JUDGMENT (Prayer: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking issuance of a Writ of Mandamus directing the 2nd respondent herein to consider the representation dated 10.03.2022 and accord police protection to Good Shepherd Matriculation School situated in Vaiyavoor, Kanchipuram and Mr.Stanislaus S. (Principal) and other staff members of the said school from Mr.S.Selvakumar and his associates.) 1. This writ petition has been filed seeking a direction to the second respondent police to consider the representation of the petitioner dated 10.03.2022 and accord police protection to the Good Shepherd Matriculation School situated in Vaiyavoor, Kanchipuram and to the Principal and other staff members. 2. It is the case of the petitioner that their Foundation has established and managing 103 schools in the name of Good Shepherd Schools all over India since 2004. One such school was started at 244, Dharmanayckkan Pattarai, Vaiyavoor village, Kanchipuram. Due to the prevailing management and on advice of Mr.S.Selvakumar, the third respondent herein, the petitioner executed a lease deed in favour of the said school on 13.03.2012. 3. Thereafter, during internal audits of the school, it came to light that huge swindling of monies from the accounts of the said school had taken place at the behest of the third respondent Mr.S.Selvakumar. The same was brought to the notice of the third respondent and warning was also given to him. The third respondent has purchased a bus from the said funds of the school and he was running a private transport business from the illegal gains. 4. When the matter stood thus, the petitioner and other staff members of the petitioner's school entered the school on 18.11.2019, at that time, the third respondent and his associates not only asked them to leave the school but also threatened them of dire consequences. Due to the said threat, a complaint was also filed and on receipt of the complaint, the respondent police issued CSR bearing No.2150/2019. 5. It is the case of the petitioner that Mr.S.Selvakumar was terminated from all his duties and responsibilities from 02.12.2019. Mr.S.Selvakumar has filed an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The petitioner has also applied for anticipatory bail. The petitioner has also sought a direction against Mr.S.Selvakumar for registering an FIR and a FIR was also registered in Crime No.2183 of 2020 for the offence punishable under Sections 381, 403, 406, 420, 447 and 506(2) of IPC. 6. Mr.S.Selvakumar has filed an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The petitioner has also applied for anticipatory bail. The petitioner has also sought a direction against Mr.S.Selvakumar for registering an FIR and a FIR was also registered in Crime No.2183 of 2020 for the offence punishable under Sections 381, 403, 406, 420, 447 and 506(2) of IPC. 6. The third respondent has also filed a suit in O.S.No.385 of 2019 for permanent injunction against the petitioner. The said suit was challenged before this Court in C.R.P.No.2164 of 2020 and this Court has struck off the said plaint. Thereafter, the petitioner wrote a letter dated 13.12.2021, requesting police protection. The concerned police official were in regular communication and follow ups with the DSP, Kanchipuram regarding police protection. Due to Covid lock down they could not visit the school. Once again the petitioner approached the police for protection on 10.03.2022, however orally they refused to accord any protection. Hence, seeking police protection, this writ petition has been filed. 7. It is the case of the third respondent that in a criminal case pending against the petitioner with regard to cheating of school children, he is a prime witness. It is the case of the third respondent that he started the school in the year 2002 with a noble intention to benefit and uplift the dalit and marginalised communities. He started the school in a rented building with the name Elijah Hoff Memorial Good Shepherd Nursery and Primary School. In the year 2004, the petitioner's foundation approached him and asked him to join the foundation so that they will adopt the school and raise funds for the benefit of children by getting donations from the donors who are living abroad through their foundation. Even after the school was adopted by the petitioner's foundation, he was functioning as Correspondent and independently working on the school's development, admission, appointment of staff, getting recognition for primary, secondary and higher secondary classes etc., The petitioner was collecting nominal fees from the students and was maintaining proper accounts. 8. It is the further case of the third respondent that he is a bonafide registered lease holder of the property situated in Survey No.536 (Patta No.230), Vaiyanoor village, Kanchipuram Taluk which was duly registered vide Document No.865 of 2012 for a period of 30 years. Hence, he oppose this petition for police protection. 9. 8. It is the further case of the third respondent that he is a bonafide registered lease holder of the property situated in Survey No.536 (Patta No.230), Vaiyanoor village, Kanchipuram Taluk which was duly registered vide Document No.865 of 2012 for a period of 30 years. Hence, he oppose this petition for police protection. 9. The first respondent police filed a status report. According to them Mr.S.Selvakumar alone is still in possession and control of the management of the said school as its Correspondent. Since, he was not vacated from the premises by any specific order of the Court, he could not be forcibly removed from the said school premises. The petitioner intends to interfere with the possession of the third respondent by entering into the said school premises and a law and order problem may arose and he seeks the police protection by applying the above application before this Court. Hence it is contended that the police could not high handedly remove the third respondent from the said school premises without having any specific order obtained by the petitioner for the same from any appropriate civil forum. 10. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently contended that the petitioner's eduction agency runs schools through out the country. The third respondent was appointed as Community Development Officer on 19.05.2004 in the school owned by the petitioner. Though lease deed was entered into in the year 2012 with the local school, at that time, the third respondent was appointed as Correspondent, whereas, the petitioner is the owner of the building and the property was purchased on 09.06.2006 and thereafter there was change in the head office in the year 2018 and it is contended that the third respondent has indulged in misappropriation of funds, which came to the notice of the petitioner and thereafter the third respondent was removed from the correspondent post and police complaint was also given in this regard. When the petitioner entered into the premises in the year 2019, the third respondent is threatening and abusing the petitioner by his caste name. The third respondent has filed a suit for permanent injunction, which was also struck off by this Court. Despite various complaints given to the police they are not giving protection to the petitioner to run the school. The third respondent has filed a suit for permanent injunction, which was also struck off by this Court. Despite various complaints given to the police they are not giving protection to the petitioner to run the school. Therefore, the learned senior counsel submitted that the third respondent is merely a trespasser and he cannot seek injunction against the true owner. The position of the third respondent is that of a trespasser and he is preventing the school from being run by the founder, hence seeks police protection against the third respondent. In support of his contention, the learned senior counsel relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes Vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira reported in (2012) 5 SCC 370 and Dehram Tejani Vs. Azeem Jagani reported in (2017) 2 SCC 759 . 11. Though various submissions were also made with regard to the ownership of the property and management of the school whereas, the learned senior counsel appearing for the third respondent would submit that the third respondent has given exclusive possession and there is a valid lease deed executed in his favour in the year 2012. Though it is claimed by the petitioner that the third respondent was terminated from service, the school is run by the third respondent. It is merely a civil dispute, even assuming that the third respondent is a trespasser, it is settled position of law that the police protection cannot be sought to dispose the person who is already in possession. Hence he oppose this petition. 12. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent police would submit that on their enquiry they found out that the third respondent is in possession of the property, until a competent Civil Court decides the right of the parties, police will not interfere in dispossessing a person. 13. Heard the learned counsel on either side and also perused the entire materials. 14. Though various documents filed in the typed set of papers have been relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, one such document that has been emphasized is the order of this Court striking off the plaint filed by the third respondent in C.R.P.(PD) No.2164 of 2020, wherein this Court has held that Mr.S.Selvakumar was terminated from service on 02.12.2019 and therefore he is no longer a staff to represent the plaintiff in the said suit. He cannot represent the plaintiff, more specifically, as a correspondent. He may have his individual grievances against the defendant, he can always institute a suit in his individual name seeking redressal. But he cannot take advantage of the name of the school and plead innocence and ignorance and seek indulgence. By holding so, the plaint was struck off. 15. It is stated by the learned senior counsel appearing for the third respondent that as against the said order already a S.L.P. has been filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 16. Be that as it may, the very representation of the petitioner dated 01.09.2021 at Page No.93 of the typed set of papers filed by the petitioner, makes it clear that the petitioner has admitted that the third respondent is squatting on the property as a trespasser. The petitioner has recognised the third respondent as a trespasser and though it is stated that the third respondent was terminated from service, he is no longer having any right in the school management. The fact remains that he has been squatting on the property as per the representation of the petitioner themselves. The lease deed entered into between the school and the third respondent as Correspondent, is a registered lease deed for a period of 30 years. Though the third respondent was shown as a correspondent of Good Shepherd Matriculation School, but he was placed into possession based on the above lease deed. 17. Now it is contended by the petitioner that they have terminated the services of the third respondent and therefore he is no longer having any right to remain in the property and he is only a trespasser and he is preventing the school authorities to return to the school. 18. It is relevant to note that the third respondent was originally inducts into possession locally. Now even assuming that his position is a trespasser, the remedy lies for the petitioner to evict him by following due process of law and not by way of the police help. Status Report of the first respondent filed before this Court also indicate that still the third respondent is in control of the school and the entire documents filed by both sides indicate that there is a dispute with regard to the management of the school. Status Report of the first respondent filed before this Court also indicate that still the third respondent is in control of the school and the entire documents filed by both sides indicate that there is a dispute with regard to the management of the school. Though the termination order was also brought to the notice of this Court, but the fact remains that we are not dealing with the termination, but it is for police protection. The very representation of the petitioner itself has indicated that the third respondent is a trespasser on the property. Such being the position, it is for the petitioner to work out his remedies by filing appropriate suit to evict the trespasser including claiming of damages for his illegal occupation. No doubt the two judgments relied on by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner indicate that a person who was in possession as caretaker or agent cannot seek injunction as against the true owner. Absolutely, there is no dispute with regard to the above legal position. Only at the appeal stage alone the judgments have been passed, therefore, the above judgments will not be helpful to the petitioner for granting police aid. 19. Whereas, when the petitioner himself has recognised the third respondent as a trespasser, it is for the petitioner to take appropriate legal action for recovery of possession or evict him from the premises. Without recourse to such course of action, police protection cannot be granted. 20. This Court is of the view that such a protection cannot be granted particularly, when there is rival claim by the other side. The practice of granting the blanket police protection particularly, immovable property without establishing title, leads to serious consequences. In this aspect, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of ''PR. Muralidharan and others Vs.Swami Dharmananda Theertha Padar'' reported in 2006 4 SCC as held as follows: ''19. A Writ for ''Police Protection" socalled, has only a limited scope, as when the Court is approached for protection of rights declared by a decree or by an order passed by a civil Court. Muralidharan and others Vs.Swami Dharmananda Theertha Padar'' reported in 2006 4 SCC as held as follows: ''19. A Writ for ''Police Protection" socalled, has only a limited scope, as when the Court is approached for protection of rights declared by a decree or by an order passed by a civil Court. It cannot be extended to cases where rights have not been determined either finally by the civil Court or, at least at an interlocutory stage in an unambiguous manner, and then too in furtherance of the decree or order.'' Thus, the Hon'ble Apex Court has deprecated the practice of granting police protection in such type of cases. 21. Such view of the matter, police protection cannot be granted, it is well open to the petitioner to evict the person by following due process of law. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed. No costs.