JUDGMENT 1. Appellant-defendant has filed this second appeal under Section 100 CPC, aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 05.12.2013 passed in Civil First Appeal No.12/2009 by the Additional District Judge, Tijara, District Alwar dismissing the appeal and affirming the judgment and decree dated 29.11.2008 in Civil Suit No.38/2003 by the Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Alwar whereby and whereunder the suit for specific performance of agreement, filed by the respondent-plaintiff, has been decreed on merits in following terms:- ^^izfj.kker% oknh dk fo#) izfroknhx.k bl vk'k; ds lkFk fMdzh fd;k tkrk gS fd izfroknh eksguyky fookfnr vkjkth [kljk uŒ 210 jdck 1 ch?kk ekStk lqjkokl rglhy frtkjk ftyk vyoj dks nks ekg ds vUnj fu;ekuqlkj oknh dks c;ukek djk nsos rFkk fookfnr laifRr dks fdlh nhxj O;fDr dks jgu&cS fodz; uk djs ,oa oknh ds mi;ksx&miHkksx esa ck/kk dkfjr uk djsaA mijksDr vuqlkj ipkZ fMdzh rS;kj dh tkosA^^ 2. Heard learned counsel for both parties and perused the material available record. 3. The relevant facts of the case, as culled out from the record, are that plaintiff and defendant both are real brothers and plaintiff instituted a civil suit seeking specific performance of an agreement to sell date dated 15.06.1979 executed by the defendant in respect of land bearing Khasra No.210 measuring 1 bigha situated at village Surawas, Tehsil Tijara, District Alwar against the sale consideration of Rs.4,000/-. 4. Plaintiff averred that the entire sale consideration of Rs.4,000/- was paid to the defendant and the defendant delivered the physical possession of the land in question to plaintiff. Plaintiff averred that after execution of agreement, time and again he asked to execute the sale deed but defendant deferred the matter for one or another reason, and lastly plaintiff served a legal notice dated 28.07.2003 and thereafter instituted the present civil suit. 5. Defendant submitted his written statement and contended that the agreement to sell dated 15.06.1979 is forged document, which was never executed by him. The defendant did not dispute that he is the Khatedar of the land in question bearing Khasra No.210 measuring 1 bigha and the fact that both parties are real brothers. Defendant raised an objection that the suit was barred by limitation. 6. The Trial Court, on the basis of rival pleadings of both parties, permitted both parties to adduce their evidence in respect of their respective contentions. Defendant raised an objection that the suit was barred by limitation. 6. The Trial Court, on the basis of rival pleadings of both parties, permitted both parties to adduce their evidence in respect of their respective contentions. The plaintiff produced agreement as well as produced himself as PW-1, Vijay Kumar (PW-2) the scriber of agreement and Mahendra Kumar (PW-3) the stamp vendor of agreement. In rebuttal, the defendant did not led any evidence. 7. The Trial Court, on appreciation of evidence on record, concluded that the plaintiff has proved the execution of agreement dated 15.06.1979 by his own evidence as well as by producing its scriber and the stamp vendor from whom the stamp of agreement was purchased. Since the defendant has taken a defence that the agreement is forged and prepared, therefore, placing reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Daulatram Vs. Yog [(2005) DNJ SC 73], it was observed that the burden to prove the agreement being forged lies upon the defendant, the trial court held that in absence of defendant’s evidence, he could not discharge his burden. Further the trial court observed that according to recital indicated in the agreement itself as well as from the evidence of plaintiff, it stands established that the plaintiff has paid entire sale consideration of Rs.4,000/- and the defendant delivered the possession of suit land to the plaintiff. In respect of the objection as to limitation, the trial court observed that in the agreement dated 15.06.1979, no limitation has been provided and only it was indicated that the sale deed would be executed by Samvat 2037 but the time was not essence of the contract. The trial court relied upon the provision of Section 54 of the Limitation Act to held that the limitation for the purpose of suit for specific performance begins from the date when the plaintiff noticed that the performance of agreement has been refused by the defendant. Since in this case, no date of performance was indicated in the agreement and the plaintiff adduced the evidence that he asked the defendant to execute the sale deed time and again, thereafter served a legal notice and then filed the present suit, therefore, the suit was not found to be barred by limitation. 8. Since in this case, no date of performance was indicated in the agreement and the plaintiff adduced the evidence that he asked the defendant to execute the sale deed time and again, thereafter served a legal notice and then filed the present suit, therefore, the suit was not found to be barred by limitation. 8. The Trial Court further opined that the plaintiff has paid entire sale consideration as well as obtained the physical possession of the suit land, therefore, equity lies in his favour, and since there is no counter evidence from the side of defendant, the trial court exercised its discretionary power to decree the suit for specific performance in favour of plaintiff vide judgment and decree dated 29.11.2008 in the manner as mentioned hereinabove. 9. The defendant did not prefer the first appeal within the prescribed limitation, however a delay of near about more than three months. The First Appellate Court, considering legal aspects that the first appeal is a valuable and statutory right, took a liberal view and condoned the delay and considered the first appeal on merits. The First Appellate Court re-considered entire material on record. The First Appellate Court observed that the plaintiff has concluded his evidence by 01.08.2007 and thereafter several opportunities were accorded to the defendant to adduce his evidence. Even opportunity on cost was also accorded, but the defendant led any evidence, and lastly his evidence was closed vide order dated 06.11.2008. The said order was not challenged by way of filing writ petition nor he has assigned sufficient reason for not adducing any evidence. The First Appellate Court, in absence of defendant’s evidence, concurred with findings of the trial court that the agreement dated 15.06.1979 was executed by the defendant and the plaintiff had paid entire sale consideration as also he received the possession of suit land. In respect of the limitation, the First Appellate Court too appreciated that it is true that the suit was filed after immense delay, however it may not be treated as barred by limitation. In respect of the limitation, the First Appellate Court too appreciated that it is true that the suit was filed after immense delay, however it may not be treated as barred by limitation. The First Appellate Court held that firstly, the time is not essence of the contract and secondly, parties are real brothers and when the plaintiff has paid the entire sale consideration as well as had obtained the possession, moreover he adduced evidence that he was ever ready and willing to get the sale deed registered, the suit may not be held to be barred by limitation. The First Appellate Court placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. D’ Souza vs. Shondrilo Naidu [ (2004)6 SCC 649 ]. The First Appellate Court also considered the article of Section 54 of the Limitation Act and concurred with fact finding and judgment of the trial court and dismissed the first appeal on merits vide judgment and decree dated 05.12.2013. 10. Having considered the fact finding recorded by both courts below in respect of execution of agreement as well as to the fact that the plaintiff has paid entire sale consideration and did receive physical possession, which are based on evidence available on record, this Court is not inclined to interfere with such fact finding. It may not be said in given facts and circumstances that two courts below have committed any jurisdictional error or exercised their discretion arbitrarily. In totality of facts, it is a case where the trial court exercised its discretion guided by the judicial principles of reasonableness and equity, and such discretion has further been affirmed by the First Appellate Court. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Zarina Siddiqui Vs. Ramalingam @ R. Amarnathan [ (2015)1 SCC 705 ] has held as under:- "33. The equitable discretion to grant or not to grant a relief for specific performance also depends upon the conduct of the parties. The necessary ingredient has to be proved and established by the plaintiff so that discretion would be exercised judiciously in favour of the plaintiff. At the same time, if the defendant does not come with clean hands and suppresses material facts and evidence and misleads the Court then such discretion should not be exercised by refusing to grant specific performance." 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Ramathal Vs. Maruthathal and Ors. At the same time, if the defendant does not come with clean hands and suppresses material facts and evidence and misleads the Court then such discretion should not be exercised by refusing to grant specific performance." 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Ramathal Vs. Maruthathal and Ors. [ (2018)18 SCC 303 ] while dealing with the scope of Section 100 CPC to interfere in fact findings of two courts below in respect of decreeing a suit for specific performance observed as under:- "When the intention of the legislature is so clear the courts have no power to enlarge the scope of Section 100 for whatsoever reasons. Justice has to be administered in accordance with law. In the case on hand the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction by reversing the well considered judgment of the courts below which is based on cogent reasoning. The learned judge ought not to have entered the arena of re appreciation of the evidence, hence the whole exercise done by the High Court is beyond the scope and jurisdiction conferred under Section 100 of CPC." 13. In other cases of State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Shiv Dayal & Anr. [ (2019)8 SCC 637 ] and C.Doddanarayana Reddy and Ors. Vs. C. Jayarama Reddy and Ors. Reported in [ (2020) 4 SCC 659 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that concurrent findings of fact is binding, unless it is pointed out that it was recorded de hors pleadings or it was based on no evidence or based on misreading of the material on records and documents. 14. In view of discussion made hereinabove, no substatiial question of law arises in the instant second appeal. In order to exercise the scope of Section 100 of CPC, involvement/formulation of substantial question of law is sine qua non. 15. As a result, the second appeal is bereft of merits and the same is hereby dismissed. No costs. 16. Stay application and any other pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.