JUDGMENT (Prayer: Review Application filed under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC against the Judgment and Decree dated 11.12.209 passed by her Lordship Miss. Justice R.Mala in S.A.No. 203 of 1993.) 1. The respondents in S.A. No. 203 in 2003, Sekar and Lakshmiammal, aggrieved by the judgment dated 11.12.2009, by which judgment, the second appeal had been allowed, thereby reversing the judgment of the first appellate Court in A.S. No. 3 of 1999 are the review applicants herein. 2. They were the defendants in O.S. No 63 of 1990 on the file of the Additional District Munsif Court, Kallakurichi. 3. O.S. No. 63 of 1990 had been filed by the plaintiff, Arthanari seeking declaration of title over the suit properties and for permanent injunction to protect possession. Since it was alleged that pending the suit, the defendants therein, Sekar and Laksmiammal, the review applicants herein, had trespassed into the suit property, the plaint was amended to include the relief of recovery of possession. 4. By judgment dated 16.11.1998, the Additional District Munsif, Kallakurichi, decreed the suit. 5. The review applicants herein/defendants in the suit, then filed A.S. No. 3 of 1999 before the Sub Court, Kallakurichi. By judgment dated 23.11.2001, the appeal suit was allowed and the decree in the suit was reversed and the suit was dismissed. 6. The plaintiff, Arthanzri then filed S.A. No. 203 of 2003 before this Court. 7. The second appeal had been admitted on the following substantial questions of law: 1. “Whether the lower appellate Court is correct in law in reversing the judgment of the trial court, without setting aside the findings rendered by the trial court ? 2. When the appellant has established his title and right over the suit property by producing Exs. A-1 to A-7, whether the lower appellate Court is justified in law in its interpretation of the said documents ? 3. Whether the lower appellate Court is justified in law in assuming that R.S. 332/1A2 had been subdivided as R.S. 333/2, especially when there is neither any plea nor any evidence for arriving at such conclusion ? 4. Whether the lower appellate Court is justified in law in holding that th suit property  was assigned to one Subbaraya Gounder, especially when there are no materials on record, in total contravention of the imperative provisions of Sections 101 to 103 of the Evidence Act, 1872 ?” 8. 4. Whether the lower appellate Court is justified in law in holding that th suit property  was assigned to one Subbaraya Gounder, especially when there are no materials on record, in total contravention of the imperative provisions of Sections 101 to 103 of the Evidence Act, 1872 ?” 8. It would be only appropriate to have a brief look into the background facts. 9. The plaintiff, Arthanari claimed to have purchased the suit property, vacant land in Dry R.S. No. 332/3, measuring 3 acres and 29 cents (now subdivided as R.S. No. 332/3A measuring 1.25.0 hectares and R.S. No. 332/3B measuring 0.08.0 ares) under U.D.R. Scheme, and situated at Thottapadi Village, Kallakurichi, by a registered sale deed dated 23.3.1987 from the original owner Shanmugam. He had also obtained patta No. 227. Claiming interference from the defendants, Sekar and Lakshmiammal, the suit was filed for declaration of title and permanent injunction to protect possession. However, alleging that during the pendency of the suit, the defendants had encroached onto the suit lands, the relief was amended to include recovery of possession. 10. The defendants, Sekar and Lakshmiammal, who are the review applicants herein, in their written statement disputed the title of Shanmugam, the vendor of the plaintiff. They claimed to be in possession and therefore claimed to have prescribed title by adverse possession. They filed additional written statement asserting possession and further claimed that the suit lands had been assigned by the Government to one Subbaraya Gounder under D.K.T. No. 1513/68, dated 13.08.1959, and that patta No. 430 was also granted. The 1st defendant, Sekar claimed to be the brother’s son of the said Subbaraya Gounder, and therefore also claimed right to title over the suit lands. 11. The parties went to trial. The plaintiff was examined as P.W,1. He marked his sale deed dated 23.08.1987 as Ex. A1. He marked further documents to prove possession at the time of institution of the suit. The 1st defendant was examined as D.W.1 and he marked the assignment to Subbaraya Gounder under D.K.T. No. 1513/68 dated 13.08.1959 as Ex. B1 and also further documents to also establish possession. An advocate commissioner had also been appointed and his report and sketch had been marked as Exs. C1 and C2. 12. On analysis of the pleadings and oral and documentary evidence, the Additional District Munsif found that Ex. B1 and also further documents to also establish possession. An advocate commissioner had also been appointed and his report and sketch had been marked as Exs. C1 and C2. 12. On analysis of the pleadings and oral and documentary evidence, the Additional District Munsif found that Ex. B1, assignment document to Subbaraya Gounder, produced and filed as a document by the defendants and through which the defendants claimed title, is a tampered document. It was specifically found that in the survey number mentioned therein, 332/1, the ‘1’ portion had been torn off and a paper had been stuck at the back and it was written as ‘3’ to give an impression that the assignment was 332/3 and not 332/1, though what was originally assigned to Subbaraya Gounder was land in S. No. 332/1. 13. On the basis of the above very damaging finding and also on the basis of analysis of the oral and documentary evidence produced, the suit was decreed. 14. The first appellate court, in a very disappointing judgment, brushed aside that finding of tampering of a document produced before Court and proceeded to allow A.S. No. 3 of 1999 filed by the defendants and interfered with the judgment of the trial court. 15. It is under those circumstances that the plaintiff filed S.A. No. 203 of 2003 before this Court. 16. The substantial questions of law also surrounded the interpretation of the documents granting assignment to Subbaraya Gounder in Exs. B.1/B.9. 17. The Learned Single Judge had observed as follows in the judgment dated 11.12.2009 in paragraph No. 17 with respect to the tampering of Ex. B1, which was, and still is available in the Court records, and which I also had opportunity to examine. “17. It is the case of the respondents that the suit property has been assigned in favour of Subbaraya Kounder under D.K.T. No. 1513/68 dated 13.8.1959. The original is marked as Ex. B.9. In Ex. B.9, it was stated only Thottapadi Gramam, Survey No. 332/1, Extent: 3 acres 28 cents. So while considering Ex. B.1 along with Ex. B.9, Ex. B.1 is not a true and genuine document. It is only a concocted document. The ‘1’ has been modified as ‘3’. Original of Ex.B.9 maintained by the revenue authorities has been placed before this Court. I am of the opinion that as per Ex. So while considering Ex. B.1 along with Ex. B.9, Ex. B.1 is not a true and genuine document. It is only a concocted document. The ‘1’ has been modified as ‘3’. Original of Ex.B.9 maintained by the revenue authorities has been placed before this Court. I am of the opinion that as per Ex. B.9, Subbaraya Kounder had given assignment under D.K.T. No. 1513 of 1968 only in respect of S. No. 332/1 for 3 acres 28 cents in Thottapadi village. 18. Therefore the defence raised by the respondent in paragraph 2 in ther 2nd additional written statement is unacceptable one…” 18. It is thus seen that the learned Single Judge had summoned the original document from the office of the revenue authorities and had satisfied herself as to the finding of the trial court regarding tampering of Ex. B1. A detailed examination of that fact had been undertaken and this Court must bow down to such effort taken. 19. The grounds raised in this review application relate to the very same fact and it had been urged by the learned counsel for the review applicant/defendants in the suit that the findings require to be revisited. I hold that any endeavour to undertake that task would only be an unwarranted exercise, particularly at the instance of a party who had the temerity to blatantly tamper an official document and introduce the same as an Exhibit, with clear intention to interfere with the justice delivery system. 20. In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, reported in (1995) 1 SCC 170 , it had been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as follows : “8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. 20. In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, reported in (1995) 1 SCC 170 , it had been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as follows : “8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the court under Order 47, Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [ (1979) 4 SCC 389 : AIR 1979 SC 1047 ] , speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J., has made the following pertinent observations: (SCC p. 390, para 3) “It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1963 SC 1909 ], there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.” 21. In Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) reported in 8 SCC 320 at page 333, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had considered the scope of Review Jurisdiction and had summarized the relevant factors as follows: “Summary of the principles: 20. In Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) reported in 8 SCC 320 at page 333, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had considered the scope of Review Jurisdiction and had summarized the relevant factors as follows: “Summary of the principles: 20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: 20.1. When the review will be maintainable: (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words “any other sufficient reason” have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144 : (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112 ] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [ AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955) 1 SCR 520 ] to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. [ (2013) 8 SCC 337 : JT (2013) 8 SC 275] 20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived. (Emphasis supplied) 22. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived. (Emphasis supplied) 22. In Subramanian Swamy v. State of T.N., reported in (2014) 5 SCC 75 : at page 96, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had held as follows: “52. The issue can be examined from another angle. The Explanation to Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “CPC”) provides that if the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based, is reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, it shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Thus, even an erroneous decision cannot be a ground for the court to undertake review, as the first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order, review of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order and in absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed. (Vide Rajender Kumar v. Rambhai [ (2007) 15 SCC 513 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 584 : AIR 2003 SC 2095 ] .)” 23. In the instant case, none of the principles enunciated to review a judgment are attracted. As a matter of fact, the review applicants have to be held responsible for subverting the justice delivery system by producing a tampered document before Court. 24. The tampering had been found as a fact established by the trial Court and also by the learned Single Judge in the course of the judgment in the Second Appeal. 25. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 at page 387 held as follows : “25. An enlarged interpretation to Section 195(1)(b)(ii), whereby the bar created by the said provision would also operate where after commission of an act of forgery the document is subsequently produced in court, is capable of great misuse. An enlarged interpretation to Section 195(1)(b)(ii), whereby the bar created by the said provision would also operate where after commission of an act of forgery the document is subsequently produced in court, is capable of great misuse. As pointed out in Sachida Nand Singh [ (1998) 2 SCC 493 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 660] after preparing a forged document or committing an act of forgery, a person may manage to get a proceeding instituted in any civil, criminal or revenue court, either by himself or through someone set up by him and simply file the document in the said proceeding. He would thus be protected from prosecution, either at the instance of a private party or the police until the court, where the document has been filed, itself chooses to file a complaint. The litigation may be a prolonged one due to which the actual trial of such a person may be delayed indefinitely. Such an interpretation would be highly detrimental to the interest of the society at large. “26. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the courts are normally reluctant to direct filing of a criminal complaint and such a course is rarely adopted. It will not be fair and proper to give an interpretation which leads to a situation where a person alleged to have committed an offence of the type enumerated in clause (b)(ii) is either not placed for trial on account of non-filing of a complaint or if a complaint is filed, the same does not come to its logical end. Judging from such an angle will be in consonance with the principle that an unworkable or impracticable result should be avoided. In Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion (3rd Edn.), para 313, the principle has been stated in the following manner: “The court seeks to avoid a construction of an enactment that produces an unworkable or impracticable result, since this is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament. Sometimes, however, there are overriding reasons for applying such a construction, for example, where it appears that Parliament really intended it or the literal meaning is too strong.”” 26. I hold that the Additional District Munsif, Kallakurichi must be directed to examine the production of a tampered document, Ex. Sometimes, however, there are overriding reasons for applying such a construction, for example, where it appears that Parliament really intended it or the literal meaning is too strong.”” 26. I hold that the Additional District Munsif, Kallakurichi must be directed to examine the production of a tampered document, Ex. B.1 in the light of the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah, (referred supra) and proceed against the defendants in O.S. No. 63 of 1990 for deliberately producing a tampered document, thereby affecting the administration of justice. 27. In the result: i. The Review Application is dismissed however, in the circumstances without costs since further directions have been given in (iii) infra. ii. The judgment of this Court in S.A. No. 203 of 2003 dated 11.12.2009 is retained and the direction therein that the defendants should vacate and hand over vacant possession of the suit schedule lands as described in the schedule to the plaint in O.S. No. 63 of 1990 to the plaintiff therein, Arthanari within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order is maintained. C.V.KARTHIKEYAN, J. vsg iii. The Additional District Munsif is directed to issue notice to the defendants in the said suit in O.S. No. 63 of 1990 and proceed in manner known to law for producing a tampered document in Ex. B.1 with intention to subvert due administration of justice. The judgment of the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah vs Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 , may be carefully examined and followed. iv. Consequently, connected Civil Miscellaneous Petition is closed.