Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Amerjeet Singh
2022-11-03
SUDESH BANSAL
body2022
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Sudesh Bansal, J. - The appellants-defendants Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereafter 'the RSRTC') have preferred this second appeal assailing the judgment and decree dated 23-11-2017 passed by the Additional District Judge No. 7, Jaipur Metropolitan City in first appeal No. 12/2011 allowing appeal reversed the judgment dated 9-5-2011 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 5, Jaipur Metropolitan City in civil suit No. 143/2008 and decreed the suit for declaration for allowing pay scale Rs. 5500-150-9000 of the post of Traffic Inspector on completion of service of 18 years and Rs. 6500-200-10500 of the post of Depot Manager on completion of service of 27 years and to pay arrears of differential amount with interest at the rate of 8%. 2. Facts as culled out from the record are that respondent-plaintiff-employee (hereafter 'the employee') filed a suit for declaration challenging the order No. 1272 dated 5-2-2003 and claiming that pursuant to order of State Government dated 25-1-1992 he was entitled for the pay scale Rs. 5500-150-9000 of the post of Traffic Inspector on completion of service of 18 years and Rs. 6500-200-10500 of the post of Depot Manager on completion of service of 27 years and to pay arrears of differential amount with interest at the rate of 18%. 2.1. The plaintiff stated in his plaint that he was initially appointed on the post of booking clerk vide order dated 12-7-1968 and was promoted to the post of Assistant Traffic Inspector vide order No. 1835 dated 1-2-1977 in the pay scale of 370-10-410-15-530-20-590 and vide order No. 619 dated 30-9-2003 he was promoted to the post of Traffic Inspector in the pay scale of Rs. 5000-150-8000. On 25-1-1992 the State Government issued circular dated 25-1-1992 granting selection pay scale to employees on completion of service of 9, 18 and 27 years. The circular of the Government was approved by the RSRTC vide resolution No. 34/92 dated 29-3-1992 and made applicable to employees of RSRTC vide order No. 2971 dated 27-4-1993. 2.2. In aforesaid circumstances the plaintiff moved an application before the RSRTC claiming pay scale Rs. 5500-150-9000 of the post of Traffic Inspector on completion of service of 18 years and Rs. 6500-200-10500 of the post of Depot Manager on completion of service of 27 years and to pay arrears of differential amount with interest at the rate of 18%.
2.2. In aforesaid circumstances the plaintiff moved an application before the RSRTC claiming pay scale Rs. 5500-150-9000 of the post of Traffic Inspector on completion of service of 18 years and Rs. 6500-200-10500 of the post of Depot Manager on completion of service of 27 years and to pay arrears of differential amount with interest at the rate of 18%. But the application of the plaintiff was rejected vide order No. 1272 dated 5-2-2003. Therefore, the plaintiff filed the suit challenging the impugned order dated 5-2-2003 and claiming due benefits of selection scale on completion of service of 18 years and 27 years. 3. On service of notice, defendants filed written statement and stated that on completion of 18 years of service the plaintiff was not entitled for the pay scale of the post of Traffic Inspector. It was stated that in compliance of order dated 27-4-1993, whereby the circular dated 25-1-1992 was made applicable, the plaintiff was granted pay scale according to his post of booking clerk, on which he was appointed. The plaintiff was not entitled for selection scale on completion of 27 years of service. It was further stated that vide order dated 8-2-2007 the plaintiff has been promoted to the post of Depot Manager in the pay scale of Rs. 6500-200-10500. The prayer was made to dismiss the suit. 4. On basis of pleadings of parties, four issues were framed. Plaintiff examined himself as PW.1 and exhibited 11 documents. Defendants examined as DW.1 Satya Narayan Sharma but no document was exhibited. 5. The trial court considering evidence of both parties decided issues No. 1 & 2 against the plaintiff and the issue No. 3 against defendants and consequently the plaintiff's suit was dismissed vide judgment dated 9-5-2011. 6. On filing first appeal by the plaintiff, the appellate court considered the case. Considering the fact that the plaintiff was awarded benefits of pay scale on completion of 18 years on 3-7-1994 and on completion of service of 27 years on 9-7-1996 the amendment in the concerned circular on 5-2-2003 was not applicable and therefore the plaintiff was entitled for the pay scale Rs. 5500-150-9000 of the post of Traffic Inspector on completion of service of 18 years and Rs.
5500-150-9000 of the post of Traffic Inspector on completion of service of 18 years and Rs. 6500-200-10500 of the post of Depot Manager on completion of service of 27 years along with arrears of differential amount with interest at the rate of 8% instead of 18% as claimed. Accordingly, issues No. 1 & 2 were decided in favour of plaintiff. The issue No. 3 regarding jurisdiction of Civil Court was also decided in favour of plaintiff relying on judgment dated 4-11-2016 in The Regional Manager RSRTC v. Rajveer Singh, wherein it was held that if there is violation of principles of natural justice than only civil court had the jurisdiction. Accordingly, the plaintiff's suit was decreed with a direction to defendants that pay scale Rs. 5500-150-9000 of the post of Traffic Inspector on completion of service of 18 years and Rs. 6500-200-10500 of the post of Depot Manager on completion of service of 27 years be granted and arrears of differential amount be paid with interest at the rate of 8% from the date of filing the suit till payment of the amount. 7. Hence, this second appeal. 8. Heard learned counsel for appellant RSRTC and perused impugned judgment passed by court below. 9. It is not in dispute that respondent plaintiff was appointed on the post of booking clerk vide order dated 12-7-1968 and the next promotion post is Assistant Traffic Inspector, then Traffic Inspector and thereafter Depot Manager. It cannot be disputed that pursuant to circular date 25-1-1992, which was made applicable to employees of RSRTC vide order dated 27-4-1993 plaintiff was entitled for selection scale of Rs. 5500-150-9000 of the post of Traffic Inspector on completion of service of 18 years and then Rs. 6500-200-10500 of the post of Depot Manager on completion of service of 27 years. The plaintiff was accorded selection on completion of 18 years of service on 3-7-1994 and on completion of 27 years of service on 9-7-1996. Appellant on the basis of order dated 5-2-2003 denied the grant of selection scale to the plaintiff. This order does not apply to the case of plaintiff as it cannot be given effect retrospectively. The first appellate court has rightly held so.
Appellant on the basis of order dated 5-2-2003 denied the grant of selection scale to the plaintiff. This order does not apply to the case of plaintiff as it cannot be given effect retrospectively. The first appellate court has rightly held so. Counsel for appellant though made a persuasive attempt that by virtue of order dated 5-2-2003 amendment has been made to delete clauses 4(i)(ii)(iii) from the order dated 27-4-1993, therefore, selection to plaintiff could not have been granted for the next promotional post. But he could not satisfy as to how and in what manner the order dated 5-2-2003 would have retrospective effect. It may also be noticed that the order dated 5-2-2003 is ex-parte order for non grant of selection scale to plaintiff without affording any opportunity of hearing. As such there is clear violation of principles of natural justice. It has not been disputed and cannot be disputed that tenure of service of an employee is to counted from the date of initial appointment. On this basis of such factual matrix this court find that the first appellate court has not committed any illegality or jurisdictional error in deciding issues No. 1 & 2 in favour of plaintiff. 9.1. As far as issue No. 3 regarding jurisdiction of Civil Court is concerned, when it has been noticed that non grant of selection scale to plaintiff is in violation of principles of natural justice, a coordinate bench of this court in case of the Regional Manager RSRTC v. Gagan Kumar Jain [2017 (1) WLC (Raj.) UC 584] held that if there is violation of principles of natural justice then only civil court had the jurisdiction. 9.2. The case of RSRTC v. Krishna Kant [ (1995) 5 SCC 75 ], relied upon by counsel for appellant RSRTC, wherein the Apex Court held that where disputes, even industrial disputes, involve reliefs based on general law of contract, civil court has alternative jurisdiction, as in the instant case the plaintiff claimed his right on the basis of circular dated 25-1-1992, which was made applicable to RSRTC vide order dated 27-4-1993. The RSRTC has denied such claim of plaintiff on the basis of order dated 5-2-2003 applying it retrospectively, which is clearly against principles of natural justice. Thus the judgment in case of Krishna Kant (supra), rather it supports the case of plaintiff and is against the plea of RSRTC. 9.3.
The RSRTC has denied such claim of plaintiff on the basis of order dated 5-2-2003 applying it retrospectively, which is clearly against principles of natural justice. Thus the judgment in case of Krishna Kant (supra), rather it supports the case of plaintiff and is against the plea of RSRTC. 9.3. Further the issue of jurisdiction of civil court and grant of selection scale on completion of service 9, 18 and 27 years pursuant to circular dated 25-1-1992 has been considered by coordinate bench of this court in case of RSRTC v. Malu Ram Raigar [SB Civil Second Appeal No. 3/2010, decided on 31-7-2017] and relying on judgments in case of RSRTC v. Mohar Singh [ 2008 (66) AIC 58 (SC)], RSRTC v. Bal Mukund Baira [ (2009) 4 SCC 299 ] and RSRTC v. Bhonri Lal [SB Civil Second Appeal No. 2008/2011, decided on 17-7-2013] came to the conclusion that Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit where question of legal rights of an employee arises, and that for grant of benefit of selection grade on completion of 9, 18 and 27 years of service, employees were entitled to receive their salary in the pay scale of the post of promotion. 9.4. Therefore no substantial question of law, as suggested by counsel for appellant in memo of appeal, does arise, nor there is any other any substantial question of law in the instant appeal. 10. In case of Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari [ (2001) 3 SCC 179 ] the Apex court held that "while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. An additional obligation has been cast on the first appellate court by the scheme of the present Section 100 substituted in the Code. The first appellate court continues, as before, to be a final court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal.
An additional obligation has been cast on the first appellate court by the scheme of the present Section 100 substituted in the Code. The first appellate court continues, as before, to be a final court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. Now the first appellate court is also a final court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate court even on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one." It has been further held by the Apex Court:- "14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be substantial, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law involving in the case there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis." 11.
In case of State Bank of India v. Emmsons International Limited [ (2011) 12 SCC 174 ] the Apex Court held that "first appellate court is required to consider all issues of fact and law before setting aside judgment of trial court. First appellate court is required to address itself to said issue which had bearing on final outcome of the case. 12. In case of Jagannath v. Arulappa [ (2005) 12 SCC 303 ] the Apex Court held that "court of first appeal can re-appreciate the entire evidence and come to a different conclusion from trial court". 13. In case of Arumugham v. Sundarambal [JT 1994 (4) SC 464] the Apex Court has held that "the first appellate court is entitled to consider the evidence adduced by the parties and give its own reasons for accepting that of on one side or the other, and that it is not permissible for the second appellate court to interfere with such findings of facts by the first appellate court". 14. In case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gurjar [ (1999) 3 SCC 722 ] the Apex Court held that "it is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at by the last Court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so". 15. A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the first appellate court shows that after due appreciation of evidence oral and documentary the first appellate court has given its own findings on each issues. The first appellate court considering evidence of parties has come to a just finding regarding application of the circular in issue. The first appellate court after due appreciation of evidence oral and documentary has decided issues in favour of plaintiff. The first appellate court, being final court of facts and law, has not committed any illegality in reversing the finding of the trial court. 16.
The first appellate court after due appreciation of evidence oral and documentary has decided issues in favour of plaintiff. The first appellate court, being final court of facts and law, has not committed any illegality in reversing the finding of the trial court. 16. The scope of second appeal is confined to examine substantial question of law, which are sine qua non to exercise powers under Section 100 of CPC. In case of Umerkhan v. Bismillabi [ (2011) 9 SCC 684 ] Hon'ble Supreme Court has propounded that "if a second appeal is admitted on substantial question of law, while hearing second appeal finally, can re-frame substantial question of law or can frame substantial question of law afresh or even can hold that no substantial question of law involved, but the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction of Section 100 CPC without formulating substantial question of law". 17. It is a case where no substantial question of law involved as there is no perversity or material irregularity/infirmity in the judgment passed by the first appellate court. Accordingly, the second appeal is not liable to succeed. Consequently, the same is hereby dismissed. 18. Stay application and any other pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.