JUDGMENT : Alexander Thomas, J. The prayers in the instant Original Petition filed under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India are as follows: “…....to set aside Ext.P3 Interim Order in OA No.180/00329/2021 dated 20.08.2021 of Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench, in the interest of justice. Sufficient time for completion of the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the respondent may kindly be granted.” 2. Heard Sri.S.Manu, learned Assistant Solicitor General of India, appearing for the petitioners in the OP/respondents in the OA and Sri.M.A.Shafik, learned counsel appearing for the sole respondent in the OP/ the sole respondent in the O.A. 3. The petitioners in the OP are the respondents in the O.A and the respondent in the OP is the applicant in the O.A. 4. The prayers in the instant Ext.P1 Original Application, O.A.No.329 of 2021 filed before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench are as follows: “(i) To call for the records leading to the issue of Annexures A-1 to A18 and to quash the A-1, A-2 & A-3, in the interest of justice; (ii) To direct the respondents to reinstate the applicant back in service with all consequential benefits including the arrears of pay and allowances as if the applicant had not been compulsorily retired from service; (iii) To pass such other orders or directions as deemed just, fit and necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case; and (iv) To award costs of and incidental to this application.” 5. The Tribunal after hearing both sides, has rendered the impugned Ext.P3 order dated 20.08.2021, directing that, in view of Annexure-A8 appellate order, the respondents shall reinstate the applicant in service, before further proceeding with the disciplinary enquiry, as ordered in Annexure-A8, is effectuated and that this would be subject to the final result of the O.A. 6. The respondent in the O.P will be referred for short as 'the original applicant/applicant'. The applicant, while holding the post of Postal Assistant under the Postal Department, was served with Annexure-A4 memo of charges dated 06.06.2018 issued by the 3rd respondent Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Calicut Division (disciplinary authority), raising certain allegations therein. The applicant submitted her statement of defence and thereafter, regular enquiry for major penalty proceedings in terms of Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules was initiated and completed. The applicant submitted her statement of defence and thereafter, regular enquiry for major penalty proceedings in terms of Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules was initiated and completed. Thereafter, the 3rd respondent disciplinary authority has issued the impugned Annexure-A6 penalty order dated 30.07.2020, ordering that the applicant shall stand compulsorily retired from service as a punishment. Aggrieved thereby, the applicant has preferred Annexure-A7 statutory appeal in terms of Rule 24 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, before the 2nd respondent Director of Postal Services. The 2nd respondent appellate authority has issued Annexure-A8 appellate order dated 25.11.2020, holding that there is illegality and impropriety in the issuance of the impugned Annexure-A6 penalty order to the extent that the relevancy of additional defence do0cuments and additional defence witnesses has not been properly examined by the disciplinary authority and that therefore, the matter would require reconsideration. Hence, the appellate authority has remitted the matter to the 3rd respondent disciplinary authority, in terms of Annexure-A8 order, to reconsider the matter from the stage of deciding the relevancy of additional defence document and additional defence witnesses required by the applicant and then pass fresh orders in the disciplinary proceedings, in accordance with law. The operative portion of Annexure-A8 appellate order dated 25.11.2020 issued by the 2nd respondent Director of Postal Services, reads as follows: “I, Manoj Kumar, Director of Postal Services, Northern Region, hereby remit the case back to the disciplinary authority for de-novo proceedings from the stage of deciding relevancy of additional defence documents and witness demanded by the CGS.” [See internal page 7 of Annexure-A8 given on page 76 of the paper book of the O.P]. 7. The applicant then demanded that, in view of the remit order, the penalty order stands set aside and further that she was never suspended from service, at any point of time, during the initiation of the above disciplinary proceedings and that therefore, she is legally entitled to be reinstated in service, etc. 7. The applicant then demanded that, in view of the remit order, the penalty order stands set aside and further that she was never suspended from service, at any point of time, during the initiation of the above disciplinary proceedings and that therefore, she is legally entitled to be reinstated in service, etc. The said request made by the applicant has been rejected as per the impugned Annexure-A14 order dated 23.04.2021, issued by the 2nd respondent stating that Annexure-A8 appellate order remitting the matter to the disciplinary authority is one passed under Rule 27(2)(c)(ii) of CCS (CCA) Rules and that therefore, the punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority was not set aside and that de-novo proceedings ordered should be carried out as per the Rule and that the earlier punishment order of compulsory retirement issued by the disciplinary authority at Annexure-A6, would cease to exist and would be deemed to have been set aside, immediately before fresh orders are issued by the disciplinary authority based on the facts on record, etc. 8. It is this order at Annexure-A14, that is under challenge in the O.A. As mentioned above, the Tribunal has ordered that, in view of Annexure-A8 appellate order of remit, the delinquent is legally entitled to secure reinstatement in service before proceeding with further steps in the disciplinary proceedings afresh and accordingly, the Tribunal has directed that the applicant should be reinstated in service. It is this order of the Tribunal at Ext.P3 that is under challenge in the present O.P, filed at the instance of the Union of India and the Departmental Authorities concerned. In view of the complex nature of the issues, we proposed to both sides that we may render our opinion on the legal aspects of the matter, which may affect the pending O.A. Thereupon, the learned Assistant Solicitor General of India had taken time to get instructions as to whether the applicant could be reinstated in service and the O.A may be decided accordingly. 9. Today, when the matter was taken up for consideration, the learned ASGI, has apprised us that this Court may pass orders on the merits of the matter. The counsel for the respondent herein/applicant has also welcomed the above said submission made by the petitioners and has apprised us that this Court may decide on the merits of the matter. 9. Today, when the matter was taken up for consideration, the learned ASGI, has apprised us that this Court may pass orders on the merits of the matter. The counsel for the respondent herein/applicant has also welcomed the above said submission made by the petitioners and has apprised us that this Court may decide on the merits of the matter. We are told by both sides that the relevant facts in this case are not disputed and the two crucial relevant facts are (i) that the applicant was never suspended from service at any point of time, during the initiation of present disciplinary proceedings at Annexure-A4 memo of charges or thereafter and (ii) Annexure-A8 order is one passed by the appellate authority remitting the matter to the disciplinary authority in exercise of the powers under Rule 27(2)(c)(ii) of CCS(CCA) Rules. Therefore, what we have to decide essentially is the legal consequences that flow from an order of remit passed by the Appellate Authority in terms of Clause (ii) of Rule 27(2)(c) of CCS (CCA) Rules. Since, any opinion we may render on the legal aspects of the matter is likely to affect the pending O.A and we had cautioned both the parties and now both the parties have apprised us that in view of the complex nature of the issues, this Court may render a judgment on the merits of the matter, elucidating the legal position and accordingly, we propose to do so. 10. Rule 24 of the CCS (CCA) Rules (hereinafter referred for short as “CCS Rules”) deals with the Appellate Authority. Rule 27 thereof deals with consideration of appeal. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 27 is more relevant and pertinent in the instant case and therefore, there is no necessity for us, to refer to the other provisions in that Rule. Rule 27(2) of the CCS(CCA) Rules provides as follows: “Rule 27. Rule 27 thereof deals with consideration of appeal. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 27 is more relevant and pertinent in the instant case and therefore, there is no necessity for us, to refer to the other provisions in that Rule. Rule 27(2) of the CCS(CCA) Rules provides as follows: “Rule 27. x x x x x x x x (1) x x x x x x x x (2) In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 11 or enhancing any penalty imposed under the said rules, the Appellate Authority shall consider_ (a) Whether the procedure laid down in these rules has been complied with and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in the violation of any provisions of the Constitution of India or in the failure of justice; (b) whether the findings of the Disciplinary Authority are warranted by the evidence on the record; and (c) whether the penalty or the enhanced penalty imposed adequate, inadequate or severe; and pass orders_ (i) confirming, enhancing, reducing, or setting aside the penalty, or (ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed or enhanced the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of these cases: provided that_ (i) the Commission shall be consulted in all cases where such consultation is necessary 1[and the Government servant has been given an opportunity of representing against the advice of the Commission] [within the time-limit specified in Clause (b) of sub-rule(3) of Rule 15]: (ii) if such enhanced penalty which the Appellate Authority proposes to impose is one of the penalties specified in Clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 and an inquiry under Rule 14 has not already been held in the case, the Appellate Authority shall, subject to the provisions of Rule 19, itself hold such inquiry or direct that such inquiry be held in accordance with the provisions of Rule 14 and thereafter, on a consideration of the proceedings of such inquiry and make such orders as it may deem fit: (iii) if the enhanced penalty which the Appellate Authority proposes to impose is one of the penalties specified in Clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 and an inquiry under Rule 14 has been held in the case, the Appellate Authority shall make such orders as it may deem fit after the appellant has been given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation against the proposed penalty; and (iv) no order imposing an enhanced penalty shall be made in any other case unless the appellant has been given a reasonable opportunity, as far as may be in accordance with the provisions of Rule 16, of making a representation against such enhanced penalty.” (emphasis supplied) 11. It may also be pertinent to refer to the relevant portion of Rule 29 of CCS(CCA) Rules, which deals with the revision. It may also be pertinent to refer to the relevant portion of Rule 29 of CCS(CCA) Rules, which deals with the revision. The relevant provision of Rule 29 (revision), to the extent it is pertinent, may be quoted as follows: “Rule 29 [Revision] (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules_ (i) x x x x x x x (ii) x x x x x x x (iii) x x x x x x x (iv) x x x x x x x (v) x x x x x x x (vi) x x x x x x x may at any time, either his or its own motion, or otherwise call for the records of any such inquiry and [revise] any order made under these rules or under the rules repealed by Rule 34 from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred or from which no appeal is allowed, after consultation with the Commission where such consideration is necessary and may – (a) confirm, modify or set aside the order; or (b) confirm, reduce enhance or set aside the penalty imposed by the order, or impose any penalty where no penalty has been imposed; or (c) remit the case to the authority which made the order to or any other authority directing such authority to make such further enquiry as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case; or (d) passed such orders as it may deem fit: Provided that no order imposing or enhancing any penalty shall be made by any revising authority unless the Government servant concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation against the penalty proposed and where it is proposed to impose any of the penalties specified in Clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 or to enhance the penalty imposed by the order sought to be revised to any of the penalties specified in those clauses, and if an inquiry under Rule 14 has not already been held in the case, no such penalty shall be imposed except after an inquiry in the manner laid down in rule 14 subject to the provisions of Rule 19, and except after consultation with the Commission where such consultation is necessary 1[ and the Government servant has been given an opportunity of representing against the advice of the Commission] 2[within the time-limit specified in Clause (b) of sub-rule(3) of Rule 15: Provided further that no power of [revision] shall be exercised by the Comptroller any Auditor-General, 4[Member (Personnel), Postal Services Board, Adviser (Human resources Department), Department of Telecommunications or the Head of Department, as the case may be, unless- (i) the authority which made the order in appeal, or (ii) the authority to which an appeal would lie, where no appeal has been preferred, is subordinate to him.” (emphasis supplied). 12. Rule 10 of the CCA Rules deals with suspension from service. Rule 10(1) authorises the appointing authority or any other authority to which it is subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any authority empowered in that behalf by the President by general or special order, may place a Government servant under suspension due to any of the contingencies envisaged in the Clauses enumerated thereunder. Sub-rules (3) & (4) of Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules are more relevant and pertinent in the case in hand and the same provides as follows: “Rule 10. Suspension x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x (3) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a government servant under suspension is set aside in a appeal or on review under these rules and the case is remitted for further inquiry or action or with any other directions, the order of his suspension shall be deemed to have continued in force, on and from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall remain in force until further orders. (4) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a Government servant is set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by a decision of a Court of Law and the Disciplinary Authority, on a consideration of the circumstances of the case, decides to hold a further inquiry against him on the allegations on which the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement was originally imposed, the Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the Appointing Authority from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders.” Provided that no such further inquiry shall be ordered unless it is intended to meet a situation where the Court has passed an order purely on technical grounds without going into the merits of the case. 13. As per the legal position well settled by the Apex Court in a series of decisions as in Om Prakash Gupta Vs. State of UP [( AIR 1955 SC 600 )], H.L Mehra Vs. 13. As per the legal position well settled by the Apex Court in a series of decisions as in Om Prakash Gupta Vs. State of UP [( AIR 1955 SC 600 )], H.L Mehra Vs. Union of India & Ors [( AIR 1974 SC 1281 )]= [(1974) (4) SCC 396)], etc., it is well settled that an order of suspension from service comes to an end by the order of dismissal and the relationship of master and servant is extinguished and once the suspension comes to an end by an order of dismissal, it cannot be revived by a mere subsequent setting aside of the order of dismissal in the absence of a statutory provision or rule to that effect. A Six Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the decision in Om Prakash Gupta Vs. State of UP [( AIR 1955 SC 600 )] has categorically held in para 12 thereof; that where an order of suspension is made against a Government servant pending an inquiry and as a result of inquiry an order of dismissal by way of penalty has been passed, the order of suspension lapses with that order and the subsequent declaration by a Court that the order of dismissal was illegal cannot revive the order of suspension which did not exist, etc. Subsequently, the Apex Court in the decision as in H.L Mehra Vs. Union of India & Ors [(1974) (4) SCC 396)]= [( AIR 1974 SC 1281 )], has held after reference to Sub-rule (5)(b) of Rule 10 of the CCS(CCA) Rules that the said Rules provides for continuation of the suspension order, but in a situation as in the said case, where the previous suspension order passed against the delinquent had lapsed when he was dismissed and therefore, it was incapable of being continued and the continuance of the suspension order under Sub-rule (5)(b) of Rule 10 was held to be invalid. In H.L Mehra's case supra, the Apex Court dealt with a case where a criminal prosecution was launched, the appellant delinquent therein, who was a Senior Superintendent in the Railway Mail Service on four charges and the principal charge was that, while functioning as Officer on Special Duty at Goa, he had sent four consignments in trucks or railway wagons hired by the Department without payment of prior charges, customs duty, etc., and thus committed offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. During the pendency of the criminal case, the Union Government proposed to hold an enquiry against him under Rule 15 of the CCS(CCA) Rules, 1957 on the above charges differently worded and also on other charges. The appellant delinquent was convicted by the criminal court on the above charges and the conviction was confirmed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. Thereafter, the Union Government had passed an order on 26th October, 1967 dismissing him from service with immediate effect on the ground that his conduct, which has led to conviction, rendered his further retention in service as a public servant undesirable. Thereafter, his conviction was set aside by the Apex Court and thereupon, the Union Government had passed the impugned order dated 09.06.1971 setting aside the dismissal order and directing that the enquiry against him shall be continued and further holding that he should continue under suspension until the termination of the proceedings. It is this order rendered on 09.06.1971 that was challenged by the writ proceedings which was dismissed and thereafter the appellant therein had preferred an appeal to the Apex Court on certificate obtained from the High Court. Para No.5 of H.L.Mehra's case supra, deals with the provisions contained in Rule 10 of the CCS(CCA) Rules including Rules 3 & 4 as it stands now. Sub Rule (5) of Rule 10 of CCS(CCA) Rules, that was considered therein, reads as follows [see page 402 of SCC Report in H.L.Mehra's case supra]: “(5)(a) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the authority competent to do so. Sub Rule (5) of Rule 10 of CCS(CCA) Rules, that was considered therein, reads as follows [see page 402 of SCC Report in H.L.Mehra's case supra]: “(5)(a) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the authority competent to do so. (b) Where a Government servant is suspended or is deemed to have been suspended, (whether in connection with any disciplinary proceeding or otherwise), and any other disciplinary proceeding is commenced against him during the continuance of that suspension the authority competent to place him under suspension may, for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, direct that the Government servant shall continue to be under suspension until the termination of all or any of such proceedings.” It may be pertinent to refer to para No.7 of the judgment of the Apex Court in H.L.Mehra's case supra [(1974) (4) SCC 396)], p.p.-402 to 405, which reads as follows: ….........''the employer is regarded as issuing an order to the employee which because the contract is subsisting, the employee must obey”. This being the true nature of an order of suspension, it follows that the Government servant would be entitled to his remuneration for the period of suspension unless there is some provision in the statute or rules governing his conditions of service which provides for withholding of such remuneration. Now, when an order of dismissal is passed, the viyculum juris between the Government and the servant is dissolved: the relationship off master and servant between them is extinguished. Then the order of suspension must a 'forliory' dome to an end. But what happens when the order of dismissal is subsequently set aside ? Does that revive the order of suspension ? We do not think so. Once the suspension has come to an end by an order of dismissal, which was effective when made, it cannot be revived by more subsequent setting aside of the order of dismissal in the absence of a statutory provision or rule to that effect. That is precisely the reason why sub-rules (3) and (4) had to be introduced in Rule 10 providing for retrospective revival and continuance of the suspension in cases falling within those sub-rules. This position which emerges clearly on principle is supported also by authority. That is precisely the reason why sub-rules (3) and (4) had to be introduced in Rule 10 providing for retrospective revival and continuance of the suspension in cases falling within those sub-rules. This position which emerges clearly on principle is supported also by authority. There is a decision of a Bench of six judges of this Court which endorses the same view.” So it is well settled that, where initially an order of suspension is issued in the disciplinary proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings is finalised by an order of termination from service like dismissal order, etc., then mere setting aside of the dismissal order by itself will not revive the suspension order in the absence of any statutory prescriptions. To take care of the said scenario, the provisions have been made as in Sub-rules (3) & (4) of Rule 10 of the CCS(CCA) Rules quoted herein above, which has also been considered in para No.5 of H.L. Mehra's case supra. 14. In the case in Union of India & Ors Vs. V.B.Hajela [ (1997) 10 SCC 531 )], the penalty order of compulsory retirement was set aside by the Tribunal on the ground that the enquiry report was not supplied to the employee. But the Tribunal had given liberty to the authority to continue the proceedings. In the meanwhile, the employee attained the age of superannuation and had retired. The authority then passed an order to the effect that the employee was treated as deemed to have been placed under suspension from the date of compulsory retirement. That order was challenged contending that, since the employee was not under suspension at any stage, during the pendency of the earlier disciplinary proceedings, the provision for deemed suspension cannot be invoked. In the said case, it was held by the Apex Court that, since the Government servant, though not earlier suspended, will be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the authority from the date of the original order of the compulsory retirement. 15. In Divisional Personnel Officer, Western Railway Kota Vs. Sunder Dass [ (1981) 4 SCC 563 )], the Apex Court dealt with a case where the dismissal of a railway employee was declared to be illegal by the Court. After holding a fresh enquiry, he was again dismissed from service. 15. In Divisional Personnel Officer, Western Railway Kota Vs. Sunder Dass [ (1981) 4 SCC 563 )], the Apex Court dealt with a case where the dismissal of a railway employee was declared to be illegal by the Court. After holding a fresh enquiry, he was again dismissed from service. It was held therein that he must be deemed to have been continued under suspension from the date of the original order of dismissal to the date of the second order of dismissal and he would be entitled only for subsistence allowance during the said period. In the case in A.K.Balakrisnan Nair Vs. Superintendent of Post Offices, Ernakulam Division [( 1982 KLJ 149 )] it has been held that two conditions must be satisfied in order to attract the operation of Sub-rule (4) of Rule 10. Firstly, the order of dismissal must be set aside in consequence of a decision of the court of law and secondly, the disciplinary authority must be decided to hold a fresh enquiry on the allegations on which the order of dismissal was originally passed. Where the new allegations against the officers are wholly unrelated to the charges in the criminal case and therefore, the new enquiry was clearly not an enquiry on the allegations on which the penalty of dismissal was originally imposed, the provisions contained in Sub-rule (4) of Rule 10 was not to be attracted. 16. In the case in Mahender Singh Vs. Union of India & Anr. [(1991 Supp (2) Supreme Court Cases 127)], the Apex Court held that a case of simple order of termination of service which was set aside by the Tribunal on the ground that it really amounted to punishment. The Tribunal therein also ordered that the employee shall continue under suspension from the date of the order of termination, if the employer decided to initiate disciplinary action. Pursuant to the decision of the Tribunal, the employer passed an order to the effect that the appellant therein shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension from service with effect from the date of the termination and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders. Pursuant to the decision of the Tribunal, the employer passed an order to the effect that the appellant therein shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension from service with effect from the date of the termination and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders. The Supreme Court held that the order of the Tribunal and the authorities as to retrospective suspension was not sustainable since the original order of termination from service was not passed against the appellant as a measure of punishment and hence, it was held that Rule 10(4) of CCS(CCA) Rules will not apply in the said case. In Union of India Vs. Rajiv Kumar [ (2003) 6 SCC 516 )], the Apex Court has held that an actual order of suspension from service is not required to be passed in terms of Rule 10(3) and that the said provision is one and that it is deemed to have been passed by the operation of the legal fiction related under the statutory rule and that the order is not restricted in its point of duration or efficacy to the actual period of detention only and that it continues to be operative unless modified or revoked. 17. Now, we may examine the above said provisions contained in Rule 10(3) & Rule 10(4) of the CCS (CCA) Rules. A perusal of the said Rules would make it clear that Rule 10(3) deals with a case where the penalty of termination from service is imposed upon a Government servant under suspension and where the same is set aside in appeal or review by the superior departmental authorities concerned and the case is remitted for further enquiry, etc. Whereas, Rule 10(4) deals with a case where the penalty of termination from service imposed upon a Government servant is set aside or declared or rendered void by a decision of a Court of Law and the Disciplinary Authority, on a consideration of the circumstances of the case, decides to hold a further inquiry, etc. The legal fiction of deemed suspension in terms of Rule 10(3) can arise only where the penalty of termination of service is imposed upon a Government servant under suspension and where the same is set aside in appeal or review by the superior departmental authorities and the case is remitted for further inquiry. The legal fiction of deemed suspension in terms of Rule 10(3) can arise only where the penalty of termination of service is imposed upon a Government servant under suspension and where the same is set aside in appeal or review by the superior departmental authorities and the case is remitted for further inquiry. Then, in such a scenario, the order of suspension shall be deemed to have been continued in force, on and from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be and shall remain in force until further orders. For invoking the legal fiction under Rule 10(3), it is mandatory that the Government servant should have been under suspension, at the time of imposition of the major penalty of termination of service and later the superior departmental authorities in appellate or revisional/review powers interfere with the said penalty order on the ground of contravention of principles of natural justice, etc. In such a scenario, where the Government servant was under suspension and then terminated from service as a major penalty and the said major penalty is set aside by the superior departmental authorities by way of appeal or review, etc., then, the legal fiction would automatically come into play with the result that the Government servant will then be deemed to be under suspension from the date of issuance of the original order of major penalty and shall remain in force until further orders. 18. Whereas, under Rule 10(4), it is not necessary or mandatory that the Government servant should have been under suspension, at the time of imposition of the major penalty of termination from service. 18. Whereas, under Rule 10(4), it is not necessary or mandatory that the Government servant should have been under suspension, at the time of imposition of the major penalty of termination from service. All what is required is that the Government servant should suffer a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsorily retirement from service and the said penalty imposed on him is set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by a decision of a Court of Law and then where the Disciplinary Authority, on a consideration of the circumstances of the case, decides to hold further inquiry, as envisaged therein, and on satisfaction of the said conditions, the legal fiction under Rule 10(4) is automatically attracted and in such a situation where the intervention is made by a Court of Law, it is not material as to whether the Government servant should have been under suspension or not at the time of imposition of the major penalty and where the intervention by the Court of Law is made on account of contravention of natural justice and the disciplinary authority is having the liberty to conduct further enquiry, then on account of the interference made to the penalty order by the Court of Law, the Government servant whether earlier he was under suspension or not is deemed to have been under suspension by the operation of law. The various conditions envisaged in Sub-rule (4) of Rule 10 as well as the proviso thereto should be satisfied. The proviso to Rule 10(4) mandates that no such further enquiry shall be ordered, unless it is intended to meet a situation, where the court has passed an order purely on technical grounds without going to the merits of the case, etc. The said proviso has been added as an amendment, with effect from 16th June 2007. So there is a vital distinction between the operation of the legal fiction as made out in Rule 10(3) vis-a-vis Rule 10(4). In Rule 10(3), the intervention is made by the superior departmental authorities like, Appellate Authority, Review Authority/Revisional Authority, etc., where the superior departmental authorities, who interfere in the matter on account of contravention of natural justice. So there is a vital distinction between the operation of the legal fiction as made out in Rule 10(3) vis-a-vis Rule 10(4). In Rule 10(3), the intervention is made by the superior departmental authorities like, Appellate Authority, Review Authority/Revisional Authority, etc., where the superior departmental authorities, who interfere in the matter on account of contravention of natural justice. In such a case, for attracting the legal fiction of deemed suspension, it is incumbent and mandatory that the Government servant should have been under suspension from service at the time of imposition of the major penalty of termination from service. Whereas, in the latter category conceived under Rule 10(4), it makes no difference as to whether or not the Government servant was under suspension of service at the time of imposition of the major penalty of termination from service and even if he is not under suspension from service at that time, so long as the intervention made by the Court of Law with the major penalty mentioned therein, on account of contravention of natural justice, procedural irregularity, etc, and liberty is available to the Departmental Authorities/Disciplinary Authorities to conduct further inquiry, then by the operation of the legal fiction created under Rule 10(4), the Government servant is deemed to be under suspension. The intention of the rule making authority is manifest and evident in making out different provisions in Rule 10(3) & (4). The intervention under Rule 10(3) is made by the superior departmental authority, whereas the intervention under Rule 10(4) is made by the Court of Law. Where, the intervention made by the Court of Law and an employee is forced to be taken back by the Departmental Authorities against their wishes, then the Rule has made sufficient safe guards by the said legal fiction, whereby, irrespective as to whether or not the employee was under suspension at the time of imposition of the major penalty of termination from service, he/she shall be deemed to be under suspension on and with effect from the declaration or intervention made by the Court of Law on the said procedural grounds. Whereas, in the former category under Rule 10(3) where the Government servant is not under suspension, the rule making authority does not create the legal fiction automatically. Whereas, in the former category under Rule 10(3) where the Government servant is not under suspension, the rule making authority does not create the legal fiction automatically. The intention for the same is also clear, as the intervention under Rule 10(3) is made by the superior departmental authorities and it cannot be said that such an employee is being thrust upon the department by the superior departmental authorities, as the whole hierarchy of officialdom is one and the same as far as the authority of the Department/Government is concerned. Therefore, a fine tune distinction has been made in Rule 10(3) and the legal fiction thereunder will arise only if the Government servant is under suspension at the time of imposition of the major penalty of termination from service. In the instant case, the applicant was never under suspension from service either at the time of issuance of Annexure-A4 memo of charges or before that or thereafter. That is the admitted case of both sides. Going by the operation of Rule 10(3), there is no deemed suspension of such an employee from service. 19. The respondent herein would place reliance on the instructions given by the Director General P & T Orders, as per Letter No.3/171/72-Disc-I, dated 9th February, 1973, which read as follows: [see page 99 of the paper book of the O.P]. "(1) Need for clear and careful reading of appellate orders conforming to provisions of rule _ It has been noticed that orders issued by the authorities competent under CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965, including Appellate Authorities, are not carefully officials take advantage of these technical defects and have the said orders quashed. The matter has been examined carefully in consultation with the Ministry of Law, Department of Legal Affairs and it has been decided that henceforth all Appellate / Reviewing Authorities should ensure to guard against the technical defects while issuing the appellate/review orders. In this connection, attention is invited to Rule 27(2)(c). In Clause (i), it clearly envisages that the Appellate Authority shall pass orders confirming, enhancing and reducing or setting aside the penalty while in Clause (ii), as an alternative, it requires the Appellate Authority to remit the case to an authority mentioned therein with such directions as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. In Clause (i), it clearly envisages that the Appellate Authority shall pass orders confirming, enhancing and reducing or setting aside the penalty while in Clause (ii), as an alternative, it requires the Appellate Authority to remit the case to an authority mentioned therein with such directions as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. It is clear that Rule 27(2) (c) (i) and (ii)ibid, do not empower the Appellate Authority to pass an order in which both these alternatives are ordered. The appellate orders should be quite clear and in conformity with the provisions contained in Rule 27(2) (c) and Rule 29 of CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965." From a reading of the said instructions from the Director General of Posts given on 09.02.1973, it can be seen that all what is stated therein is that Clause 1 & Clause 2 of Rule 27 (2)(c) of the CCS(CCA) Rules are two distinct limbs and that Clause 2 of Rule 27(2)(c) requires the Appellate Authority to remit the case to hold an enquiry mentioned therein with such directions as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. Further, it is mentioned therein that it is clear that Rule 27(2)(c)(i) &(ii) do not empower the Appellate Authority to pass an order in which both these alternatives are ordered and that the Appellate orders should be quite clear and should be in conformity with the provisions contained in Rule 27(2) (c) and Rule 29 of the CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965. Further, it is mentioned therein that it is clear that Rule 27(2)(c)(i) &(ii) do not empower the Appellate Authority to pass an order in which both these alternatives are ordered and that the Appellate orders should be quite clear and should be in conformity with the provisions contained in Rule 27(2) (c) and Rule 29 of the CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965. A reading of Rule 27(2)(c) of the CCS(CCA) Rules would make it clear that, in the case of an appeal against an order of imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 11 or enhancing any penalty imposed under the said Rules, the Appellate Authority shall consider (a) whether the procedure laid down in those Rules has been complied with and if not whether such non-compliance has resulted in the violation of any provisions of the Constitution of India or in the failure of justice; (b) whether the findings of the Disciplinary Authority are warranted by the evidences on the record; and (c) whether the penalty or enhanced penalty is adequate, inadequate or severe;etc., and then pass orders (i) confirming, enhancing, reducing, setting aside the penalty; or (ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed or enhanced the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the cases. A combined reading of the said provisions contained in Clauses (a) to (c) as well as Clauses (i) & (ii) under Rule 27(2) would make it clear that the Appellate Authority shall bestow their anxious consideration and decide as to whether the impugned penalty order suffers from non compliance of natural justice or violation of the provisions of Constitution of India as in Article 311 or failure of justice or whether the findings of the Disciplinary Authority are warranted by the evidences on record or regarding the adequacy or proportionality of punishment, etc. Thereafter, the Appellate Authority will have to pass orders either (i) confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty; or (ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed or enhanced the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem proper in the circumstances of the case, etc. Thereafter, the Appellate Authority will have to pass orders either (i) confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty; or (ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed or enhanced the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem proper in the circumstances of the case, etc. Where the order passed by the Appellate Authority is under Rule 27(2)(i), then it amounts to consideration of the merits of the matter and then taking a considered decision as to whether the impugned penalty order is to be confirmed or whether it is to be enhanced or reduced or whether the penalty is to be set aside. The decision under Clause (i) of Rule 27(2) is on the merits of the matter, and the said decision of the Appellate Authority will be otherwise final, subject to other remedies like Rule 29 revision or approaching the judicial Fora like, the Central Administrative Tribunal, High Court, Supreme Court, etc. As far as the Appellate Authority is concerned, the decision under Clause (i) of Rule 27 (2) is on the merits of the matter. Whereas, the decision on Clause (ii) of Rule 27(2) is only regarding technical violation or technical contravention of the provisions of the Constitution of India as in Article 311(2) guaranteeing reasonable opportunity or violation of principles of natural justice or violation of the procedural rigour of CCS(CCA) Rules like Rule 14, etc. In such a case, where the considered decision taken by the Appellate Authority under Rule 27(2) is not on the merits of the matter then, it cannot be traced into Clause(1) supra, but only under Clause(ii). While taking the said option under Clause (ii), the Appellate authority will have to remit the case to the Authority which imposed or enhanced the penalty or to any other Authority with such directions as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. Once, the Appellate Authority takes recourse to Clause (ii), it is only on account of technical failure of justice and then the matter would require reconsideration at the hands of the Disciplinary Authority or any other competent authority and for that purpose the matter will have to be remitted. Once, the Appellate Authority takes recourse to Clause (ii), it is only on account of technical failure of justice and then the matter would require reconsideration at the hands of the Disciplinary Authority or any other competent authority and for that purpose the matter will have to be remitted. But it has to be borne in mind, where the statutory appeal under Rules 24 & 27 is directed against the major penalty of termination from service, like removal, dismissal from service and compulsory retirement from service, etc, then, the jural relationship between the employer & employee relationship has snapped with the major penalty of termination from service. Without restoring the said snapped jural relationship between the employer & employee, there is no question of bringing such an ex-delinquent within the ambit of the statutory Rules to bring him within the province of the said statutory powers of the Employer-Departmental Authorities. In other words, remit necessarily implies technical setting aside of the penalty, but with liberty to proceed further with the inquiry in the manner in which it has been ordered by the Appellate Authority. Without setting aside the said penalty, there is no question of restoring the snapped jural relationship of the employer & employee between the Department and the delinquent concerned. Where the Government servant is already under suspension from service and the decision is taken by the Appellate Authority under Clause (ii) of Rule 27 (2), then, Rule 10(3) of CCS(CCA) Rules will automatically come into play and the legal fiction will be in statutory force with a result that such a Government servant, who was under suspension from service at the time of imposition of the major penalty would be treated to be under deemed suspension from the date of imposition of the original major penalty. But in a case where such an employee was not under suspension at the time of imposition of the major penalty, then the legal fiction under Rule 10(3) would not come into play. In that regard, needless to say, that even Rule 10(4) will not have any application in as much as the said scenario under Rule 10(4) would apply only in relation to court intervention. In that regard, needless to say, that even Rule 10(4) will not have any application in as much as the said scenario under Rule 10(4) would apply only in relation to court intervention. Though, the automatic deemed suspension under Rule 10(3) may not come into play where the Government servant was not under suspension from service at the time of imposition of major penalty, and where the appellate Authority is to pass order under Clause (ii) of Rule 27(2), still, the Appellate Authority is given a vestige of discretion by the Rule making authority, since Clause (ii) thereof clearly stipulates and mandates that the remit can be made by the Appellate Authority "with such directions as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case". The said wordings have been very guardedly and consciously imposed by the Rule making authority under Clause (ii) of Rule 27(2). The said wordings in Clause (ii) are conspicuously absent in Clause (i), as it is not necessary there. Therefore, even if the Government servant is not under suspension from service and the appellate Authority proposed to pass the order of remit under Clause (ii) and since such a remit would also involve the fulfillment of the restoration of the snapped jural relationship of employer and employee, and if the Appellate authority is having cogent materials to take the view that suspension of the employee from service is necessary for the conduct of the de-novo inquiry, etc, then, the wordings "with such directions as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case" would empower the Appellate Authority to pass appropriate orders giving liberty to the Disciplinary Authority to keep the delinquent under suspension from service during the conduct of the de-novo inquiry contemplated under Clause (ii) of Rule 27(2). Such a scenario may arise in very rare and exceptional cases. Ordinarily, where the disciplinary authority themselves take a considered decision not to keep the employee under suspension at any point of time before or after the issuance of the memo of charges, then, it could be inferred that there may not be any necessity or relevance to keep such a delinquent under suspension from service even in the stage of de-novo inquiry permitted as per the remit in terms of Clause (ii) of Rule 27(2). But there could not be any dogmatic approach in that regard and there could be real cases in rare and exceptional scenario, where the Appellate Authority is apprised that though the employee was never under suspension earlier, his suspension from service may be necessary in view of changed circumstances at the later point of time for valid reasons. If such valid reasons are there, then the Appellate Authority can certainly give liberty to the Disciplinary Authority to keep the delinquent under suspension from service during the conduct of the de-novo inquiry. Prima facie, we also feel that, ordinarily, the Appellate Authority may also be a higher authority in terms of Rule 10(1) and in as much as the competent authority, who suspended the employee from service is subordinate to such an Appellate Authority and if that be so, the Appellate Authority is otherwise empowered in terms of Rule 10(1), the Appellate Authority can also exercise the power under Clause (ii) of Rule 27(2) r/w Rule 10(1) of the CCS(CCA) Rules, to even directly order the suspension of the employee from service for cogent and valid reasons and based on real materials on record. That aspect of applicability of Rule 10(1) at that stage is only a prima facie opinion of ours and we need not rendering any final opinion on that regard. However, we make it clear that the legal position is that Clause (ii) of Rule 27(2) would certainly empower the Appellate Authority, to pass appropriate orders while remitting the case to the Disciplinary Authority, giving liberty to such competent Authority to keep the delinquent under suspension from service if really necessary and warranted in the given facts and circumstances of the case. So that it is not as if the Rule making authority has not made sufficient inbuilt safeguards, in the scenario conceived under Clause (ii) of Rule 27(2). 20. It is true that Clause (i) & Clause (ii) of Rule 27(2) would operate on two separate fields, one on the merits of the matter and the other on technical failure of justice due to contravention of natural justice, procedural Rules, violation of reasonable opportunity, etc. In the latter category, as in the instant case, and where the employee is not under suspension from service, there is no question of deemed suspension from service by the operation of Rule 10(3). In the latter category, as in the instant case, and where the employee is not under suspension from service, there is no question of deemed suspension from service by the operation of Rule 10(3). Still the Appellate Authority has got the liberty to invoke the special powers empowered by the wordings, "with such directions as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case". In this case, the Appellate Authority, has not deemed fit and proper to give any such liberty to the Disciplinary Authority in the facts of this case, as can be seen from a mere reading of Annexure-A8 Appellate Order. Therefore, there is no dispute to the proposition by the respondents, on the basis of the instructions of the Director General of Posts mentioned hereinabove that Clauses (i) & (ii) of Rule 27(2) would operate on different fields or dimensions. In the operation of Clause (ii), there is only a remit and there is no question of any technical setting aside of the penalty order. As otherwise it may lead to a situation where there is no restoration of the snapped jural relationship of the employer-employee with the result that the delinquent cannot be said to be within the seisin of the Disciplinary Authority without such restoration of the snapped employer-employee relationship. Therefore, it goes without saying and indeed it is an elementary position of law that where Clause (ii) is invoked it is certainly on a different dimension in as much as it is not on the merits of the case, but on technical failure of justice, etc. But it would lead to the technical setting aside of the major penalty order, so as to restore the snapped relationship of employer-employee between the department and the delinquent, and where the employee is already under suspension as above, then Rule 10(3) would certainly automatically apply and if he is deemed to have been under suspension, whereas he is not under suspension the Appellate Authority may consider the facts of the case and if it is really warranted based on factual records that the suspension is necessary, then the Appellate Authority can give liberty to the disciplinary authority in that regard, going by the specific wordings in Clause (ii) of Rule 27(2). 21. 21. At this juncture, we may also refer to the contents of Rule 29 of the CCS(CCA) Rules, which deal with revisional powers and therein also, prima facie, we are inclined to hold that such residuary or vestige of discretionary powers are vested with the revisional authority, while remitting the case for further inquiry, to pass such orders as the revisional authority as may deem fit going by the wordings in Clauses(c) & (d) of Rule 29(1). Hence, prima facie, we feel that even where the revisional authority is interfering with the matter, on account of technical violation of natural justice as akin to Clauses (ii) of 27(2), then, while remitting the case for further recommencement of the proceedings, the revisional authority has the discretion to pass such other orders as it may deem fit, and prima facie, it should also be inclusive of the power where the revisional authority is convinced that suspension from service of a delinquent employee is highly imperative and warranted, then to issue such directions to the competent authority giving liberty to such steps like suspension from service, etc. In the facts of this case, the appellate authority has no case in Annexure-A8 order that the suspension of the applicant from service is highly necessary, on the basis of relevant materials. Both the appellate and disciplinary authorities have no such case even now. 22. The learned Assistant Solicitor General of India has placed reliance on certain decisions of the Apex Court as in the celebrated case rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of India Limited (ECIL), Vs. B.Karunakar [ (1993) 4 SCC 727 ], para 31, which reads as follows: "31.........in all cases where the enquiry officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the courts and tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the court/tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the court/tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. If the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the court/tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The court/tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the courts/tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the court/tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the court/tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law". The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law". The said dictum laid down by the Apex Court in para No.31 of B.Karunakar's case supra, has also been further reiterated in the decisions as in U.P. State Spinning Co.Ltd., Vs. R.S.Pandey & Anr. [ (2005)8 SCC 264 ], para No.25 and certain other decisions. A reading of para 31 of B.Karunakar's case supra, would make it clear that the scenario contemplated therein is a case where the Court of Law interfered with the penalty order on the ground of non furnishing of enquiry report, which results in violation of natural justice. Therein the Apex Court has held that merely on account of the non supply of inquiry report the judicial review court shall not mechanically interfere with the penalty order with a remit but should give opportunity to the delinquent to establish that the non supply of inquiry report has really resulted in serious prejudice to him and as to how he could have responded differently to the disciplinary authority if he had been given a copy of the inquiry report. If the Court exercising the judicial review comes to a considered conclusion that not only the inquiry report had not been given to the delinquent, but also the same has resulted in serious prejudice on facts, then, the Apex Court has made it amply clear in para 31 of B.Karunakar's case supra, that the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authorities/management to proceed with the inquiry by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him such report, etc. The said scenario contemplated by the Apex Court is in relation to various categories of employment including Government employment, Public Sector employment, Private Sector employment, etc. In the context of Government employment, specific provisions have been made in Rule 10(3) & Rule 10(4) of CCS(CCA) Rules, which are also available in Rule 10(4) & Rule 10(5) of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules. In the context of Government employment, specific provisions have been made in Rule 10(3) & Rule 10(4) of CCS(CCA) Rules, which are also available in Rule 10(4) & Rule 10(5) of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules. So in a scenario where the penalty order is set aside on the ground of non furnishing of inquiry report which has caused serious prejudice to a Central Government employee, etc, and such an intervention is made by the Court of Law, exercising judicial review, then automatically Rule 10(4) would come into play with the result that, irrespective as to whether the Central Government servant was under suspension or not at the time of imposition of major penalty, he/she would be deemed to be under suspension, from the date of the original order of major penalty on account of the legal fiction arising out of Rule 10(4). 23. In the instant case, we are not concerned with the scenario under Rule 10(4) or the intervention made by the courts. The reliance placed by the respondents on the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court may not be really relevant or germane, in the facts of this case, in as much as the same deals with the scenario of intervention made by the Appellate Authority under Rule 27(2) of the CCS(CCA) Rules. The learned Assistant Solicitor General of India has also placed reliance on another decision of the Apex Court in Union of India Vs. Y.S.Sandhu, Ex-Inspector [(2008) (12) SCC 30]. A reading of the said judgment would make it clear that therein also the Apex Court has placed reliance on para No. 31 of B.Karunakar's case, supra. But however, on facts the Apex Court decided not to give the relief of reinstatement to the employee therein. However, para 6 of Y.S.Sandhu's case supra, would make it clear that the Apex Court therein also has reiterated the elementary legal principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in para No.31 of the celebrated B.Karunakar's case supra. The learned Assistant SGI has also placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in Hiran Mayee Bhattacharyya Vs. Secretary, S.M. School for Girls & Ors. [ (2002) 10 SCC 293 ]. A reading of the said judgment would make it clear that the said case related to an employee of a recognised an unaided educational institution. The learned Assistant SGI has also placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in Hiran Mayee Bhattacharyya Vs. Secretary, S.M. School for Girls & Ors. [ (2002) 10 SCC 293 ]. A reading of the said judgment would make it clear that the said case related to an employee of a recognised an unaided educational institution. The Apex Court has held in the decisions as in Kailash Singh Vs. Managing Committee, Mayo College, Ajmer & Ors. [ (2018) 18 SCC 216 ], that in the celebrated case in T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. [ (2002) 8 SCC 481 ], by the Larger Bench of the Apex Court in para No.64 thereof that in the case of a private unaided institution the relationship between the management and employee is contractual in nature [ (2002) 8 SCC 481 ), (p.547, para 64). In view of the said dictum laid down by the Apex Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation's case supra, para 64 thereof, it has been held by the Apex Court in Kailash Singh's case, supra [ (2018) 18 SCC 216 ], that the relief of reinstatement in the case of an employee of an unaided institution may not be legally feasible remedy and that, in such cases ordinarily, damages should be considered by the Court. But it can be seen from a reading of Hiran Mayee Bhattacharyya's case supra [ (2002) 10 SCC 293 ], para No.4 thereof, that reliance and reiteration has been made to the legal principle laid down by the Apex Court in B.Karunakar's case supra, [ (1993) 4 SCC 727 ] therein also. In the light of these aspects, it has to be borne in mind that the legal principles laid down by the Apex Court in para No.31 of B.Karunakar's case supra, [ (1993) 4 SCC 727 ], which have been reiterated in the above said decisions cited by the learned Assistant SGI, deal with the scenario of judicial review court intervening in the matter on account of non furnishing of an enquiry report and serious prejudice, etc, and such a scenario, where the delinquent is a Central Government employee, Rule 10(4) of CCS(CCA) Rules directly applies. But even if there is no specific Rule, the Apex Court has laid down the principles in B.Karunakar's case supra, has said that the proper relief would be to order reinstatement in such cases, but the court should give liberty to the Disciplinary Authority concerned to place the delinquent under suspension from service for recommencing of the enquiry process from the stage of furnishing of the enquiry report. So the decision aforecited by the learned Asst. SGI have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 24. The upshot of the above discussion is that Clauses (i) & (ii) of Rule 27(2) of CCS(CCA) Rules would apply on different fields and dimensions, one on merit, and the other on technical failure of natural justice. But, even where the order is passed under Clause (ii) of Rule 27(2), it would require the restoration of the snapped jural relationship of employer-employee between the delinquent and the department and therefore, it goes without saying that such a technical remit would also involve the technical setting aside of the order of termination from service by way of major penalty, and then, for recommencement of the proceedings. And in a case where the employee is already under suspension from service, then legal fiction under Rule 10(3) of deemed suspension would automatically apply. Where the employee is not under suspension, such legal fiction would not apply in Rule 10(3), but the appellate authority, if convinced, based on its cogent and relevant materials, could give liberty to the disciplinary authority or competent authority to recommence the proceedings after keeping the employee under suspension from service. But in a scenario covered by Clause(ii), it goes without saying that reinstatement is mandatory otherwise the snapped relationship between the employer-employee cannot be restored. In the result that the delinquent cannot be brought within the seisin of the employer's disciplinary proceedings in the eye of law. 25. We have adverted to these aspects based on the requests made by both sides, as there are quite a few nuanced and subtle areas in the understanding of the above said provisions. In the result that the delinquent cannot be brought within the seisin of the employer's disciplinary proceedings in the eye of law. 25. We have adverted to these aspects based on the requests made by both sides, as there are quite a few nuanced and subtle areas in the understanding of the above said provisions. In the instant case, the petitioner was never suspended from service and the Appellate Authority, while passing Annexure-A8 appellate order, has not found, on the basis of the existence of relevant materials, that it is necessary to keep the employee under suspension from service and has not given any liberty to the Disciplinary Authority, to do so. In the light of the above legal position, it is only to be held that the applicant has made out a strong prima facie case for reinstatement, pending finalisation of disciplinary proceedings, as the operation of legal fiction under Rule 10(3) will not apply in the facts of this case. The reinstatement will be subject to the final result of the O.A. Other issues of pay and allowances, etc, pursuant to such reinstatement, will also be subject to the final result of the O.A. The Tribunal may deal with all such issues in the OA and may decide on the legality and correctness of the proceedings impugned in O.A, as in Annexure-A14 dated 23.04.2021 issued by R2, in the light of the above legal position in the matter. So the impugned order of the Tribunal does not deserve any interference in this O.P. 26. Hence, it is ordered that the 3rd respondent will forthwith reinstate the applicant in service, as ordered by the Tribunal, without any further delay, at any rate, within one week from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. However, it is made clear that if the 3rd respondent is of the considered opinion that the applicant is to be kept away from the station or office where the alleged events had taken place, then they will have the liberty to do so. No other orders and directions are called for. However, it is made clear that if the 3rd respondent is of the considered opinion that the applicant is to be kept away from the station or office where the alleged events had taken place, then they will have the liberty to do so. No other orders and directions are called for. The Tribunal will take all reasonable endeavours possible in the circumstances of the case to ensure the final disposal of the O.A, without much delay, preferably within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment or within any reasonable time limit that may be appropriately fixed by the Tribunal, taking note of the interest of administration of justice. With these observations and directions, the above Original Petition will stand finally disposed of.