JUDGMENT 1. The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner Bhanwar Lal Naga with the following prayers:- "A. The Charge Sheet dated 23.09.2011 (Annex.5) may kindly be declared illegal, arbitrary and unjust and kindly be quashed and set aside. B. The respondent may kindly be directed to promote the petitioner in selection scale of R.A.S. with effect from 01.04.2013 because the same is in abeyance because of pendency of this charge sheet and release the arrears of selection scale to the petitioner @ 24% interest P.A. C. The action of respondent department may kindly be held illegal and same may kindly be quashed and set aside and an action against the responsible officers may kindly be ordered for this illegality committed by them because their this action falls in the category of Criminal act also. If this Hon'ble Court deems it fit and proper then this petition may also kindly be treated as Criminal Contempt Petition. D. The personal liability of the guilty officials may kindly be ordered and the interest of delayed payment may be recovered from their pockets. E. During the pendency of this petition, if any order is passed or any action is taken against the petitioner prejudicial to his interests, the same may kindly be taken on record and may be quashed and set aside. F. Any other writ order or direction which this Hon'ble Court deems just and proper may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioners. G. Costs of the writ petition and suitable compensation for petitioner's suffering may kindly be awarded to the petitioners." 2. Factual matrix of the case is that the petitioner being member of Rajasthan Administrative Services remained posted as Sub Divisional Officer at Tehsil Shiv, District Barmer from 30.09.2009 to 04.05.2010. A memorandum dated 23.09.2011, along with the charge-sheet and statement of charges came to be served upon the petitioner. In the charge-sheet, following charge was levelled against the petitioner. Factual matrix of the case is that the petitioner being member of Rajasthan Administrative Services remained posted as Sub Divisional Officer at Tehsil Shiv, District Barmer from 30.09.2009 to 04.05.2010. A memorandum dated 23.09.2011, along with the charge-sheet and statement of charges came to be served upon the petitioner. In the charge-sheet, following charge was levelled against the petitioner. ;g fd vki Jh Hkaoj yky ukxk] vkj-,-,l- rRdkyhu mi[k.M vf/kdkjh f'ko ds in ij fnukad 30-09-2009 ls 04-05-2010 rd dk;Zjr jgus ds nkSjku mi[k.M vf/kdkjh ,oa mi[k.M eftLVsV f'ko 1@4 lgk;d dyDVj f'ko 1@2 ds U;k;ky; esa jktLo vkosnu i= la[;k 40@2009 jktΠjkT; rglhynkj f'ko cuke xqyke iq= ihjk oxSjgk /kkjk 1771@411@2 jktLFkku dk'rdkjh vf/kfu;e] 1955 ds rgr izLrqr gqvkA mDr vkosnu ds vUrxZr foizkFkhZx.k }kjk vius tokc esa xzke uhEcklj ds [kljk uEcj 127@1 ds jdck 1-00 ch?kk Hkwfe dk mi;ksx d`f"k fHkUu iz;kstukFkZ fd;s tkus dk Lohdkj djus ds ckn Hkh vki }kjk fof/kor~ dk;Zokgh fd;s cxSj izkFkhZ rglhynkj f'ko ds vkosnu dks vius vkns'k fnukad 11-11-2009 ds }kjk fcuk dksbZ dkj.k crk;s vLohdkj dj fn;k x;k ,oa foizkFkhZx.k dks nk:y mYywe jkf'k fn;k laLFkku uhEcklj dks i{kdkj cukus o Hkou fuekZ.k djus dh vuqefr iznku dj nh xbZA bl izdkj Hkwfe dh fdLe laifjorZu djk;s fcuk d`f"k Hkwfe dks /kkfeZd@O;olkf;d iz;kstukFkZ mi;ksx djus dh vuqefr iznku djuk jktLFkku fVusUlh ,DV 1955 dh /kkjk 1771@411@2 jktLFkku Hkw&jktLo xzkeh.k {ks=ksa esa d`f"k Hkwfe dk vd`f"k iz;kstukFkZ laifjorZu fu;e 2007 ds izko/kkuksa ds foijhr gksus ls vkidk mDr d`R; drZO; ds izfr ykijokgh ,oa vius in ds nq:i;ksx djus ds dkj.k nqjkpj.k dh Js.kh esa vkrk gS ftlds fy, vki mRrjnk;h gSA 3. The petitioner submitted a reply to the charge-sheet dated 02.12.2011 denying the charges levelled against him stating inter alia that the order dated 11.11.2009 passed in (Application No.40/2009), Tehsildar Shiv v. Gulam S/o Peera filed under Section 177(1) of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 was rejected in accordance with law. Further it was stated that vide review order dated 04.01.2010, permission for use of land for religious/commercial purpose without conversion of agriculture land by raising construction was withdrawn. In the reply, it was also stated that since the order dated 11.11.2009, was passed while discharging judicial functions, the protection under Section 3 of the Judges Protection Act, 1985 is available to the petitioner. In the reply, it was also stated that since the order dated 11.11.2009, was passed while discharging judicial functions, the protection under Section 3 of the Judges Protection Act, 1985 is available to the petitioner. Representations/notice for demand of justice dated 08.11.2013, 27.12.2014 and 26.01.2015 were submitted by the petitioner requesting the respondents to drop the charges levelled against him in the charge-sheet dated 23.09.2011, but to no avail. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order dated 11.11.2009 passed in (Application No.40/2009) Tehsildar Shiv v. Gulam S/o Peera fell in the nature of discharging duties as Sub Divisional Officer, Shiv, in conformity with the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. Further, the permission for construction granted in order dated 11.11.2009 without conversion of land had been reviewed vide order 04.01.2010 and the permission was subsequently withdrawn. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner is protected under the Judges Protection Act, 1985 and, therefore, in the absence of any specific order of the State Government, no charge-sheet could be issued against him. Lastly, it was submitted that the petitioner has further protection for actions taken under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act by virtue of Section 254 of the said Act and Rule 5 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'CC&A Rules, 1958'). 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the petitioner while discharging duties of Sub Divisional Officer, Shiv decided (Application No.40/2009) Tehsildar Shiv v. Gulam & Ors., filed under Section 177(1) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. In the reply filed to Application No.40/2009, it was stated that the application had been preferred against the non- agricultural activities being undertaken in the agriculture land, therefore, tenancy rights of the respondents may be terminated over one bigha land in Khasra No.127/01 out of total area 12.18 bighas in Village Nimbasar. A prayer to declare the disputed land as Government land was made. The petitioner without assigning reasons impleaded Darul Ulum Rashidia Institution as party in the matter and granted permission for construction of Bhawan over the land in dispute. The permission granted was in contravention of law as no permission for construction could be granted without conversion of agricultural land for religious purpose. The petitioner without assigning reasons impleaded Darul Ulum Rashidia Institution as party in the matter and granted permission for construction of Bhawan over the land in dispute. The permission granted was in contravention of law as no permission for construction could be granted without conversion of agricultural land for religious purpose. Learned counsel urged that the petitioner while exercising judicial or quasi judicial powers acted negligently, therefore, the disciplinary authority was well within its rights to issue charge-sheet against the petitioner under Rule 16 of the CC&A Rules, 1958. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 7. This Court is not inclined to enter into the correctness or legality of the order dated 11.11.2009 passed in (Application No.40/2009) Tehsildar Shiv v. Gulam & Ors. which can only be examined in appeal or in revision, as the case may be. 8. The question before this Court is that whether an authority while exercising quasi judicial function enjoys immunity from disciplinary proceedings with respect to matters adjudicated upon by it is no longer res integra. 9. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. v. K.K. Dhawan reported in (1993) 2 SCC 56 , held as under:- "26. In the case on hand, article of charge clearly mentions that the nine assessments covered by the article of charge were completed: i) in an irregular manner, ii) in undue haste, and iii) apparently with a view to confer undue favour upon the assessee concerned. (Emphasis supplied). 10. Therefore, the allegation of conferring undue favour is very much there unlike Civil Appeal No.560/91. If that be so, certainly disciplinary action is warranted. This Court had occasion to examine the position. In Union of India v. A. N. Saxena, (1992) 3 SCC 124 to which one of us (Mohan, J.) was a party, it was held as under (Paras 7 and 8 of AIR): "It was urged before us by learned counsel for the respondent that as the respondent was performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions in making the assessment orders in question even if his actions were wrong they could be corrected in an appeal or in revision and no disciplinary proceedings could be taken regarding such actions. In our view, an argument that no disciplinary action can be taken in regard to actions taken or purported to be done in the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings is not correct. It is true that when an officer is performing judicial or quasi- judicial functions disciplinary proceedings regarding any of his actions in the course of such proceeding should be taken only after great caution and a close scrutiny of his actions and only if the circumstances so warrant. The Initiation of such proceedings. it is true, is likely to shake the confidence of the public in the officer concerned and also if lightly taken likely to undermine his independence. Hence the need for extreme care and caution before initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an officer performing judicial or quasi- judicial functions in respect of his actions in the discharge or purported to discharge his functions. But it Is not as if such action cannot be taken at all. Where the actions of such an officer indicate culpability, namely a desire to oblige himself or unduly favour one of the parties or an improper motive there is no reason why disciplinary action should not be taken." 27. This dictum fully supports the stand of the appellant. There is a great reason and justice for holding in such cases that the disciplinary action could be taken. It is one of the cardinal principles of administration of justice that it must be free from bias of any kind. 28. Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers acts negligently or recklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as a Judge. 11. Accordingly, the contention of the respondent has to be rejected. It is important to bear in mind that in the present case, we are not concerned with the correctness or legality of the decision ofthe respondent but the conduct of the respondent in discharge of his duties as an officer. The legality of the orders with reference to the nine assessments may be questioned in appeal or revision under the Act. But we have no doubt in our mind that the Government is not precluded from taking the disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct Rules. The legality of the orders with reference to the nine assessments may be questioned in appeal or revision under the Act. But we have no doubt in our mind that the Government is not precluded from taking the disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct Rules. Thus, we conclude that the disciplinary action can be taken in the following cases: i) Where the officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for integrity good faith or devotion to duty; ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty; iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a government servant; iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers; v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party; vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive however, small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago "though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great." 12. In the case of State of Orissa v. Sangram Keshari Misra: (2010) 13 SCC 311 Hon'ble Apex Court held that normally a charge-sheet is not quashed prior to conclusion of the enquiry on the ground that facts stated in the charge are erroneous for the reason that finding correctness or truth of the charge is the function of the disciplinary authority. 13. Manifestly thus, the Government is not precluded from initiating disciplinary proceedings against an employee for violation of conduct rules even if the alleged misconduct took place while performing judicial or quasi judicial functions. In the present case, the charge-sheet clearly indicates that the petitioner while discharging duties had acted negligently and misused his post amounting to misconduct or violation of the Conduct Rules. 14. In the considered opinion of this Court, a writ petition generally does not lie against the charge-sheet unless it is established that the same had been issued by an authority not competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. It is a settled law that charge-sheet cannot be interfered with by the Court lightly or in a routine manner. The delinquent employee instead of seeking quashing of the charge-sheet at the initial stage must submit his/her reply before the Enquiry Officer/Disciplinary Authority and wait for conclusion of the proceedings. 15. It is a settled law that charge-sheet cannot be interfered with by the Court lightly or in a routine manner. The delinquent employee instead of seeking quashing of the charge-sheet at the initial stage must submit his/her reply before the Enquiry Officer/Disciplinary Authority and wait for conclusion of the proceedings. 15. In the result, the writ petition stands dismissed being devoid of merit. However, the disciplinary authority is directed to conclude the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner vide charge-sheet dated 23.09.2011 within a period of six months from the date of the receipt of this order. 16. No order as to costs.