JUDGMENT : Shri Dinesh Tacho/petitioner No. 1 and Shri Mamugey/ petitioner No. 2. have jointly preferred this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for invoking the inherent power of this Court to quash the FIR of Anini P.S. Case No. 14/10, under Section 337 IPC, read with Section 25(IB)/27 (I) of the Arms Act and the Charge-Sheet No.01/2011, corresponding to aforementioned case, which is presently pending before the Court of learned JMFC, Anini. Be it mentioned here that the above mentioned FIR has been registered on the basis of a complaint lodged by petitioner No.2, who has shot at petitioner No.1 with his gun and injured him due to some domestic dispute. 2. The factual background leading to filing of the present petition is briefly, stated as under:- “On 16.12.2010 Sri Mamugey Tacho/the petitioner No. 2 herein had lodged one FIR with the Officer-in-Charge, Police station, Anini to the effect that due to some domestic problem, he had shot his brother, namely, Sri Dinesh Tacho at about 09.00 hours. On receipt of the aforesaid FIR, the Officer-in-Charge of Police Station, Anini registered a case being Anini P.S. Case No. 14/2010, under Section 307 IPC read with Section 27 (I) Arms Act and endorsed the same to Sub Inspector T. Tako to investigate the case. The investigation, so carried out, culminated in submission of Charge-Sheet under Section 337 IPC read with Section 25 (IB)/27 (I) of the Arms Act against the petitioner No.1. While the case was pending before the Court of learned JMFC, Anini for trial, the petitioner Nos. 1 & 2, who happened to be the brothers in relation, at the intervention of the family members, arrived at a settlement and also entered into a settlement agreement, dated 27.10.2021, and basing upon the said settlement agreement, the petitioners have approached this Court for quashing the proceeding pending before the Court of learned JMFC, Anini”. 3. I have heard Mr. T. Garam, learned counsel for the petitioners and also heard Mr. J. Tsering, learned PP for the State of Arunachal Pradesh. 4. Mr. 3. I have heard Mr. T. Garam, learned counsel for the petitioners and also heard Mr. J. Tsering, learned PP for the State of Arunachal Pradesh. 4. Mr. T. Garam, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that both the petitioners are brother in relation and their dispute is civil in nature and at the relevant time altercation took place between the two brothers accidentally a bullet went off from the gun, which was on the back of the petitioner No. 2, and injured the petitioner No.2 and he had no intention to cause the same. Mr. Garam, further submits that at the behest of the family members and local villagers, the petitioner Nos. 1 & 2 have settled their dispute and they have also entered into a settlement agreement and based upon the said settlement agreement, the petitioners have approached this Court for quashing the further proceeding pending before the Court of learned JMFC, Anini Mr. Garam also submits that since the dispute is between 2 (two) brothers and since it is private in nature and not against the society, the petition can be allowed to meet the ends of justice. Mr. Garam also referred one case law of the Hon’ble Supreme in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh-vs-Laxmi Narayan ; reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688 to make good of his submission. 5. On the other hand, Mr. J. Tsering, learned PP submits that the petitioner No.2 is charge sheeted under Section 25 (IB)/27 (I) of the Arms Act, besides Section 337 of the IPC. Mr. Tsering, further submits that apart from other conditions, the Court has to see the nature and gravity of the offence also before invoking its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 Cr.P.C. 6. Having heard the submission of learned Advocates of both the sides, I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record and also the scanned copy of the record received from the learned Court below. It appears that Anini P.S. Case No. 14/2010 under Section 307 IPC read with Section 25 (IB)/27 (I) Arms Act has been registered on the basis of one FIR lodged by the petitioner No. 2 on 16.12.2010, wherein, in no uncertain term, the petitioner No. 2 has stated on that day he has shot his brother/the petitioner No. 1 due to some domestic problem. It also appears that the investigation, so carried out had culminated in submission of Charge-Sheet against the petitioner No. 2, under Section 337 IPC, read with Section 25 (IB)/27 (I) of the Arms Act. A cursory perusal of the settlement deed, basing on which the present petition has been preferred, reveals that both the petitioners have settled their dispute on the following terms and conditions:- (1) that, the petitioner No. 2 regrets his mistake and hence undertake not to repeat such type of offences in near future; (2) that, the first party has agreed to withdraw the criminal case being the Anini P.S. Case No. 14/2010, which is pending before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Anini, at the stage of trial; (3) that, both the parties undertake to maintain cordial relationship in near future; and (4) that, this instant agreement is being executed without any coercion, misrepresentation, undue influence, pressure but with free consent of both the parties. 7. It also appears that the petitioner No.1 is 55 years old and the petitioner No.2 is 63 years old. And both of them are brother in relation and at the intervention of the family members and they have settled the dispute. Now, the question is can this court invoke the inherent jurisdiction to quash a proceeding pending before the court where charge sheet is submitted by the investigating agency under Section 337 IPC, read with Section 25 (IB)/27 (I) of the Arms Act. 8. In this regard the guideline laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Laxmi Narayan (Supra), assumes significance. In the said case Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Paragraph-13 has observed and held as under:- “i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society; iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender; iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove; v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.” 9. So, what comes through loud and clear from the point No. 4 of Paragraph No. 13 above that the offences under the Arms Act would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences, and therefore, are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. And therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under the Arms Act have a serious impact upon the society and therefore, cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. 10. It is to be mentioned here that the petitioner No. 2, here, in this case is Charge-sheeted under Section 337 IPC read with Section 25 (IB)/27(I) of the Arms Act. 10. It is to be mentioned here that the petitioner No. 2, here, in this case is Charge-sheeted under Section 337 IPC read with Section 25 (IB)/27(I) of the Arms Act. Since the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Laxmi Naryan (Supra) in no uncertain terms stated that the offence under the Arms Act falls in the category of heinous and serious offences, and since the petitioner No.2 is charge-sheeted under section 25 (IB)/27(I) of the Arms Act, which are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, the instant criminal proceeding for the offence under Arms Act, cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground, that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. 11. I have considered the submissions of the learned Advocates of both the sides and also considered the facts and circumstances on the record and I find the submission, so advance by the learned counsel for the petitioners, devoid of merit. The ratio, laid down in the case of Laxmi Naryan (Supra), so referred by him and discussed herein above, to the considered opinion of this Court would not come into his aid. 12. In the result I find no merit in this petition and accordingly the same stands dismissed. The parties have to bear their own cost(s).