JUDGMENT : AJAY MOHAN GOEL, J. 1. Both these appeals are being disposed of by a common judgment as they arise out of the same judgment and decree dated 09.01.2009, passed by the Court of learned District Judge Solan, District Solan, H.P. in Civil Appeal No 35/S/13 of 1984/102-S/13 of 1986-84, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh through Collector Solan, District Solan, H.P. Versus Shri Brij Mohan and others. 2. Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of the present appeals are that a suit for declaration was filed by one Shri Brij Ballab Singh against Gram Panchayat, Dharampur and others, to the effect that he and defendants No. 2 and 3 were owners in possession of the land measuring 337 bighas 14 biswas to the extent of 1/3rd share, situated in village Dharampur (Badholi) and relief of permanent injunction for restraining defendants No. 4 to 6 from interfering with their possession upon the suit land was sought. According to the plaintiff, the grandfather of the plaintiff purchased about 37 bighas of land in Village Dharampur from one Mst. Jakhu alongwith her share in the Shamlat land in the month of June, 1911, vide registered sale deed for a consideration of Rs.700/-. A mutation to this effect was attested in favour of the grandfather of the plaintiff, namely, Shri Chuhar Singh. Smt. Jakku was in physical possession of the land to the extent of 1/6th share, which was prior to the sale. Chuhar Singh remained in possession thereafter and after his death, the landed property including the share in the Shamlat Deh was inherited by plaintiff’s father, namely, Shri Harsaran Dass, who remained in possession thereof as owner till the year 1942. After the death of Harsaran Dass, plaintiff and defendant No. 3 succeeded to the property and were now the owners in possession. On 12.08.1956, vide mutation No. 80, Shamlat land was mutated in the name of Gram Panchayat, Dharampur, under the provisions of Pepsu Village Common Land Act. According to the plaintiff, the mutation was attested at the back of the plaintiff as also his brother (defendant No. 3) and besides the interest of the plaintiff, even the interest of defendant No. 2 in the Shamlat Deh was extinguished by way of the said mutation attested on 12.05.1956. According to the plaintiff, the mutation was attested at the back of the plaintiff as also his brother (defendant No. 3) and besides the interest of the plaintiff, even the interest of defendant No. 2 in the Shamlat Deh was extinguished by way of the said mutation attested on 12.05.1956. According to the plaintiff, he and defendants No. 2 and 3 were in actual physical possession of the suit land and according to him the vesting of the ownership rights thereof in the Gram Panchayat and subsequently in the State of Himachal Pradesh was bad. 3. The suit was contested by the State on the grounds that the plaintiff and defendants were out of possession of the suit land and the same was Shamlat land which rightly vested in the Gram Panchayat and later in the State of Himachal Pradesh. 4. At this stage, it is pertinent to mention that the Civil Suit was originally filed on 19.09.1973. Thereafter, Himachal Pradesh Village Common Land Vesting and Utilization Act, 1974 came into force. In terms thereof, the ownership of the suit land was vested in the State of Himachal Pradesh, which was subsequently impleaded as a party in the Civil Suit and the plaint was also amended. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, learned Trial Court framed the following issues: “Whether the plaintiff is owner in possession of the suit land? OPP. Whether the land in dispute falls into the definition of ‘Shamlat Deh’? OPD. Whether the plaintiff was owner in possession as alleged? OPP. If issue No. 3 is not proved whether the plaintiff is entitled to remain in possession as alleged in para No. 6A of the amended plaint? OPP. Whether the suit is time-barred? OPD. Whether this court has no jurisdiction to try the suit ? OPD. Whether the suit is bad for want of notice under section 190 of the H.P. Panchayat Raj Act? OPD. Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder of parties? OPD. Whether the plaint is not properly valued for purpose of court fee and jurisdiction? OPD Relief.” 6. OPD. Whether this court has no jurisdiction to try the suit ? OPD. Whether the suit is bad for want of notice under section 190 of the H.P. Panchayat Raj Act? OPD. Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder of parties? OPD. Whether the plaint is not properly valued for purpose of court fee and jurisdiction? OPD Relief.” 6. On the strength of the evidence which was led by the parties in support of their respective contentions, the suit was decreed by the learned Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kandaghat, District Solan, H.P., vide judgment and decree dated 12.12.1983 in the following terms: “On the basis of the discussion held, plaintiff and defendant No. 3 are hereby declared as owners in possession of the land comprised in khewat khatauni No. 14/46 to 57, bearing khasra No. 203/1, 7/2, 7/4, 22/89, 96, 100, 174/2, Min, 177/2 Min, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 40, 86, 99, 201/105, 131, 166, 167, 168, 176/2 Min 177/2 Min, 85 Min, 17/2, 16, 2, 97, 177/2, 42, 47, 95, 7, 4/2, 176/2 Min, 23, 78, 98, 120, 122 measuring 337 bighas 14 biswas to the extent of 1/6th share therein situated in village Dharampur Batholi. The defendants 4, 5 and 6 are restrained permanently from interfering with the ownership and possession of the plaintiff in the land mentioned above.” 7. Feeling aggrieved, the State preferred an appeal. 8. Vide judgment and decree dated 09.01.2009, the appeal of the State was allowed by the learned Appellate Court by holding that the Civil Suit was barred in terms of the provisions of Section 3(5) of the Himachal Pradesh Village Common Lands (Vesting and Utilization) Act read with Rule 9 of the Rules framed thereunder and the matter whether the land vested in the State, right was in the domain of the Collector and the Civil Court could not look into this question. Learned Appellate Court further held that as the plaintiff was held to be in possession, therefore, said possession was liable to be protected till determination of the dispute by the Collector regarding vestment of the land in the Civil Suit. Learned Appellate Court further held that as the plaintiff was held to be in possession, therefore, said possession was liable to be protected till determination of the dispute by the Collector regarding vestment of the land in the Civil Suit. It further held that if inquiry as envisaged under Section 3(5) of the Himachal Pradesh Village Common Lands (Vesting and Utilization) Act read with Rule 9 of the Rules framed thereunder stood made, then the Collector shall be competent to proceed against the plaintiff in accordance with law for his dispossession. 9. Against the judgment and decree so given by the learned Appellate Court, the following two appeals were filed. 10. RSA No. 177 of 2009 was filed by Shri Ravi Ahluwalia and others, successors in interest of plaintiff Raj Ballabh Singh, whereas RSA No. 200 of 2009 has been preferred by successor in interest of defendant No. 2 Paras Ram. 11. RSA No. 177 of 2009 was admitted on 22.04.2009, on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has misunderstood and misapplied the provisions of Pepsu Village Common Land Act, Punjab Village Common Land Regulation Act, 1961 and H.P. Village Common Land (Vesting and Utilization) Act, 1974 to hold that Civil Court does not have the jurisdiction to entertain the dispute involved in the suit? 2. Whether Lower Appellate Court has put undue reliance on the revenue entries which were not at all relevant by misreading the same and misconstruing the real import of such revenue entries, especially when the plaintiffs-appellants were claiming title to the suit property much before the enfocement of the aforesaid Act? Has not Lower Appellate Court acted in erroneous and perverse manner to hold that the land was a Shamlat land, when such characteristic of land was lost much before the enforcement of aforesaid statutes and regulations? RSA No. 200 of 2009 was admitted on 08.09.2010, on the following substantial question of law: “Whether the suit land was exempt from vestment in the State, under the provisions of H.P. Village Common Lands (Vesting and Utilization) Act, as also in the Panchayat, under the Act of Pepsu, and the findings to the contrary, given by the first Appellate Court is illegal and erroneous? 12. 12. Shri Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants in RSA No. 177 of 2009, while taking the Court through the record of the case in terms of the substantial questions of law on which the appeal stood admitted, argued that the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court was not sustainable in the eyes of law for the reason that while allowing the appeal filed by the State, learned First Appellate Court erred in not appreciating that as the Civil Suit was filed much before coming into force of the Himachal Pradesh Village Common Land Vesting and Utilization Act, 1974, therefore, suit could not have been held to be not maintainable on the basis of the provisions of the said Act. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that at the time of filing of the suit, the plaintiff was aggrieved by the mutation which stood attested in favour of the Gram Panchayat of the suit land on the basis of the relevant provisions of the Pepsu Village Common Lands Act and this is clearly borne out from the record of the case. Therefore, in this background, holding that the suit filed by the plaintiff was not maintainable on the strength of the statutory provisions of a statute which was not even in force on the date when the Civil Suit was preferred was bad in law and learned Senior Counsel thus stated that the present appeal deserves to be allowed on this count alone. Mr. Ramakant Sharma, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants in RSA No. 200 of 2009 advanced the arguments on similar lines. 13. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General submitted that as at the time when the suit and the appeals were decided, the 1974 Act had come into force and in the light of the statutory provisions thereof, the suit land stood vested from the Gram Panchayat to the State Government, therefore, learned Appellate Court rightly held that the suit was not maintainable in view of the statutory provisions of the 1974 Act. He submitted that in this background, there was no infirmity with the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court and he, accordingly, prayed for the dismissal of the appeals. 14. He submitted that in this background, there was no infirmity with the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court and he, accordingly, prayed for the dismissal of the appeals. 14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the judgments passed by both the learned Courts below as well as the record of the case. 15. In terms of the record, initially the suit was instituted by plaintiff Brij Ballabh Singh on the basis of a plaint dated 18.09.1973, against Gram Panchayat, Dharampur, praying that a decree be passed in favour of the plaintiff and defendants No. 2 and 3, declaring that plaintiff and defendants No. 2 and 3 were owners in possession 1/3rd i.e. 1/6th share belonging to the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 and 1/6th belonging to defendant No. 2 of the suit land and that mutation No. 80 attested on 12.08.1956 in favour of defendant No. 1 be declared void, ineffective and inoperative as regards the right of the plaintiff and defendants No. 2 and 3 and entries in jamabandies subsequently made pursuant to the said mutation were also wrong and void and not binding upon the plaintiff. The suit was filed on 20.09.1973. 16. During the pendency of the suit, Himachal Pradesh Village Common Land Vesting and Utilization Act, 1974 came into force after it received the assent of the President of India on 09.08.1974 and was published in the extra ordinary ‘Rajpatra’ 29.08.1974. In terms of the record, after coming into force the 1974 Act, the land which was earlier mutated in the name of Gram Panchayat, Dharampur was transferred in the name of the Government of Himachal Pradesh, because of which the suit was amended. The amended plaint is on record and this amendment was carried out in the month of February/March, 1982. Yet, the fact of the matter remains that primarily the grievance of the plaintiff was with regard to the mutation which was entered in favour of Gram Panchayat, Dharampur, i.e. mutation No. 80, attested on 12.08.1956 in terms of the provisions of Pepsu Village Common Lands Act. 17. Yet, the fact of the matter remains that primarily the grievance of the plaintiff was with regard to the mutation which was entered in favour of Gram Panchayat, Dharampur, i.e. mutation No. 80, attested on 12.08.1956 in terms of the provisions of Pepsu Village Common Lands Act. 17. This Court is of the considered view that as the suit initiated before coming into force of the 1974 Act, then by no stretch of imagination, the suit could have been held to be bad in law on the basis of the statutory provisions of the said Act. This belies logic. Section 10 of the 1974 Act provides that save as otherwise expressly provided under the Act, no order made by the Collector or the State Government or any officer authorised by it, as the case may be, shall be called in question by any Court or before any officer or authority. It is reiterated that when the plaintiff filed the suit, he was not aggrieved by any order passed by any authority envisaged under the 1974 Act. The reliefs which were prayed for in the original suit, stood incorporated in the amended suit also, i.e. declaration to the effect that mutation No. 80, dated 12.08.1956, attested in favour of Gram Panchayat, Dharampur was void, ineffective and inoperative as regards the rights of the plaintiff and defendants No. 2 and 3. This extremely important aspect of the matter has been over looked by the learned Appellate Court while decreeing the suit and therefore, this Court holds that the learned Lower Appellate Court misapplied the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Village Common Land Vesting and Utilization Act, 1974. 18. In view of the fact that this Court finds the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court are not sustainable on the reasoning assigned hereinabove and further it does not deems it appropriate to answer other substantial questions of law as this Court is of the view that it will be in the interest of justice to now remand the matter back to the learned Appellate Court with a direction to decide the appeal filed by the State afresh on merit. 19. 19. Accordingly, these appeals are partly allowed by setting aside the judgment and decree dated 09.01.2009, passed by the Court of learned District Judge Solan, District Solan, H.P. in Civil Appeal No 35/S/13 of 1984/102-S/13 of 1986-84, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh through Collector Solan, District Solan, H.P. Versus Shri Brij Mohan and others and by remanding the matter back to the said Court for adjudication afresh on the appeal filed by the State. The represented parties through counsel are directed to appear before the learned Appellate Court on 20.06.2022 and taking into consideration the fact that the suit is quite an old one, the learned Appellate Court is requested to decide the same positively within a period of six months from today. No order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, stands disposed of. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.