State Of H. P. Through Addl. Chief Secretary (Agriculture) To The Govt. Of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla-2 (H. P. ) v. Krishan Chand, S/O Sh. Diwan Singh
2022-06-13
SABINA, SATYEN VAIDYA
body2022
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Since common questions of law and facts are involved in both these appeals, therefore, the same are being decided by a common judgment. 2. The common facts in both the appeals are that respondents in both the appeals were engaged as daily wagers by respondent No.2 in the month of May, 1996 and continued to work in the same capacity till 30.6.2006. The only difference is that the date of engagement of respondent in LPA No. 158 of 2016 was 17.5.1996, whereas, the date of engagement of respondent in LPA No. 85 of 2017 was 15.5.1996. Both of them were retrenched w.e.f. 30.6.2006. They raised their individual Industrial Disputes. The appropriate Government referred the matter to Labour Court-cum-Industrial Disputes Tribunal, Dharmshala, (for short, “the Tribunal”). The questions referred for adjudication to learned Tribunal in both the cases were substantially identical. Learned Tribunal was required to decide, whether the retrenchment of services of respondents in both the appeals by appellant No.2 vide retrenchment orders dated 30.6.2006, especially when, the Government had issued orders to regularize the services of all daily wagers etc. who had completed eight years of service as on 31.3.2004, was legal and justified? 3. Learned Tribunal registered Reference No. 54 of 2008 and Reference No. 455 of 2009 which now are subject matters in LPA Nos. 158 of 2016 and LPA No. 85 of 2017 respectively. Both the references were answered in negative vide separate Awards dated 11.12.2012. The retrenchment of respondents was held to be compliant with the provisions of Section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act (for short, “the Act”). Whereas, sub-sections (a) and (b) of Section 25-F were held to have been complied with, sub-section (c) of Section 25-F was understood to be merely a directory provision and hence of no significance. 4. As regards the acquisition of the right of regularization by respondents, learned Tribunal again answered in negative on the ground that the cases of respondents were not comparable with the facts of the case in Mool Raj Upadhayaya vs. State of H.P. & others, 1994 (2) SLR 377 (SC). 5. Both the respondents assailed the respective awards passed against them. The Award in Reference No. 54 of 2008 was assailed by way of CWP No. 2365 of 2013 and Award in Reference No. 455 of 2009 was assailed in CWP No. 2366 of 2013. 6.
5. Both the respondents assailed the respective awards passed against them. The Award in Reference No. 54 of 2008 was assailed by way of CWP No. 2365 of 2013 and Award in Reference No. 455 of 2009 was assailed in CWP No. 2366 of 2013. 6. Learned Single Judge allowed both the writ petitions vide judgments dated 4.8.2015 and 27.7.2016 respectively. The Awards passed in Reference No. 54 of 2008 and Reference No. 455 of 2009 were set aside. Retrenchment of the respondents was declared void-ab-initio. The appellants were directed to regularize the services of the respondents from the date of completion of eight years of uninterrupted service rendered by them with all consequential benefits, hence these appeals. 7. We have heard Mr. Ashwani Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellants and Mr. Vijay Chaudhary, Advocate for the respondents in both the appeals and have also gone through the records carefully. 8. Learned Tribunal had proceeded on the premise that compliance of sub-sections (a) and (b) of Section 25-F was required to be followed as mandatory condition precedent but the same was not held applicable in respect of sub-section (c) of said Section. Reliance was placed upon judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bombay Union of Journalists & others vs. State of Bombay and Another, AIR 1994 SC 1617. 9. On facts, learned Tribunal had held that the provisions of sub-sections (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act had been complied with by the appellants. However, on appraisal of the material on record, we find such findings to be perverse. Admittedly, the respondent in both the cases were retrenched w.e.f. 30.6.2006. There is nothing on record to suggest that till 30.6.2006, appellants had paid the salary to respondents in lieu of notice under sub-section (a) or retrenchment compensation under sub-section (b) of Section 25-F of the Act. Rather, the material on record suggested that such compliance, if any, was alleged to have been made on 1.7.2006 i.e. after the retrenchment of respondents had already been effected. Since sub-sections (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act were not complied as pre-condition, learned Tribunal had clearly erred in holding due compliance of said provisions of law. The retrenchment of respondents, thus, could not have been held to be legal and valid. 10.
Since sub-sections (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act were not complied as pre-condition, learned Tribunal had clearly erred in holding due compliance of said provisions of law. The retrenchment of respondents, thus, could not have been held to be legal and valid. 10. Indeed, there was no compliance of sub-section (c) of Section 25-F of the Act also. Non compliance of the aforesaid provisions of law also could not be said to be merely directory in light of judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raj Kumar vs. Director of Education & others 2016 (6) SCC 541 . 11. Learned Tribunal had further answered the respective references in cases of both the respondents in negative by holding that their cases were not comparable on facts with Mool Raj Upadhayays’s case. Such findings, in our considered view, again cannot be sustained for the reason that the learned Tribunal, on one hand, had taken notice of the communication dated 9.6.2006, issued by the Secretary Personnel to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, communicating the decision of Government of Himachal Pradesh to regularize the services of all daily wage employees working in various departments of the Government, who had completed eight years of continuous service as on 31.3.2004, on the other had conveniently ignored such decision of the Government while answering the references against the respondents. Aforesaid decision of the State Government had come into being before retrenchment of respondents. 12. The undisputed facts of the case reveal that the respondents in both the appeals had remained engaged by the appellants for about ten years before their retrenchment. The action of appellants in retrenching the respondents came after issuance of correspondence dated 9.6.2006, as noticed above. The State has to act as model employer. Being a welfare State, it cannot indulge in unfair labour practices. The facts of the instant cases clearly reveal that the conduct of appellants can easily be said to be amounting to unfair labour practices under Clause 5 (b) and Clause 10 of “fifth schedule” appended to the Act. Respondents definitely had acquired right to be considered for regularization in terms of the policy decision taken by the State Government. It cannot be overlooked that the decision of the State Government as conveyed vide correspondence dated 9.6.2006 was not one-time measure but it was followed by similar policy decisions from time to time.
Respondents definitely had acquired right to be considered for regularization in terms of the policy decision taken by the State Government. It cannot be overlooked that the decision of the State Government as conveyed vide correspondence dated 9.6.2006 was not one-time measure but it was followed by similar policy decisions from time to time. In view of this, the respondents could not have been denied the right of consideration for regularization. 13. Learned Single Judge while taking note of all relevant aspect of the matter has rightly concluded that the retrenchment of respondents was void-ab-initio and accordingly directed not only reinstatement of the respondents but their regularization also w.e.f. the due applicable dates with all consequential benefits. 14. On the basis of aforesaid analysis, we do not find any reason to take a view different than the one taken by learned Single Judge. Accordingly, both the appeals are dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.