JUDGMENT 1. Instant appeal has been preferred by the appellantinsurance Company under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 [for short ’the Act of 1923] against the impugned judgment and award dated 30.09.2009 passed by the Court of learned Commissioner Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, Jaipur City, Jaipur (Raj.) (for short ’the learned Commissioner’) in claim case No. WCCNF 91/2005 by which the claim petition filed by the claimant-respondent has been allowed and the Insurance company was directed to pay compensation of Rs. 3,64,409/- to the claimant-respondent with interest @ 12% per annum with effect from the date of accident i.e. on 23.09.2005. 2. Learned Tribunal after framing the issues, evaluating the evidence on record and after hearing counsel for the parties, decided the claim petition of the claimant-respondent and awarded compensation to the tune of Rs.3,64,409/- under various heads in favour of the claimant-respondent. 3. Counsel for the appellant-insurance company submits that the injured has sustained only 36.7% permanent disability even then his permanent disability has been treated as 70% by the learned Commissioner for the purpose of determining the loss of income of the injured. Counsel submits that the injury sustained by the injured was non-scheduled injury and the doctor has not been examined, hence there was no occasion with the learned Commissioner to assess the injury of the injured to the extent of 70% permanent disability. 4. Counsel further submits that no evidence has been produced by the claimant-respondent on the record that after the aforesaid accident, he has surrendered his driving licence, hence the claimant-respondent has failed to prove his loss of income. Counsel submits that while passing the final award, a direction has been issued to the Insurance Company to pay interest @ 12% per annum from the date of accident i.e. 23.09.2005. Counsel submits that the claim petition was filed on 19.12.2005 and the same was dismissed in default on 23.08.2007 and the restoration application itself was submitted by almost a lapse of one year i.e. on 06.02.2008. Counsel submits that the claimant-respondent are not entitled to get interest for this intervening period with effect from 23.08.2007 to 06.02.2008. 5. Counsel submits that the claim petition was filed on 19.12.2005 and the same was dismissed in default on 23.08.2007 and the restoration application itself was submitted by almost a lapse of one year i.e. on 06.02.2008. Counsel submits that the claimant-respondent are not entitled to get interest for this intervening period with effect from 23.08.2007 to 06.02.2008. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the claimant-respondent opposed the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellant-insurance Company and submitted that at the time of the accident, the claimant-respondent was doing the job of driver and he has sustained injury on his leg which has resulted in 36.7% permanent disability and the Medical Board of Government Hospital, Bagru, Jaipur has issued Permanent Disability Certificate (Ex-11) which indicates that in future, the movements of the injured would be restricted and it was a specific note which was appended in the Disability Certificate which is as under:- "Restricted movements of right knee and hip & Paraesthesia at lateral aspect of right thigh. Difficulty in squatting, sitting cross leg, climbing stairs, kneeling and driving vehicle" 6. Counsel submits that genuineness of the Disability Certificate issued by the Medical Board of a Government Hospital, Bagru cannot be doubted. Counsel submits that because of the aforesaid accident, he has suffered loss of income. Counsel submits that findings of fact has rightly been recorded by the learned Commissioner while deciding the claim petition and no substantial question of law is involved in the instant case. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the judgments of Hon’ble Apex court in the cases of "Golla Rajanna etc. vs. The Divisional Manager and Ors. reported in 2017(1) SCC 45 " and "North East Karnatka Transport Corporation Vs. Smt. Sujatha reported in 2019 (11) SCC 514 ". 7. Counsel submits that under these circumstances, interference of this Court is not warranted. 8. Heard and considered the submissions made at the Bar and perused the impugned judgment as well as the other material available on the record. 9. This fact is not in dispute that the claimant was a driver and he has sustained injuries on the day of accident, which occurred on 23.09.2005 which has resulted into 36.7% permanent disability. 8. Heard and considered the submissions made at the Bar and perused the impugned judgment as well as the other material available on the record. 9. This fact is not in dispute that the claimant was a driver and he has sustained injuries on the day of accident, which occurred on 23.09.2005 which has resulted into 36.7% permanent disability. Permanent Disability Certificate (Ex.11) was issued by the Hospital Bagru, Jaipur, which indicates that the movements of right knee and hip and thigh have been restricted and there is difficulty in squatting, sitting cross leg, stairs climbing, kneeling and driving vehicle, so the genuineness of this document cannot be doubted. The learned Commissioner has not committed an error by treating the permanent disability of the injured as 70% for the purpose of determining the loss of income of the injured. 10. I find no force in the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that no evidence was produced on the record that after the accident, the injured has surrendered his driving licence. The arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellant-insurance Company are based on finding of fact which has been decided by the learned Commissioner while passing the impugned award. 11. In the opinion of this Court, the learned Commissioner is the last authority on facts and the findings recorded by the learned Commissioner are based on sound appreciation of evidence whch does not liable to be disturbed by this Court unless and until substantial question of law is involved. 12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Goll Rajanna (supra) has held in para Nos. 8 & 10 which is as under:- "8. Section 30 of the Act provides for appeal to the High Court. To the extent, the provision reads as follows; 30. 12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Goll Rajanna (supra) has held in para Nos. 8 & 10 which is as under:- "8. Section 30 of the Act provides for appeal to the High Court. To the extent, the provision reads as follows; 30. Appeals.-(l) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely: (a) an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum; [(aa) an order awarding interest or penalty Under Section 4A;] (b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a half-monthly payment; (c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependants of a deceased workman, or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependant; (d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 12; or (e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions: Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in Clause (b), unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees (Emphasis supplied) 10. Under the scheme of the Act, the workmen’s Compensation Commissioner is the last authority on facts. The Parliament has thought it fit to restrict the scope of the appeal only to substantial question of law, being a welfare legislation. Unfortunately, the High Court has missed this crucial question of limited jurisdiction and has ventured to re-appreciate the evidence and recorded its own findings on percentage of disability for which also there is no basis. The whole exercise made by the High Court is not within the competence of the High Court under Section 30 of the Act." 13. The similar view has been expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of North East Karnataka Transport Corporation (supra). It has specifically held in Para Nos. 9 to 12 as under: "9. The whole exercise made by the High Court is not within the competence of the High Court under Section 30 of the Act." 13. The similar view has been expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of North East Karnataka Transport Corporation (supra). It has specifically held in Para Nos. 9 to 12 as under: "9. At the outset, we may take note of the fact, being a settled principle, that the question as to whether the employee met with an accident, whether the accident occurred during the course of employment, whether it arose out of an employment, how and in what manner the accident occurred, who was negligent in causing the accident, whether there existed any relationship of employee and employer, what was the age and monthly salary of the employee, how many are the dependants of the deceased employee, the extent of disability caused to the employee due to injuries suffered in an accident, whether there was any insurance coverage obtained by the employer to cover the incident etc. are some of the material issues which arise for the just decision of the Commissioner in a claim petition when an employee suffers any bodily injury or dies during the course of his employment and he/his LRs sue(s) his employer to claim compensation under the Act. 10. The aforementioned questions are essentially the questions of fact and, therefore, they are required to be proved with the aid of evidence. Once they are proved either way, the findings recorded thereon are regarded as the findings of fact. 11. The appeal provided under Section 30 of the Act to the High Court against the order of the Commissioner lies only against the specific orders set out in clauses (a) to (e) of Section 30 of the Act with a further rider contained in the first proviso to the section that the appeal must involve substantial questions of law. 12. In other words, the appeal provided under Section 30 of the Act to the High Court against the order of the Commissioner is not like a regular first appeal akin to Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which can he heard both on facts and law. The appellate jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the appeal is confined only to examine the substantial questions of law arising in the case." 14. The appellate jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the appeal is confined only to examine the substantial questions of law arising in the case." 14. This Courts finds no good ground to disturb the findings recorded by the learned Commissioner. There is only one substance in this appeal that the claimant is not entitled to get interest for the intervening period commencing from 23.08.2007 till 06.02.2008. The reason for giving said observation is that, the claim petition was dismissed in default on 23.08.2007 and the claimant himself filed the restoration application almost after a lapse of one year that is on 06.02.2008, hence the claimant is not entitled to get any sort of interest for this intervening period. 15. In view of the above, the instant appeal is partly allowed. 16. The learned Commissioner is directed to calculate the interest of this intervening period and refund this amount of interest @ 12% for this intervening period to the appellantinsurance Company within two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this Judgment. 17. Appeal stands disposed of in above terms. 18. Stay application and all pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 19. Record of the Tribunal be sent back forthwith.