ORDER : The present criminal petition is filed seeking to quash the proceedings in C.C.403 of 2017 before the I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Tenali, Guntur District. 2. The 2nd respondent herein filed a complaint against the petitioners under section 138 read with 142 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which is numbered as C.C.No.403 of 2017on the file of Additional Junior Civil Judge, Tenali. The petitioners herein are arrayed as accused Nos.1 and 2. The allegations in the complaint are that the 2nd accused is the managing partner of the 1st accused and doing construction business; based on the publicity made by the accused that they are going to develop and construct villas at White Field, Bangalore under the name and style of Lotus Green. Accordingly, the complainant/2nd respondent booked Villa No.22 in an extent of 3945 Sq.ft. at the rate of Rs.3,400/- per sq.ft and on 26.12.2013 paid an amount of Rs.17,50,000/- to the accused as initial payment on for booking of the above said villa, through RTGS, City Union Bank, Tenali. Subsequently, in spite of repeated requests, the accused did not answer to the complainant; on that the complainant came to know that the name of the Lotus Green changed into the Villagio by SRK Infra Projects, Visakhapatnam. After knowing the same, the complainant shocked and approached the 2nd accused, then it came to the knowledge of the complainant that the accused has sold the entire project to SRK Infra Projects without any knowledge and consent of the complainant, though they are ready and willing to pay the balance sale consideration and took the possession of Villa No.22. But the accused has intentionally committed all these misdeeds to cause wrongful loss to the complainant. 3. Subsequently after intervention of the well-wishers of both the parties, the matter was settled between the complainant and the accused. As per the said settlement the accused has agreed to pay an amount of Rs.94,36,500/- which includes compensation and payment made by the complainant together with interest. Accordingly, on 27.04.2016 the 2nd accused on her behalf and on behalf of the 1st accused, issued a cheque bearing No.011552 in favour of the complainant for an amount of Rs.94,36,500/- towards full and final satisfaction, drawn on Vijaya Bank, Gandhi Bazar, Bangalore Branch. Accordingly, on 27.04.2016 the 2nd accused on her behalf and on behalf of the 1st accused, issued a cheque bearing No.011552 in favour of the complainant for an amount of Rs.94,36,500/- towards full and final satisfaction, drawn on Vijaya Bank, Gandhi Bazar, Bangalore Branch. At the time of giving the cheque, the 2nd accused on behalf of 1st accused, stated that there are sufficient amounts in the said account. Believing the same, the complainant has presented the said cheque, with his banker City Union Bank Limited, Tenali for collection on 30.04.2016. But surprisingly said cheque was returned with an endorsement payment stopped by the drawer. That itself ipso facto speaks the intention of the accused. The complainant’s banker informed the same to the complainant on 02.05.2016 through a memo to that effect. After receipt of information from the complainant banker, the complainant got issued legal notice on 28.05.2016 through registered post requesting the accused to make payment of the cheque amount within 15 days form the date of receipt of the notice and the same was returned as unclaimed on 11.06.2016. The 2nd accused received the said notice and got issued reply notice on 20.06.2016 with false allegations. Hence, the complainant filed the present complaint against the petitioners. Based on the said complaint, the court issued NBW against the accused No.2. Hence, the present criminal petition. 4. Heard Sri Adinarayana Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners and the public prosecutor appearing for the state. 5. At the stage of admission on 13.06.2019, this court has passed the following order:- “Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the request of the learned counsel for the petitioners, the presence of petitioner No.2/A-2 in the court below in C.C.No.403 of 2017 on the file of the Court of I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Tenali is dispensed with for a period of three weeks. Till then, NBWs shall not be executed.” 6. Subsequently by order dated 03.03.2020, this court has extended the said interim directions for a period of four weeks and while extending the interim directions this court observed that despite notice received by the 2nd respondent, none appeared on its behalf. 7. Till then, NBWs shall not be executed.” 6. Subsequently by order dated 03.03.2020, this court has extended the said interim directions for a period of four weeks and while extending the interim directions this court observed that despite notice received by the 2nd respondent, none appeared on its behalf. 7. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners has contended that in fact the 2nd petitioner has given reply to the legal notice dated 28.05.2016 wherein she has categorically stated that she is no more Managing Partner of M/s.Brundawan Builders and Developers; she has walked out of the firm M/s.Brundawan Builders and Developers and the firm was reconstituted on 20.09.2014 by in favour of Mohan Krishnan Raju along with Books of Accounts. 8. Learned counsel further submitted that the cheque was issued for M/s.Brundawan Builders and Developers, in favour of the 2nd respondent i.e., on 27.04.2016 with the signature of the 2nd petitioner in the capacity of partner. But the fact remains that according to the register of Registrar of Companies/Firms shows that the name of the 2nd respondent is deleted as partner from 23.12.2014 by reconstituting in the name of Sri M.Mohan Krishnam Raju and Sri M.Satyanarayana Raju as continuing partners. 9. Learned senior counsel further argued that the 2nd petitioner filed complaint before the IV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Bangalore stating that while she was the Managing Partner of the Firm, issued 10 blank signed cheques bearing Nos.27011551 to 27011560 belonging to the firm account at Vijaya Bank, Gandhi Nagar Branch, Bengaluru to meet day to day affairs of the firm. It is also stated in the complaint that while leaving the firm, the 2nd petitioner herein demanded to return the said cheques in order to cancel them. But despite her requests, the other partners did not return the blank cheques, by misrepresenting that said cheques are lost and by hatching a conspiracy with third parties. Hence, she has made the compliant and the same was numbered as PCR No.4269 of 2016. Based on the said complaint FIR was registered in Crime No.0107/2016 under sections 406, 420, 120B, 34 of IPC. 10. Hence, she has made the compliant and the same was numbered as PCR No.4269 of 2016. Based on the said complaint FIR was registered in Crime No.0107/2016 under sections 406, 420, 120B, 34 of IPC. 10. Further contention of the learned senior counsel is that that in fact on 23.10.2014 itself she made a request to the Branch Manager Vijaya Bank, Gandhi Bazar, requesting to stop payment for above cheques, since the said cheques were misplaced at the work place of office site. Though said facts were brought to the notice of the 2nd respondent herein/complainant, with malafide intention the 2nd respondent made the present complaint which is contrary to the rulings of the Hon’ble Apex court. 11. Further it is also submitted by the learned counsel that the 2nd petitioner is not disputing her signatures in the said cheques, but disputing that the cheque is anti-dated, she has resigned the Firm in the year 2014 itself. Even as per the record of Registrar of Companies/Firms, Benguluru, it clearly establishes that said register was altered on 23.12.2014 itself by deleting the name of the 2nd petitioner as partner of the firm. When she has left the firm in the year 2014, the question of signing the 2nd petitioner as partner in the year 2016 i.e., 27.04.2016 would not arise. 12. The fact remains that she has requested the Branch Manager, Vijaya Bank with regard to misplacement of 10 cheques serial Nos.27011551 to 27011560 and requested for stop payment. A perusal of the record, it is clearly establishes that basing on the information, she herself made a complaint before the concerned Metropolitan Magistrate stating that the accused therein, by hatching a conspiracy with third parties, did not return the signed blank cheques even after a lapse of two years; accordingly FIR is also registered by the concerned Police. 13. To support his contentions, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners relied on the following decisions:- 1. Nikhil P Gandhi Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors, 2016 (4) Crimes 413 Guj. 2. Harshendra Kumar D. Vs. Rebatilata Koley and Ors., 2011 AIR SC 1090 3. Anita Malhotra Vs. Apparel Export Promotion Council and Ors., 2012 AIR SC 31 14. 13. To support his contentions, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners relied on the following decisions:- 1. Nikhil P Gandhi Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors, 2016 (4) Crimes 413 Guj. 2. Harshendra Kumar D. Vs. Rebatilata Koley and Ors., 2011 AIR SC 1090 3. Anita Malhotra Vs. Apparel Export Promotion Council and Ors., 2012 AIR SC 31 14. Nikhil P Gandhi’s case cited supra, the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedaad observed that – “I can appreciate a situation that a Director of a company who drew the cheque on behalf of that company thinks it fit to tender resignation after having received the notice of dishonour and demand for payment of the cheque drawn by him. In such circumstances, he cannot avoid the criminal liability under Section 138 of the N.I. Act as it may result in incongruous situations. He could not escape from his liability under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The Director appointed in his place subsequently can plead that he was not incharge of affairs of that of that company when the cheque was drawn and so he cannot be made liable. In the circumstances like this, though the offence under Section 138 of the Act becomes complete only if the payment is not made within fifteen days of the receipt of the statutory notice, yet since the Director who tendered the resignation could pay the amount covered by the dishonoured cheque and then resigned. 68. The situation in the case on hand is altogether different. Much before the statutory notice was issued i.e. almost eight years before the issue of statutory notice, the drawer of the cheque had ceased himself to be the Managing Director of the company. There could be many circumstances under which a Director of a company, who drew the cheque, may have to quit the office. Sometimes the company itself would relieve the Director. Like the case in hand, the entire management would change and a new management may take over the affairs of the company. After 2005, the accused, who had drawn cheque, had absolutely no say in the matter of saying that the cheque is honoured. He could not have asked the new management to pay the amount. ........ 71. Like the case in hand, the entire management would change and a new management may take over the affairs of the company. After 2005, the accused, who had drawn cheque, had absolutely no say in the matter of saying that the cheque is honoured. He could not have asked the new management to pay the amount. ........ 71. In taking the aforesaid view, I am also supported by a decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Kamal Goyal v. United Phosphorus Ltd reported in 2013(7) RCR(Cri) 3224. The Delhi High Court also considered D.C.M. Financial Services Limited (supra) and observed in paras 11, 12 and 13 as under:- 11. .... 12. In the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the respondent No.1 resigned from the Directorship of the Company under intimation to the complainant and, in these circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that a person who had resigned with the knowledge of the complainant in the year 1996, could not be a person in charge of the Company in the year 1999 when the cheque was dishonoured as he had no say in the matter that the cheque is honoured and he could not have asked the Company to pay the amount. In my view even if resignation was not given by the petitioner under intimation to the complainant, that would not make any difference, once the Court relying upon certified copy of Form 32 accepts his plea that he was not a director of the Company, on the date the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act committed. He having resigned from the directorship much prior to presentation of the cheque for encashment, he cannot be vicariously liable for the offence committed by the Company, unless it is alleged and shown that even after resigning from directorship, he continued to control the affairs of the company and therefore continued to be person in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. 13. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the complainant/respondent that the being the petitioner being the signatory of cheque in question, he was its drawer within the meaning of Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. In my view, the contention is totally misconceived. The cheque was issued by the Company and not by the petitioner. 13. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the complainant/respondent that the being the petitioner being the signatory of cheque in question, he was its drawer within the meaning of Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. In my view, the contention is totally misconceived. The cheque was issued by the Company and not by the petitioner. He only signed the cheque on behalf of the Company. He does not become a drawer of the cheque merely by signing it on behalf of the company when the cheque is issued by the company in discharge of its debt or the liability and is not signed by him in his personal capacity. If the contention of the learned counsel for the complainant/ respondent is accepted, even an employee of the Company, who on account of his being an authorized signatory signs a cheque issued by the Company towards discharge of the debt or other liability of the Company, would be liable to prosecution and conviction under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act even after he resigns from the company and is no more in its employment. This certainly could not have been the intention of the legislature. Even the vicarious liability created under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act would not be attracted in respect of Director or an employee of the Company who resigns and severs his connections with the company, unless the complainant is able to bring his case within the purview of sub Section 2 of Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act, by proving that the offence had been committed with his consent or connivance or was otherwise attributable to any neglect on his part.” 15. In Harshendra Kumar D. Vs. Rebatilata Koley and Ors case, the Hon’ble Apex court held that:- “........ However, in an appropriate case, if on the face of the documents - which are beyond suspicion or doubt - placed by accused, the accusations against him cannot stand, it would be travesty of justice if accused is relegated to trial and he is asked to prove his defence before the trial court. In such a matter, for promotion of justice or to prevent injustice or abuse of process, the High Court may look into the materials which have significant bearing on the matter at prima facie stage. 21. Criminal prosecution is a serious matter; it affects the liberty of a person. In such a matter, for promotion of justice or to prevent injustice or abuse of process, the High Court may look into the materials which have significant bearing on the matter at prima facie stage. 21. Criminal prosecution is a serious matter; it affects the liberty of a person. No greater damage can be done to the reputation of a person than dragging him in a criminal case. In our opinion, the High Court fell into grave error in not taking into consideration the uncontroverted documents relating to appellant's resignation from the post of Director of the Company. Had these documents been considered by the High Court, it would have been apparent that the appellant has resigned much before the cheques were issued by the Company. As noticed above, the appellant resigned from the post of Director on March 2, 2004. The dishonoured cheques were issued by the Company on April 30, 2004, i.e., much after the appellant had resigned from the post of Director of the Company. The acceptance of appellant's resignation is duly reflected in the resolution dated March 2, 2004. Then in the prescribed form (Form No. 32), the Company informed to the Registrar of Companies on March 4, 2004 about appellant's resignation. It is not even the case of the complainants that the dishonoured cheques were issued by the appellant. These facts leave no manner of doubt that on the date the offence was committed by the Company, the appellant was not the Director; he had nothing to do with the affairs of the Company. In this view of the matter, if the criminal complaints are allowed to proceed against the appellant, it would result in gross injustice to the appellant and tantamount to an abuse of process of the court.” 16. In view of the observations made in the above said judgments, in the instant case also it clearly established that the 2nd petitioner herein has resigned from the firm as a partner, way back in December 2014, the same was showed with the support of the documents i.e., Register of Registrar of Companies/Firms and also private complaint made by the 2nd petitioner herein, which was taken cognizance; FIR also has been registered by the concerned police. Taking relevant date into consideration i.e., issuance the cheque dated 27.04.2016, according to the acceptable material, the petitioner has no more as a partner of the said firm and in such circumstances, issuing of cheque as partner would not arise. Therefore, in exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of Cr.P.C. this court inclined to quash the proceedings against the petitioners in C.C.403 of 2017. 17. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is allowed and the proceedings in C.C.403 of 2017 before the I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Tenali, Guntur District are quashed. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.