal of the communication dated 22.04.2013 (Annexure-20), it can be clearly seen that the Disciplinary Authority did not agree with the report of the Commissioner of Enquiry by stating that there is preponderance of probability against the petitioner for having misappropriated substantial amount of Government money. Further, non-cross examination of SW-8 by itself at a belated stage while full opportunity having been given at the relevant time of hearing on regular basis was considered not to be a sufficient reason/ground for reversing the finding of the charge under Article II from ‘proved’ to ‘not proved’. He therefore submits that the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner in this regard is without any basis. He therefore submits that the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner in this regard is without any basis. He also submits that Rule 15 (2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 has been duly complied with and therefore, there is no further requirement to give the petitioner an opportunity of making representation on the penalty to be imposed upon her in view of Sub-Rule (4) and (6) of Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. 13. Mr. C. Zoramchhana, learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the finding recorded in the note sheet at 87/N on 11.04.2013 by the Disciplinary Authority who was the competent authority at the relevant time was not acted upon and therefore, the same cannot be the basis for setting aside the impugned order of penalty issued on 30.08.2013. He submits that prior to the issuance of the impugned order dated 30.08.2013, the petitioner was duly given an opportunity to submit her representation against the disagreement of the Disciplinary Authority on the finding of the Commissioner of Enquiry in his second Enquiry report that charge against Article II was not proved in view of the benefit of doubt given to her. Therefore, the imposition of the impugned penalty upon the petitioner after giving her due opportunity to make a representation is only in order. He submits that the Disciplinary Authority is the sole authority on facts and the degree of proof in a departmental proceeding is lesser than those in a criminal proceeding. The charges can be proved in a departmental proceeding on the basis of preponderance of probability and there is no requirement of there being proof beyond reasonable doubt as in a criminal proceeding. He submits that at any rate, if it is the opinion of the Court that the petitioner should be given the benefit of cross examining the witness i.e. SW-8, the matter may be remanded back for reconsideration. In support of his submission, the learned Additional Advocate General has relied upon the following authorities: (i) P.V. Srinivasa Sastry and Others vs. Comptroller and Auditor General and Others, (1993) 1 SCC 419 (ii) Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs. Mohd. Yousuf Miya and Others, (1997) 2 SCC 699 (iii) Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and Others vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 612 14. Yousuf Miya and Others, (1997) 2 SCC 699 (iii) Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and Others vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 612 14. From a perusal of the materials available on record, it is seen that a detailed enquiry proceeding was conducted against the petitioner by appointing the Commissioner of Enquiry as the Enquiry Officer. Out of the four Article of charges levelled against the petitioner, the Commissioner of Enquiry found the Article of charge No. I, III and IV to be not proved, while he found the Article of charge No. II to be proved. However, as the petitioner did not have the opportunity to cross examine SW-8, the Disciplinary Authority remanded the case back to the Commissioner of Enquiry for affording the petitioner a chance to cross examine SW-8. However, despite three summons, SW-8 failed to appear before the Commissioner of Enquiry and which led to a finding by the Commissioner of Enquiry that Article of charge No. II was not proved by giving the benefit of doubt to the petitioner. The Disciplinary Authority however did not accept the said finding and proceeded to record its finding and pass an order on 11.04.2013. The record reveals that the finding and order is recorded at 82/N to 87/N of the note sheet in the relevant file. The Disciplinary Authority in exercise of the powers conferred on it vide No. A.19018/1/2011-VIG dated 13.03.2013 decided to impose a major penalty of reduction to lower rank and Grade pay of Rs. 6600/- per month under Rule 11(vi) of the CCS (CCS) Rules, 1965 upon the petitioner for a period of three years with cumulative effect, with immediate effect and on expiry of the penalty period, her pay is to be restored at the same stage which was drawn by her immediately before she was placed under suspension in connection with the case. It was also decided that her suspension period will be treated as on duty for the purpose of seniority and pension but without any arrear pay and allowances apart from the subsistence allowance already drawn by her. It was also decided that her suspension period will be treated as on duty for the purpose of seniority and pension but without any arrear pay and allowances apart from the subsistence allowance already drawn by her. The petitioner was then given a copy of the further report made by the Commissioner of Enquiry vide communication dated 22.04.2013, by indicating that the Disciplinary Authority was of the tentative view that there was sufficient reason to believe that there is preponderance of probability that the petitioner has misappropriated substantial amount of Government money and mere non-cross examination of SW-8 at a later stage, while full opportunity was given at the time of regular hearing was insufficient to change the earlier finding based on evidence. The petitioner was given 15 days time to submit her representation. The petitioner however submitted her representation after the stipulated time, as it was received by the authority concerned only on 14.06.2013. What is to be noticed here is that prior to furnishing a copy of the further report of the Commissioner of Enquiry, the Disciplinary Authority on 11.04.2013 had already taken a decision. Besides this, although the impugned order of penalty was passed on 30.08.2013 the advice/opinion of the respondent No. 3 given on 13.08.2013 to the DP&AR (CSW) was admittedly not given to the petitioner. The Apex Court in Union of India and Others vs. R.P. Singh (Supra) took into consideration and agreed to what was held in ECIL vs. B. Karunakar (Constitution Bench), (1993) 4 SCC 727 , wherein it was opined that non-supply of enquiry report is a breach of the principle of natural justice. Advise of the Public Service Commission when utilized as a material against the delinquent officer, it should be supplied in advance. Same was the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Union of India vs. S.K. Kapoor, (2011) 4 SCC 589 and which was implemented by the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Department of Personnel and Training vide Office Memorandum dated 06.01.2014. The same has also acknowledged by the Apex Court in Union of India and Others vs. R.P. Singh (Supra). 15. The same has also acknowledged by the Apex Court in Union of India and Others vs. R.P. Singh (Supra). 15. In the case of Oriental Bank of Commerce and Others vs. S.S. Sheokand and Another (Supra), the Apex Court in the given facts of that case came to a finding that any material which goes into the decision making process against an employees, cannot be denied to him. Paragraph No. 20 of the said judgment is reproduced below: “20. We have considered the submissions of both the counsel. When we come to the question of imposition of punishment on the respondent, what we find is that undoubtedly, there was a serious allegation against him, and as it has been held in Disciplinary Authority-Cum-Regl. Manager, such acts could not be condoned. At the same time, we have also to note that the bank management itself had taken the view in the initial stage that the action did not require a major penalty. It is also relevant to note that the High Court was also informed at the stage of review that the Bank was considering imposition of a minor penalty. It is quite possible to say that the bank management did arrive at its decision to maintain a major penalty at a later stage on its own, and not because of the dictate of the CVC, but at the same time it has got to be noted that the CVC report had been sought by the management of the bank, and thereafter the punishment had been imposed. As observed in State Bank of India, may be that the Disciplinary Authority had recorded its own findings, and had arrived at its own decision, but when this advice from CVC was sought, it could not be said that this additional material was not a part of the decision making process. When this report was not made available to the respondent, it is difficult to rule out the apprehension about the decision having been taken under pressure. Any material, which goes into the decision-making process against an employee, cannot be denied to him. In view of the judgment in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regl. When this report was not made available to the respondent, it is difficult to rule out the apprehension about the decision having been taken under pressure. Any material, which goes into the decision-making process against an employee, cannot be denied to him. In view of the judgment in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regl. Manager, the decision of the Bank could have been approved on merits, however, the two judgments in Nagaraj Shivarao Karajagi and SBI lay down the requisite procedure in such matters, and in the facts of this case, it will not be appropriate to depart from the dicta therein. On this yardstick alone, the part of the judgment of the High Court interfering with the punishment will have to be sustained.” 16. Regarding the materials which goes against the employee concerned and not being supplied to him before the imposition of penalty, a Division Bench of this Court in Union of India and Others vs. Debal Roy (Supra) at paragraph No. 6 of the said judgment held as follows: “6. We have heard Mr. H.K. Das, learned counsel for the writ petitioners as well as Mr. NNB Choudhury, learned counsel for the sole respondent herein at length. It is an undisputed fact that the respondent herein who was at the relevant time working as Enquiry Cum Reservation Clerk at Silchar in North East Frontier Railway was allegedly spotted by the Vigilance Department and it was on the initiation of the Vigilance Department that an inquiry was initiated against him, in which subsequently four article of charges were framed and charge sheet were given to the respondent herein which we have already referred to above. Consequent to the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings, the Inquiry Officer came to the conclusion that the charges framed against the delinquent officer (respondent herein) are not proved and he gave his findings to that effect. The report of the Inquiry Officer, however, was not accepted by the Disciplinary Authority. The main reason for disagreement being the advice of none other but the Vigilance Department itself. As the learned counsel for the Union of India has submitted that the Vigilance Department gave its comment to each of the Article of Charges, which according to the Vigilance Department stood proved. The main reason for disagreement being the advice of none other but the Vigilance Department itself. As the learned counsel for the Union of India has submitted that the Vigilance Department gave its comment to each of the Article of Charges, which according to the Vigilance Department stood proved. When we compare the comments of the Vigilance Department to the comment of the Disciplinary Authority, we find that they were verbatim the same, a fact which has been very fairly accepted by the counsel for the petitioner. In other words, the reason for disagreement with the report of the Inquiry Officer was the advice or the findings of the Vigilance Department. In all fairness, therefore, these findings of the Vigilance Department should have been supplied to the delinquent officer i.e. the respondent herein. It does not matter nor does it help the case of the petitioners herein even if the findings of the Vigilance Department and that of the Disciplinary Authority are the same. Therefore, although the findings are the same, yet the facts remains that the report of the Vigilance Department which is contrary to the findings of the Inquiry Officer, were never supplied to the delinquent officer. It should have supplied and therefore its non-supply vitiates the entire proceedings of the Disciplinary Authority, and we are therefore in agreement with the findings of the Central Administrative Tribunal that there was grave procedural irregularity committed while imposing penalty against the respondent herein.” 17. Coming to the present case, there is no dispute at the bar that the petitioner was not given a copy of the advice of the respondent No. 3 MPSC prior to issuance of the impugned order of penalty and therefore, the ratio laid down by the Apex Court and by the Division Bench of this Court as well, as highlighted above is found applicable to the instant case. 18. The next point which has drawn the attention of this Court is that the petitioner did not have the opportunity to cross examine SW-8. In fact, it was on the basis of the evidence of SW-8 that the Commissioner of Enquiry had come to a finding that the Article of charge No. II was proved against the petitioner. 18. The next point which has drawn the attention of this Court is that the petitioner did not have the opportunity to cross examine SW-8. In fact, it was on the basis of the evidence of SW-8 that the Commissioner of Enquiry had come to a finding that the Article of charge No. II was proved against the petitioner. The Apex Court in Gopal Saran vs. Satyanarayana, (1989) 3 SCC 56 in the given facts of that case held that it would not be safe to rely on the examination-in-chief recorded which was not subjected to cross examination before the summon was made. In the instant case as well, the petitioner did not cross examine the said witness i.e. SW-8 and after it was remanded back to the Commissioner of Enquiry by the Disciplinary Authority for the said purpose, the Commissioner of Enquiry could not secure the attendance of the said witness. In fact, the Commissioner of Enquiry could have taken coercive steps to enforce the attendance of the said witness, but the same was not done. Therefore, on the basis of the evidence of SW-8 alone and he not being cross examined and also, without there being corroboration, it would not be safe to conclude that Article of charge No. II is proved against the petitioner. 19. In Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and Others vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava (Supra), the Apex Court accepted and adopted the ratio laid down by the Court in B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and Others, (1995) 6 SCC 749 that the Disciplinary Authority is the sole Judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the Appellate Authority has got extensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a Disciplinary Enquiry, the strict prove of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. There cannot be any argument to the said ratio laid down by the Apex Court but the fact remains that prior to the Disciplinary Authority’s decision taken on 11.04.2013, the petitioner was not given any opportunity to represent her case against the disagreement of the Disciplinary Enquiry on the further report submitted by the Commissioner of Enquiry. Besides this, the advice of the MPSC was also not furnished to her. Besides this, the advice of the MPSC was also not furnished to her. As such, the case of Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and Others vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava (Supra) is found to be not applicable to the present case. 20. The case of Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs. Mohd. Yousuf Miya and Others (Supra) relied upon by the learned Additional Advocate General is also found to be not applicable to the present case. The said decision is with regard to the standard of prove required in a departmental proceeding. Unlike a criminal proceeding where prove beyond reasonable doubt is required, in a departmental proceeding, preponderance of probability is sufficient for establishing the charge. Even if such is the requirement, the fact remains that the petitioner in the instant case as already notice hereinabove did not have an opportunity to cross examine the prime witness i.e. SW-8. As such, this decision is also found to be not applicable. 21. In so far as the question of there being no scope for filing an appeal against the order passed by the President/Governor, where the said authorities are the Disciplinary Authority as contended by the State respondents, it may be seen that as per the Notification dated 27.05.2013 relied by the State respondents and which was issued by the Vigilance Department, Government of Mizoram, a review or revision by the Governor appears to be permissible when the Governor is the Disciplinary Authority. Therefore, the appeal preferred by the petitioner could easily have been construed as a review or revision for consideration by the Disciplinary Authority. However, in view of the finding arrived at and the conclusion being drawn hereafter, this Court would not like to enter into the issue beyond this observation and leaves it open to be decided in appropriate proceedings. 22. Thus, upon due consideration, this Court finds that the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is not sustainable, in view of the petitioner not being given the chance to cross examine the prime witness, SW-8 and also for having not being given the chance of pre-decisional hearing. In view of such finding, the other authorities cited by the parties is not looked into. 23. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned order dated 30.08.2013 is hereby set aside and the petitioner will be entitled to all the consequential benefits. 24. In view of such finding, the other authorities cited by the parties is not looked into. 23. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned order dated 30.08.2013 is hereby set aside and the petitioner will be entitled to all the consequential benefits. 24. With the above observation and direction, the writ petition stands disposed of. No cost.