JUDGMENT (Prayer: Writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, Calling for records relating to the order of the 1st respondent made in Se. Mu. Order No. A.N.P. 1/60497/2022 dated 11.05.2022 and the consequential proceedings of 2nd respondent made in Se. Mu. Order No. A1/ 11308/ 2022 dated 12.05.2022 and that of 3rd respondents proceedings made in No. A2/ 4663/2022 dated 13.05.2022 to quash the same.) According to the petitioner, the petitioner is working in the office of the third respondent as Assistant. Vide proceedings of the first respondent made in Se.Mu.Order No.A.N.P.1/60497/2022 dated 11.5.2022 transferring the petitioner from Tirvuarur to Coimbatore on administrative ground. It is further stated that on the premise of certain complaint from a female colleague the impugned transfer order has been passed. The petitioner had chosen to give representation terming it as complaint to higher authorities as to the maladministration and mismanagement by the higher authority in the said office resulting in false allegation and certain unwarranted issues against the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition before this Court for the aforesaid prayer. 2. According to the petitioner, the impugned transfer is sought to be effected on administrative grounds, but various reasons more particularly allegations have been stated therein, hence, the said orders without any opportunity to putforth his defence amounts to punitive one. Further, it is stated that a complaint by a female colleague with regard to sexual harassment for which there is no preliminary enquiry in the presence of the petitioner. Therefore, the impugned transfer order is outcome of arbitrary exercise of power with malafide intention and therefore, the impugned transfer order is liable to be quashed. 3. Counter affidavit has been filed by third respondent wherein it is stated that the State President, Tamilnadu Ministerial Staff Association made a representation on 5.5.2022 in which the President of the said Association requested to take action on the representation dated 29.4.2022 of the District President, Tamilnadu Ministerial Staff Association, Thiruvarur. 3. Counter affidavit has been filed by third respondent wherein it is stated that the State President, Tamilnadu Ministerial Staff Association made a representation on 5.5.2022 in which the President of the said Association requested to take action on the representation dated 29.4.2022 of the District President, Tamilnadu Ministerial Staff Association, Thiruvarur. In the representation, dated 29.4.2022 certain allegations were made against the petitioner that he was interfered with other colleagues- work with wrong and ulterior motive of making money with corrupt manner, he also insisted to depute the temporary female staff working in the subordinate offices to the third respondent office for typing work and sexually harassed them and threatening other employees especially dealt files relating to appointing employees on outsourcing and misbehaved with female staff of the third respondent office. Based on the allegations received from the Association, a woman officer Tmt.G.Valarmathi, Additional Director of Agriculture was appointed as enquiry officer to enquire into the grave allegations made against the petitioner. Under these circumstances, it is very essential to transfer the petitioner from the present station to protect the women employees and maintain the dignity and decorum of the office. The transfer order is passed only after the competent authority found strong prima facie case against the petitioner. Therefore, there is no irregularity or malafide intention as alleged by the petitioner. The third respondent also placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex court in Union of India Vs. S.L.Abbas reported in (1993) 4 SCC 357 and S.C. Sexena Vs. Union of India reported in 2006 SCC (L & S) 1890 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that “it is duty to first report to where he is transferred and make representation as to what may be his personal problems. This tendency of not reporting at the place of posting and indulging in litigations needs to be curbed.” In State of M.P. Vs. S.S.Koura [A.I.R. 1995 SC 1056] the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that Courts and Tribunals are not appellate forum to decide an order of transfer when made on administrative ground. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh Vs. Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs [1993 SCC (L & S) 119] observed that when statute gave discretion to an administration to take decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Mohd. Mohsin Vs. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh Vs. Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs [1993 SCC (L & S) 119] observed that when statute gave discretion to an administration to take decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Mohd. Mohsin Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others [(2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 973] has held that “we are of the considered opinion that transfer and posting are within the discretion of the Government.” 4. Heard the rival submissions of the parties and perused the materials available on record. 5. In an identical issue, this Court made in W.P.(MD) Nos.10759 & etc., batch, dated 28.10.2021, at Madurai Bench by relying upon the various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and following the decisions of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court, has held as follows: 19. In K.M.Elumalai vs. The Superintendent of Prisons, Central Prison-II and another [CDJ 2009 MHC 4819], this Court, by taking note of catena of decisions of the Honourable Apex Court, has held as follows: 12. The above said principles of law evolved by the English Courts would clearly lead to the conclusion that while acting upon a fact the person who exercises the power treating the said fact as conclusive will have to satisfy himself about the due proof of the same before taking any action based upon the same. In other words when a power is vested upon an authority the said authority will have to exercise the said power only in the manner known to law which is by giving a sufficient opportunity to the person against whom the action is proposed. The basic requirement of the said principle is to inform the person concerned about the charges levelled against him and thereafter affording an opportunity to putforth his case followed by a further opportunity to peruse the materials placed against him and cross-examine the witnesses who deposed against him. 13. It is no doubt true that an order of transfer is incidental to the service but the question for consideration is as to whether such an order can be passed in total violation of principles of the natural justice and by dispensing with the enquiry. ... ... 20. 13. It is no doubt true that an order of transfer is incidental to the service but the question for consideration is as to whether such an order can be passed in total violation of principles of the natural justice and by dispensing with the enquiry. ... ... 20. Therefore this Court is of the opinion that the impugned orders passed by the respondents will have to be set aside being punitive in nature and therefore bad in law in not following the principles of natural justice, by affording an opportunity to the petitioner and by conducting an enquiry. 21. The proceedings are also liable to be set aside since the respondents have come to the conclusion based upon a discreet enquiry which is again based upon the statement obtained from persons behind the back of the petitioner. Even in an enquiry a statement obtained in a preliminary enquiry prior to a full-fledged enquiry cannot be relied upon. Therefore in such a case an order passed based upon such an enquiry cannot be sustained. In the judgment reported in (2006) 2 MLJ 202 [T.PITCHAI vs. DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, TIRUNELVELI RANGE, TIRUNELVELI AND ANOTHER] the Hon’ble High Court after considering the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court and the Division Bench judgment of the Hon’ble High Court was pleased to hold that the punishment based upon a statement given a preliminary enquiry cannot be sustained. The Hon’ble High Court has observed as follows: ... ... 22. The learned Government Advocate made strong reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in (2004) 4 SCC 245 [UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS vs. JANARDHAN DEBANATH AND ANOTHER] and submitted that under Fundamental Rules 15 an order of transfer can be passed even in a case of misbehaviour or misconduct by the employee concerned. It is a well settled principle of law that a judgment will have to be applied to the facts of each case, in the said case the Hon’ble Apex Court was dealing with the case where based upon certain allegation an order of transfer was made by exercising the power under the Fundamental Rules. Therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering the powers of the authorities under the said Rules. Therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering the powers of the authorities under the said Rules. Moreover a reading of the said judgment would show that it was clearly observed that the question of misbehaviour can be gone into departmental proceedings whereas in the present case it has been clearly stated by the respondents that they have no intention to go with the departmental proceedings since they know very well that it is not possible to prove the factum of the alleged misconduct by the petitioner. 23. Moreover the interpretation of Fundamental Rules 15 is not in question in the present case since the power has been exercised by the first respondent under the Tamil Nadu Jail Subordinate Rules. Further a reading of the Fundamental Rules would show that the power has to be exercised by the Government whereas in the present case on hand the said power has been exercised under the Tamil Nadu Jail Subordinate Rules by the first respondent herein. In this connection, it is useful to refer the judgment of the Division Bench reported in 2009(3) CTC 97 [D.Sivakumar v. The Government of Tamil Nadu] wherein the Hon’ble Division Bench has observed as follows: ... ... 24. Similarly in the judgment reported in 2009 AIR SCW 942 [COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, BANGALORE v. SRIKUMAR AGENCIES] the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows: “4. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid-s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton (1951 Apex Court 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed: “The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge.“ In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970(2) All ER 294) Lord Reid said, “Lord Atkin-s speech.... is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. It will required qualification in new circumstances.“ Megarry, J. in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell L.J.as if it were an Act of Parliament.“ And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board( 1972(2) WLR 537 ) Lord Morris said: “There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.“ 5. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: “Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between on case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive. “25. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive. “25. Therefore on a reading of the said judgments, this Court is of the opinion that the judgments relied upon by the learned Government Advocate do not apply to the present case on hand. 26. Thus on a consideration of the facts and circumstances and also on a consideration of the legal issues involved, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned orders passed by the respondents are liable to be set aside. Accordingly they are set aside and the writ petitions are allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.” ...... ...... 23. In Somesh Tiwari-s case (supra), the Honourable Apex Court has held as follows: 19. Indisputably an order of transfer is an administrative order. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that transfer, which is ordinarily an incident of service should not be interfered with, save in cases where inter alia mala fide on the part of the authority is proved. Mala fide is of two kinds - one malice in fact and the second malice in law. 20. The order in question would attract the principle of malice in law as it was not based on any factor germane for passing an order of transfer and based on an irrelevant ground i.e. on the allegations made against the appellant in the anonymous complaint. It is one thing to say that the employer is entitled to pass an order of transfer in administrative exigencies but it is another thing to say that the order of transfer is passed by way of or in lieu of punishment. When an order of transfer is passed in lieu of punishment, the same is liable to be set aside being wholly illegal. ... ... 25. No vigilance enquiry was initiated against him. The order of transfer was passed on material which was not existent. The order, therefore, not only suffers from total non application of mind on the part of authorities of respondent No.1, but also suffers from malice in law. 26. The High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must consider the fact of each case. The order, therefore, not only suffers from total non application of mind on the part of authorities of respondent No.1, but also suffers from malice in law. 26. The High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must consider the fact of each case. Mechanical application of the normal rule “no work no pay“ may in a case of this nature, be found to be wholly unjust. No absolute proposition of law in this behalf can be laid down.” ....... ...... 28. In view of the above settled legal position, this Court is of the opinion that when transfers are effected after preliminary enquiry on the complaints / allegations, it should necessarily be followed up by a detailed investigation and disciplinary proceedings initiated on the allegations resultantly found to be substantiated. However, in the present case, prima facie it is found that disciplinary proceedings were initiated and charge memos were issued only when the matter was taken up for hearing that too after the matter was being adjourned on several occasions, which is contrary to the aforesaid G.O.Ms.No.10, dated 07.01.1994 and the clarificatory letter dated 09.08.1994. Even on perusal of the impugned transfer orders, it is seen that the same were passed on the administrative grounds, however, in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, it is stated that based on the discreet enquiry report, the impugned transfer orders were passed. Further, according to the respondents, the impugned transfer orders were passed to avoid more complications in the prison administration. That apart, the respondents have not initiated disciplinary proceedings immediately after the incident had taken place and only in the month of September, 2021, by way of filing additional counter affidavit, it was brought to the notice of this Court that disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against the petitioner for the incident alleged to have been taken place in the month of April, 2021 and in the counter affidavit filed in the month of August, 2021, there is no whisper about the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners and only after the matter was taken up for hearing, disciplinary proceedings were initiated and charge memos were issued to the petitioner. Hence, this Court comes to a conclusion that the impugned transfer orders are punitive in nature and there is violation of the principles of natural justice on the part of the respondents and therefore, the respondents have not followed the clarification order issued by the Government and the decision in the case of Elumalai-s case (supra) would therefore squarely apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Hence, the respondents have violated the principles of natural justice as observed in the aforesaid decision. Hence, for all these reasons, the impugned transfer orders are liable to be set aside. 6. In the present case on hand, admittedly, certain allegations were made against the petitioner by the President of Tamilnadu Ministerial Staff Association that he interfered with other colleagues- work with wrong and ulterior motive of making money with corrupt manner, he also insisted to depute the temporary female staff working in the subordinate offices to the third respondent office for typing work and sexually harassed them and the enquiry officer was also appointed to conduct enquiry. Under these circumstances, the petitioner was transferred from the present station viz., Tiruvarur to Coimbatore. 7. It has been submitted by the learned Government Advocate that the transfer of a public servant, made on administrative grounds or on public interest, should not be interfered with unless there are strong and compelling grounds rendering the transfer order improper and unjustified. 8. It is relevant to refer to the decision of this Court made in W.P.(MD) Nos.10759 & etc., batch, dated 28.10.2021, [Narasingaraja vs 1.The Director General of Police / Inspector General of Prisons, Department of Prison, Chennai-600 008] wherein Madurai Bench (myself) of this Court has held as follows: 18. In the instant case, it is seen that the impugned transfer orders are stated to have been passed on administrative grounds. The Government, by G.O.Ms.No.10, Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department, dated 07.01.1994, has issued revised instructions in the matter of transfer of Government servants from one station /post to another once in three years. Subsequently, the Government, vide Letter dated 09.08.1994, clarified G.O.Ms.No.10, dated 07.01.1994, clarifying that when transfers on complaints / allegations are made after preliminary enquiry, it should be followed up by a detailed investigation and disciplinary action instituted on allegations finally found to be substantiated. The relevant portion of the said letter is extracted hereunder: (III). Subsequently, the Government, vide Letter dated 09.08.1994, clarified G.O.Ms.No.10, dated 07.01.1994, clarifying that when transfers on complaints / allegations are made after preliminary enquiry, it should be followed up by a detailed investigation and disciplinary action instituted on allegations finally found to be substantiated. The relevant portion of the said letter is extracted hereunder: (III). In the said G.O. In sub-clause (f) of para III (vii), the following shall be added at the end: Transfers shall not be effected on the basis of allegations, unless the allegations are prima facie found to be true by a preliminary enquiry and it is decided by the transferring authority that the continuance of the officer in the same station is injurious to public interest and that he can be transferred rather than suspended from service. When such transfers on complaints / allegations are made after preliminary enquiry, it should be followed up by a detailed investigation and disciplinary action instituted on allegations finally found to be substantiated”. 9. Taking note of the catena of decisions of the Honourable Apex Court as well as this Court, this Court is of the view that it is merely based on the complaint made by his colleague against the petitioner, without providing an opportunity to the petitioner, the impugned transfer order has been passed which amounts to punitive in nature. The petitioner also specifically stated that he was not aware of the said allegation. Therefore, in the light of the decisions cited supra, the impugned order is liable to be quashed. It is always open to the petitioner to proceed with the enquiry proceedings in accordance with law, by following the circular issued by the Government. Therefore, the impugned transfer order is liable to be set aside. 10. Accordingly, the impugned transfer order passed by the first respondent in Se.Mu. Order No. A.N.P. 1/60497/2022 dated 11.05.2022 and the consequential proceedings of 2nd respondent made in Se.Mu. Order No.A1/ 11308/ 2022 dated 12.05.2022 and that of 3rd respondents proceedings made in No.A2/ 4663/2022 dated 13.05.2022 are set aside. However, liberty is granted to the respondents to proceed afresh against the petitioner, if necessary. 11. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently, W.M.P.No.12813 of 2022 stands allowed. W.M.P.No.17612 of 2022 stands dismissed.