JUDGMENT : Arup Kumar Goswami, J. Heard Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned counsel, appearing for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Vikram Sharma, learned Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for the respondents. 2. This appeal is presented against an order dated 07.03.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (S) No. 1510 of 2022, wherein the challenge made to an order dated 04.02.2022 by which the appellant was placed under suspension for the second time, was dismissed. 3. The appellant-petitioner is a Principal of Government Higher Secondary School, Tuman, District Korba, Chhattisgarh. By an order dated 07.09.2021 passed by the Under Secretary, School Education Department, he was placed under suspension under the provisions of Section 9(1)(a) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966, for short, the Rules of 1966, on the grounds that (i) he used to treat his subordinate staff unequally, (ii) he did not pay any heed to the suggestions/requests of the local public representatives and the parents of the students, (iii) he used to pollute the atmosphere of the school, (iv) he made the students carry out a rally and raise slogans in connection with incident of theft and ransacking to the property of the school, (v) in the brief audit, some financial irregularities were detected. It is stated in the said order that the aforesaid acts of the appellant is a serious misconduct in terms of Rules 3 and 5 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965, for short, the Rules of 1965. 4. As the charge sheet could not be issued within a period of 90 days, the order of suspension dated 07.09.2021 was revoked and the petitioner again started to discharge his duties as a Principal. Subsequently, a charge-sheet was issued by the Under Secretary, School Education Department, on 04.02.2022 stating that a disciplinary action is proposed against the appellant under the provisions of Rule 14 of the Rules of 1966. As many as 08 charges were framed against the appellant. On the very same day, the appellant was again placed under suspension under the provisions of Rule 9(1)(a) read with Rule 9(5)(b) of the Rules of 1966. 5. The translated version of the charges levelled against the appellant are as under: “1. As many as 08 charges were framed against the appellant. On the very same day, the appellant was again placed under suspension under the provisions of Rule 9(1)(a) read with Rule 9(5)(b) of the Rules of 1966. 5. The translated version of the charges levelled against the appellant are as under: “1. That, while posted as Principal, Government Higher Secondary School, Tuman, since 25.06.2008, you have been behaving with the staff and the people of the village in an indisciplined and biased manner. 2. That, you have realised a sum of Rs.10,000/- at the rate of Rs. 500 per teacher for doing the data entry in Karmik Sampada. 3. That, in the name of ransacking and theft in the school, under your leadership, you took out a rally of students in the village and made them raise slogans. This act of yours is encouraging indiscipline amongst the students. 4. That, you have withheld/deducted salary of 04 employees of the institution, namely, Shri B.K.Bais (PTI), Shri Kapilram Sahu (Lecturer), Shri K.P.Kurrey (Lecturer) and Shri Rajaram Paikra (Assistant Teacher) for various reasons. 5. That, you are providing House Rent Allowance to two of the teachers, namely, Shri Manharan Lal Sahu, Lecturer and Shri Dukhiram Patel, UDT, of your institution despite they having been allotted government accommodation in the school. 6. That, after December 2019, you have not granted project allowance as per rules to most of the employees despite their working in the project area. 7. That, you have twice paid an amount of Rs. 1000/- on the same date to Mr. Gajendra for transporting stationary by vehicle No. CG 10 VA 7765, through Local Examination Fund Voucher No. 276, dated 29.07.2015 and 277, dated 29.07.2015. 8. That you have withdrawn a sum of Rs. 13,800/- by attaching bills of various general stores and photocopy centers and thereby committed financial irregularities. The above act of yours falls under the category of grave misconduct and is against Rule 3 and 5 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965.” 6. Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Single Judge did not consider the meaning of the term “if it considers expedient so to do” as appearing in Rule 9(5)(b) of the Rules of 1966. Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Single Judge did not consider the meaning of the term “if it considers expedient so to do” as appearing in Rule 9(5)(b) of the Rules of 1966. It is submitted that a plain reading of the order of suspension dated 04.02.2022 would go to show that there was no consideration as to why the appellant had to be again placed under suspension. There was no application of mind and the order of suspension was mechanically passed construing as if whenever the charge sheet is issued, the authority will be at liberty to issue an order of suspension again. Mr. Paranjpe places reliance on the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India & Others v. A.Masilamani, reported in (2013) 6 SCC 530 , Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana, reported in (2000) 5 SCC 82 , Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India & Another, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 291 , and a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Dayaram Khare v. State of Madhya Pradesh (WP No. 4261/2015). 7. Mr. Vikram Sharma, learned Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for the respondents, submits that no interference is called for with regard to the order of the learned Single Judge and that having regard to the nature of charges, the respondent authorities considered it necessary to place the petitioner under suspension. It is further submitted that Rule 9(5)(b) of the Rules of 1966 permits placing of an officer under suspension after a copy of the charge-sheet and other documents as required under Rule 14(4) of the Rules of 1966 had been issued to him and therefore, there is no illegality in issuing the order of suspension dated 04.02.2022. He relies on U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad & Others v. Sanjiv Rajan, reported in (1993) Supp. 3 SCC 483 8. The learned Single Judge, at paragraphs 10 and 15 of the impugned judgment, observed as under: “10. Sub-Rule (5)(a) deals with the effect of suspension in case if charge-sheet is not issued within a period of 45 days or 90 days as the case may be in respect of a government servant. Rule (5)(b) empowers the State Government to again place an employee under suspension whose suspension earlier stood revoked under the 1st or the 2nd proviso to Sub-Rule (5)(a). Rule (5)(b) empowers the State Government to again place an employee under suspension whose suspension earlier stood revoked under the 1st or the 2nd proviso to Sub-Rule (5)(a). So far as the reference of the term “if the government considers expedient so to do” what is meant is that though at the first instance for a period of 45 or 90 days as the case may be, the charge-sheet could not be issued, however, at a later stage if the Department does issue a chargesheet and considering the gravity of the charges and misconduct if the Department wants, they can still place the services of the concerned employee under suspension after issuance of the charge-sheet xxx xxx xxx 15. From the plain reading of the charges leveled against the petitioner and also taking note of the fact that the petitioner is none other than the Principal of the school himself, the nature of charges becomes quite serious. Thus in the given factual backdrop if the respondents-State has placed the services of the petitioner under suspension under Rule 9(5)(b), the same cannot be said to be either malafides or arbitrary, nor can it be said to be contrary to the Rules applicable.” 09. Rule 9(1) of the Rules of 1966 provides that the appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the Governor by general or special order, may place a Government servant under suspension (a) where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending, or (b) where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial. The proviso thereto lays down that where the order of suspension is made by an authority lower than the appointing authority, such authority shall forthwith report to the appointing authority the circumstances under which the order was made. 10. Proviso to Rule 9(2-a) of the Rules of 1966 provides that where the disciplinary authority is the State Government or the High Court, the copy of the charges and other documents mentioned shall be issued or caused to be issued to such Government servant within a period of 90 days from the date of suspension. 10. Proviso to Rule 9(2-a) of the Rules of 1966 provides that where the disciplinary authority is the State Government or the High Court, the copy of the charges and other documents mentioned shall be issued or caused to be issued to such Government servant within a period of 90 days from the date of suspension. Rule 9(2-b) of the Rules of 1966 provides that where the disciplinary authority fails to issue a copy of the charges and other documents to the Government servant within a period of 45 days, before expiry of the said period, the disciplinary authority shall obtain orders in writing of the State Government for extension of the said period of suspension. It is further provided that beyond the period of 90 days from the date of the order of suspension, the period of suspension shall not be enhanced in any case. 11. Rule 9(5)(a) and 9(5)(b) of the Rules of 1966 are relevant for the purpose of this case and therefore, they are extracted herein below: “9(5)(a) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule, shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the authority competent to do so : Provided that the order of suspension shall stand revoked on expiry of the period of forty-five days from the date of order of suspension in case a copy of charges and other documents referred to in sub-rule (2-a) are not issued to such Government servant by the disciplinary authority (if it is not the State Government) without obtaining the orders of the State Government for extension of the period for issue of the said documents, as required under sub-rule (2-b): Provided further that the order of suspension shall stand revoked on expiry of the period of 90 days from the date of order of suspension, in case the copy of charges and other documents referred to in sub-rule (2-a) are not issued to such Government servant. (b) In respect of a Government servant, whose orders of suspension stand revoked in accordance with the first or second proviso of clause (a) the authority competent may, if it considers expedient so to do, place him under suspension after a copy of charges and other documents, as required by sub-rule (4) of Rule 14, have been issued to him.” (emphasis supplied by Court) 12. The translated version of the order of suspension dated 04.02.2022 reads as follows: “Government of Chhattisgarh Department of School Education, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar – 492002 Order Naya Raipur, Dated : 04.02.2022 No. F1-16/2021/20-2 : By even number order dated 07.09.2021 of this Department, Mr. Purushottam Patel, Principal, Government Higher Secondary School, Tuman, District Korba, was placed under suspension under the provisions of Rule 9(1)(a) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1996 on the basis of the allegations that he used to treat his subordinate staff unequally; he did not pay any heed to the suggestions/requests of the local public representatives and the parents of the students; he used to pollute the atmosphere of the school; he made the students carry out a rally and raise slogans in connection with incident of ransacking/theft to the property of the school; in the brief audit, some financial irregularities were detected. 2. As the charge-sheet could not be issued to Mr. Purushottam Patel, Principal, within a period of 90 days of his suspension under the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, the said suspension stood revoked in light of the circular No. C-6-2/92/3/1, dated 20.05.1992 issued by the General Administration Department. 3. Therefore, the State Government, hereby places Mr. Purushottam Patel, Principal, Government Higher Secondary School, Tuman, District Korba, under suspension with immediate effect under the provisions of Rule 9(1)(a) read with Rule 5(b) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966, assigning the office of the District Education Officer, Korba, as his Headquarter. 4. During the period of suspension, Mr. Purushottam Patel would be eligible for the subsistence allowance. By order and in the name of Governor of Chhattisgarh Sd/- illegible (Anvesh Dhritlahre) Government of Chhattisgarh School Education Department” 13. In Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down that currency of a suspension order should not extend beyond three months if within this period the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is not served on the delinquent officer/employee. It was also laid down that if the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is served, a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the suspension. 14. In State of Tamil Nadu Rep. by Secretary to Govt. It was also laid down that if the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is served, a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the suspension. 14. In State of Tamil Nadu Rep. by Secretary to Govt. (Home) v. Promod Kumar, IPS & Another, reported in (2018) 17 SCC 677 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has frowned upon the practice of protracted suspension and held that suspension must necessarily be for a short duration. 15. In U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that whether the employees should or should not continue in their office during the period of inquiry is a matter to be assessed by the concerned authority. Ordinarily, the Court should not interfere with the orders of suspension unless they are passed mala fide or passed without there being even a prima facie evidence on record connecting the employees with the misconduct in question. 16. In Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India & Others (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court was examining the true import of the word ‘consider’. It was observed that the word ‘consider’ is of great significance. The dictionary meaning of the same is, ‘to think over’, ‘to regard as’, or ‘deem to be’. Hence, there is a clear connotation to the effect that there must be active application of mind. In other words, the term ‘consider’ postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of the matter and thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the materials available on record. The order of the authority itself should reveal such application of mind. 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Dalbir Singh (supra), while dealing with Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, at paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 observed as under: “7. The condition for applying Section 4 of the PO Act have been delineated in the commencing portion of the provision in the following words: “4. 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Dalbir Singh (supra), while dealing with Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, at paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 observed as under: “7. The condition for applying Section 4 of the PO Act have been delineated in the commencing portion of the provision in the following words: “4. When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct…” 8. Parliament made it clear that only if the court forms the opinion that it is expedient to release him on probation for his good conduct regard being had to the circumstances of the case. One of the circumstances which cannot be sidelined in forming the said opinion is “the nature of the offence”. 9. Thus Parliament has left it to the Court to decide when and how the Court should form such opinion. It provided sufficient indication that releasing the convicted person on probation of good conduct must appear to the Court to be expedient. The word ‘expedient’ had been thoughtfully employed by Parliament in the section so as to mean it as ‘apt and suitable to the end in view’. In Black's Law Dictionary the word "expedient" is defined as "suitable and appropriate for accomplishment of a specified object" besides the other meaning referred to earlier. In State of Gujarat v. Jamnadas G. Pabri & Ors. {AIR (1974) SC 2233}, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has considered the word "expedient''. Learned Judges have observed in paragraph 21 thus : "Again, the word 'expedient' used in these provisions, has several shades of meaning. In one dictionary sense, 'expedient' (adj.) means 'apt and suitable to the end in view', 'practical and efficient'; 'politic'; 'profitable'; 'advisable', 'fit, proper and suitable to the circumstances of the case'. In another shade, it means a device 'characterised by mere utility rather than principle, conducive to special advantage rather than to what is universally right' (see Webster's New International Dictionary)." 18. In another shade, it means a device 'characterised by mere utility rather than principle, conducive to special advantage rather than to what is universally right' (see Webster's New International Dictionary)." 18. A Single Bench of High Court of Madhya Pradesh, in Dayaram Khare (supra), observed as follows: “The emphasis is on the words ‘if it considers, expedient so to do’. Thus, if a government servant is required to be again placed under suspension after issuance of the charge-sheet after expiry of the prescribed period of 45 days or 90 days, as the case may be, then such authority is required to record reasons for such expediency to place such government servant under suspension, but in the impugned order, no such expediency has been explained or mentioned. Thus, it cannot be said that the order dated 23.06.2015 is in terms of the authority bestowed on the District Education Officer in terms of Rule 9(5)(b) of the CCA Rules, because expediency also means there should be an explanation as to why the disciplinary authority deems it proper to place the concerned government servant under suspension again. In absence of any such explanation in the order, such order cannot be sustained…” 19. A perusal of Rule 9(5)(b) of the Rules of 1966 does not lead to conclusion that in respect of a Government servant whose order of suspension stands revoked in accordance with the first or second proviso of Rule 5(a), the authority competent may routinely or automatically place him under suspension after a copy of charge-sheet and other documents as required by Rule 14(4) had been issued to him. It is important to note the expression ‘if it considers expedient so to do’ occurring in Rule 9(5)(b) of the Rules of 1966. Such an expression cannot be ignored and the expression has to be given its due meaning. In view of the interpretation given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court to the words ‘consider’ and ‘expedient’, it is obligatory on the part of the authority to record reasons, which would demonstrate formation of opinion on due application of mind, for placing the Government servant under suspension again. In other words, reason as to why it was considered necessary to place the officer under suspension again has to be indicated. 20. In other words, reason as to why it was considered necessary to place the officer under suspension again has to be indicated. 20. A reading of the order of suspension dated 04.02.2022 would go to show that the aforesaid order does not reflect that any consideration was made as to why it was considered expedient to place the appellant under suspension. We had requested Mr. Vikram Sharma, learned Deputy Government Advocate, to obtain the relevant note-sheets leading to passing of the order of suspension dated 04.02.2022 and on perusal of the same, Mr. Sharma very fairly submits that the note-sheets also do not reflect any consideration as to why further suspension of the appellant was required. 21. The second order of suspension was passed after about 2 ½ months of resumption of duty by the appellant after revocation of the first suspension order dated 07.09.2021. The learned Single Judge had observed that the nature of charges are grave, but that is not how the competent authority has proceeded in the matter. It was for the authority to decide whether having regard to the nature of charges, suspension of the officer is warranted. The order reflects total non-application of mind and the order of suspension has been passed in a routine and mechanical manner on a fallacious assumption that suspension order should invariably follow once a charge-sheet is issued. 22. In view of the above discussion, the order of suspension cannot be sustained in law. The same is set aside. The appeal is allowed and the order dated 07.03.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside. No cost.