JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner is the Chairman, Board of Trustees of Maniyoor Sree Subramanya Swami Temple, a temple under the control of the first respondent Board and listed under the religions institutions in terms of Section 38 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act, 1951 (for short ‘the Act’) as amended. One Padmavathy Varisyar, the mother of respondents 5 and 6 filed OA 19 of 2000 before the third respondent under Section 57(e) of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act, 1951 for short HR&CE Act), claiming that her family was doing kazhakam in the temple as the right of kazhakam was vested with the family of her husband, K.M. Kunhirama Variyar of Vadakke Veedu. It is further stated that K.M. Kunhirama Variyar did not get wages for the Kazhakam work done and that his arrears of salary and the right of kazhakam on the death of K.M. Kunhirama Variyar devolved upon her and on that basis she was doing the Kazhakam work from September 1986 to December 1994, for which also she was not paid the salary. It is further alleged that due to her ill health, her son, the 5th respondent performed Kazhakam and thus he sought for a declaration that the right of kazhakam in Maniyoor Sree Subramanya Swami Temple had to be vested with Vadakke Veedu family and that the arrears due to her husband from 10.09.1986 to 05.09.1990 and also the salary due to her from 6.9.1990 to 31.12.1994 had to be paid to her with interest. 2. In the proceedings as referred above, the petitioner herein did not enter appearance and was set ex-parte. The third respondent answered all the issues in favour of the applicant and the original application was allowed by order dated 17.11.2001, marked as Ext.P1 in the writ petition. Padmavathy Varisyar died on 18.12.2005 and the 6th respondent herein filed a W.P. (C) No. 8448 of 2006 before this Court seeking a direction to implement Ext.P1 order and it was only on receipt of notice from this Court that the petitioner came to know about the passing of ExtP1 order. The petitioner then filed an application, I.A. No. 5/2007 before the third respondent to set aside the ex-parte order, Ext.P1, along with an application to condone the delay in filing the said application to set aside the ex-parte order. These applications were dismissed for default on 10.11.2010. The petitioner then filed an application, I.A. No. 5/2007 before the third respondent to set aside the ex-parte order, Ext.P1, along with an application to condone the delay in filing the said application to set aside the ex-parte order. These applications were dismissed for default on 10.11.2010. Thereafter, an application for restoration was filed and the said application was allowed restoring I.A. No. 5/2007 in O.A. No. 19/2000. 3. Challenging the said order, respondents 5 and 6 herein filed an application before the 2nd respondent as A.S. No. 10 of 2012, which was allowed setting aside the order of the third respondent in I.A. No. 5 of 2007 and directed the respondent to reconsider I.A. No. 5 of 2007 in accordance with law. After reconsideration as above, the third respondent by order dated 15.05.2013 allowed I.A. No. 5 of 2007 by setting aside the ex-parte order, Ext.P1. The order dated 15.05.2013, Ext.P2 was challenged by respondents 5 and 6 before the second respondent by filing an appeal petition, AP No. 7 of 2013. The said appeal petition was dismissed as respondents 5 and 6 herein, the appellant therein did not appear, and thus the appeal was dismissed for default by order dated 6.5.2014, Ext.P3. 4. Thereafter, respondents 5 and 6 filed an application to set aside the order of dismissed for default and restore the same on the file along with an application to condone the delay in filing the said application. These applications were marked as Exts.P4 and P5. The second respondent considered the appeal and allowed the same by order dated 3.12.2014, whereby, the order passed by the third respondent, Ext.P2 was set aside restoring Ext.P1. The said order dated 03.12.2014 is marked as Ext.P6 in the writ petition and the petitioner impugns the same. 5. A counter affidavit has been filed by the 6th respondent on behalf of the 5th respondent as well. It is stated that thereafter, Kunhirama Variar was the hereditary kazhakam of the Sree Maniyoor Subramania Swami Temple. He performed the Kazhakam till 5.9.1990 and from 6.9.1990 to 31.12.1994 the kazhakam was done by the respondents mother Padmavathy Varasiar and from 1.1.1995 to 30.10.2014 the kazhakam was done by the 5th respondent and thereafter, the 6th respondent is entitled to the kazhakam. He performed the Kazhakam till 5.9.1990 and from 6.9.1990 to 31.12.1994 the kazhakam was done by the respondents mother Padmavathy Varasiar and from 1.1.1995 to 30.10.2014 the kazhakam was done by the 5th respondent and thereafter, the 6th respondent is entitled to the kazhakam. It is alleged that the salary and the other emoluments from September 1986 was not paid which led to filing of a petition under Section 57(e) of the Act for the reliefs of declaration of the right of kazhakam as well as for the arrears of salary and emoluments payable. It is submitted that the Chairman, Board of Trustees of the Temple was on an inimical terms with their family and there were several civil and criminal cases between them. Exts.R6(e) and R6(f) are the judgments/orders in the above litigations and the Chairman of the temple was abusing his position and victimising the 6th respondent and their family members. It was only after the notice in W.P. (C) No. 8448 of 2006 was received by the petitioner that he sought to set aside Ext.P1 order. Thus, it was urged that there was no merit at all in the writ petition, and prayed for its dismissal. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the Board submits that there is an alternative efficacious remedy available to the petitioner under Section 62 of the Act and as such the writ petition need not be entertained. It is further alleged that the Commissioner (R2) and the Deputy Commissioner (R3) not being a Court was not entitled to condone the delay as the application of Section 29 of the Limitation Act is ousted. Even the presence of section, a like section 92 of the Act will not come to the rescue of the writ petitioner is the contention. 7. Heard Sri. R. Sreehari, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri. Lakhmi Narayan, the learned Standing Counsel for the Malabar Devaswom Board. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner answers the contention on the applicability of the Limitation Act by resorting to Section 95 and Rule 4 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Rules, one framed under Sections 31, 57 to 60, 61(2) and 64 of the Act. 9. Lakhmi Narayan, the learned Standing Counsel for the Malabar Devaswom Board. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner answers the contention on the applicability of the Limitation Act by resorting to Section 95 and Rule 4 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Rules, one framed under Sections 31, 57 to 60, 61(2) and 64 of the Act. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued on the basis of Section 95 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act that Limitation Act would apply in the case of appeals filed under the Act. Section 95 is extracted hereunder: “95. Procedure and powers at inquiries under Chapters V and VI: (1) Where a Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner makes an inquiry or hears an appeal under Chapter V or Chapter VI, the inquiry shall be made and the appeal shall be heard, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the trial of suits or the hearing of appeals, as the case may be. (2) The provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the Indian Oaths Act, 1873 shall apply to such inquiries and appeals. (3) The Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner holding such an inquiry or hearing such an appeal shall be deemed to be a person acting judicially within the meaning of the Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850.” 10. Reliance is also placed on Rule 4 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Rules, which reads as follows: “4. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Civil Rules of Practice and Circular Orders shall apply, as far as practicable, to appearance of pleaders and to affidavits, production of documents, examination of witnesses, taking of oral evidence, proof by affidavits, filing of exhibits, issue of commissions, return of documents, not admitted in evidence and other connected matters and the inquiry shall be made, as far as practicable, in the manner laid down in the said Code for the trial of suits.” 11. The learned counsel for the Board, on the other hand argued citing the decision in Ganesan vs. Commissioner, Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board, 2019 (2) KLT 925 (SC) to hold that since Limitation Act has no application, the authorities under the Act do not have the power to condone delay and that the remedy available to the writ petitioner is only to file a suit under Section 62 of the Act challenging Ext.P6 order. 12. I will first deal with the contention on the applicability of the Limitation Act to the proceedings under the Act. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the Board the said issue is no longer res integra. The Hon'ble Supreme Court culled out the principles in Ganesan's case (supra) after surveying all the authorities till then and held as follows: “54. The ratio which can be culled from above noted judgments, especially judgment of three-Judge benches, as noted above, is as follows: (1) The suits, appeals and applications referred to in the Limitation Act, 1963 are suits, appeals and applications which are to be filed in a court. (2) The suits, appeals and applications referred to in the Limitation Act are not the suits, appeals and applications which are to be filed before a statutory authority like Commissioner under Act, 1959. (3) Operation of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act is confined to the suits, appeals and applications referred to in a special or local law to be filed in Court and not before statutory authorities like Commissioner under Act, 1959. (4) However, special or local law vide statutory scheme can make applicable any provision of the Limitation Act or exclude applicability of any provision of Limitation Act which can be decided only after looking into the scheme of particular, special or local law.” 13. The presence of the section which makes the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure to the trial of suits and hearing of appeals as the case may be also does not make the statutory authority a Court. In as much as there is nothing in the Act which makes the Limitation Act applicable, no recourse can be taken to the provision of the Limitation Act which as aforesaid is limited only in the circumstances extracted above. In as much as there is nothing in the Act which makes the Limitation Act applicable, no recourse can be taken to the provision of the Limitation Act which as aforesaid is limited only in the circumstances extracted above. It is to be noted that where appeal is before a body or the authority other than a court, special statute under which appeal is filed must authorise such body or authority to apply section 5 of the Limitation Act while dealing with an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 14. The mere fact that a statutory authority is empowered to follow the procedure as merely may be in accordance with the procedure under the Code of Civil Procedure, the trial of suits or hearing of appeals will not make the statutory authority a court. In the total absence of any provision which indicates the applicability of the Limitation Act, the arguments based on the above provisions must fail. The above provisions cannot be understood as provided applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 15. In that view of the matter it has to be held that the decision of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in W.P. (C) No. 44003 of 2002 holding that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to an appeal under the HR&CE Act is clearly an error in law. The said decision cannot he held as stating the law correctly in view of the statutory provisions besides the authoritative and binding precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held in the decision reported in Sakuru vs. Tanaji, (1985) 3 SCC 590 , that even if the provision of the Limitation Act is made applicable for computation of the period of limitation, even then it cannot be said that the Limitation Act itself is made applicable. This was in the context of Section 93 of the A.P. Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (21 of 1950), which reads as follows: 93. Every appeal and every application for revision under this Act shall be filed within sixty days from the date of the order against which the appeal or application is filed and the provisions of section 5 and sections 12 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963, shall apply for the purposes of extension and computation of the said period. 17. Every appeal and every application for revision under this Act shall be filed within sixty days from the date of the order against which the appeal or application is filed and the provisions of section 5 and sections 12 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963, shall apply for the purposes of extension and computation of the said period. 17. Construing the above provision it was held that the effect of the said section is only to render applicable the provisions of the Limitation Act for 'computation of the period of limitation'. Computation of the period of limitation is contained in Sections 12 to 24 in Part III of the Limitation Act, 1963. By no stretch can Section 5 be treated as a provision dealing with computation of period of limitation. It is only after a computation of the period of limitation, it could be found whether an application or appeal has been filed after the expiry of the prescribed period in which case alone the question of extension of the period under Section 5 of the Limitation Act will arise. 18. In the aforesaid circumstances, it has to be held that the Deputy Commissioner while passing Ext.P5 order did not have the power to condone the delay and to that extent finding of the Commissioner to Ext.P6 has to be upheld. The learned counsel for the petitioner seeks permission to challenge Ext.P6 order by way of a suit under Section 62 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act, 1951. Liberty is granted. 19. Writ Petition is dismissed subject to the above.