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2022 DIGILAW 2855 (MAD)

Hyundai Motors Ltd. (Represented by its General Manager – Taxation T. Saravanan v. Deputy Commissioner (CT) – IV (FAC), Chennai

2022-08-22

ANITA SUMANTH

body2022
JUDGMENT (Prayer: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to issue a Writ of Certiorari, calling for the records on the files of the respondent herein, in TIN/33781661709/2013-14 dated 27.08.2015.) 1. The petitioner has challenged an order of assessment passed in terms of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006 (in short 'Act') for the period 2013-14 dated 27.08.2015 and was disposed by a learned single Judge of this Court on 14.12.2017 following the ratio laid down in a batch of Writ Petitions in the case of The State of Tamil Nadu represented by its Secretary, Commercial Taxes Department, The Deputy Commissioner (CT) (FAC) V. M/s.Everest Industries Limited (2022(4) TMI 1204) touching upon the reversal of Input Tax Credit (ITC) in terms of Section 19(2)(v) of the Act. 2. As against the aforesaid decision, the State has filed Writ Appeals in all cases. In W.A.No.1654 of 2017 pertaining to this petitioner, an order has been passed by a Division Bench of this Court on 12.03.2018 remanding the matter to the file of the learned single Judge. 3. It is relevant to note that the larger batch of matters touching upon the reversal of ITC in terms of Section 19(2)(v) have come to be decided in favour of the assessee in W.A.No.1260 of 2017 dated 31.03.2022. Inter alia, at paragraph 139, the Division Bench has specifically stated that ITC in terms of Section 19(2)(v) is not liable to be reversed in the case of a 'manufacturer' and paragraph 139 reads as follows: “........ 139. In the present case, the mischief is two in numbers. Firstly, the one identified by the State and the other, the counter mischief occasioned by their curative action and implementation of the proviso by the department. The end result is that the legislature decided to restore the original position with respect to Section 19 (2) (v) by omitting and substituting with a new provision to remove the mischief caused by wrongful implementation. The actual intention of the legislature is to be derived only by interpretation of the provision to find out its actual applicability and decide whether it is curative or substantative. As already seen, the original provision along with the proviso was omitted and a new provision was substituted. The word “retrospective” would mean “to look back” or “to go back in time”. As already seen, the original provision along with the proviso was omitted and a new provision was substituted. The word “retrospective” would mean “to look back” or “to go back in time”. A curative provision is held to be effective from a date prior to which it was enacted and so, will have a retrospective effect. As evident from the correct statement of objects and reasons and also from the contention of the Department that the amendment was brought in only to cure the defect and when it caused adverse effects, the same was withdrawn and substituted with a new provision, the time in that case is reversed. The amendments restore the benefit to all the dealers effecting interstate sale. As rightly pointed out by the counsel for the respondents, the subsequent amendment is in the form of “Declaration” reiterating that the provision is to be read as it stood before the 2013 amendment. Upon consideration of the materials placed before us and for the reasons stated above, the amendment to Section 19(2) brought about in the year 2015 is held to be curative in nature. Though we disagree with the reasoning of the learned Judge as to the interpretation placed on the scope of amendment to Section 19(2) vide Act 28 of 2013, in the light of the finding that Amendment Act 5 of 2015 is curative / declaratory in nature and would thus relate back to 11.11.2013, resultantly, the position insofar as the right of the manufacturers to avail ITC is, it becomes an absolute right, once the inputs are used in the manufacture or processing of the goods within the State, the subsequent event of the manufactured goods being sold by way of iner-state / intra-state sale would have no bearing nor does it result in imposing any limitation/restriction or whittle down the right to ITC earned in terms of Section 19(2)(ii) or 19(2)(v) of the TNVAT Act in the interregnum period.” 4. The decision/conclusion on this aspect is admittedly applicable to the petitioner on all fours. 5. That apart, the purpose for which the matter was remanded to the file of the learned single Judge by the Division Bench was in light of a distinction that had been drawn by the petitioner when the matter had come up for hearing along with the larger batch. 5. That apart, the purpose for which the matter was remanded to the file of the learned single Judge by the Division Bench was in light of a distinction that had been drawn by the petitioner when the matter had come up for hearing along with the larger batch. The distinction was to the effect that the petitioner was the beneficiary of an incentive scheme under G.O.Ms.No.101 dated 23.04.2008. 6. Briefly put, the Scheme provided for a cash refund of input tax upon condition that the petitioner had not availed the benefit of reversal as provided for under Section 19(2)(v) of the Act. Thus, the petitioner had contended, pending W.A.No.1260 of 2017, that whatever may be the fate of the decision in Everest Industries (supra), its case stands on a different footing as there has been no claim of credit by it in the first place. 7. In the absence of a claim or credit, the question of reversal does not arise. It was for this purpose and in light of the distinction made that the Division Bench had set aside the order of the learned single Judge that had been passed on the anvil of Section 19(2)(v), remanding the matter to the file of the learned single Judge for decision in regard to the distinction made by the petitioner. 8. Since the decision on the aspect of applicability of Section 19(2)(v) impacts the case of manufacturers as well, of which the petitioner is, admittedly, one, the petitioner does not wish to make a foray into the argument taken by it in W.A.No.1654 of 2019. It merely wishes to obtain the benefit of the decision of the Division Bench in W.A.No.1260 of 2017. 9. There are no divergent views on the narration as captured in the preceding paragraphs and in light of the same, this Writ Petition is liable to be allowed. 10. Mr.Prashanth Kiran, learned Government Advocate who appears for the respondent would submit that the decision of the Division Bench in W.A.No.1260 of 2017 is proposed to be challenged by the State before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 11. In the event that the decision is reversed at a later date, the petitioner may pursue the alternate argument taken by it touching upon the incentive scheme under G.O.Ms.No.101 dated 23.04.2008. In such an event, the authorities shall thoroughly verify the claim prior to pass any order in that regard. 11. In the event that the decision is reversed at a later date, the petitioner may pursue the alternate argument taken by it touching upon the incentive scheme under G.O.Ms.No.101 dated 23.04.2008. In such an event, the authorities shall thoroughly verify the claim prior to pass any order in that regard. 12. This Writ Petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms. No costs. Connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.