JUDGMENT : K.MANMADHA RAO, J. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal arises against the order in I.A No.35 of 2019 in O.S.No.12 of 2018 on the file of VI Additional District & Sessions Judge,-cum-Special Court for trial of offences against Women, Chittoor (for short “Court below”), dated 27.01.2020 dismissing the said Interlocutory Application with costs for grant of temporary injunction restraining the respondent/defendant from creating any encumbrances or alienating the petition schedule property in favour of third parties or between the parties till disposal of the main suit and also granted ad-interim injunction orders to that effect till disposal of the main suit. 2. The appellants herein are the petitioners in I.A., and the plaintiffs in the suit before the Court below. The respondent herein is the respondent in the I.A., and the defendant in the suit before the Court below. 3. The appellants herein filed O.S.No.12 of 2018 before the Court below against the respondent herein seeking grant of decree and judgment in favour of the plaintiffs, directing the defendant to receive the balance of sale consideration of Rs.2,00,000/- form the appellants and to execute a regular register sale deed conveying the plaint schedule mentioned property in favour of the appellants or in alternative to refund the advance amount of Rs.45,00,000/- to the appellants with interest at the rate of 24% p.a. from the date of filing of the suit till the date of recovery and costs. Pending suit, the appellants filed I.A No.35 of 2019 in the above said suit before the Court below for grant of temporary injunction, restraining the respondent/defendant from in any way creating encumbrances or from in any way alienating the plaint schedule mentioned property in favour of third parties or between parties till the disposal of the suit, on the ground that the respondent/defendant has agreed to sell the plaint schedule property for a sum of Rs.47,00,000/- and executed an agreement of sale on 11.11.2016 after receiving a sum of Rs.45,00,000/- as advance and agreed to receive balance sale consideration of Rs.2,00,000/- to execute regular registered sale deed in favour of the appellants or their nominee on or before 10.11.2018. The appellants were ready and willing to pay the balance of sale consideration of Rs.2,00,000/- to the respondent and to get registered sale deed, and the same was also intimated, but the respondent has been postponing the same for the reasons best known to them. The appellants were ready and willing to pay the balance of sale consideration of Rs.2,00,000/- to the respondent and to get registered sale deed, and the same was also intimated, but the respondent has been postponing the same for the reasons best known to them. Accordingly, the respondent failed to perform her part of contract without any reasons. The appellants got issued notice on 27.11.2017, but the respondent refused to receive the same. As the respondent is trying to alienate the schedule property, the appellants filed the above I.A. for temporary injunction. 4. Per contra, the respondent filed counter in the above said I.A., opposing the above said averments and pleaded that she has no need or necessity to sell the schedule property and the said house was constructed with the bank loan and also with the support of her brothers and other financial aid. It is also stated that agreement of sale is a rank forged one and the signature of the executants, in the agreement of sale dated 4.11.2016, do not belong to the respondent and the allegation that the appellants have paid Rs.45,00,000/- to the respondent under an execution of agreement of sale is false. She also stated that the plaint schedule property was already mortgaged with State Bank of India, V.Kota Branch for an amount of Rs.30,00,000/- and the house property for above Rs.75,00,000/- but not for Rs.47,00,000/- and the respondent has not received any notice on 27.11.2017. 5. According to the respondent, the 2nd appellant filed a private complaint before Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Palamaner and the same was forwarded to the V.Kota Police and later police have registered a case in Crime No.48 of 2014 on the ground of cheating against the respondent and her husband. The appellants have also filed another suit for specific performance in O.S.No.66 of 2017 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Palamaner on an allegation that there was agreement of sale dated 4.6.2017 for Rs.11,50,000/- and this respondent received Rs.11,00,000/- and the same is pending. She also stated that it is difficult to believe that the appellants would have paid a sum of Rs.11,00,000/- under the agreement of sale and Rs.45,00,000/- under another agreement to the respondent without taking possession of properties or title deed. She also stated that it is difficult to believe that the appellants would have paid a sum of Rs.11,00,000/- under the agreement of sale and Rs.45,00,000/- under another agreement to the respondent without taking possession of properties or title deed. The husband of the respondent has already discharged the amounts due to one Somasekhar Reddy, apart from execution of registered sale deed dated 29.9.2016 in the name of the 1st appellant for the amount due by husband of the respondent to him from Gudisinti Gangappa, S/o late Chinna Appaiah in respect of land in S.No.236/3 admeasuring Ac.0.55 cents (in lieu of the debt due to Somasekhar Reddy, without receiving any consideration). She also stated that the appellants have approached the Court with unclean hands by suppressing material facts, namely the connected matters pending on the file of other Courts. Accordingly, urged that there is no prima facie case, and balance of convenience is not in favour of the appellants for grant of injunction. 6. During enquiry, Ex.P1 to Ex.P3 were marked on behalf of the appellants/ appellants while Ex.R1 to Ex.R6 were marked on behalf of the respondents. 7. On consideration of the matter basing upon the above said documents marked and hearing of the parties, the Court below came to a conclusion that the appellants are not entitled to any relief of temporary injunction restraining the respondent from alienating the schedule property. Hence, dismissed the above said I.A., vacated the interim order granted on 20.2.2018, vide order, dated 27.1.2020. Against which, the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal has been filed. 8. Heard Sri K. Anand Rao and Sri K.Koutilya, learned counsels appearing for the appellants and Sri V.S.R. Anjaneyulu, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the Court below erred in observing that the appellants failed to produce the affidavits of the attestors and scribe in support of the agreement of sale dated 11.01.2016 and therefore the appellants failed to establish a prima facie case. The Court could not have given such a finding at the stage of deciding the issue, more so, in the interlocutory application. The Court could not have given such a finding at the stage of deciding the issue, more so, in the interlocutory application. He also submits that filing of charge sheet in Crime No.48 of 2018 of V.Kota P.S, in which the respondent herein were charged for the offences under Section 420 of IPC, with regard to the property sold, which is the subject matter in Agreement of sale dated 04.06.2017, as the respondent sold away the property other than the present property, which is involved in the suit and also suppression of the fact about the mortgage of the schedule property to the Bank, therefore not mentioning those facts in the I.A or in the suit may not come in the way of deciding the issue involved in the I.A., and the finding of the trial Court that the appellants have suppressed all the said facts and did not approach the Court with clean hands is nothing but an unwarranted observation. 10. He further submits that the trial Court failed to appreciate the documentary evidence filed by the appellants in support of their claim in a proper manner and ultimately failed to exercise its jurisdiction in a proper manner and as such he prayed to set aside the order of the Court below. On hearing at the stage of admission, this Court vide order dated 03.03.2020, granted “Status Quo as on today to be maintained till 31.3.2020”. 11. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the Court below rightly discussed and gave a reasoned order in the above said I.A., while dismissing the said I.A., vide order dated 27.01.2020 and as such it does not require any interference by this Court. 12. Sri V.S.R. Anjaneyulu, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent argued at length and vehemently opposed passing of the order in I.A.No.2 of 2020 on 03.03.2020. He would submit that since the Court below has dismissed the I.A.No.35 of 2019 in O.S.No.12 of 2018 vide the impugned order, anticipating that the appellants would file a CMA before this Court, the respondent got a caveat filed before this Court on 18.02.2020. The present C.M.A. is filed on 24.02.2020 and it reached for consideration before this Court on 03.03.2020. The present C.M.A. is filed on 24.02.2020 and it reached for consideration before this Court on 03.03.2020. Hence, by the date of filing of CMA and by the date of obtaining the interim order on 03.03.2020, the appellants have got knowledge about the filing of caveat and its pendency. Having knowledge about the caveat the appellants filed CMA and obtained interim order, in I.A.No.2 of 2020, without informing the caveator and as such the same is liable to be vacated. He argued that it is settled principles of law that in view of Section 148A of Code of Civil Procedure Code (for short “CPC”) if any order is passed, concealing the fact about the pendency of the caveat, the interim order is nonest and is liable to be set aside. On this sole ground, the interim order granted on 03.03.2020 in I.A.No.2 of 2020 is liable to be set aside. 13. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the appellants have filed O.S No.12 of 2018 on the file of learned I Additional District & Sessions Judge, Chittoor seeking grant of a decree and judgment in their favour directing the respondent to receive the balance of sale consideration of Rs.2,00,000/- and to execute a registered sale deed conveying the plaint schedule mentioned property and in default through process of the Court or alternative to refund the advance amount of Rs.45,00,000/- with interest at the rate of 24% per annum from the date of filing of suit ill the date of recovery. He further submitted that the appellants have also filed I.A.No.35 of 2019 seeking temporary injunction restraining the respondent from creating encumbrances or in any way alienating the plaint schedule property in favour of third parties till disposal of suit. The learned trial Judge, vide order dated 20.02.2018 granted injunction restraining the respondents from alienating the plaint schedule property till 27.03.2018. Immediately, after receipt of the notice in the above I.A., the respondents filed a detailed counter contending inter alia that the subject agreement of sale is fabricated and forged document and it is absolutely false to state that an amount of Rs.45,00,000/- cash was paid to the respondent. Though they have filed counter immediately and insisted for disposal of I.A., the same was not taken up in view of the procrastinative attitude of the Appellants/Plaintiffs and to take advantage of the interim injunction granted in his favour. 14. Though they have filed counter immediately and insisted for disposal of I.A., the same was not taken up in view of the procrastinative attitude of the Appellants/Plaintiffs and to take advantage of the interim injunction granted in his favour. 14. Learned Senior counsel further submits that since the concerned trial judge was transferred and the injunction application is not being taken up for consideration, on representation made on their behalf, the said 1.A. was taken up by the learned VI Additional District & Sessions Judge, Chittoor and the same is pending for no fault of respondent and it is procrastinative the attitude of the Appellants, the matter was prolonged. 15. He further submits that the trial Court having considered the respective contentions, in the light of the documentary evidence produced arrived at a conclusion that since the respondent disputed the transactions under Ex.B1 and passing of consideration and since the alternative plea for refund of advance sale consideration was already sought, no balance of convenience lies in favour of the Plaintiffs, and accordingly vacated the order of injunction, vide order dated 20.02.2018 and on a reading of the order of the Court below, it would be clear that it is supported by cogent reasons. 16. It is a settled principle of law that if the Court refuses to grant injunction vide speaking order giving reasons, the Appellate court in exercise of the power conferred under Order 43 Rule 1 of CPC would not interfere with the findings recorded by the trial Court and no irreparable loss would be caused to the Plaintiffs/Appellants, if the order of injunction as sought is granted. Admittedly, the respondent is the owner of the property and no injunction can be granted against the real owner pending suit. Since the trial Court has vacated the order of injunction giving reasons, the present C.M.A is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. 17. He further submits that one Mr M. Somasekhar Reddy, the husband of M.Bharathi, 1st plaintiff/respondent got filed series of criminal and civil cases against the respondent and her husband in his benami names one after the other to black mail the respondents. Totally he got filed 9 cases viz. (1) CC No: 48/2018 at JMFC, Palamaner, (2) O.S. No: 66 of 2017 at Senior Civil Judge's Court, Palamaner, (3) CC No: 21 of 2019 at III Addl. Totally he got filed 9 cases viz. (1) CC No: 48/2018 at JMFC, Palamaner, (2) O.S. No: 66 of 2017 at Senior Civil Judge's Court, Palamaner, (3) CC No: 21 of 2019 at III Addl. Judicial Magistrate, Tirupathi, (4) O.S. No: 54 of 2017 at Additional Senior Civil Judge, Tirupathi, (5) O.S, No: 208 of 2020 at III Addl. District Court, Tirupathi, (6) CC No: 08 of 2018 at XII JMFC at Hasthinapuram, RR District, Telangana, (7) O.S. No: 2281 of 2018 at Senior Civil Judge's Court, L.B. Nagar, RR District, Telangana, (8) LA No: 31 of 2018 and (9) O. S. No: 12 of 2018 at IX Addl. District Court, Chittoor, A.P. 18. He further submits that since the Appellants/Plaintiffs are not able to convince, as to how the order of the trial Court is liable to be set aside in exercise of the power conferred under order 43 Rule 1 of CPC, the C.M.A. and the I.A. are liable to be dismissed. Since the order of status quo is obtained in violation of Section 148A of CPC, the order dated 03.03.2020 is liable to be vacated besides dismissing the C.M.A. 19. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent would submit Transfer of Property during the pendency of Suit is protected by the Doctrine of Lispendency under Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act. He relies upon a decision of Hon’ble Apex Court reported in K.N.Aswathnarayan Chetty (dead) through L.RS and others Vs. State of Karnataka and others, 2014 SAR (Civil) 5, wherein, it was held that the settled principles of law that the purchase of suit property during pendency of civil suit are bound by the final orders of the Court and held as under:- Para 6, 7, 8 : "Para-6 Doctrine of lis pendens is based on legal maxim 'ut lite pendente nihil innovetur (During a litigation nothing new should be introduced). This doctrine stood embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882. The principle of lis pendens' is in accordance with the equity, good conscience or justice because they rest upon an equitable and just foundation that it will be impossible to bring an action or suit to a successful termination if alienations are permitted to prevail. A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as he was party to the suit. A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as he was party to the suit. A litigating party is exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the pendency of the litigation. However, it must be clear that mere pendency of a suit does not prevent one of the parties from dealing with the property constituting the subject matter of the suit. The law simply postulates a condition that the alienation will, in no manner, affect the rights of the other party under any decree which may be passed in the suit unless the property was alienated with the permission of the Court. The transferee cannot deprive the successful plaintiff of the fruits of the decree if he purchased the property pendente lite. [Vide: K. Adivi Naidu & Ors. Vs. E. Duruvasulu Naidu & Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 150 : Venkatrao Anantdeo Joshi & Ors. Vs. Malatibal & Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 722 ; Raj Kumar Vs. Sardari Lal & Ors., (2004) 2 5CC 601; and Sanjay Verma V. Manik Roy & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 1332 ), -Para-7 In Rajender Singh & Ors. Santa Singh Ors., AIR 1973 SC 2537 , while dealing with the application of doctrine of lis pendens, this court held as under: "The doctrine of lis pendens was intended to strike at attempts by parties to a litigation to circumvent the jurisdiction of a court, in which a dispute on rights or interests in immovable property is pending by private dealings which may remove the subject matter of litigation from the ambit of the court's power to decide a pending dispute or frustrate its decree". "Para-8 In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that it is not permissible to say that in case the appellants had purchased the suit property during the pendency of the appeal filed by respondent No.3 before this Court, the appellants are not bound by the final orders of this Court". 20. It is further argued by learned Senior Counsel that in view of the provisions of Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act, 1982, the rights of the appellants in the suit for Specific Performance against the Immovable property is protected under Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act, if any alienations are made during pendency of the suit. 20. It is further argued by learned Senior Counsel that in view of the provisions of Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act, 1982, the rights of the appellants in the suit for Specific Performance against the Immovable property is protected under Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act, if any alienations are made during pendency of the suit. Further, the main prayer in the suit to direct the defendants to execute registered sale deed in pursuance of specific performance or refund of advance amount of Rs. 45,00,000/-. 21. He contended that as the I.A is filed Under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC for temporary injunction, the Court below is bound to discuss the Prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss. The petitioner got marked Ex.P-1 agreement of sale which discloses that the respondent got executed agreement of sale on receipt of Rs.45,00,000/-. Further, the petitioner got produced the office copy of Ex.P.2 which discloses that it was issued on behalf of the appellants herein demanding the defendant/respondent herein to execute registered sale deed, but the same was not served, hence the notice was returned to the sender (Ex.P-3). 22. He further argued that the respondent got marked Exd.R-1 to R-6. The pleadings in the counter of the respondent disclose that the signature on the Agreement of sale dated 04.11.2016 do not belongs to the respondent and the same is forged. 23. He further contended that in the main suit the appellants/plaintiffs claimed alternative reliefs i.e., either directing the defendants to execute registered sale deed or refund of amount of Rs.45,00,000/- in advance with interest. As the appellants/plaintiffs claimed alternative relief of refund of Rs. 45,00,000/- with interest from the respondent/defendant, the question of irreparable loss to the appellants/plaintiffs does not arise. In these circumstances, the appellants have failed to prove that irreparable loss would be caused if injunction is not granted in their favour. As the appellants/plaintiffs claimed alternative relief of refund of Rs. 45,00,000/- with interest from the respondent/defendant, the question of irreparable loss to the appellants/plaintiffs does not arise. In these circumstances, the appellants have failed to prove that irreparable loss would be caused if injunction is not granted in their favour. Learned Senior Counsel further argued and relied upon a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in Skyline Education Institute (India) Private Limited Versus S.L.Vaswani and another, 2010 SCC Online SC 127, wherein it was held that “Once the Court of first instance exercises its discretion to grant or refuse to grant relief of temporary injunction and said exercise of discretion is based upon objective consideration of material placed before the Court and is supported by cogent reasons, appellate Court will be loath to interfere simply because on a de novo consideration of the matter, it is possible for the appellate Court to form a different opinion on the issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury and equity.” 24. In respect of prima facie case is concerned, though the appellants have relied on Ex.P-1 agreement of sale dated 11.11.2006, the respondent has denied the transactions particularly passing of consideration of Rs.45,00,000/-. The respondent in its counter pleaded that agreement of sale dated 04.11.2016 is forged and the same does not relate to the agreement of sale dated 11.11.2016(Ex.P-1). However, the rest of the pleadings in the counter disputes passing of consideration of Rs. 45,00,000/- and the averments in Ex.P-1. The appellants got filed petition and also obtained interim orders restraining the respondent not to alienate the property with the supporting affidavits of P.V. Siva Sankar and E. Ramakriushna Reddy. As per Ex.P-1, Agreement of sale dated 11.11.2016, contains the names of the attestors Chengappa, Kishore and R.G. Divakar Reddy and one scribe. But there are no affidavits of the attestors and scribe in support of agreement of sale. Further a perusal of Ex.P-1 agreement of sale dated 11.11.2016, show that possession of the property is not with the appellants/plaintiffs herein. Under these circumstances, for the limited purpose of establishing the document Ex.P-1 at this stage, the appellants/appellants failed to produce necessary affidavits of signatories to document Ex.P-1. 25. Further a perusal of Ex.P-1 agreement of sale dated 11.11.2016, show that possession of the property is not with the appellants/plaintiffs herein. Under these circumstances, for the limited purpose of establishing the document Ex.P-1 at this stage, the appellants/appellants failed to produce necessary affidavits of signatories to document Ex.P-1. 25. Further on perusal, the Ex.R-4 served copy of charge sheet in Cr.No.48 of 2018 of V.Kota P.S, categorically shows that the appellants/plaintiffs herein got registered FIR under Section 420 r/w 34 IPC based on the agreement of sale dated 11.11.2016. The police have investigated the matter and filed a charge sheet against one Subbamma ie., respondent herein stating that they availed bank loans and part of the said property was sold to onesymala under registered document No. 211/2017 and part of the said property to one K. Nagendra on 19.02.2008. Accordingly the accused is alleged to have cheated the complainant and his family i.e., appellants herein, for wrongful gain. Further, Ex.R-4 categorically shows that part of the land was already sold in the year 2008 and part of the land was sold away in the year 2017. From a reading of Ex.R-4, it is clear that the defendant/respondent already got initiated criminal law to punish the accused for the offence under Section 420 r/w 34 IPC, the appellants/appellants again got filed the suit and an Interlocutory Application to get relief under the same document i.e., agreement of sale dated 11.11.2016. However, the appellants have suppressed all the said facts of cheating allegedly done by the respondent and filed the suit, as such the appellants did not approach the Court with clean hands. 26. The other documents Ex.R-1 relates to initiation of criminal proceedings under Sections 138, 148, 420 IPC under C.C.No.8 of 2018 on the file of XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad at L.N. Nagar against husband of respondent herein. Further Ex.R-2 shows that the same appellants herein got filed OS No.66/2017 based on the agreement dated 04.06.2017 in respect of the house property. Accordingly, the transactions under Ex.R-1 establish that there were monetary transactions also like borrowing amounts and issuance of cheques. As the respondents have disputed passing of consideration, and the very existence of Ex.P-1 agreement of sale, the appellants have failed to prove prima facie case in their favour. 27. Accordingly, the transactions under Ex.R-1 establish that there were monetary transactions also like borrowing amounts and issuance of cheques. As the respondents have disputed passing of consideration, and the very existence of Ex.P-1 agreement of sale, the appellants have failed to prove prima facie case in their favour. 27. So far as balance of convenience is concerned, as the respondents are disputing the transactions under Ex.P-1 and passing of consideration and the appellants have alternative plea in the main suit i.e., refund of advance amount of Rs. 45,00,000/- with interest by way of decree, there will not be any inconvenience to the appellants herein even if injunction is not granted. Accordingly, there is no balance of convenience, in favour of the appellants herein as well. 28. On perusing the entire material on record and submissions made by both the counsels, this Court holds that the appellant miserably failed to prove three cardinal principles as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court judgment reported in Dalpat Kumar and others Vs. Prahlad Singh and others, MANU/SC/0715/1991, wherein it was held that “It is settled law that the grant of injunction is a discretionary relief. The exercise thereof is subject to the court satisfying that (1) there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the court, there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by the plaintiff/defendant; (2) the Court’s interference is necessary to protect the party from the species of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damage would ensue before the legal right would be established at trial; and (3) that the comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be greater than that would be likely to arise from granting it.” 29. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise that there is “a prima facie case” in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on adducing evidence at the trial. 30. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on adducing evidence at the trial. 30. With the above discussion, we find no merit in the order of the trial Court and the same is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. No costs. 31. Accordingly, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending in this Appeal, shall stand closed.