JUDGMENT : At the request of the learned counsel for the petitioners, the defects as pointed out by the office are ignored. The present writ petition has been filed for issuance of direction upon the respondents to fix the cut-off date for upper age limit either from the date of existence of vacancies or in alternative from the date when the present examination was scheduled to be held earlier in the year 2019 or before, by substituting the same in the Clause-5 of the advertisement being Advertisement No. 06 of 2021 (Amended) published on 03.02.2022 inviting applications for appointment to the posts of Junior Engineer (Electrical, Civil, Mechanical and Agricultural engineering trades). Further prayer has been made to extend the time for submission of their application forms. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission (JSSC) published advertisement on its official website for conducting Jharkhand Diploma Level Combined Competitive Examination-2021 being Advertisement No. 06/2021 for making appointment to the posts of Junior Engineer (Electrical), Junior Engineer (Civil) and Junior Engineer (Mechanical) in Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi and the cut-off date for calculating the minimum and maximum age limit was fixed as 01.08.2021. Thereafter, amended Advertisement No. 06/2021 was published on 03.02.2022 wherein apart from the previous vacancies, the vacancies for the posts of Junior Engineer vacant in other departments such as Drinking water and Sanitation Department, Water Resources Department, Road Construction Department, Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Co-operative Department of Government of Jharkhand were also included providing the cut-off date as 01.08.2021 for calculating the minimum and maximum age limit regarding vacancies of earlier department i.e., Urban Development and Housing, however, the said cut-off date regarding vacancies of newly added departments was fixed as 01.08.2022. Earlier, the JSSC had conducted the examination in the year 2014 for the same post and at that time, the cut-off date for calculating the minimum and maximum age limit was fixed as 01.08.2014 and thereafter, no competitive examination for filling up the vacant posts of Junior Engineer was ever conducted for all these 7 years. It is further submitted that before 2014, the advertisement for the same post was published in the year 2012 and only after a gap of 2 years, the next advertisement was published by the respondent-JSSC. It is further submitted that before 2014, the advertisement for the same post was published in the year 2012 and only after a gap of 2 years, the next advertisement was published by the respondent-JSSC. However, for all these 7 years, the respondent-State/JSSC has not taken any examination or published any advertisement for filling up the post of junior engineer, rather they kept appointing the junior engineers only on contractual basis though permanent vacancies of sanctioned post existed since 2015. As per calendar available on the website of JSSC, it was shown that examination would be conducted in April 2019, however, the same was not conducted. Due to not taking regular examination for filling the vacant posts of Junior Engineer, the petitioners have become age barred with respect to the cut off date of upper age limit which has been fixed as 01.08.2022 in the amended advertisement and for the said reason, the petitioners being ineligible are unable to fill up forms of the said examination. Moreover, the respondent-State also could not conduct any examination since March 2020 due to spread of COVID-19 pandemic and hence, they lost 2 precious years of their career. The aforesaid situation was not in control of anyone as the same was an act of God, for which the upper age limit of the petitioners should have been considered. The respondent-State in other competitive examination i.e., Civil Services Combined Competitive Examination, 2021, has fixed the upper age limit from the date when the vacancies were existing i.e., 01.08.2016, as no civil services examination was conducted in the State of Jharkhand from 2016 till 2021. After publication of Advertisement No. 06/2021, the petitioners have immediately represented the respondent authorities vide letter dated 09.02.2022 requesting inter alia to give relaxation in cut off date of upper age limit which has been fixed as 01.08.2022 so that suitable candidates who were preparing for this examination since long may not be left out. However, the respondents have not responded to the same. They have also failed to consider that not holding regular examinations for filling up the vacant post of Junior Engineers for a long period itself violates the fundamental rights of the petitioners. Since huge backlog and large number of vacancies have been accumulated since 2014, the cases of those candidates who were waiting for the said examination since long should be considered. 3. Since huge backlog and large number of vacancies have been accumulated since 2014, the cases of those candidates who were waiting for the said examination since long should be considered. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners, in support of his argument puts reliance on the judgment rendered by the learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of “Sanjiv Kumar Sahay & Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors.” reported in 2008 (2) JLJR 543 , granting relaxation of age by modifying the cut-off date to calculate the maximum age of 35 years from 31.01.2008 to 31.01.2003. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners puts further reliance on the judgment rendered by the learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of “Bhola Nath Rajak & Ors. Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.” reported in 2014 (1) JLJR 217 , wherein having considered that there was a gap of about more than 5 years between the earlier advertisement issued in the year 2008 and in the year 2013 and as a consequence, the eligible candidates aspiring to appear for the Civil Judge (Junior Division)/Munsif Examination, 2013 might have crossed their age between the period 2008 and 2013 since they did not get the opportunity to appear in the said examination, the cut-off date was ordered to be fixed as 31.01.2009 instead of 31.01.2013 to render complete justice. 5. Mr. Sanjay Piparwall, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent nos. 4 and 5 and Mr. Mohan Kumar Dubey, AC to AG appearing on behalf of the respondent nos. 1 to 3, while countering the said argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners, put reliance on another judgment rendered by the learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of “Krishna Kumar Mishra Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.” reported in 2018 Supreme (Jhk) 130 and submit that the aforesaid judgments heavily relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners have been held per incuriam. 6. I have perused the said judgment rendered by learned Division Bench in the case of “Krishna Kumar Mishra” (supra), the relevant part of which reproduced hereinbelow:- Per incuriam judgments: XXIV. 6. I have perused the said judgment rendered by learned Division Bench in the case of “Krishna Kumar Mishra” (supra), the relevant part of which reproduced hereinbelow:- Per incuriam judgments: XXIV. Much has been argued out by the counsel for the petitioners about the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court, reported in 2005 (3) JCR 505 and 2008 (2) JLJR 543 as well as the judgment delivered in W.P.(S) No.7524 of 2013 dated 16.01.2014, for change of cut-off date. None of the aforesaid judgments are helpful to the petitioners mainly for the following reasons: (a) If any judgment is delivered out of ignorance, such type of judgment is known as per incuriam judgment; (b) If the earlier catena of decisions, rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, have never been cited before the earlier Division Bench nor the same have been discussed by the earlier Division Bench, and out of this type of ignorance, if any judgment is delivered then such type of judgments are per incuriam and impliedly overruled and the ratio propounded by such type of judgments are not binding. (c) 'Incuria' literally means carelessness. In practice per incuriam is taken to mean per ignorantium. 'Per Incuriam' are those decisions given in ignorance in forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the court concerned. (d) Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or preceded without any reason cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as a precedent. Restraint in dissenting or overruling is for sake of stability and uniformity but rigidity beyond reasonable limits is inimical to the growth of law. (e) The rule of per incuriam can be applied where a Court omits to consider a binding precedent of the same Court or the superior Court rendered on the same issue deciding that issue. (f) Therefore, when a Court delivers a judgment in obvious inadvertence or oversight of a plain statutory authority running counter to the reason and result reached, it may not have the sway of binding precedent. This is more so the case than such omission is obtrusive and glaring. (g) A decision or judgment can also be held to be per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of co-equal or larger Bench. This is more so the case than such omission is obtrusive and glaring. (g) A decision or judgment can also be held to be per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of co-equal or larger Bench. (h) A judgment in which there is no consideration of the principle of law and thus, the said order without there being contest on the principle of law cannot be treated as a precedent for deciding the legal issue at hand. (i) Any decision of the High Court which has taken a view contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court would stand overruled as a consequence of the same. (j) In a matter wherein the decision of the Supreme Court holds binding authority, and same has been erroneously ignored, then any subsequent decision must implicitly follow the decision of the Supreme Court holding such ignorant judgment as impliedly overruled. 7. After citing several judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the point of “per incuriam”, the learned Division Bench has held as under: XXVIII. On the basis of the aforesaid decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the law can be summarized as under:- (i) The choice of date as a basis for classification fixed by the legislature or its delegate cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary, even if, no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless, it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances, (ii) The cut-off date, to attain the minimum or maximum age, must be specific and determinate on a particular date and it cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date, because it may lead to consequences, anomalies and uncertainties. (iii) Mere errors of government in fixing of cut off date, which may be unjust and oppressive are not subject to judicial review, it is only its palpable arbitrary exercise which can be declared void. (iv) It is the discretion of the rule-making authority or employer, to fix a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age prescribed for a post and it cannot be, per se arbitrary, unless the cut-off date, is as wide off the mark, as to make it wholly unreasonable. (v) A cut-off date cannot be fixed with any mathematical precision. (v) A cut-off date cannot be fixed with any mathematical precision. As soon as a cut-off date is fixed there will be some persons who fall on the right side of the cut-off date and some persons fall on the wrong side of the cut-off date and the persons falling on the wrong side cannot challenge the same, unless, it is as capricious or whimsical as to be wholly unreasonable. (vi) There cannot be any “wholesale relaxation” on the ground that the advertisement is delayed unless, there is an allegation of any mala fides in connection with delay in issuing an advertisement. This wholesale relaxation would make total uncertainty in determining the maximum age of a candidate and it might be unfair for large number of similarly situated candidates who may not apply, thinking that they are age-barred. (vii) A cut-off date can be provided in terms of the provisions of statute or executive order and if any hardship is caused to some persons or a section of society that may by itself cannot be a ground for holding that the cut-off date so fixed is ultra vires to Article 14 of the constitution. (viii) The fixing of cut-off dates is within the domain of the executive authority. There may be various considerations in the mind of the executive authorities due to which a particular cut-off date is fixed. These considerations can be financial, administrative or other considerations. Therefore the court should not normally interfere with the fixation of cut-off date by the executive authority unless such order appears to be on the face of it blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary. 8. On perusal of the aforesaid judgments, it would be evident that the judgments of “Sanjiv Kumar Sahay” (supra) and “Bhola Nath Rajak” (supra) [W.P.(S) No. 7526 of 2013 which is wrongly typed as W.P.(S) No. 7524 of 2013 in the case of “Krishna Kumar Mishra” (supra)] relied upon by the petitioners have been held per incuriam observing that the same have been passed without having discussed the earlier binding judgments. Learned Division Bench in the case of “Krishna Kumar Mishra” (supra) after citing various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that fixation of cut-off date is within the domain of the executive and the court should not normally interfere with the said aspect. Learned Division Bench in the case of “Krishna Kumar Mishra” (supra) after citing various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that fixation of cut-off date is within the domain of the executive and the court should not normally interfere with the said aspect. The fixation of cut-off date cannot be relaxed on mere ground of delay in issuance of advertisement or due to hardships suffered by the aggrieved persons. 9. Moreover, this Court, in the case of “Mukesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. Jharkhand Public Service Commission, Ranchi & Anr.” reported in 2021 (3) JLJR 575 after having gone through the judgment of learned Division Bench of this Court rendered in the case of “Krishna Kumar Mishra” (supra) and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Hirandra Kumar Vs. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad & Anr.” reported in (2019) SCC OnLine SC 254, has held as under: 9. Thus, it is the discretion of the rule-making authority or employer to fix a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age for a post and the said fixing of cut-off date can be interfered with only if the same is palpably an arbitrary exercise of power or appears to be very wide off the reasonable mark. Merely delay in advertising public posts cannot be a ground to give wholesale relaxation to those who come to the court as the same will create an uncertainty and it might be unfair for those who did not fill the form thinking themselves to be overage. Moreover, the fixing of cut-off date cannot be held arbitrary merely on the ground of hardship. Since fixing of cut-off date is within the domain of the executive, the court should not normally interfere with the fixation of the same unless such decision appears to be blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary on the face of it. As soon as a cut-off date is fixed, there will be some aspirants falling on the wrong side of the cut-off date, however, they may not be allowed to challenge the same unless it is capricious or whimsical. 10. Thus, the delay in publication of advertisement to fill up public posts cannot be a ground to give relaxation in the cut-off date for upper age limit especially when there is no allegation of any malafide in connection with delay caused in issuance of the same. 11. 10. Thus, the delay in publication of advertisement to fill up public posts cannot be a ground to give relaxation in the cut-off date for upper age limit especially when there is no allegation of any malafide in connection with delay caused in issuance of the same. 11. That apart, the learned counsel for the respondents have invited the attention of this Court to rule 5 of the Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission Examination (Graduate Level) Conduct Rules, 2015, according to which, 1st August of the year of requisition is to be taken into consideration for calculating the age of a candidate. In the case in hand, initially Advertisement No. 06/2021 issued for filling up the post of Junior Engineers in Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi was advertised in the year 2021, wherein the cut-off date was fixed as 01.08.2021. Subsequently, the said advertisement was revised vide another Advertisement No. 06/2021 published on 03.02.2022, wherein the cut-off date regarding calculation of minimum and maximum age limit for the previous vacancy was fixed as 01.08.2021 and for the new vacancies, the said cut-off date was fixed as 01.08.2022. Thus, the fixation of the said cut-off dates appears to be in conformity with the Rules, 2015, which needs no interference by this Court under the extraordinary writ jurisdiction. The claim of the petitioners is that they have been deprived of appearing in the examination for the posts of junior engineer due to delay in publishing the advertisement by the respondents which has caused hardship to them, however, it is a well settled law that the hardship of aggrieved persons cannot be a ground to give age relaxation. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I see no reason to entertain the petitioners’ prayer made in the present writ petition and the same being devoid of merit is accordingly dismissed.