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2022 DIGILAW 263 (ALL)

Manoj Kumar Mahto v. Union Of India

2022-02-25

PRAKASH PADIA, VIVEK KUMAR BIRLA

body2022
JUDGMENT : Prakash Padia, J. Order on Delay Condonation Application No.Nil of 2021 1. Heard. 2. Cause shown for the delay in filing the review application is sufficient. The delay is condoned. 3. The application is allowed. Order on Review Application No.379 of 2021 1. Heard Shri Ashok Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners and Shri Devendra Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent-Union of India. 2. This application seeks review of the judgment and order dated 16.06.2021 passed in Writ A No. 5939 of 2021 (Manoj Kumar Mahto and 8 Others vs. Union of India and 6 Others) whereby the petitioners petition was dismissed. 3. Facts in brief are that an Original Application was filed by the petitioners before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench Allahabad being Original Application No. 0642 of 2019. Original Application was filed challenging the order dated 27.12.2018 endorse vide letter dated 16.05.2019 issued by the Chief Crew Controller (Operating), East Central Railway, Mugalsarai and Gaya. The directions were also sought for excluding the name of the petitioners from pre-promotion training list for the post of Loco Pilot (Goods) dated 3.06.2019 and that they (the applicants) be continued as Loco Pilot (shunting). 4. The case of the petitioners before the Central Administrative Tribunal was that there exists a promotional channel for the Assistant Loco Pilot/Shunters/ET to post of Loco Pilot (Goods). The petitioners being within the zone of consideration were found suitable for pre-promotion training, a pre-requisite for promotion vide order Estb. No. B63/2019 dated 3.6.2019. Petitioners tendered their collective refusal which was tentatively accepted by Sr. DEE (Ops)/DMEs/Power. However, the Authority senior in hierarchy, i.e., Principal Chief Electrical Engineer, East Central Railway vide Communication DO.No. ECR/ELE/OP/370 dated 27.12.2018 advised the Divisional Railway Manager, Mugalsarai Division, East Central Railway to withdraw the acceptance of refusal and the incumbents be immediately sent for next pre-promotional training programme at their associated training centers. The said DO resulted in issuance of communication dated 16.5.2019. 5. The following findings were recorded by the Central Administrative Tribunal while rejecting the applications filed by the petitioners:- “5. In our considered view, the impugned communication is based on sound reason of serving larger public interest and does not call for any interference. There is more than adequate justification for the decision to post the applicants on operational duties after prescribed training. In our considered view, the impugned communication is based on sound reason of serving larger public interest and does not call for any interference. There is more than adequate justification for the decision to post the applicants on operational duties after prescribed training. The applicants have enjoyed the benefit of choosing to remain on the post of their choice for long enough and do not deserve the luxury of this choice throughout their service career. A public utility like the railways is to run in the interest of the public, and this requires effective manning of operational posts. On the other hand, the applicants' demand is purely confined to their own personal comfort and convenience. Moreover, the reasons given by the applicants for refusal of promotion are vague and do not justify a sympathetic consideration. It is ironic that the applicants have chosen to agitate their promotion and not a denial of it.” 6. Aggrieved against the aforesaid, the petitioners have preferred the writ petition before this Court being Writ A No. 5939 of 2021 Manoj Kumar Mahto And 8 Others vs. Union of India And 6 Others). The writ petition was dismissed while recording the following findings:- “Though submissions similar to those before the Tribunal are reiterated; however, in absence of any Rules or Regulations facilitating the refusal to follow the departmental orders issued by the superior Authorities, being commended at we are not inclined to cause any indulgence with the findings by Tribunal that in public interest the respondents were justified in recalling of the permission by authority to refuse promotion.” 7. In this view of the matter, the writ Court was not inclined to cause any indulgence with the findings of the Tribunal on the ground that in public interest the respondents were justified in recalling of the permission by the authorities to refuse permission. 8. Aggrieved against the aforesaid judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court, the petitioners have preferred the present review petition. 9. It is argued by the counsel for the petitioners that the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal dated 26.03.2021 was passed without recording any findings. It is further argued that the higher Court has no occasion to appreciate or adjudicate as to how Central Administrative Tribunal has dealt the issue raised by the petitioners. 9. It is argued by the counsel for the petitioners that the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal dated 26.03.2021 was passed without recording any findings. It is further argued that the higher Court has no occasion to appreciate or adjudicate as to how Central Administrative Tribunal has dealt the issue raised by the petitioners. It is further argued that while passing the judgment, this Court has ignored the material aspects of the matter and committed error apparent on the place on record while dismissing the writ petition in limine. 10. We have gone through the grounds taken in Review Application, which virtually constitutes an attempt to re-argue the matter which cannot be done in the garb of review. 11. It is well settled law that the power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure is very limited and it may be exercised only on the ground that :- “(1) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed. (2) Order made on account of some mistake. (3) Error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason.” 12. To appreciate the scope of review, it would be proper for this Court to discuss the object and ambit of Section 114 CPC as the same is a substantive provision for review when a person considering himself aggrieved either by a decree or by an order of Court. From the bare reading of Section 114 CPC, it appears that the said substantive power of review under Section 114 CPC has not laid down any condition as the condition precedent in exercise of power of review nor the said Section imposed any prohibition on the Court for exercising its power to review its decision. An application for review is more restricted than that of an appeal and the Court of review has limited jurisdiction as to the definite limit mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC itself. The powers of review cannot be exercised as an inherent power nor can an appellate power can be exercised in the guise of power of review. 13. The dictionary meaning of the word “review” is “the act of looking after something again with a view of correction or improvement”. The powers of review cannot be exercised as an inherent power nor can an appellate power can be exercised in the guise of power of review. 13. The dictionary meaning of the word “review” is “the act of looking after something again with a view of correction or improvement”. It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. In the case of Patel Narshi Thakershi vs. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, (1971) 3 SCC 844 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise. 14. We may now notice some of the judicial precedents in which Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and/or Section 22(3) (f) of the Central Administrative Act have been interpreted and limitations on the power of the civil court/tribunal to review its judgment/decision have been identified. 15. In Rajah Kotagiri Venkata Subbamma Rao v. Rajah Vellanki Venkatrama Rao, (1899-1900) 27 IA 197 the Privy Council interpreted Sections 206 and 623 of the Civil Procedure Code and observed: (IA p.205) “… Section 623 enables any of the parties to apply for a review of any decree on the discovery of new and important matter and evidence, which was not within his knowledge, or could not be produced by him at the time the decree was passed, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason. It is not necessary to decide in this case whether the latter words should be confined to reasons strictly ejusdem generic with those enumerated, as was held in Roy Meghraj v. Beejoy Gobind Burral, ILR (1875) 1 Cal 197. In the opinion of Their Lordships, the ground of amendment must at any rate be something which existed at the date of the decree, and the section does not authorise the review of a decree which was right when it was made on the ground of the happening of some subsequent event.” (emphasis added) 16. In the opinion of Their Lordships, the ground of amendment must at any rate be something which existed at the date of the decree, and the section does not authorise the review of a decree which was right when it was made on the ground of the happening of some subsequent event.” (emphasis added) 16. In Hari Sankar Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter, 1949 FCR 36 a five-Judge Bench of the Federal Court while considering the question whether the Calcutta High Court was justified in not granting relief to non-appealing party, whose position was similar to that of the successful appellant, held: (FCR p. 48) “That a decision is erroneous in law is certainly no ground for ordering review. If the court has decided a point and decided it erroneously, the error could not be one apparent on the face of the record or even analogous to it. When, however, the court disposes of a case without adverting to or applying its mind to a provision of law which gives it jurisdiction to act in a particular way, that may amount to an error analogous to one apparent on the face of the record sufficient to bring the case within the purview of Order 47 Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code.” 17. In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius AIR 1954 SC 526 the Hon'ble Supreme Court interpreted the provisions contained in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which are analogous to Order 47 Rule 1 and observed: “32. … Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order 47 Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely, (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and (iii) for any other sufficient reason. It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words ‘any other sufficient reason’ must mean ‘a reason sufficient on grounds, least analogous to those specified in the rule’.” 18. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words ‘any other sufficient reason’ must mean ‘a reason sufficient on grounds, least analogous to those specified in the rule’.” 18. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. AIR 1964 SC 1372 it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that a review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereof an erroneous decision can be corrected. 19. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma (1979) 4 SCC 389 the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the scope of the High Courts’ power to review an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution, referred to an earlier decision in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 S.C. 1909 and observed: (Aribam Tuleshwar case (Supra), SCC p. 390, para 3) “3. … It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab (Supra), there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.” 20. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.” 20. In K. Ajit Babu v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 473 , it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that even though Order 47 Rule 1 is strictly not applicable to the tribunals, the principles contained therein have to be extended to them, else there would be no limitation on the power of review and there would be no certainty or finality of a decision. A slightly different view was expressed in Gopabandhu Biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty, (1998) 4 SCC 447 ). In that case it was held that the power of review granted to the tribunals is similar to the power of a civil court under Order 47 Rule 1. 21. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi (1997) 8 SCC 715 it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that: (SCC p. 716) “Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be ‘reheard and corrected’. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be ‘an appeal in disguise’.” 22. In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik, (2006) 4 SCC 78 the Hon'ble Supreme Court made a reference to the Explanation added to Order 47 by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 and held: “13. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be ‘an appeal in disguise’.” 22. In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik, (2006) 4 SCC 78 the Hon'ble Supreme Court made a reference to the Explanation added to Order 47 by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 and held: “13. In order to appreciate the scope of a review, Section 114 CPC has to be read, but this section does not even adumbrate the ambit of interference expected of the court since it merely states that it ‘may make such order thereon as it thinks fit’. The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing ‘on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason’. The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict. This is amply evident from the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order 47 which states that the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Where the order in question is appealable the aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and the court should exercise the power to review its order with the greatest circumspection.” 23. In Ajit Kumar Rath v. State of Orissa, (1999) 9 SCC 596 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that power of review vested in the Tribunal is similar to the one conferred upon a civil court and held: (SCC p. 608, paras 30-31) “30. The provisions extracted above indicate that the power of review available to the Tribunal is the same as has been given to a court under Section 114 read with Order 47 CPC. The provisions extracted above indicate that the power of review available to the Tribunal is the same as has been given to a court under Section 114 read with Order 47 CPC. The power is not absolute and is hedged in by the restrictions indicated in Order 47. The power can be exercised on the application of a person on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. The power can also be exercised on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason. A review cannot be claimed or asked for merely for a fresh hearing or arguments or correction of an erroneous view taken earlier, that is to say, the power of review can be exercised only for correction of a patent error of law or fact which stares in the face without any elaborate argument being needed for establishing it. It may be pointed out that the expression ‘any other sufficient reason’ used in Order 47 Rule 1 means a reason sufficiently analogous to those specified in the Rule. 31. Any other attempt, except an attempt to correct an apparent error or an attempt not based on any ground set out in Order 47, would amount to an abuse of the liberty given to the Tribunal under the Act to review its judgment.” 24. In the case of Haridas Das vs. Usha Rani Banik (Smt.)and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 78 while considering the scope and ambit of Section 114 CPC read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is observed and held in paragraph 14 to 18 as under: “14. In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170 it was held that: “8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170 it was held that: “8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the court under Order 47 Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court, in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389 speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J. has made the following pertinent observations: ‘It is true there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found, it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.’ ” 15. A perusal of Order 47 Rule 1 shows that review of a judgment or an order could be sought: (a) from the discovery of new and important matters or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant; (b) such important matter or evidence could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the decree was passed or order made; and (c) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient reason.” 25. In State of Haryana v. M.P. Mohla, (2007) 1 SCC 457 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: (SCC pp. 465-66, para 27) “27. A review petition filed by the appellants herein was not maintainable. There was no error apparent on the face of the record. The effect of a judgment may have to be considered afresh in a separate proceeding having regard to the subsequent cause of action which might have arisen but the same by itself may not be a ground for filing an application for review.” 26. In Gopal Singh v. State Cadre Forest Officers’ Assn., (2007) 9 SCC 369 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that after rejecting the original application filed by the appellant, there was no justification for the Tribunal to review its order and allow the revision of the appellant. Some of the observations made in that judgment are extracted below: (SCC p. 387, para 40) “40. The learned counsel for the State also pointed out that there was no necessity whatsoever on the part of the Tribunal to review its own judgment. Even after the microscopic examination of the judgment of the Tribunal we could not find a single reason in the whole judgment as to how the review was justified and for what reasons. No apparent error on the face of the record was pointed, nor was it discussed. Thereby the Tribunal sat as an appellate authority over its own judgment. This was completely impermissible and we agree with the High Court (Sinha, J.) that the Tribunal has travelled out of its jurisdiction to write a second order in the name of reviewing its own judgment. In fact the learned counsel for the appellant did not address us on this very vital aspect.” 27. In the case of Lily Thomas vs. Union of India, (2000) 6 SC 224, it is observed and held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. 28. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. 28. It is further observed in this judgment that the words “any other sufficient reason” appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC must mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule” as was held in Chhajju Ram vs. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526 . 29. In the case of Inderchand Jain vs. Motilal, (2009) 14 SCC 663 in paragraphs 7 to 11 it is observed and held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as under: “7. Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short “the Code”) provides for a substantive power of review by a civil court and consequently by the appellate courts. The words “subject as aforesaid” occurring in Section 114 of the Code mean subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed as appearing in Section 113 thereof and for the said purpose, the procedural conditions contained in Order 47 of the Code must be taken into consideration. Section 114 of the Code although does not prescribe any limitation on the power of the court but such limitations have been provided for in Order 47 of the Code; Rule 1 whereof reads as under: “17. The power of a civil court to review its judgment/decision is traceable in Section 114 CPC. The grounds on which review can be sought are enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, which reads as under: 1. The power of a civil court to review its judgment/decision is traceable in Section 114 CPC. The grounds on which review can be sought are enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, which reads as under: 1. Application for review of judgment.-(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved- (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment of the court which passed the decree or made the order.’ ” 8. An application for review would lie inter alia when the order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record and permitting the same to continue would lead to failure of justice. In Rajendra Kumar v. Rambai this Court held: (SCC p. 514, para 6) “6. The limitations on exercise of the power of review are well settled. The first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order, review of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order and permitting the order to stand will lead to failure of justice. In the absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed.” 9. The power of review can also be exercised by the court in the event discovery of new and important matter or evidence takes place which despite exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. An application for review would also lie if the order has been passed on account of some mistake. Furthermore, an application for review shall also lie for any other sufficient reason. 10. An application for review would also lie if the order has been passed on account of some mistake. Furthermore, an application for review shall also lie for any other sufficient reason. 10. It is beyond any doubt or dispute that the review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A rehearing of the matter is impermissible in law. It constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. It is also trite that exercise of inherent jurisdiction is not invoked for reviewing any order. 11. Review is not appeal in disguise. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India this Court held: (SCC p. 251, para 56) “56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise.” 30. What can be said to be an error apparent on the face of the proceedings has been dealt with and considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of T.C. Basappa vs. T.Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440 . It is held that such an error is an error which is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. In the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233 , it is observed as under: “It is essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. The real difficulty with reference to this matter, however, is not so much in the statement of the principle as in its application to the facts of a particular case. When does an error cease to be mere error, and become an error apparent on the face of the record? Learned counsel on either side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated.” 31. In the case of Parsion Devi vs. Sumitri Devi (1997) 8 SCC 715 in paragraph 7 to 9 it is observed and held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as under: “7. Learned counsel on either side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated.” 31. In the case of Parsion Devi vs. Sumitri Devi (1997) 8 SCC 715 in paragraph 7 to 9 it is observed and held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as under: “7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 1372 this Court opined: “What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’). The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’, for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by ‘error apparent’. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.” 32. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170 while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma AIR 1979 SC 1047 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. “9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not selfevident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. An error which is not selfevident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”. 33. In the case of State of West Bengal and Others vs. Kamal Sengupta and Anr., (2008) 8 SCC 612 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider what can be said to be “mistake or error apparent on the face of record”. In para 22 to 35 it is observed and held as under: “22. The term “mistake or error apparent” by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision.” 34. The principles which can be culled out from the abovenoted judgments are: “(i) The power of the Tribunal to review its order/decision under Section 22(3)(f) of the Act is akin/analogous to the power of a civil court under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. (ii) The Tribunal can review its decision on either of the grounds enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 and not otherwise. (iii) The expression “any other sufficient reason” appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 has to be interpreted in the light of other specified grounds. (ii) The Tribunal can review its decision on either of the grounds enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 and not otherwise. (iii) The expression “any other sufficient reason” appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 has to be interpreted in the light of other specified grounds. (iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of power under Section 22(3)(f). (v) An erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected in the guise of exercise of power of review. (vi) A decision/order cannot be reviewed under Section 22(3)(f) on the basis of subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger Bench of the tribunal or of a superior court. (vii) While considering an application for review, the tribunal must confine its adjudication with reference to material which was available at the time of initial decision. The happening of some subsequent event or development cannot be taken note of for declaring the initial order/decision as vitiated by an error apparent. (viii) Mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review. The party seeking review has also to show that such matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court/tribunal earlier.” 35. In view of above, no ground for review is made out. 36. Application is accordingly rejected.