JUDGMENT 1. Heard. 2. This appeal arises out of order dated 16.12.2015 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby, the writ petition filed by the appellant-writ-petitioner has been dismissed. 3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the factual matrix of the case giving rise to this appeal is that the appellant-writ-petitioner, desirous of seeking admission to B.Ed. course in the institution of the respondents, applied along with his credentials, which also included proof of he being a commerce graduate with degree of having passed B.Com. and also a certificate of teaching experience. The appellant-writ-petitioner was granted provisional admission. He continued to pursue B.Ed. course and, thereafter, appeared in the final examination and having obtained minimum qualifying marks, was declared pass. A mark-sheet of passing B.Ed. course was issued in favour of the appellant-writ-petitioner. However, thereafter, it appears that some adverse material was collected against the appellant-writ-petitioner by the respondents-Institute, which led to cancellation of his admission vide impugned order dated 16/17.09.1998. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant-writ-petitioner filed writ petition. 4. In the writ petition, initially an interim order was passed by the learned Single Judge on 14.09.1999 staying the operation of order of cancellation of examination though with liberty to the University to hold an enquiry. When the matter again came up for hearing before the court on 03.02.2014, as there was no one to press the writ petition, the same was dismissed. It was, however, observed that if the appellant-writ-petitioner has already pursued the course then dismissal of the writ petition will not affect him. 5. According to the appellant-writ-petitioner, this order was not known to him and it is only when the departmental authority gave him a notice on 16.07.2015 that he came to know about the same and, therefore, an application for restoration was moved. Vide order dated 16.12.2015, the order dated 03.02.2014 was recalled, writ petition was restored to its original number and in the same breath, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition holding that the counsel for the appellant-writ-petitioner could not dislodge the contention advanced by the respondents that the experience certificate furnished by the appellant-writ-petitioner was forged. It is this order, which has been assailed in this appeal. 6. It is this order, which has been assailed in this appeal. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-writ-petitioner would argue that the cancellation of examination in which the appellant-writ-petitioner appeared successfully and was declared pass, has taken place without affording him any opportunity of hearing whatsoever. He would argue that the allegation that experience certificate was forged is a serious one. The appellantwrit-petitioner stands by the certificate issued by the then District Education Officer annexed along with the writ petition and which was also placed before the admission authorities at the time of admission to B.Ed. course. He would argue that the material, which was collected behind appellant’s back by the respondents-authorities to cancel examination much after he had already passed the examination, was never disclosed to him. Further contention of learned counsel for the appellant-writ-petitioner is that the appellant-writ-petitioner was never afforded any opportunity of hearing before taking such a drastic action of cancellation of his examination. Learned counsel for the appellantwrit-petitioner would argue that the action of the respondents-authorities has resulted in serious civil consequences. Therefore, the respondents ought to have afforded an opportunity of hearing as also disclosed adverse material on the basis of which, decision was taken to cancel examination. This having not been done, it is argued, the impugned action of the respondents-authorities is bad in law. 7. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would argue that in the present case, when the appellant-writpetitioner had submitted his application for admission to B.Ed. courses, he was granted only provisional admission on clear terms and stipulation that if, in future, any fact or document is found to be false/incorrect, admission would be cancelled and fee would be forfeited. Referring to the averments made in the reply, learned counsel for the respondents would argue that as per usual verification, the experience certificates submitted by various candidates including the appellant-writ-petitioner were sent to the respective District Education Officer from where those certificates were stated to have been obtained. The information received from the concerned District Education Officer was that the experience certificate submitted by the appellant-writ-petitioner was a forged one. There was no reason for the respondents to doubt the veracity or correctness of an official communication received from the concerned District Education Officer and, therefore, on that basis, the admission of the appellant-writ-petitioner was cancelled. 8. The information received from the concerned District Education Officer was that the experience certificate submitted by the appellant-writ-petitioner was a forged one. There was no reason for the respondents to doubt the veracity or correctness of an official communication received from the concerned District Education Officer and, therefore, on that basis, the admission of the appellant-writ-petitioner was cancelled. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents would also argue that the appellant-writ-petitioner has failed to substantiate and prove by discharging his burden that he had actually taught in the school for the period in respect of which certificate was issued in his favour and on which basis, he secured admission in B.Ed. course. Even before this Court, it is argued, relevant records of the concerned school have not been placed to prove and establish that the appellant-writ-petitioner actually taught in the concerned school and acquired experience on the basis of which he was entitled to get experience certificate. Therefore, the appellantwrit-petitioner is not entitled to any relief only on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Ram Saran Versus IG of Police, CRPF and Others, (2006) 2 Supreme Court Cases 541 and Jayashree Versus The Director Collegiate Education, (Civil Appeal No.1559 of 2022) decided on 22.02.2022. 9. It is also the submission of learned counsel for the respondents that when initially an order was passed by the Court on 14.09.1999 staying the operation of the order of cancellation, a liberty was reserved to the University to hold an enquiry. The University issued notice to the appellant-writ-petitioner, but the appellant-writ-petitioner replied to the same by saying that the matter is subjudice. Therefore, the appellant-writ-petitioner is not entitled to discretionary relief on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. It is also submitted that later on, the employer of the appellant-writ-petitioner also terminated the appellant-writ-petitioner’s services vide order dated 14.12.2015 after giving him a notice on 16.07.2015. In view of aforesaid special circumstances and that the order of termination from service is separately under challenge in another writ petition, insofar as the present appeal is concerned, the appellant-writpetitioner is not entitled to any relief. 10. In view of aforesaid special circumstances and that the order of termination from service is separately under challenge in another writ petition, insofar as the present appeal is concerned, the appellant-writpetitioner is not entitled to any relief. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records and given our anxious consideration to various submissions made before us. 11. It is not in dispute that at the time of seeking admission, the appellant-writ-petitioner had submitted documents in support of his eligibility to get admission in B.Ed. course, one of them being three years teaching experience. Along with the writ petition, the appellant-writ-petitioner has annexed a certificate of experience dated 23.12.1995, which shows that he taught in Senior Secondary Vishwabandhu Vidya Mandir, Bhandarej, District Dausa from 01.07.1992 to 20.12.1995 continuously. The school is also declared to be recognized by the Government. This certificate bears seal and signatures of not only District Education Officer, but number of other officers including Headmaster of the concerned school. On the basis of the aforesaid certificate of experience, the appellant-writ-petitioner was treated to be eligible for admission to B.Ed. course. A letter of admission was issued to the appellantwrit-petitioner on 16.04.1996 followed by letter dated 01.07.1996. Though, the letter states that the admission is provisional, it is an undisputed fact on record that the appellant-writ-petitioner was allowed to pursue the course, appeared in the examination and he successfully passed B.Ed. course also, which is evident from his mark-sheet annexed along with the writ petition. The examination was conducted in the month of December, 1997. It, thus, appears that though initially the admission was treated to be provisional, by lapse of time, the appellant-writ-petitioner was allowed to pursue the course, appeared in the examination and declared pass also, therefore, his admission could not be treated as provisional in nature. The appellant-writ-petitioner acquired right to pursue the course and having successfully completed, was awarded a degree also. 12. Eventually, on 17.09.1998, by impugned order, the examination result of B.Ed. programme held in December, 1997 of number of candidates including the appellant-writ-petitioner was cancelled. 13. It is not in dispute that before cancellation of the result based on the examination held in December, 1997, no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the appellant-writ-petitioner. It was a serious action against the appellant-writ-petitioner, which affected not only his academic carrier, but also future prospects of employment. 13. It is not in dispute that before cancellation of the result based on the examination held in December, 1997, no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the appellant-writ-petitioner. It was a serious action against the appellant-writ-petitioner, which affected not only his academic carrier, but also future prospects of employment. Such being serious consequences, it was a case where the appellant-writ-petitioner was required to be afforded an opportunity of hearing before taking action. 14. We have also noticed that when in the writ petition, interim order was passed on 14.09.1999, the liberty was reserved to the University to hold enquiry and notice was also given to the appellant-writ-petitioner to which a reply was given by the appellant-writ-petitioner, but thereafter, University did not proceed to pass final order in the matter. 15. During the course of hearing in the present appeal, a statement was made before us on 13.12.2021 that subsequently another enquiry was made in the year 2015 in which the appellant-writ-petitioner was afforded an opportunity of hearing. Thereafter, affidavit has been filed by the respondents which only shows that a notice was given, reply was obtained, but thereafter, nothing happened, much-less any order passed against the appellant-writ-petitioner. 16. Subject to certain exceptions, it is well settled legal proposition as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its Constitution Bench Judgment in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and Another Versus The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 851 that whenever adverse civil consequences ensue, opportunity of hearing is a must and ordinarily it does not admit of any exclusionary rule. Therefore, affording opportunity of hearing before taking any adverse action is a principle of general application subject to certain exceptions only. 17. In order to persuade this court that present is a case of an exception to the application of principles of natural justice, learned counsel for the respondent argued that the appellant-writpetitioner having approached the Court was required to establish by leading appropriate evidence, oral and/or documentary, to establish that the appellant-writ-petitioner had actually taught in the concerned school for the period as stated in the disputed certificate. 18. We are not convinced with this argument at all. The records of the concerned school are not in the hands of the appellant-writpetitioner. He is not the custodian of those records. 18. We are not convinced with this argument at all. The records of the concerned school are not in the hands of the appellant-writpetitioner. He is not the custodian of those records. Secondly, the issue as to whether the certificate was forged or not could be decided only in a fact finding enquiry. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the certificate which is sought to be disputed, has not only been signed by the District Education Officer under his own seal, but also by the Headmaster of the school where the appellant-writ-petitioner claims to have taught various classes. No material was placed before the Court by the respondent-Institution nor by the District Education Officer, District Dausa, who is also party in this appeal to convince the Court that present is a case of forgone conclusion and affording an opportunity of hearing would be useless formality. In the absence of any such material placed before us, requiring the appellant-writ-petitioner to prove otherwise would amount to giving complete go by to the settled principles of law that an action resulting in civil consequences without affording an opportunity of hearing would be void ab initio. The action of public authorities must confirm to the principles of natural justice, fairness and objectivity. If a person is subjected to the civil consequences serious in nature like the present one, reverse burden cannot be put on that person to prove otherwise, even when the allegations on the basis of which action against him has been taken, could not be proved to the hilt before the Court. In the absence of any cogent material before us, except the communication made by the District Education Officer, we are not inclined to hold that present is a case of an exception. 19. As to under what exceptional circumstances, mere violation of principles of natural justice would not entitle a party to relief, has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in number of cases. 20. In the case of Aligarh Muslim University and Others Versus Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 Supreme Court Cases 529, their Lordships in the Supreme Court authoritatively held that non compliance with principles of natural justice unless the cases prejudice does not automatically entitle one to relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Their Lordships, however, explained doctrine of useless formality as below:- "21. Their Lordships, however, explained doctrine of useless formality as below:- "21. As pointed recently in M.C. Mehta V. Union of India 1999 (6) SCC 237 there can be certain situations in which an order passed in violation of natural justice need not be set aside under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For example where no prejudice is caused to the person concerned, interference under Article 226 is not necessary. Similarly, if the quashing of the order which is in breach of natural justice is likely to result in revival of another order which is in itself illegal as in Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of A.P. AIR 1966 SC 828 , it is not necessary to quash the order merely because of violation of principles of natural justice. 22. In M.C. Mehta 1999 (6) SCC 237 it was pointed out that at one time, it was held in Ridge vs. Baldwin 1964 AC 40 that breach of principles of natural justice was in itself treated as prejudice and that no other ’de facto’ prejudice needed to be proved. But, since then the rigour of the rule has been relaxed not only in England but also in our country. In S.L. Kapoor V. Jagmohan (1980) 4 SCC 379 , Chinnappa Reddy, J. followed Ridge vs. Baldwin 1964 AC 40 and set aside the order of supersession of the New Delhi Metropolitan Committee rejecting the argument that there was no prejudice though notice was not given. The proceedings were quashed on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. But even in that case certain exceptions were laid down to which we shall presently refer. 23. Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.L. Kapoor case (1980) 4 SCC 379 laid down two exceptions (at SCC p.395) namely, " if upon admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion was possible", then in such a case, the principle that breach of natural justice was in itself prejudice, would not apply. In other words if no other conclusion was possible on admitted or indisputable facts, it is not necessary to quash the order which was passed in violation of natural justice. Of course, this being an exception, great care must be taken in applying this exception. 24. The principle that in addition to breach of natural justice, prejudice must also be proved has been developed in several cases. Of course, this being an exception, great care must be taken in applying this exception. 24. The principle that in addition to breach of natural justice, prejudice must also be proved has been developed in several cases. In K.L. Tripathi V. State Bank of India (1984) 1 SCC 43 , Sabyasachi Mukherji, J. (as he then was) also laid down the principle that not mere violation of natural justice but de facto prejudice (other than non-issue of notice) had to be proved. It was observed, quoting Wade’s Administrative Law (5th Edn., pp.472-75), as follows: (SCC p.58, para 31) "[I]t is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when principles of natural justice are to apply, nor as their scope and extent..... There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subjectmatter to be dealt with, and so forth". Since then, this Court has consistently applied the principle of prejudice in several cases. The above ruling and various other rulings taking the same view have been exhaustively referred to in State Bank of Patiala V. S.K. Sharma (1996) 3 SCC 364 . In that case, the principle of ’prejudice’ has been further elaborated. The same principle has been reiterated again in Rajendra Singh V. State of M.P. (1996) 5 SCC 460 . 25. The ’useless formality’ theory, it must be noted, is an exception. Apart from the class of cases of "admitted or indisputable facts leading only to one conclusion" referred to above, there has been considerable debate of the application of that theory in other cases. The divergent views expressed in regard to this theory have been elaborately considered by this Court in M.C. Mehta (1999) 6 SCC 237 referred to above. This Court surveyed the views expressed in various judgments in England by Lord Reid, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Woolf, Lord Bingham, Megarry, J. and Straughton L.J. etc. in various cases and also views expressed by leading writers like Profs. Garner, Craig, de Smith, Wade, D.H. Clark etc. Some of them have said that orders passed in violation must always be quashed for otherwise the Court will be prejudging the issue. in various cases and also views expressed by leading writers like Profs. Garner, Craig, de Smith, Wade, D.H. Clark etc. Some of them have said that orders passed in violation must always be quashed for otherwise the Court will be prejudging the issue. Some others have said that there is no such absolute rule and prejudice must be shown. Yet, some others have applied via media rules. We do not think it necessary in this case to go deeper into these issues. In the ultimate analysis, it may depend on the facts of a particular case. 21. Having surveyed the aforesaid decisions and the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in different circumstances, applying those principles in the peculiar facts and circumstance of the present case, we are of the view that present is not a case of forgone conclusion or a case of useless formality. 22. Therefore, violation of principles of natural justice necessarily would result in rendering the action of the respondents as being void ab initio as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its Constitutional Bench Judgment in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill (Supra). 23. Though, learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon an order passed by the Departmental Authority on 14.12.2015 terminating the services of the appellant-writ-petitioner, we find that the scope of that enquiry was only whether the appellantwrit-petitioner was possessed of B.Ed. certificate between the period from 1999 to 2014. The show cause notice dated 16.07.2015 and order dated 14.12.2015 does not show that any evidence was collected by affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant-writ-petitioner and then a finding was recorded with regard to certificate of experience being forged. Therefore, the departmental proceedings and the order dated 14.12.2015 also do not by itself constitute the material to carve out that the present is a case of exceptional nature so as to exclude application of principles of natural justice and deny relief only on that ground. 24. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Saran Versus IG of Police, CRPF & Others (Supra). That was a case where the delinquent employee at the time of recruitment had submitted certificate of date of birth, but later on revealed that his date of birth was other than what was declared. That was a case where the delinquent employee at the time of recruitment had submitted certificate of date of birth, but later on revealed that his date of birth was other than what was declared. A departmental enquiry was instituted against him on that very charge, which initially resulted in reduction in rank, but ultimately dismissal from service. In appeal also that order was affirmed. The High Court taking into consideration the provisions contained in Rule 29(d) of the relevant Service Rules, noticed that the concerned authority had power to enhance the punishment. Since, the appellant in that case had entered into service on the basis of false date of birth, the petition was not entertained and it was observed that he was not entitled to gratuity and other benefits. 25. When the matter was brought to the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was urged that the employee was a poor youngster belonging to remote rural place, the age of the appellant therein was only two months short of the requisite age; that he had served for nearly 28 years when he was about to take voluntary retirement from service, the proceedings were initiated. The quantum of punishment was in essence under challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In answer to that their Lordships in the Supreme Court held that the Court should not interfere with the administrator’s decision unless it was illogical or suffered from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards and further that the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to it and the Court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator as the scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision making process and not the decision itself. 26. While examining such an issue in hand, the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the decision in the case of R. Vishwanatha Pillai Versus State of Kerala & Others, (2004) 2 Supreme Court Cases 105 for the purposes of considering as to what would be an appropriate and commensurate penalty though that was a case of a false caste certificate, the logic indicated thereunder was applied. The aforesaid decision, does not advance the argument of respondents. The aforesaid decision, does not advance the argument of respondents. That was a case where the consideration of the Hon’ble Supreme Court was mainly to the aspect of penalty and having found that the person was found to have submitted false certificate of date of birth, no equitable consideration was made in his favour. That judgment is not an authority for the proposition that where that allegations are serious in nature, the enquiry may be dispensed with or that in such cases, opportunity of hearing may not be afforded. 27. The decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jayashree Versus The Director Collegiate Education (Supra) equally does not help the respondents’ case. That was a case relating to taking benefit as schedule tribe to which the appellantemployee therein was not found entitled to. Once the caste status could not be disputed by the concerned appellant-employee, the High Court had proceeded on the basis that it was futile to have given the employee an opportunity before the order of termination. It was in this background that an exception was carved out by the Hon’ble Supreme Court holding that it being a case of obtaining employment against reserved post and the employee admittedly not belonging to the said category, termination of service need not precede opportunity of hearing. 28. On facts, therefore, the aforesaid decision is also not applicable and clearly distinguishable. 29. In the result, we are of the view that the cancellation of examination of the appellant-writ-petitioner without affording him an opportunity of hearing was void ab initio and cannot be sustained in law. In view of our findings as recorded above, the order of learned Single Judge is set aside. The appeal stands allowed. 30. We make it clear that the B.Ed. Degree and mark-sheet of the appellant-writ-petitioner stands revived. 31. The matter pertains to the year 1999. Though ordinarily, we would have put quietus to the issue, but taking into consideration that the allegation is of producing a forged certificate, it needs to be enquired into. We accordingly give liberty to respondents No.1, 2 & 3 to hold enquiry, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant-writ-petitioner, and pass appropriate order as may be permissible under the law. 32. We accordingly give liberty to respondents No.1, 2 & 3 to hold enquiry, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant-writ-petitioner, and pass appropriate order as may be permissible under the law. 32. We further make it clear that unless enquiry is opened within a period of three months, it will no longer be open for the aforesaid respondents to reopen any enquiry. Enquiry be completed within a period of three months from the date of initiation.