JUDGMENT (Prayer in Cont.P.No.307 of 2022: Contempt Petition filed under Section 11 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, to punish the respondents for willful disobedience of non-compliance of the order of this Hon'ble Court made in W.P.No.50327 of 2006 dated 22.03.2007. In Sub.A.No.296 of 2022 : Sub Application filed under Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 r/w Section 151 of CPC, 1908, to decide the preliminary issue of maintainability of contempt petition on the ground of limitation as envisaged under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.) 1. This contempt petition was filed on the ground that the order passed by this Court in W.P.No.50327 of 2006, dated 22.03.2007 was willfully disobeyed by the respondents and the respondents did not grant extension of lease in favour of the petitioner as directed by this Court in the above said writ petition. 2. The respondents have filed a sub application raising a preliminary objection on the maintainability of this contempt petition on the ground that it is barred by limitation as envisaged under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (herein after referred to as “the Act”). 3. Since a preliminary objection has been raised by the respondents, this Court has to necessarily deal with the same before considering the issue involved in the main contempt petition. Accordingly, this Court heard Mr.T.R.Rajagopalan, learned Senior counsel for petitioner and Mr.B.Vijay, learned Additional Government Pleader for the respondents. 4. The operative portions of the order passed in the writ petition are extracted hereunder: 5. The reasoning given in the counter cannot be regarded as a reason to non-suit the petitioner for the demand of the petitioner for grant of lease for a statutory period as provided under the Rules. The Government thought it fit that in respect of the virgin quarry the period should be ten years and that is the reason the provision has been amended to ten years from five years. Some third parties have illicitly quarried in a piece of area or particular quantity in the subject land cannot render the quarry as already exploited. If the Government has not leased out the quarry earlier, and it has not been exploited legally, it could only be regarded as a virgin quarry. Any illicit quarrying of small quantity cannot be regarded as an exploitation of quarry, and it comes outside the purview of Rule 8(8). If the Government has not leased out the quarry earlier, and it has not been exploited legally, it could only be regarded as a virgin quarry. Any illicit quarrying of small quantity cannot be regarded as an exploitation of quarry, and it comes outside the purview of Rule 8(8). 6. Hence, the respondents are hereby directed to grant lease in favour of the petitioner for ten years as provided under Rule 8(8) instead of five years. It is also open to the respondent to recover and realise from the petitioner the proportionate lease amount for the extended period of five years. 7. With this observation, the writ petition is disposed of. No costs. Consequently, the connected M.P. is closed. 5. The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in the contempt petition submitted that the right of the petitioner for grant of lease for a further period was upheld by this Court and the respondents, who are mandated to comply with the direction issued by this Court, failed to do so and thereby there is a continuing cause of action. Therefore, this contempt petition is not barred by limitation as provided under Section 20 of the Act. It was further submitted that this Court derives its power to punish for contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution of India and this power cannot be whittled down by applying the law of limitation. To substantiate his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court in T.M.A.Abdul Hameed .v. S.Radhakrishnan, reported in 1989 L.W.(Crl.) 237. 6. Per contra, the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the petitioner filed the writ petition in the year 2006 and the order was passed in the writ petition in the year 2007. Thereafter, the writ appeal filed by the respondents was dismissed on the ground of delay in the year 2012 and the contempt petition has been filed with an exorbitant delay in the year 2021. The learned counsel further submitted that Section 20 of the Act applies even to the High Court and the power conferred under Article 215 of the Constitution of India will not in any way dilute the limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the Act and insofar as the procedure is concerned, even the High Court has to follow the procedure as provided under the Act. 7. 7. The learned Additional Government Pleader further submitted that there is no continuing cause of action in the present case and the cause of action arose immediately after the order was passed in the writ petition and even assuring that a writ appeal was filed by the respondents, the cause of action has to be determined atleast from the year 2012. Therefore, the contempt petition ought to have been filed atleast within one year after the dismissal of the writ appeal. Whereas the petitioner has filed the contempt petition after nine years after the dismissal of the writ appeal. Hence, looking at this case from any angle, the contempt petition is clearly barred by limitation. The learned Additional Government Pleader in order to substantiate his submissions relied upon the following judgments: (a) Pallah Sheth .v. Custodian reported in (2001) SCC 549 (b) A.Paul Pandi .v. A.Karthik reported in 2014 (6) CTC 747 (c) Maheswar Peri .v. High Court of Allahabad reported in (2016) 14 SCC 25 (d) Order in Cont.P.(MD).No.1009 of 2016 dt.14.06.2009 (e) Order in Contempt Petition No.465 of 2021, dt.27.07.2021. (f) Order in Civil Application No.3558 of 2019, dt.05.05.2022. 8. This Court has carefully considered the submissions made on either side and the materials available on record. 9. The concept of continuing cause of action will arise only in cases where there is a continuing breach or a continuing tort. A continuing breach or violation is predicated only on a continuous wrong and it is not relatable to a continuing right. Where a cause of action is complete, there is no question of a recurring right. In cases where the right gets determined and the same has to be enforced, it goes without saying that such enforcement should be made within the period of limitation. The law of limitation is founded on the public policy to promote expediency. The purpose behind providing the limitation is not to destroy the right of the party, but to see that such a right is enforced with vigilance and not to allow any person to sleep over his rights. The law will assist only those who are vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights. This is based on the maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt. 10. In the present case, the right of the petitioner to get the extended period of lease was recognised by this Court. The law will assist only those who are vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights. This is based on the maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt. 10. In the present case, the right of the petitioner to get the extended period of lease was recognised by this Court. Once such a right is recognised, the petitioner ought to have enforced the same with alacrity. Just because this right of the petitioner continues, that does not mean that the concept of continuing cause of action will apply to the petitioner. As discussed herein above, this concept arises only in cases of continuing wrong and the wrong that is committed every time gives raise to a new cause of action. This will not apply in cases involving a continuing right and in those cases, it must be enforced within the period of limitation prescribed under the Act. 11. It is clear from the judgments cited by the learned Additional Government Pleader that Section 20 of the Act, which prescribes the period of limitation will also equally apply to the High Court and this period of limitation cannot be construed to be a provision which abrogates or stultifies the contempt jurisdiction of this Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. 12. In the present case, the order was passed in the writ petition in the year 2007 and the writ appeal was dismissed in the year 2012 and whereas, the contempt petition has been filed only in the year 2021. Hence, this contempt petition is clearly barred by limitation and the same cannot be entertained. 13. In the result, the Sub Application is allowed and the Contempt Petition stands dismissed.