JUDGEMENT : Sharad Kumar Sharma, J. Its a claimants’ Appeal from Order, under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, praying for an enhancement of the compensation, as it has been made determined to make payable by the learned Motor Accident Claim Tribunal/District Judge, Udham Singh Nagar, in its award of 12th March, 2012, which has been rendered in MACP Case No. 228 of 2009, Smt. Naseem and others Vs. Ishrar and others. 2. Few facts of the case, as it was subject matter of consideration before the Court below was, that an ill-fated accident had chanced on 5th July, 2009, whereby, the bullock cart, which was being ridden by the deceased Yamin, met with an accident, when it was hit from behind by a Tractor Trolley, bearing registration No. UA-06C-4109, due to which, on account of the impact of the collusion between the tractor trolley and the bullock cart, Yamin had met with the sad demise, for which, a Claim Petition was instituted by the claimants by invoking the provisions contained under Section 140/166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 3. The learned Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, after appreciating the rival contentions, and particularly, the admitted fact pertaining to the income, which was accruing to the deceased Yamin, it was a case of the claimants themselves, that Yamin used to earn about Rs.6,000/- per month, and according to their version, in their pleadings, his age on the date of accident was 35 years, and hence, based upon the aforesaid accrual of income of the deceased, they assessed their claim to be payable to the tune of Rs.12 lacs. 4. 4. The Claim Petition was contested by the owner of the offending tractor, bearing registration No. UA-06C-4109, as well as by the Insurance Company, who had filed their respective written statements, and particular, the written statement which was filed by the Insurance Company, i.e. paper No. 23, wherein, they had denied the claim averments, and particularly, they have contested the same on the ground that no liability could be fastened or could have been fastened upon the Insurance Company, because as per the terms of the Insurance policy, the owner of the offending vehicle had not immediately supplied the information about the accident, forthwith to the Insurance Company, and hence, the claim cannot be fastened upon the Insurance Company, being in derogation to the provisions of the insurance cover of the offending vehicle. 5. Based upon the aforesaid rival pleadings, the learned Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, had framed the following issues :- D;k nq?kZVuk fnukad 5&7&2009 dks le; djhc 7-00 cts izkr% LFkku cQZ QSDVªh ds lkeus vQtyxढ+ [kVhek&ikuhir jktekxZ] cgn Fkkuk tliqj] ftyk Å/ke flag uxj es VªSDVj la[;k&;wŒ,Œ&06lh&4109 ds pkyd }kjk mDr okgu dk rsth o ykijokgh ls pykus ds dkj.k ?kfVr gq;h] ftlesa vk;h pksVksa ds dkj.k ;kehu dh e`R;q gks x;h\ ;fn gk rks izHkko\ 2- D;k nq?kZVuk dh frfFk ij iz'uxr VªSDVj ds pkyd ds ikl oS/k ,oa izHkkoh pkyd ykblsal ugha Fkk\ 3- D;k ;kphx.k dksbZ izfrdj dh /kujkf'k izkIr djus ds vf/kdkjh gS\ ;fn gka rks fdruh /kujkf'k o fdl i{kdkj ls\^^ 6. The claimants led their oral evidence by adducing PW1 Naseem, PW2 Mohd. Furkhan, apart from that the opposite party had also adduced the oral evidence of DW1 Israr Ahmed. Though, the Insurance Company has not adduced any oral testimony of any individual witness to substantiate, their stand pertaining to the alleged violation of the terms of the Insurance policy of the offending vehicle, when the accident had chanced. Rather parties to the proceedings had filed their documentary evidences, which included, the first information report, post mortem report, the chargesheet and such other documents, including the insurance cover note, i.e. paper No. 13Ga, the driving licence of the driver of the vehicle, the identity certificates and such other documents in support of their respective contentions. 7. Rather parties to the proceedings had filed their documentary evidences, which included, the first information report, post mortem report, the chargesheet and such other documents, including the insurance cover note, i.e. paper No. 13Ga, the driving licence of the driver of the vehicle, the identity certificates and such other documents in support of their respective contentions. 7. The factum of accident and the death of Yamin in the accident, is a fact, which is not disputed by any of the parties to the proceedings. Consequently, the learned Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, after appreciating the oral testimony and the evidence, which was brought on record, had ultimately, quantified the compensation, which was determined to be made payable while recording its finding on issue No. 3, which would be a subject matter of controversy for consideration to be decided by this Court in the context of the argument extended by the learned counsel for the appellants, which could be widely summarized by this Court in the following manners :- i. He submits that when the compensation was determined by the Tribunal on the basis of the notional income in view of the findings recorded on issue No.3, then the future prospects were also required to be considered. ii. The claimants submit that according to the Claim Petition, the age of the claimant was shown to be 35 years, hence, the applying of multiplier ought to have been in consonance to the principles which had been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sarla Verma (Smt) and others Vs Delhi Transport Corporation and another, as contemplated in para 42 of the said judgment. iii. He submits that he would be entitled for an unfettered interest and no conditional interest could have been imposed by the learned Motor Accident Claim Tribunal. 8. This Court feels it apt to deal with each of the arguments extended by the learned counsel for the appellants. 9. iii. He submits that he would be entitled for an unfettered interest and no conditional interest could have been imposed by the learned Motor Accident Claim Tribunal. 8. This Court feels it apt to deal with each of the arguments extended by the learned counsel for the appellants. 9. Let us first deal with the subject, that as to whether at all, when the compensation is being paid after determining the notional income for the reason being that the claimants were not able to substantiate by evidence by brining any evidence on record with regard to the alleged income, which was said to have been accruing to the deceased, and which was assessed by them to be Rs.6,000/- per month, the Court as per the principles which had been laid down in the judgment of Sarla Verma (Supra) has applied the principle of notional income by assessing the annual income as to be Rs.36,000/-, which would have been accruing to the deceased claimant. 10. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is, that the aspect of notional income, which has been determined, as to be a yardstick for determination of the compensation, the future prospect ought to have been considered to be paid in view of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Kirti and another Vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited, as reported in 2021 (2) SCC 166 . 11. In fact, this Court had an occasion to deal with a similar argument, which was raised in an Appeal from Order No. 106 of 2018, New India Assurance Company Limited Vs. Vimla Devi and others, as decided by this Court by the judgment of 30th March, 2022, and while answering the said controversial question, as to whether at all the aspect of future prospect is required to be considered to be paid, where the compensation has been determined to be made payable on the basis of the of notional income was a widely accepted principle, which has been laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi and others as reported in 2017 (16) SCC 680 , and particularly, while laying down the parameters for determination of future prospects, in those cases of accident claims, where notional income has been taken as to be the basis of criterion for determination of compensation, rather para 57 of the said judgment has deprecated that no future prospects would be at all taken into consideration in those cases, where notional income has been taken as to be the basis for determining the compensation, particularly in an eventuality, where the claimants have failed to establish by bringing any evidence on record, as to what was the actual income accruing to the deceased on the date of an accident. 12. Hence, the aforesaid principle as laid down by this Court in para 7, which is extracted hereunder is answered against the appellant As such, in view of the aforesaid principle of Pranay Sethi’s judgment, since the compensation has been accorded on the basis of the notional income, no future prospect is required to be determined. Para 7 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder :- "7. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that if the judgment of Pranay Sethi (Supra) is taken into consideration, particularly, he has made a reference to paragraph No.57, which has laid down that where looking to the legislative intent of the Motor Vehicle Act, for the determination of the payment of the compensation, where the claimants have failed to prove the aspect of income accruing to the deceased, by evidence, and the compensation is made payable, based on the application of the principles of notional income, as it happens to be in the instant case, in view of the finding recorded in paragraph no.37 of the impugned judgment. In that eventuality, as per the ratio of Pranay Sethi, judgment, no amount would be payable towards the future prospects, which could not be given in those cases, where the compensation has been determined on the basis of the notional income. Paragraph 57, of the judgment of the Constitution Bench is extracted hereunder:- "57. Having bestowed our anxious consideration, we are disposed to think when we accept the principle of standardization, there is really no rationale not to apply the said principle to the self-employed or a person who is on a fixed salary. Paragraph 57, of the judgment of the Constitution Bench is extracted hereunder:- "57. Having bestowed our anxious consideration, we are disposed to think when we accept the principle of standardization, there is really no rationale not to apply the said principle to the self-employed or a person who is on a fixed salary. To follow the doctrine of actual income at the time of death and not to add any amount with regard to future prospects to the income for the purpose of determination of multiplicand would be unjust. The determination of income while computing compensation has to include future prospects so that the method will come within the ambit and sweep of just compensation as postulated Under Section 168 of the Act. In case of a deceased who had held a permanent job with inbuilt grant of annual increment, there is an acceptable certainty. But to state that the legal representatives of a deceased who was on a fixed salary would not be entitled to the benefit of future prospects for the purpose of computation of compensation would be inapposite. It is because the criterion of distinction between the two in that event would be certainty on the one hand and staticness on the other. One may perceive that the comparative measure is certainty on the one hand and uncertainty on the other but such a perception is fallacious. It is because the price rise does affect a self-employed person; and that apart there is always an incessant effort to enhance one's income for sustenance. The purchasing capacity of a salaried person on permanent job when increases because of grant of increments and pay revision or for some other change in service conditions, there is always a competing attitude in the private sector to enhance the salary to get better efficiency from the employees. Similarly, a person who is self-employed is bound to garner his resources and raise his charges/fees so that he can live with same facilities. To have the perception that he is likely to remain static and his income to remain stagnant is contrary to the fundamental concept of human attitude which always intends to live with dynamism and move and change with the time. To have the perception that he is likely to remain static and his income to remain stagnant is contrary to the fundamental concept of human attitude which always intends to live with dynamism and move and change with the time. Though it may seem appropriate that there cannot be certainty in addition of future prospects to the existing income unlike in the case of a person having a permanent job, yet the said perception does not really deserve acceptance. We are inclined to think that there can be some degree of difference as regards the percentage that is meant for or applied to in respect of the legal representatives who claim on behalf of the deceased who had a permanent job than a person who is self-employed or on a fixed salary. But not to apply the principle of standardization on the foundation of perceived lack of certainty would tantamount to remaining oblivious to the marrows of ground reality. And, therefore, degree-test is imperative. Unless the degree-test is applied and left to the parties to adduce evidence to establish, it would be unfair and inequitable. The degree-test has to have the inbuilt concept of percentage. Taking into consideration the cumulative factors, namely, passage of time, the changing society, escalation of price, the change in price index, the human attitude to follow a particular pattern of life, etc., an addition of 40% of the established income of the deceased towards future prospects and where the deceased was below 40 years an addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years would be reasonable.” 13. Considering the second aspect, which has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants, owning to the observations, which had been made while deciding issue No.3, in relation to the 2nd question, formulated above, with regard to the quantum of deduction, which is to be made from the notional income, which has been determined to be made as a basis for grant of compensation. As far as the deduction aspect is concerned, in the instant case, the learned Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, has applied the principle of deducting of 1/3 of the income, which has been argued to the contrary by the learned counsel for the appellants on the ground that in view of para 30 of the judgment of Sarla Verma (Supra), wherein, it had provided that the deduction will depend upon the number of family members, who are depending upon the deceased. 14. In the instant case, since there were four family members, who were dependent on the income accruing to the deceased, the deduction, which was required to be made should have been in the light of the para 30 of the Sarla Verma’s judgment, it would be ¼ and not 1/3rd, as it has been applied by the impugned judgement. 15. In that eventuality, in view of the settled principle laid down, and as envisaged by para 30 of the Sarla Verma’s judgement, the deduction of 1/3rd amount of the dependency, as made by the impugned award is being modified to the extent that the deduction of 1/3rd would be reduced to 1/4th deduction, because of the number of family members, who were dependent on the income of the deceased, the dependency on the deceased, herein, in the instant case was three children and a widow. 16. Hence, the impugned award would stand modified to that extent that while determining the compensation payable, in pursuance to the impugned award dated 23rd March, 2012, would be re-determined by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal by making the deduction to the extent of ¼ of the notional income and not 1/3rd, which has been applied in the instant case. 17. The third limb of argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is with regard to the imposition of conditional interest, as it has been observed in the operative portion of the judgment, which provides that the interest @ 7% would be leviable subject to the condition, that the amount of compensation as awarded by the learned Motor Accident Claim Tribunal is not paid within two months from the date of the award. Meaning thereby, it was only on a default condition, when the interest would start accruing @ 7% till the date of actual payment, and if it has not been made payable from the date when the application or the Claim Petition was preferred under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 18. This argument of the learned counsel for the appellants has been argued to the contrary by the learned counsel for the Insurance Company, by referring to the provisions contained under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which is extracted hereunder :- "171. Award of interest where any claim is allowed.—Where any Claims Tribunal allows a claim for compensation made under this Act, such Tribunal may direct that in addition to the amount of compensation simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as it may specify in this behalf.” 19. This Court is of the view that on a simplicitor interpretation to the language used under Section 161 of the Act, awarding of an interest is always left as a prerogative of the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, depending upon the circumstances of the each claim case, and that is why the Legislature with its conscious intention for the purposes of imposition of interest has used the word “may” direct in addition to the compensation, a simple interest. 20. This first expression given under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, and in those conditions, where the interest has been chosen to be levied by the Tribunal while exercising its power under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is thereafter, only that it has been made mandatory, and it shall be paid from such date and not earlier then the date of making the claim. Now, the reference of the word 'such date' herein, would constitute to be grant of liberty to the Tribunal to impose a condition from the date from which the interest could be made payable, consequent to the award. 21. Hence, the argument extended by the learned counsel for the appellants, that unconditional interest cannot be imposed itself is contrary to the very intention of the provisions contained under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 21. Hence, the argument extended by the learned counsel for the appellants, that unconditional interest cannot be imposed itself is contrary to the very intention of the provisions contained under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act. As such, this part of the argument extended by the learned counsel for the appellants pertaining to the effect of conditional imposition of the interest, since it is not specifically barred, rather it mandates, that the Tribunal can impose an interest from such date, which herein would refer to the date from the passing of an award was a condition, which was very well permissible under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act and, hence, the imposition of interest w.e.f. said date cannot be said to be in violation of the provisions under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 22. In that eventuality, the present Appeal from Order would partly stands allowed only from a very limited perspective, so far it relates to answering the question No.2, as argued by the learned counsel for the appellants pertaining to the quantification of deduction which was to be made from the dependency, which has been determined by the learned Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, which will stand modified and the deduction, which has been directed to be made to the tune of 1/3rd, it is being directed to be deducted @ 1/4th of the dependency, as per the principal laid down in para 3 of the judgement of Sarla Verma (Supra).. 23. In view of the aforesaid, the Appeal from Order is partly allowed only subject to the finding, which has been recorded by this Court on question No.2, about the quantum of deduction which was required to be made. 24. The impugned award dated 21st March, 2012, would be re-determined by the learned Motor Accident Claim Tribunal to the extent of re-assessing the compensation after making ¼ of the deduction, if not already determined on that basis by the learned Tribunal. 25. Accordingly, the Appeal from Order is partly allowed limited to the extent of re-determination of compensation after making requisite deductions as observed above.