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2022 DIGILAW 2813 (MAD)

T. M. Thamilselvi v. P. Rajakumar

2022-08-18

S.SOUNTHAR, V.M.VELUMANI

body2022
JUDGMENT (Prayer in C.M.A.No.735 of 2021: This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed under Section 19 of the Family Court Act, 1984 to set aside the order of the V Additional Family Court, Chennai 13.03.2020 made in O.P.No.1145 of 2011 and praying to dismiss the O.P.No.1145 of 2011. Prayer in C.M.A.No.733 of 2021: This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed under Section 19 of the Family Court Act, 1984 to set aside the order of the V Additional Family Court, Chennai dated 13.03.2020 made in O.P.No.1788 of 2011 and to allow the O.P.No.1788 of 2011.)        Common Judgment: S. Sounthar, J. These Civil Miscellaneous Appeals are arising out of fair and final order passed in O.P.No.1788 of 2011 and O.P.No.1145 of 2011 on the file of the V Additional Family Court, Chennai respectively. 2. The respondent/husband filed a petition for divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion in O.P.No.1145 of 2011 and the same was allowed by granting divorce on both the grounds. Aggrieved by the same, appellant /wife has come up with this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal in C.M.A.No.735 of 2021. The appellant/wife filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights in O.P.No.1788 of 2011 and the same was dismissed and aggrieved by the same, she had come up with this C.M.A.No.733 of 2021. 3. According to the respondent/husband in O.P.No.1145 of 2011, the marriage between the parties was solemnized on 28.11.2003. They started living together at Chennai. As a result of their wedlock, they got two sons who were born on 01.09.2004 and 04.08.2006. The respondent claimed that right from the inception, appellant/wife had the habit of suspecting the respondent-s fidelity, picking up quarrel for no reasons. Due to his work conditions respondent used to return to home at late night and appellant/wife used to suspect respondent/husband for retuning late in the night. The respondent claimed in his petition that he sent a letter dated 05.03.2008 to the appellant explaining to her the mental agony faced by him, due to the act of suspecting his character and also her nature of picking up frequent quarrel. It was stated that in his letter he advised to change her attitude and until then it was not possible for him to join in matrimonial life. According to the respondent, even after receipt of the said letter, the appellant neither preferred to change her attitude, nor preferred to sent a reply. It was stated that in his letter he advised to change her attitude and until then it was not possible for him to join in matrimonial life. According to the respondent, even after receipt of the said letter, the appellant neither preferred to change her attitude, nor preferred to sent a reply. But she deserted him on 31.03.2009, without informing him. The respondent/husband further stated that he filed H.M.O.P.No.3569 of 2009 for divorce before the Principal Family Court, Chennai and on receipt of the summons, as a counter blast, the appellant filed H.M.O.P.No.3585 of 2009 for restitution of conjugal rights before the same Court. Thereafter on advice of well wishers, both of them joined after withdrawing the respective petitions and they started living together. Thereafter, according to the respondent, appellant started threatening him that she would commit suicide after preparing a suicidal note that he was cause for her death. The respondent claimed that again appellant deserted him along with her children and consequently on 12.03.2011, he sent another notice through his Advocate to appellant but however the appellant had not responded with any reply. But strangely, appellant/wife started threatening respondent/husband that she would file a false dowry demand case by using her influence in police. It was also claimed that the appellant had filed a false criminal complaint alleging that the respondent had demanded dowry and also refused to return 40 sovereigns of gold jewels. The respondent/husband claimed that the appellant/wife had taken away all jewels and nothing was available with him. The respondent/husband claimed that the appellant/wife had been living separately, wantonly without any reasonable cause and hence guilty of deserting the respondent/husband. The respondent/husband also claimed that the marriage had broken down irretrievably and sought for divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion on the basis of above said pleadings. 4. The appellant/wife filed a counter statement and denied allegations found in the divorce petition. It was claimed by the appellant/wife that on 02.04.2009, she and respondent/husband along with their children went to the house of appellant-s sister at Puliangudi. On the next day, the respondent/husband alone returned to Chennai and asked the appellant/wife to return to Chennai after a week. But strangely on 05.04.2009 the respondent called appellant over phone and asked her not to come back to the matrimonial home any more. On the next day, the respondent/husband alone returned to Chennai and asked the appellant/wife to return to Chennai after a week. But strangely on 05.04.2009 the respondent called appellant over phone and asked her not to come back to the matrimonial home any more. The appellant/wife also claimed that shocked by the said attitude of the respondent, she immediately returned to matrimonial home on 06.04.2009 but she was obstructed by the respondent. The respondent also made it clear that he was not ready to live with the appellant any more and he would not allow the appellant to get into the matrimonial home. When the respondent was confronted with the reason for his behavior he did not whisper any words. The appellant/wife claimed that she made several attempts through the elders of the family for re-union but resulted in vain. The appellant also claimed that during earlier round of litigation, there was counseling conducted by the Family Court and ultimately the respondent promised to live with the appellant. Therefore, the petitions filed by both the parties had been withdrawn and the appellant and respondent started living together at Chennai again from 26.02.2010. The appellant/wife claimed that the respondent started ignoring her and deserted her from January 2011 onwards. The appellant/wife also expressed her willingness to join the respondent for her own sake and also for the sake of the children. 5. The appellant/wife, on her part, filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights in O.P.No.1788 of 2011, wherein the above said material averments were reiterated by the parties. Both the petitions were taken up for joint trial. The respondent/husband examined himself as P.W.1 and he marked exhibits Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.9 on his behalf. The appellant examined herself as R.W.1 and she marked exhibits Ex.R1 to Ex.R6 on her behalf. After considering the evidence available on record, the learned Family Court came to the conclusion that respondent/husband had made out a case on the grounds of cruelty and desertion and granted decree for divorce. The petition for restitution of conjugal rights filed by the appellant was dismissed. Aggrieved by the said common order, the appellant /wife has come up with these above Civil Miscellaneous Appeals. 6. Ms.A.Arulmozhi, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the allegations of cruelty pleaded by the respondent in his petition were not proved by any acceptable independent evidence by the respondent. Aggrieved by the said common order, the appellant /wife has come up with these above Civil Miscellaneous Appeals. 6. Ms.A.Arulmozhi, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the allegations of cruelty pleaded by the respondent in his petition were not proved by any acceptable independent evidence by the respondent. It was also submitted that the various allegations made by the respondent in his legal notice Ex.P.5 had not been found place in his petition before the Court which shows the hollowness of respondent-s claim. It was also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant preferred police complaint, only for the purpose of getting her jewels back and when she received her jewels, she did not insist any further action against the respondent/husband. Therefore, the allegations of respondent that the criminal complaint would amount to cruelty cannot be accepted. The learned counsel also contended that the finding of the Family Court that respondent was working in a Government service and the complaints preferred by the appellant/wife were aimed at jeopardizing his job is vitiated by perversity, in view of the specific pleadings found in the respondent-s petition that he was working in a private concern. The learned counsel further contended that the material allegations made by the respondent as a ground for divorce were not substantiated by acceptable evidence and in the present case, parties are living apart only due to ordinary normal wear and tear of the matrimonial life and it cannot be a sole ground for granting divorce. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Ex.R.6 is a copy of birth certificate of a child Deleena Sri.R. The perusal of the said certificate makes it clear that the said child was born to respondent (Mr.Rajkumar) through another lady Subbulakshmi. The said document proves extra marital affair of the respondent and as a person who committed a matrimonial wrong, respondent cannot take advantage of his own wrong and seek decree of divorce. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant also contended that the decree for divorce on the ground of desertion is not at all sustainable in the eye of law. She elaborated that the petition for divorce was presented by respondent on 01.04.2011. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant also contended that the decree for divorce on the ground of desertion is not at all sustainable in the eye of law. She elaborated that the petition for divorce was presented by respondent on 01.04.2011. In the legal notice issued by the respondent which was marked as Ex.P.5, it was clearly mentioned that the parties had been living apart from 23.01.2011 and hence essential condition mentioned in the Section 13 (1) (ib) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 namely separation of 2 years immediately preceding presentation of the petition is not satisfied in the present case and hence petition for divorce on the ground of desertion was not maintainable. 8. Per contra, Dr.C.Ravichandran, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that he confined his argument only to the ground of cruelty pleaded by the respondent. He conceded that the respondent-s petition for divorce was presented within 2 years from the date of separation and hence it was not maintainable. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the main act of cruelty alleged by the respondent/husband was appellant/wife suspected the fidelity of respondent/husband. The learned counsel submitted that when respondent had sent a registered letter to wife on 05.03.2008 and subsequently a legal notice on 12.03.2011, there was no response by the appellant/wife, controverting, the allegations found therein and hence adverse inference shall be drawn against the appellant/wife for her failure to give reply. He relied on the case law, (2009) 1 MLJ 1067 , Jaga Industries, rep., by its Managing Partner M.Jeganathan,Tirupur Taluk and another versus Sulochana Cotton Spinning Mills Pvt. Ltd., rep by its Managing Director S.Krishnakumar, Tirupur. The learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that Ex.R.6 birth certificate cannot advance the case of the appellant because it was specifically denied by him in witness box. The learned counsel also submitted that appellant herself admitted during her evidence that the respondent had no illegal relationship with any other lady. The learned counsel also submitted that Ex.R.6 birth certificate marked by the respondent was not proved by examining the author of the document and hence, it cannot be relied on. The respondent placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court, reported in (2003) 8 SCC 745 , Narbada Devi Gupta versus Birendra Kumar Jaiswal and Another, for that proposition. The respondent placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court, reported in (2003) 8 SCC 745 , Narbada Devi Gupta versus Birendra Kumar Jaiswal and Another, for that proposition. The learned counsel submitted that on the basis of the evidence available on record, it is proved that the cruelty meted out to respondent is of such nature that the parties could not be reasonably expected to live together and hence prayed for dismissal of the Appeal by confirming the findings of the Family Court. 9. On the basis of the pleadings, evidence available on record and the contentions of the respective counsels, the following points are arising for consideration in this Appeal. 1. Whether the respondent/husband is entitled to get divorce on the ground of cruelty? 2. Whether the appellant/wife is entitled to decree for restitution for conjugal rights? 10. The respondent/husband sought for divorce on the ground of cruelty. The various acts of cruelty alleged by him were that the appellant/wife suspected his fidelity, she preferred police complaint against her husband alleging her husband demanded dowry, she threatened him that she would commit suicide after preparing a suicidal note implicating the husband. As far as, the allegations that wife suspected the fidelity of the husband and she threatened to commit suicide are concerned, the respondent/husband has not examined any independent witnesses to corroborate his own testimony as P.W.1. The appellant/wife entered witness box as R.W.1 and she deposed on the oath that she did not suspect the fidelity of the husband and she also denied the other allegation that she threatened respondent as if, she would commit suicide. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the failure of the wife to give reply to the letter of the husband and legal notice would automatically result in drawal of adverse inference against her. He relied on the decision reported in (2009) 1 MLJ 1067 , Jaga Industries, rep., by its Managing Partner M.Jeganathan,Tirupur Taluk and another versus Sulochana Cotton Spinning Mills Pvt. Ltd., rep by its Managing Director S.Krishnakumar, Tirupur for this proposition. The above said case is a suit for recovery of money wherein failure of the defendant to give reply to the pre suit notice was taken as a ground for drawing of adverse inference against the defendant. The above said case is a suit for recovery of money wherein failure of the defendant to give reply to the pre suit notice was taken as a ground for drawing of adverse inference against the defendant. Further, the said order was the one passed in a miscellaneous petition for stay, wherein this Court had held that drawing of inference against the defendant was correct and therefore there was no need to deviate from the normal practice of directing the defendant to deposit 50 % of the decree amount and accordingly granted stay on condition that defendant shall deposit 50 % of the decree amount. Therefore, in that case the defendant was not non suited solely on the ground that he failed to give any reply. His failure to give any reply to the pre suit notice was taken into consideration just to arrive at a prima facie conclusion in a miscellaneous application for stay. Hence the above decision cannot be quoted as a precedent that too in a matrimonial case. In the present case, the husband sent a letter under Ex.P.4 on 05.03.2009 thereafter proceedings were initiated for divorce by husband and for restitution of conjugal rights by wife, subsequently both the proceedings were withdrawn and parties resumed cohabitation. Therefore, the failure of the wife prior to resumption of cohabitation cannot be put against her because by agreeing for cohabitation, respondent/husband condoned all her acts prior to resumption of cohabitation. Therefore, the failure of appellant /wife to issue reply to his letter which was written prior to resumption of cohabitation is of no consequence. Likewise, the allegation of the husband that appellant/wife suspected the fidelity of the respondent was also prior to resumption of cohabitation by the parties. The same allegation was also made in the earlier proceedings in O.P.No.3569 of 2009, divorce petition filed by the respondent. But thereafter that petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The parties resumed cohabitation, therefore we cannot attach much importance to the reiteration of that plea by the respondent/husband, especially in the absence of any evidence either oral or documentary to corroborate his interested testimony. It is also pertinent to point out that the allegation of respondent that appellant suspected his fidelity was specifically denied by the appellant on oath when she was examined as R.W.1. It is also pertinent to point out that the allegation of respondent that appellant suspected his fidelity was specifically denied by the appellant on oath when she was examined as R.W.1. It is also brought to our notice, when the present divorce petition is pending, the respondent contracted second marriage with one Subbulakshmi and a female child Deleena Sri.R was born to him on 15.03.2014. The birth certificate of the said child was marked as Ex.R.6. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Ex.R.6 proves that the respondent/husband has committed a matrimonial wrong, by contracting second marriage when the petition for divorce is pending before the Family Court and therefore, he is not entitled to take advantage of his own wrong. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that when Ex.R.6 was shown to respondent during cross examination, he denied it. The author the said document was not examined to prove the same. Therefore, Ex.R.6 cannot be taken into consideration by this Court. We are not impressed by the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent in this regard. First of all, when Ex.R.6 was marked through appellant/R.W.1 it was not objected to by the respondent. It was marked without any objection on the side of the respondent. Therefore, it is too late for the respondent to contend that Ex.R.6 was marked without proper proof. The law in this regard is very well settled. If the document is marked without any objection as to proof, it is not open to the other side to raise want of proof as a ground subsequently. It is useful to refer to the observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case law reported in 2003 (8) SCC 752 in [R.VE.Venkatachala Gounder Vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P.Temple and another], which reads as follows: 20. The learned counsel for the defendant-respondent has relied on The Roman Catholic Mission Vs.The State of Madras & Anr. AIR 1966 SC 1457 in support of his submission that a document not admissible in evidence, though brought on record, has to be excluded from consideration. We do not have any dispute with the proposition of law so laid down in the above said case. However, the present one is a case which calls for the correct position of law being made precise. We do not have any dispute with the proposition of law so laid down in the above said case. However, the present one is a case which calls for the correct position of law being made precise. Ordinarily an objection to the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. The objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes:- (i)an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence; and(ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as -anexhibit-, an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection should be taken before the evidence is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit. The later proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. The omission to object becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. The omission to object becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection does not prejudice the party tendering the evidence, for two reasons: firstly, it enables the Court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then and there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the Court on the mode of proof sought to be adopted going against the party tendering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking indulgence of the Court for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite party, is available to the party leading the evidence. Such practice and procedure is fair to both the parties. Out of the two types of objections, referred to herein above, in the later case, failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of the necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document, the document itself which is sought to be proved being admissible in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in superior Court. 21. Privy Council in Padman and Others vs. Hanwanta and Others [ AIR 1915 PC 111 ] did not permit the appellant to take objection to the admissibility of a registered copy of a will in appeal for the first time. It was held that this objection should have been taken in the trial court. It was observed: “The defendants have now appeal to the Majesty in Council, and the case has been argued on their behalf in great detail. It was urged in the course of the argument that a registered copy of the will of 1898 was admitted in evidence without sufficient foundation being led for its admission. No objection, however, appears to have been taken in the first court against the copy obtained from the Registrar-s office being put in evidence. Had such objection being made at the time, the District Judge, who tried the case in the first instance, would probably have seen that the deficiency was supplied. No objection, however, appears to have been taken in the first court against the copy obtained from the Registrar-s office being put in evidence. Had such objection being made at the time, the District Judge, who tried the case in the first instance, would probably have seen that the deficiency was supplied. Their lordships think that there is no substance in the present contention.” 22“ Similar is the view expressed by this Court in P.C.Purushothama Reddiar vs. S.Perumal [ 1972 (2) SCR 646 ]. In this case the police reports were admitted in evidence without any objection and the objection was sought to be taken in appeal regarding the admissibility of the reports. Rejecting the contention it was observed: “Before leaving this case it is necessary to refer to one of the contention taken by Mr. Ramamurthi, learned counsel for the respondent. He contended that the police reports referred to earlier are inadmissible in evidence as the Head-constables who covered those meetings have not been examined in the case. Those reports were marked without any objection. Hence it is not open to the respondent now to object to their admissibility see Bhagat Ram V. Khetu Ram and Anr. [ AIR 1929 PC 110 ].“ 23. Since documents A30 and A34 were admitted in evidence without any objection, the High Court erred in holding that these documents were inadmissible being photo copies, the originals of which were not produced. The Hon’ble Apex Court expressed similar view in the case law reported in 2004 (4) CTC 226 in [Smt.Dayamathi Bai Vs. Sri.K.M.Shaffi], the relevant observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court is as follows: We do not find merit in this civil appeal. In the present case the objection was not that the certified copy of Ex.P1 is in itself inadmissible but that the mode of proof was irregular and insufficient. Objection as to the mode of proof falls within procedural law. Therefore, such objections could be waived. They have to be taken before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record (See: Order XIII Rule 3 of Code of Civil Procedure)” 11. Further Ex.R.6 is an extract from the birth and the death register maintained by the competent authority. Therefore presumption available to official Acts under Section 114(e) of Indian Evidence Act attached to it. Further Ex.R.6 is an extract from the birth and the death register maintained by the competent authority. Therefore presumption available to official Acts under Section 114(e) of Indian Evidence Act attached to it. Therefore, there is no necessity to examine the author of the said document to prove it contents. Hence the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent reported in (2003) 8 SCC 745 , Narbada Devi Gupta versus Birendra Kumar Jaiswal and Another, for the proposition that mere marking of documents would not prove contents of document is not applicable to the facts of the case. At the time of argument we were informed that appellant/wife preferred a complaint against the respondent/husband for the offence of bigamy in C.C.No.83 of 2019 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Senkottai and the same is pending. At this stage, any observation by us with regard to Ex.R.6 would prejudice the criminal trial, therefore we are refraining from making any further observations on Ex.R.6 with regard to the complaint made by wife against husband under Ex.R.5. We have already said that the husband by withdrawing the earlier petition for divorce and by resuming cohabitation thereafter condoned all the acts and omission of appellant, if any and abandoned all his pleas and allegations made against appellant/wife prior to resumption of cohabitation. Therefore the allegations of respondent/husband that appellant/wife suspected his fidelity in the present petition pales into insignificance. As far as the allegations of the respondent that appellant/wife threatened to commit suicide is concerned again there is no acceptable evidence available on record except oral testimony of the respondent/husband. Based on his evidence alone it is not safe to come to a conclusion that wife committed the said act of cruelty as alleged by the respondent. 12. The perusal of the Ex.P.6, Memorandum of Understanding entered between appellant and respondent makes it clear that appellant preferred a complaint to police and thereafter they entered into a Memorandum of Understanding whereunder respondent handed over the jewels and other valuable articles to appellant/wife and after acknowledging the receipt of articles, appellant withdrew the complaint preferred against the respondent. Ex.P.7 is the acknowledgment issued by the appellant/wife for having received the said articles from the respondent/ husband, wherein she had specifically mentioned that she received the jewels and other articles in order to meet the educational expenses of her two children. Ex.P.7 is the acknowledgment issued by the appellant/wife for having received the said articles from the respondent/ husband, wherein she had specifically mentioned that she received the jewels and other articles in order to meet the educational expenses of her two children. Ex.P.6 and Ex.P.7 make it clear that wife preferred a complaint against husband before the police and thereafter she withdrew the same after receiving the jewels and other articles from husband. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the very object of the giving complaint to police is to receive the jewels and other article available with husband and after receiving the articles she did not press the complaint against husband is acceptable in the facts and circumstances of the case especially in the light of the Ex.P.6 and Ex.P.7. The Ex.P.7 makes it clear that appellant was in need of jewels and other articles in order to meet the educational expenses of the children and hence just to get it back, she had given a complaint to police and once she got back the same she not pressed the complaint. Therefore, the complaint was preferred only with the object of getting back valuables to meet the educational expenses of the children, but not with the object of harassing the husband. In view of our discussions made above, we hold that the respondent/husband has not proved the allegations of acts of cruelty pleaded by him against appellant /wife by any acceptable evidence. His own oral testimony is pitted against the oral testimony of wife. In the absence of any other reliable evidence in support of act of cruelty pleaded by husband, we see no justification for the Family Court to grant divorce on the ground of cruelty. In fact, the Family Court has given a specific finding that appellant had preferred a criminal complaint against the respondent/husband with the intention of removing him from Government service. The said finding of the Family Court is against the own admission of the respondent in his petition wherein he contended that he was employed in Surej Agro India Pvt. Ltd. So it is admitted case that respondent /husband is employed in a private concern and not in a Government job. Therefore, the said finding of the Family Court is against the evidence available on record, consequently vitiated by perversity. 13. Therefore, the said finding of the Family Court is against the evidence available on record, consequently vitiated by perversity. 13. In view of our above discussions, we set aside the finding of the Family Court that appellant/wife committed act of cruelty against respondent and consequently he is not entitled to divorce on the ground of cruelty. As we already stated that the learned counsel for the respondent submitted his arguments only on the ground of cruelty, therefore we set aside the decree for divorce granted by the Family Court and allow the above above C.M.A.733 of 2021. 14. We have already held that respondent /husband failed to establish the act of cruelty pleaded by him. As we discussed earlier, both the parties engaged in a previous litigation and as per the understanding reached in mediation center, they resumed cohabitation by condoning the previous acts and omissions. As per the pleadings of the parties, they resumed cohabitation on 26.02.2010 and lived together up to January 2011. The respondent/husband claimed that after resumption of cohabitation appellant/wife threatened to commit suicide and subsequently withdrew from matrimonial home. We have already found that the allegation of suicidal threat made by the respondent is not proved. 15. The respondent/husband failed to prove the acts of cruelties pleaded by him and hence we have come to the conclusion that he is not entitled to seek divorce on the ground of cruelty. The natural corollary of the same is that the appellant is entitled to decree for restitution of conjugal rights. The right to conjugal bliss is one of the reasonable expectation available to the other spouse. The respondent is not entitled to deny the said right to the appellant without showing any reasonable cause. Therefore, we hold that the appellant is entitled to decree for conjugal rights and consequently, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.733 of 2021 is allowed by setting aside fair and decreetal order dated 13.03.2020 made in O.P.No.1788 of 2011 on the file of the V Additional Family Court, Chennai. In the facts and circumstances of the case there is no order as to costs. 16. In nut shell, (i) The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.733 of 2021 is allowed by setting aside the fair and decreetal order dated 13.03.2020 passed in O.P.No.1788 of 2011 on the file of the V Additional Family Court, Chennai. In the facts and circumstances of the case there is no order as to costs. 16. In nut shell, (i) The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.733 of 2021 is allowed by setting aside the fair and decreetal order dated 13.03.2020 passed in O.P.No.1788 of 2011 on the file of the V Additional Family Court, Chennai. (ii) The appellant is entitled to decree for restitution of conjugal rights as prayed in O.P.No.1788 of 2011. (iii) The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.735 of 2021 is allowed by setting aside the fair and decreetal order dated 13.03.2020 made in O.P.No.1145 of 2011 on the file of the V Additional Family Court, Chennai. (iv) The petition for divorce filed by the respondent in O.P.No.1145 of 2011 on the file of V Additional Family Court, Chennai, stands dismissed. (v) There shall be no order as to costs. (vi) Connected miscellaneous petition is closed.