JUDGMENT 1. This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India assails the legality and validity of the judgement dated 05.08.2022 passed by learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, Jaipur Metropolitan-I dismissing the Civil First Appeal No.81/2019 preferred by the petitioner/non-applicant/tenant (for brevity, "the tenant") against the final order dated 03.04.2019 passed by learned Rent Tribunal, Jaipur Metropolitan (Senior Civil Judge No.5, Jaipur Metropolitan) allowing the Original Application No.256/2017 filed by the respondent/applicant/landlord (for brevity, "the landlord") seeking eviction of the tenant from the suit premises. 2. The relevant facts in brief are that the landlord filed an application under Sections 9 and 18 read with Section 21 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 (for brevity, "the Act of 2001") seeking eviction of the tenant from the suit premises comprising of Office Nos.704, 705 & 706 in Kailash Tower, Lal Kothi, Tonk Road, Jaipur on the ground of default in payment of rent. In its reply, the tenant raised an objection inter alia as to maintainability of the Original Application before the learned Rent Tribunal in view of existence of an arbitration clause in the lease deed dated 21.06.2014 executed between the parties. 3. After recording evidence of the respective parties, the learned Rent Tribunal, vide its final order dated 03.04.2019 allowed the Original Application and issued recovery certificate in favour of the landlord which was unsuccessfully challenged by the tenant by way of an appeal which has been dismissed by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal vide its judgement dated 05.08.2022. 4. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner made three-fold submissions assailing the judgement dated 05.08.2022; non- maintainability of the Original Application filed by the landlord before the learned Rent Tribunal in view of existence of an arbitration clause in lease deed dated 21.06.2014 as also on account of non-service of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for brevity, "the Act of 1882") and direction to pay mesne profit @ three times of the agreed rent from the date of final order being illegal. 5. 5. Elaborating his submission, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, referring to and relying upon the judgements of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of (i) Park Street Properties (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Dipak Kumar Singh & Ors.: AIR 2016 SC 4038 , (ii) Anthony v. K.C. Ittoop and Sons & Ors.: (2000) 6 SCC 394 ,(iii) N.N. Global Mercantile Private Limited v. Indo Unique Flame Limited & Ors.: (2021) 4 SCC 379 , (iv) A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam & Ors.: (2016) 10 SCC 386 , (v) Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd. & Ors.: (2011) 5 SCC 532 & (vi) Vidya Drolia & Ors. v. Durga Trading Corporation and other connected matters: (2021) 2 SCC 1 and a judgement of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in case of Tejswi Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. R-Tech Promoters Pvt. Ltd.: MANU/DE/1442/021, would submit that even if the lease deed is held to be inadmissible in evidence being unregistered, in view of the arbitration clause in it, which was severable from rest of the conditions of the lease deed, existence of which, even otherwise also, was admitted by the landlord in his notice dated 15.04.2015, the issue of eviction based on default in payment of rent could not have been decided by the learned Rent Tribunal and the matter ought to have been referred to the arbitrator. 6. Inviting attention of this Court towards the provisions of Sections 106 and 107 of the Act of 1882, Shri Mathur submits that even if it is assumed that the lease deed between the parties was on month to month basis and not on yearly basis as it was unregistered, still the landlord was required to serve a notice upon it under Section 106 before seeking eviction in absence whereof, the eviction petition was not maintainable. 7. Referring to the provisions of Sections 12(4), 15(7) and 20(3) of the Act of 2001, learned Senior Counsel submits that a tenant is liable to pay mesne profit @ three times of the agreed rent only after issuance of the recovery certificate in the execution proceedings. He, in this regard, relied upon following judgments of this Court in the cases of:- (i) Kapil Chandla v. Rent Tribunal, Kota & Ors.: MANU/RH/1366/2015 & (ii) Vijay Vyas v. Abhishek Goyal & Ors.: MANU/RH/0928/2011. He, in this regard, relied upon following judgments of this Court in the cases of:- (i) Kapil Chandla v. Rent Tribunal, Kota & Ors.: MANU/RH/1366/2015 & (ii) Vijay Vyas v. Abhishek Goyal & Ors.: MANU/RH/0928/2011. Shri Mathur would, therefore, submit that the writ petition be allowed, the judgment impugned be quashed and set aside and the matter may be referred to the arbitrator for resolution of dispute between the parties. Per contra, learned counsel for the landlord, inviting attention of this Court towards the provisions of Section 9 and 18 of the Act of 2001, would submit that since the same start with a non-obstante clause, only the learned Rent Tribunal has jurisdiction relating to disputes between the landlord and the tenant and not the arbitrator. He submits that the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is undisputed and hence, learned Rent Tribunal did not err in rejecting the objection raised by the tenant as to maintainability of the Original Application. He, in support of his submissions, placed reliance upon following judgments: (i) M/s Big Shoppers Supermarket Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s K.M. Trading and Agencies Pvt. Ltd.: 2008 (6) WLC (Rajasthan) 851, (ii) The National Textile Corporation (DP & R) Ltd. & Another v. The Rent Control Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur & Ors.: 2011 (93) WLC (Rajasthan) 458, (iii) Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v. Navrang Studios & Anr.: (1981) 1 SCC 523 & Ranjit Kumar Bose & Anr. v. Anannnya Chowdhary & Anr.: 2014 (1) WLC (Supreme Court) Civil 658. With regard to mesne profit, refuting the submission made by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, Shri Sharma submits that the mesne profit is payable @ three times of the agreed rent if the premises are not vacated within three months from the date of issuance of recovery certificate. He, therefore, prays for dismissal of the writ petition. In rejoinder, Shri R.N. Mathur, referring to the judgment in case of Vidya Drolia (supra), would submit that issue as to whether tenancy disputes are capable of being resolved through arbitrator, has been referred to a Larger Bench. He submits that in this case, earlier judgment in case of Himangni Enterprises v. Kamaljeet Singh Ahluwalia: 2017 (10) SCC 706 , has been overruled. He, therefore, prays that the writ petition be allowed. Heard. Considered. The relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is undisputed. He submits that in this case, earlier judgment in case of Himangni Enterprises v. Kamaljeet Singh Ahluwalia: 2017 (10) SCC 706 , has been overruled. He, therefore, prays that the writ petition be allowed. Heard. Considered. The relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is undisputed. The existence of an arbitrator clause in the lease deed dated 21.06.2014 is also not disputed between the parties. However, the question as to whether in view of existence of arbitration clause in the lease deed executed between the parties, the learned Rent Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the eviction application filed by the landlord, should not detain this Court much in view of settled legal position. Section 9 of the Act of 2001 provides that notwithstanding anything contained any other law or contract subject to other provisions of this Act, the learned Rent Tribunal shall not order eviction of tenant unless any or more contingencies stipulated therein are satisfied. Section 18 further provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, areas to which this Act extends, only the learned Tribunal and no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide the petitions relating to dispute between the landlord and the tenant and matters connected therewith and ancillary thereto, filed under the provisions of this Act. Thus, both the provisions start with a non-obstante clause and in unequivocal terms provide that all disputes arising between the landlord and the tenant have to be decided by the Tribunal constituted under the Act and no eviction can be ordered by the Tribunal so constituted unless condition(s) laid down under Section 9 stands satisfied. It has not been case of the petitioner that the provisions of Chapter II and III of the Act are inapplicable on the subject premises under Section 3 of the Act. There is another important aspect of the matter. It has not been case of the petitioner that the provisions of Chapter II and III of the Act are inapplicable on the subject premises under Section 3 of the Act. There is another important aspect of the matter. Section 2(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for brevity, "the Act of 1996") provides as under:- "Sub-section (3)- this part shall not affect any other law for the time being in force by virtue of which certain disputes may not be submitted to arbitration." In view of aforesaid factual and legal backdrop, this Court is of the considered opinion that despite existence of an arbitration clause in the lease deed executed between the parties, it was the learned Rent Tribunal only which had jurisdiction to decide the Original Application filed by the landlord. This view is being supported by the following precedential law. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court has, in case of M/s. Big Shoppers Supermarket Pvt. Ltd. (supra), proceeded to hold as under:- "9. I am afraid, the Arbitrator cannot resolve as to whether the respondent landlord is entitled to a decree for eviction or not under Rent Act. It is only the Rent Tribunal, which has jurisdiction to pass the decree for eviction." 8. Their Lordships have, in case of Himangni Enterprises (supra), referring to and relying upon earlier judgements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in cases of Nataraj Studies (P) Ltd. (supra) and Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. (supra), held as under:- "24. The Delhi Rent Act, which deals with the cases relating to rent and eviction of the premises, is a special Act. Though it contains a provision (Section 3) by virtue of it, the provisions of the Act do not apply to certain premises but that does not mean that the Arbitration Act, ipso facto, would be applicable to such premises conferring jurisdiction on the arbitrator to decide the eviction/rent disputes. In such a situation, the rights of the parties and the demised premises would be governed by the Transfer of Property Act and the civil suit would be triable by the Civil Court and not by the arbitrator. In such a situation, the rights of the parties and the demised premises would be governed by the Transfer of Property Act and the civil suit would be triable by the Civil Court and not by the arbitrator. In other words, though by virtue of Section 3 of the Act, the provisions of the Act are not applicable to certain premises but no sooner the exemption is withdrawn or ceased to have its application to a particular premises, the Act becomes applicable to such premises. In this view of the matter, it cannot be contended that the provisions of the Arbitration Act would, therefore, apply to such premises." 9. Submission of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that since, the judgement in case of Himangni Enterprises (supra) is overruled by a Larger Bench of three-Judge in the case of Vidya Drolia (supra), it cannot be relied upon, is misconceived. Only a part of ratio laid down in case of Himangni Enterprises (supra) has been overruled affirming the remaining part as is apparent from the following observations in case of Vidya Drolia (supra):- "80. In view of the aforesaid, we overrule the ratio laid down in Himangni Enterprises v. Kamaljeet Singh Ahluwalia: (2017) 10 SCC 706 and hold that landlord-tenant disputes are arbitrable as the Transfer of Property Act does not forbid or foreclose arbitration. However, landlord-tenant disputes covered and governed by rent control legislation would not be arbitrable when specific court or forum has been given exclusive jurisdiction to apply and decide special rights and obligations. Such rights and obligations can only be adjudicated and enforced by the specified court/forum, and not through arbitration." 10. Even otherwise also, the dispute in case of Vidya Drolia (supra) involved rights of the parties under the Act of 1882 and not under any State Rent Control Act. 11. Contention of Shri Mathur that a latter three-Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has, in case of N.N. Global Mercantile Private Limited, doubted the correctness of the view taken by the earlier three-Judges Bench judgement in case of Vidya Drolia, is misconceived inasmuch as what was doubted was correctness of the view taken in case of Vidya Drolia in Paras 146 & 147 and not the view expressed in Para 80 of the judgement, which has been reproduced hereinabove. 12. Even in the case of Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. 12. Even in the case of Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, their Lordships have held as under:- "35. The Arbitral Tribunals are private fora chosen voluntarily by the parties to the dispute, to adjudicate their disputes in place of courts and tribunals which are public fora constituted under the laws of the country. Every civil or commercial dispute, either contractual or non-contractual, which can be decided by a court, is in principle capable of being adjudicated and resolved by arbitration unless the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunals is excluded either expressly or by necessary implication. Adjudication of certain categories of proceedings are reserved by the Legislature exclusively for public fora as a matter of public policy. Certain other categories of cases, though not expressly reserved for adjudication by a public fora (courts and tribunals), may by necessary implication stand excluded from the purview of private fora. Consequently, where the cause/dispute is inarbitrable, the court where a suit is pending, will refuse to refer the parties to arbitration, under section 8 of the Act, even if the parties might have agreed upon arbitration as the forum for settlement of such disputes. 36. The well-recognized examples of non-arbitrable disputes are : (i) disputes relating to rights and liabilities which give rise to or arise out of criminal offences; (ii) matrimonial disputes relating to divorce, judicial separation, restitution of conjugal rights, child custody; (iii) guardianship matters; (iv) insolvency and winding-up matters; (v) testamentary matters (grant of probate, letters of administration and succession certificate); and (vi) eviction or tenancy matters governed by special statutes where the tenant enjoys statutory protection against eviction and only the specified courts are conferred jurisdiction to grant eviction or decide the disputes." 13. The other judgements relied upon by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner are of no assistance to him having been rendered in entirely different facts and circumstances. 14. In the cases of Park Streets Properties (Pvt.) Ltd. and Anthony, the issue was regarding the nature of relationship between the parties even when the lease deed executed in between them was held to be inadmissible in evidence on account of its non-registration. In the present case, the nature of relationship is not in dispute. 15. 14. In the cases of Park Streets Properties (Pvt.) Ltd. and Anthony, the issue was regarding the nature of relationship between the parties even when the lease deed executed in between them was held to be inadmissible in evidence on account of its non-registration. In the present case, the nature of relationship is not in dispute. 15. In the case of Tejswi Impex Pvt. Ltd., the issue before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi did not involve the vacation of the premises; but, the enforceability of the terms of the lease deed executed in between the parties wherein, the tenant has vacated the premises before the expiry of the lock-in period without paying the fixed monthly rent. The another question involved therein was as to validity or enforceability of an arbitration clause in the lease deed which was inadmissible in evidence for want of sufficient stamp duty. 16. In the case of A. Ayyasamy (supra), wherein, the suit was for declaration that the plaintiffs, as partners, were entitled to participate in the partnership business, their Lordships held that mere allegation of fraud in the case was not sufficient to distract from the obligation of the parties to submit their dispute to the arbitration and hence, has no applicability in the present case. 17. In the conspectus of the aforesaid judgements, this Court is not persuaded to hold that the impugned judgement is bad-in-law as the learned Rent Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to entertain the Original Application filed by the landlord in view of existence of an arbitral clause in the lease deed dated 21.06.2014. 18. The second limb of submission of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that in absence of a notice under Section 106, the Original Application was not maintainable, does not merit acceptance in view of the dispute being governed by the provisions of the Act of 2001 and not by the provisions under the Act of 1882. Relying upon the judgement of the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case of V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal: (1979) 4 SCC 214 , a co-ordinate Bench of this Court has, in case of Kesardeo v. Bhooridevi & Ors.: MANU/RH/0202/1980, held as under:- "4. Relying upon the judgement of the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case of V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal: (1979) 4 SCC 214 , a co-ordinate Bench of this Court has, in case of Kesardeo v. Bhooridevi & Ors.: MANU/RH/0202/1980, held as under:- "4. It was argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the question of the validity of notice is of little importance in this appeal because as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to the tenant was not necessary before filing of a suit for ejectment on any of the grounds available under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). I am inclined to agree with this contention that no notice is necessary under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act determining the tenancy before the filing a suit for eviction by the landlord against the tenant. It was thus observed in Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodal Ammal MANU/SC/0505/1979MANU/SC/0505/1979 : [1980]1SCR334. In order to get a decree or order for eviction against a tenant under any State Rent Control Act it is not necessary to give notice under Section 106 T.P. Act. Determination of a lease in accordance with the Transfer of Property-Act is unnecessary and a mere surplusage became the landlord cannot get eviction of the tenant even after such determination The tenant continues to be so even thereafter. That being so, making out a case under the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself is sufficient and it is not obligatory to found the proceeding on the basis of the determination of the lease by issue of notice in accordance with Section 106 of the T.P. Act. On the question of requirement of such a notice under Section 106 T.P. Act the difference in the language of various State Rent Acts does not bring about any distinction. It is not correct to say that Section 106 of the TP Act merely providing for termination of a lease either by the leaser or the lessee by giving the requisite notice it an extra protection against eviction. The purpose of this provision is is merely to terminate the contract which the overriding Rent Acts do not permit to be terminated." 19. The purpose of this provision is is merely to terminate the contract which the overriding Rent Acts do not permit to be terminated." 19. Submission of Shri R.N. Mathur that the tenant is not liable to pay the mesne profit @ three times of the agreed rent from the date of issuance of recovery certificate by the learned Rent Tribunal, cannot be countenanced by this Court in view of the statutory scheme under the Act of 2001. Section 20 (3) of the Act reads as under:- "20. Execution of the orders.- (1) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (2) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (3) If the tenant does not vacate the premises within three months of the date of issue of certificate for recovery of the possession, he shall be liable, from the date of issue of certificate for recovery of possession to pay mesne profits at the rate of 2 times the rent in case of premises let out for residential purpose, at the rate of 3 times the rent in case of premises let out for commercial purposes and at the rate of 3 times the rent in case certificate for recovery of immediate possession has been issued under Sec. 16." 20. Explanation under Section 20 provides as under:- "Explanation - Filing of an appeal or other proceeding against the order of issue of certificate for recovery of possession or immediate possession will not save the tenant from his liability to pay mesne profits, at the rates specified under sub-section (3), unless specifically ordered otherwise by the Appellate Rent Tribunal or the Court before which such an order is under challenge and if the order of issue of recovery certificate is finally maintained, the tenant shall be liable to pay mesne profits at the rates specified under sub-section (3) from the date on which the recovery certificate was initially issued." 21. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions leaves no room for doubt that even if the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal orders otherwise during pendency of the appeal with regard to the payment of mesne profit, the tenant shall be liable to pay the same at the rates specified under sub-section (3) from the date on which the recovery certificate was initially issued, if the appeal ultimately fails as is the position obtaining in the present case. Reliance placed by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner on Section 12 (4) or Section 15 (7) is misplaced as the same do not apply so far as payment of mesne profit in case the recovery certificate is issued and the appeal thereafter fails, is concerned. The judgements in the cases of Kapil Chandla (supra) and Vijay Vyas (supra) are of no help to the petitioner, not rendered in the facts and situation obtaining in the present case. 22. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is that the writ petition is devoid of merit and is dismissed with cost.