JUDGMENT : Sanjay Kumar Medhi, J. The instant Interlocutory Application (IA) has been filed for vacation of the interim order dtd. 8/12/2021 passed by this Court in the connected WP(C)/6604/2021.There are two applicants in this IA who are arrayed as respondent nos. 4 & 5 in the writ petition, namely, the Krishna Kanta Handiqui State Open University (herein after KKHSOU) and its Vice-Chancellor. 2. Before going into the controversy which requires a determination to come to a finding as to whether the interim order dt. 8/12/2021 is liable to be vacated or not, the basic facts of the case may be put on record in the following manner. 3. The opposite party no.1/writ petitioner was serving as a Professor in the Department of Chemistry, Dibrugarh University with around 27 years of teaching experience. She came to know that the Hiranya Chandra Bhuyan School of Science and Technology under the KKHSOU was conducting a recruitment process for four numbers of posts in the category of professor. The writ petitioner considering herself to be eligible and qualified had applied for the said post of Professor and was duly selected and appointed for the same vide appointment letter dtd. 24/12/2020. The petitioner claims to have discharged her duties without any blemish and was entrusted with various responsibilities. The cause of action for filing the writ petition is a communication dtd. 3/12/2021 issued by the Education Department addressing the Vice-Chancellor of KKHSOU requesting to take necessary action as per the Statute with regard to the anomalies in recruitment in respect of the writ petitioner. The writ petitioner contends that the impugned action is not in conformity with the settled law as well as the provisions of the KKHSOU Act, 2005 and the Statues/Rules framed thereunder. The writ petitioner further alleges violation of the constitutional and other legal rights. 4. This Court after hearing the learned counsel for the writ petitioner, vide order dtd. 8/12/2021 while issuing Notice, had given interim protection to the effect that while there is no bar for the respondent authorities to take action against the writ petitioner as per the Statute but no final order be passed until further orders. It is this interim order in respect of which the present IA has been filed. 5. 8/12/2021 while issuing Notice, had given interim protection to the effect that while there is no bar for the respondent authorities to take action against the writ petitioner as per the Statute but no final order be passed until further orders. It is this interim order in respect of which the present IA has been filed. 5. I have heard Shri D Saikia, learned Advocate General, Assam assisted by Shri B Choudhury, learned counsel for the applicants whereas the contesting opposite party/writ petitioner is represented by Shri KN Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri DJ Das, learned counsel. 6. Shri Saikia, learned Advocate General, before touching the merits of the case has, however raised a preliminary objection on the maintainability of the writ petition itself. By drawing the attention of the Court to the order impugned, namely, the communication dtd. 3/12/2021, it is submitted that vide the aforesaid communication, only action, as per the Statute, was directed to be taken and in absence of any such action being taken, the writ petition is premature. 7. As regards the merits of the case, Shri Saikia, learned Advocate General submits that the projection made by the writ petitioner based upon which the interim order has been passed is wholly incorrect wherein many relevant facts have not been highlighted. The most important facts which is conveniently not highlighted is that the recruitment is for the post of Professor in the Subject of Chemistry and in the present controversy, the aforesaid fact of the Subject in question is of crucial importance. While the said point would be dealt with by this Court subsequently, the other important point urged is that the recruitment was with the condition that the appointment was made on promotion for the period of 1 year which may be withdrawn at any time during the probation period. In this connection, reference has been made to the appointment letter dtd. 24/12/2020 which has been annexed as Annexure D to the IA. 8. The learned Advocate General submits that for the period from 2010 to 2017, 8 numbers of courses were permitted for the KKHSOU. However, the said ceiling of 8 numbers of courses was not maintained and 15 (fifteen) other subjects were introduced without any approval of the UGC. It is further submitted that based upon the impugned letter dtd. 8. The learned Advocate General submits that for the period from 2010 to 2017, 8 numbers of courses were permitted for the KKHSOU. However, the said ceiling of 8 numbers of courses was not maintained and 15 (fifteen) other subjects were introduced without any approval of the UGC. It is further submitted that based upon the impugned letter dtd. 03/12/2021, an emergent meeting (64th) of the Board of Management of KKHSOU was held in which there was a thread bare discussion regarding the issue. The Board had come to a conscious finding that the appointment of the writ petitioner was required to be terminated and the said view was also approved by the Hon'ble Chancellor, KKHSOU. It is submitted that there was no grievance against the writ petitioner so far as her qualification and the eligibility is concerned and the only grievance is that her appointment was made against the nonexisting post. 9. Per contra, Shri K.N. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel for the opposite party/writ petitioner submits that the recruitment being done by following the due process of law, the impugned action is not only unreasonable and illegal but lacks jurisdiction. By vehemently criticising the impugned communication dtd. 03/12/2021,it is submitted that the Special Secretary to the Government of Assam, Education Department does not have the power or jurisdiction to issue such letter to the Vice-Chancellor. The KKHSOU being an autonomous body created by a Statute and having its own hierarchy, the impugned communication dtd. 03/12/2021 could not have been issued and therefore, it is submitted that no action, whatsoever is liable to be taken on the basis of the said letter. To prima facie demonstrate the activities of the writ petitioner, attention has been drawn to various documents annexed to the writ petition to show the different kinds of activities done by the petitioner and the recommendations made by the authorities. He submits that numerous special responsibilities were entrusted upon the petitioner which she had successfully discharged. Vide an order dtd. 4/1/2021, the writ petitioner was also nominated as a Director of the Institute as well as another Institute, namely, Guru Prasad Das School of Vocational Studies. Vide an office order dtd. 12/1/2021, the writ petitioner was inducted as a member of the Steering Committee of the KKHSOU and thereafter a member of the Library Advisory Committee. 10. 4/1/2021, the writ petitioner was also nominated as a Director of the Institute as well as another Institute, namely, Guru Prasad Das School of Vocational Studies. Vide an office order dtd. 12/1/2021, the writ petitioner was inducted as a member of the Steering Committee of the KKHSOU and thereafter a member of the Library Advisory Committee. 10. By drawing the attention of this Court to the various Expert Committee Interface meeting, though the programme, namely, Bachelor of Science (combination of three subjects) is not recommended, the remarks accompanying for the same has been stated to be "SLM not ready". The learned Senior Counsel for the opposite party, accordingly submits that nothing has been said regarding the requirement of Faculty Member and it is only because of the fact that Self Learning Materials were not ready that the programme was not recommended. Shri Choudhury submits that the services of the petitioner could very well be utilised for preparation of the SLM. 11. Dealing with the aspect of the stigma attached to the impugned letter, Shri Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel has submitted that though the appointment was a conditional one with a probationary period of 1 year, any action taken for terminating the services prior to the expiry of 1 year would definitively be stigmatic. He submits that a bare look at the impugned communication dt. 3/12/2021 would demonstrate that there were certain allegations against the writ petitioner for which the impugned order was issued. Distinguishing the concept of termination simpliciter on expiry of the probation period and termination before the completion of the period, that too, with allegations, it is argued that in the later situation, the rigours of law, including affording of adequate notice and opportunity have to be followed which admitted has not been done. 12. In support of his contentions, Shri Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the following decisions : (i) Chandra Prakash Shahi Vs. State of U.P. and Ors., (2000) 5 SCC 152 and (ii) Somesh Thapliyal and Anr. Vs. Vice Chancellor, HNB Garhwal University and Anr., (2021) 10 SCC 116 . 13. The case of Chandra Prakash Shahi (supra) has been cited to bring home the requirement to comply with law in case the service of a probationer is proposed to be terminated. For ready reference para 33 is extracted hereinbelow : "33. Vs. Vice Chancellor, HNB Garhwal University and Anr., (2021) 10 SCC 116 . 13. The case of Chandra Prakash Shahi (supra) has been cited to bring home the requirement to comply with law in case the service of a probationer is proposed to be terminated. For ready reference para 33 is extracted hereinbelow : "33. Where, therefore, the services of a probationer are proposed to be terminated and a particular procedure is prescribed by the Regulations for that purpose, then the termination has to be brought about in that manner. The probationer/constable has to be informed of the grounds on which his services are proposed to be terminated and he is required to explain his position. The reply is to be considered by the Superintendent of Police so that if the reply is found to be convincing, he may not be deprived of his services." 14. In the case of Somesh Thapliyal and Anr. ( supra ), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with the aspect of bargaining power of the employer in which the employee is left with no other option but to accept the conditions dictated by the authority. 15. Rejoining his submission, Shri Saikia, learned AG submits that the point regarding lack of jurisdiction is not liable for consideration. There is no doubt that though the KKHSOU is an autonomous body, it is a State University created by a Statute. The Chancellor of the University is the Governor of the State and the majority of funds is made by the State Government. Sec. 39 of the KKHSOU Act, 2009 stipulates that every Statute, Ordinance or Regulations made under this Act shall be laid before the Assam Legislative Assembly for the approval. In that view of the matter, the argument made on behalf of the writ petitioner that the impugned letter has been issued by an authority without jurisdiction cannot be sustained. He further submits that no action, as such, has been taken by the impugned letter and the direction is only to take necessary action as per the Statute. The learned AG also draws the attention of this Court to the minutes of meeting dtd. 8/12/2021 from which it appears that the Board of Management has agreed to comply with the directives of the Government of Assam and the Hon'ble Chancellor of KKHSOU. 16. The learned AG also draws the attention of this Court to the minutes of meeting dtd. 8/12/2021 from which it appears that the Board of Management has agreed to comply with the directives of the Government of Assam and the Hon'ble Chancellor of KKHSOU. 16. As regards the argument made that the services of the petitioner can be rendered for preparation of the SLM, the learned AG by referring to the Notification dt. 4/9/2020 of the UGC published in the Gazette of India, more specifically Regulation 13 (B) (ii) thereof, has submitted that the said provision stipulates that at least 60% of the SLM are to be developed by in house faculty. However, in the instant case, without the Subject being approved (Chemistry), the writ petitioner would not come within the meaning of in house faculty. 17. It is submitted by the applicants that the writ petitioner had come on lien from the Dibrugarh University where she was getting a salary of Rs.2.4 lakhs per month (approximately) whereas in the present assignment, the monthly salary was Rs.1.77 lakhs and therefore, there is no question of suffering financial prejudice. In support of his submissions, Shri Saikia, learned AG has cited the case of Superintendent of Post Office and Ors. Vs. E. Kunhiraman Nair Muliyar, reported in (1998) 9 SCC 255 . In the said case, the finding of the High Court in interfering with an order of termination was reversed as the said termination was stated to be on administrative reasons. 18. This Court has given its anxious consideration to the rival submissions. The materials on record are also carefully examined. 19. This Court, however makes it clear that the since the present consideration is on an interim stage while deciding an application for modification of an interim order, the reasons to be recorded are to be deemed as tentative in nature so that no prejudice is caused to either of the parties. 20. Firstly, the objection regarding the writ petition being premature has to be examined. Though it is correct that the impugned order 3/12/2021 has only directed for taking of appropriate action as per Statute, the same direction would definitely fall within the meaning of quia timet action. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the well known case of Shri Kihota Hollohan Vs. Mr. Though it is correct that the impugned order 3/12/2021 has only directed for taking of appropriate action as per Statute, the same direction would definitely fall within the meaning of quia timet action. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the well known case of Shri Kihota Hollohan Vs. Mr. Zachilhu and Ors., reported in (1992) Supp2 SCC 651 has clearly laid down that in such a case of quia timet action, a High Court exercising writ jurisdiction would be empowered to entertain the petition and pass appropriate orders. One may also gainfully refer the case of SMD Kiran Pasha Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in (1990) 1 SCC 328 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly down that when action for violation of the fundamental right is impending and imperative, the writ court can grant appropriate relief. For read reference, the relevant paragraphs are quoted hereinbelow : "14. Article 226(1) of the Constitution of India notwithstanding anything in Article 32, empowers the High Court throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any government within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose; and it also envisages making of interim orders, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner in such a proceeding. Article 21 giving protection of life and personal liberty provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. For enforcement of one's right to life and personal liberty resort to Article 226(1) has thus been provided for. What is the ambit of enforcement of the right? The word 'enforcement' has also been used in Article 32 of the Constitution which provides the remedy for enforcement of rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. The word 'enforcement' has not been defined by the Constitution. According to Collins English Dictionary to enforce means to ensure observance of or obedience to a law, decision etc. Enforcement, according to Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary, means the act of enforcing, or the state of being enforced, compulsory execution; compulsion. The word 'enforcement' has not been defined by the Constitution. According to Collins English Dictionary to enforce means to ensure observance of or obedience to a law, decision etc. Enforcement, according to Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary, means the act of enforcing, or the state of being enforced, compulsory execution; compulsion. Enforce means to compel obedience to laws; to compel performance, obedience by physical or moral force. If enforcement means to impose or compel obedience to law or to compel observance of law, we have to see what it does precisely mean. The right to life and personal liberty has been guaranteed as a fundamental right and for its enforcement one could resort to Article 226 of the Constitution for issuance of appropriate writ, order or direction. Precisely at what stage resort to Article 226 has been envisaged in the Constitution? When a right is so guaranteed, it has to be understood in relation to its orbit and its infringement. Conferring the right to life and liberty imposes a corresponding duty on the rest of the society, including the State, to observe that right, that is to say, not to act or do anything which would amount to infringement of that right, except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. In other words, conferring the right on a citizen involves the compulsion on the rest of the society, including the State, not to infringe that right. The question is at what stage the right can be enforced? Does a citizen have to wait till the right is infringed? Is there no way of enforcement of the right before it is actually infringed? Can the obligation or compulsion on the part of the State to observe the right be made effective only after the right is violated or in other words can there be enforcement of a right to life and personal liberty before it is actually infringed? What remedy will be left to a person when his right to life is violated? When a right is yet to be violated, but is threatened with violation can the citizen move the court for protection of the right? The protection of the right is to be distinguished from its restoration or remedy after violation. What remedy will be left to a person when his right to life is violated? When a right is yet to be violated, but is threatened with violation can the citizen move the court for protection of the right? The protection of the right is to be distinguished from its restoration or remedy after violation. When right to personal liberty is guaranteed and the rest of the society, including the State, is compelled or obligated not to violate that right, and if someone has threatened to violate it or its violation is imminent, and the person whose right is so threatened or its violation so imminent resorts to Article 226 of the Constitution, could not the court protect observance of his right by restraining those who threatened to violate it until the court examines the legality of the action? Resort to Article 226 after the right to personal liberty is already violated is different from the pre-violation protection. Post-violation resort to Article 226 is for remedy against violation and for restoration of the right, while pre-violation protection is by compelling observance of the obligation or compulsion under law not to infringe the right by all those who are so obligated or compelled. To surrender and apply for a writ of habeas corpus is a post-violation remedy for restoration of the right which is not the same as restraining potential violators in case of threatened violation of the right. The question may arise what precisely may amount to threat or imminence of violation. Law surely cannot take action for internal thoughts but can act only after overt acts. If overt acts towards violation have already been done and the same has come to the knowledge of the person threatened with that violation and he approaches the court under Article 226 giving sufficient particulars of proximate actions as would imminently lead to violation of right, should not the court call upon those alleged to have taken those steps to appear and show cause why they should not be restrained from violating that right? Instead of doing so would it be the proper course to be adopted to tell the petitioner that the court cannot take any action towards preventive justice until his right is actually violated whereafter alone he could petition for a writ of habeas corpus? Instead of doing so would it be the proper course to be adopted to tell the petitioner that the court cannot take any action towards preventive justice until his right is actually violated whereafter alone he could petition for a writ of habeas corpus? In the instant case when the writ petition was pending in court and the appellant's right to personal liberty happened to be violated by taking him into custody in preventive detention, though he was released after four days, but could be taken into custody again, would it be proper for the court to reject the earlier writ petition and tell him that his petition has become infructuous and he had no alternative but to surrender and then petition for a writ of habeas corpus? The difference of the two situations, as we have seen, have different legal significance. If a threatened invasion of a right is removed by restraining the potential violator from taking any steps towards violation, the rights remain protected and the compulsion against its violation is enforced. If the right has already been violated, what is left is the remedy against such violation and for restoration of the right." 21. Dealing with the point of lack of jurisdiction to issue the impugned letter dtd. 3/12/2021, this Court is of the view that the Education Department of the State of Assam cannot be termed as a stranger to the activities of a State University wherein the Statute itself provides for certain control by the State. In any case, the action of termination is a contemplation of the writ petitioner which may or may not be issued by the competent authorities after application of mind. The record also reveals that the appropriate authority, namely, the Chancellor has also given the approval for such action. 22. In the consideration of this Court what is of crucial importance is the reason behind the contemplated action. Admittedly, Chemistry is not a subject approved by the UGC for the KKHSOU and therefore, the very process of recruitment of the writ petitioner for a subject which is non-existing is not only erroneous but wholly illegal. While the issue for such initiation of recruitment is not an issue before this Court to be answered, the action of the KKHSOU in making recruitment for non-existing subject at the cost of public exchequer would, perhaps require serious introspection and also enquiry. While the issue for such initiation of recruitment is not an issue before this Court to be answered, the action of the KKHSOU in making recruitment for non-existing subject at the cost of public exchequer would, perhaps require serious introspection and also enquiry. This Court is unable to accede to the submission made that the services of the writ petitioner could be utilised for preparing the SLM. When the writ petitioner does not meet the basic requirement of being a duly inducted teaching faculty, such submission is absolutely liable to be rejected. 23. It is however, required to be clarified by this Court that the aforesaid observations regarding the illegal recruitment is not against the writ petitioner though she is the beneficiary of such illegality. This is because of the fact that no fault can be attributed to a candidate who responds to a notice for public recruitment. Moreover, it is not because of any fault/short comings/misconduct on the part of the writ petitioner which appear to be the reason behind the impugned notice dt. 3/12/2021 but because of sheer administrative reasons, namely, recruitment made for a subject without such subject being approved by the UGC. This Court is also conscious of the fact that the order of appointment of the writ petitioner is dtd. 24/12/2020 and she had joined on 1/1/2021 as revealed in paragraph 3 of the writ petition. In that view of the matter, the period of probation has otherwise come to an end and in view of the fact that there are no discernible materials to impute any misconduct on the part of the writ petitioner, the discontinuation can very well be deemed as termination simpliciter on the expiry of the period of probation due to administrative reasons. 24. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the view that the interim order dtd. 8/12/2021 by which an embargo was imposed regarding passing of final orders pursuant to the impugned notice dtd. 03/12/2021 is liable to be vacated and, accordingly the same stands vacated. It is, however made clear that any action taken would be subject to final outcome of the writ petition. 25. The interlocutory application stands allowed.