JUDGMENT Common Order Munishwar Nath Bhandari, CJ. 1. In the batch of five writ petitions, a challenge is made to G.O.Ms.No.34, Agriculture (AA3) Department, dated 17.2.2015, amending Rule 2(b) of the Special Rules for the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Engineering Service [for brevity, “the Special Rules”] 2. Pending the aforesaid writ petitions, an interim order was passed on 31.8.2015 in W.P.No.27211 of 2015 to the following effect: “Challenge in this writ petition is to the Government Order in G.O.Ms.No.34, Agriculture (AA3) Department dated 17.02.2015 by which an amendment has been issued to the Special Rules for the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Engineering Service Rules, giving retrospective effect to the ratio of 1:3:1 for the post of Assistant Executive Engineer, from 1 st April 2011 2. Material on record shows that earlier when Tamil Nadu Agricultural Engineers Association represented by its President and Junior Engineers filed W.P.Nos.15795 and 17532 of 2015, by a common order dated 30.06.2015, a Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court has ordered notice of motion, returnable in three weeks and in the meantime, directed that the respondents shall not do anything that would take away the accrued rights of the persons, while giving retrospective effect to the impugned amendment. 3. Challenge made by the petitioner in the present writ petition, is on the same lines. Following the abovesaid order dated 30.06.2015, notice of motion is ordered in the present writ petition, returnable by 21.09.2015. Private notice is also permitted. There shall be a similar direction in the present writ petition, as passed in the abovesaid writ petitions. 4. Post on 21.09.2015.” [emphasis supplied] 3. Alleging violation of the aforesaid interim order, Contempt Petition Nos.1682 of 2019 and 2294 of 2016 have been filed by one of the petitioners in W.P.No.27211 of 2015. 4. Out of five writ petitions, three writ petitions have been filed by the Junior Engineers in the Agricultural Engineering Department and two writ petitions have been filed by the associations, whose members are predominantly Junior Engineers. 5. The post of Assistant Engineer in the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Engineering Department is governed by the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Engineering Service and the post of Junior Engineer is governed by the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Engineering Subordinate Service. Admittedly, Assistant Engineers are Degree Holders, whereas Junior Engineers are Diploma Holders and the next avenue of appointment for both the cadres is to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer. Admittedly, Assistant Engineers are Degree Holders, whereas Junior Engineers are Diploma Holders and the next avenue of appointment for both the cadres is to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer. Rule 2(b) of the Special Rules, as it existed prior to the filing of the writ petitions, prescribed the ratio of 3:2 between Assistant Engineers and Junior Engineers for appointment to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer. As per the Special Rules, the petitioners were eligible to be included in the panel for appointment to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer in the panel years 2012-2013 to 2014-2015. 6. The ratio of 3:2 was challenged by the Junior Engineers (Diploma Holders) before this court contending that they should be given equal quota. The writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge, however, the Division Bench reversed the said judgment and the same was confirmed by the Supreme Court in T.R.Kothandaraman v. T.N.Water Supply and Drainage Board, (1994) 6 SCC 282 . 7. While the Engineering Graduates Association filed W.P.No.600 of 2006 seeking amendment of the Special Rules, an Assistant Engineer filed W.P.No.11772 of 2009 seeking to declare Rule 2(b) of the Special Rules as illegal. The challenge made in those writ petitions went up to the Supreme Court and ultimately, on remand, the writ petitions were dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court by order dated 24.7.2013 [P.Sundar v. The Government of Tamil Nadu and others, (2013) 7 MLJ 100 ] and the ratio of 3:2 fixed in Rule 2(b) of the Special Rules between Assistant Engineers and Junior Engineers for appointment to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer was upheld. It is stated that the judgment of the Division Bench has attained finality, as no further appeal was filed before the Supreme Court. 8. When things stood thus, the government issued the impugned government order, being G.O.Ms.No.34, Agriculture (AA3) Department, dated 17.2.2015, amending Rule 2(b) of the Special Rules by modifying the ratio of 3:2 between Assistant Engineer and Junior Engineer to 3:1, that too, with retrospective effect from 1.4.2011. Hence, these writ petitions. 9. The challenge to the amended Rule is mainly in reference to the reduction in the ratio of the Junior Engineers for promotion to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer. The government order has also been challenged for giving it retrospective effect from 1.4.2011. Hence, these writ petitions. 9. The challenge to the amended Rule is mainly in reference to the reduction in the ratio of the Junior Engineers for promotion to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer. The government order has also been challenged for giving it retrospective effect from 1.4.2011. It is further stated that on a representation made by the Assistant Engineers (Degree Holders) on 20.8.2013 (within 26 days from the date of the judgment in the case of P.Sundar, supra) seeking amendment of ratio to 3:1, the Chief Engineer on 12.9.2013 (within 48 days from the date of judgment) forwarded a proposal for amendment in the Special Rules. 10. The amendment in the ratio is assailed in reference to the strength of the officers in the posts of Junior Engineers and Assistant Engineers. The petitioners are also aggrieved by the proviso to 2(b) of the Special Rules brought in by way of amendment which mandates that no Junior Engineer appointed in a particular year shall be considered for appointment to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer for recruitment by transfer unless and until the Assistant Engineers appointed in the same year are considered for appointment to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer. It is contended that the aforesaid proviso offends the basic structure of the Rule, because en bloc all the Assistant Engineers would be considered for promotion to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer, ignoring even the ratio extant and, as a consequence, no Junior Engineer would be considered for promotion. 11. Elaborate arguments have been made on either side and would be dealt with while considering each issue. 12. The first issue is the challenge to the ratio of 3:1 between Assistant Engineers and Junior Engineer for appointment to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer. 13. Challenge to the Rule has been made in reference to the strength of the officers in the two posts and it is submitted that ignoring the right of the Junior Engineers to get a chance of promotion to the higher post, the amendment under challenge has been brought. It is more so when a challenge to the earlier Rule having the ratio as 3:2 between the Assistant Engineers and Junior Engineers was not accepted by a Division Bench of this court in the case of P.Sundar, supra. The judgment aforesaid has attained finality, as no further challenge was made. 14. It is more so when a challenge to the earlier Rule having the ratio as 3:2 between the Assistant Engineers and Junior Engineers was not accepted by a Division Bench of this court in the case of P.Sundar, supra. The judgment aforesaid has attained finality, as no further challenge was made. 14. A reference of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of T.R.Kothandaraman, supra, has also been given. The said petition was filed by Junior Engineers seeking equal ratio of 3:3 in the place of 3:2. However, the Apex Court upheld the ratio of 3:2. 15. The ratio of 3:2 was modified to 3:1 vide the government order under challenge. The jurisdiction of this court on challenge to the ratio would be very limited, because the fixation of ratio for promotion is the prerogative of the executive. This court can interfere if fixation of ratio offends any constitution provision, which may be Articles 14 or 16, or it is out of mala fide or malicious exercise of power by the administration. We do not find that any of such issues have been made out for challenge to the government order under challenge. The State Government has justified the change in the ratio giving out the strength of the Assistant Engineers vis-a-vis the Junior Engineers. To fortify the view aforesaid, it is appropriate to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of T.N. Rural Development Engineers Assn. v. Deptt. of Rural Development, (2013) 15 SCC 380 , wherein it has been held as under: “47. It cannot be disputed that for promotion to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer (RD) Notification No. III GOMs No. 15, more than one mode of recruitment i.e. promotion from Assistant Engineer (RD) and recruitment by transfer from the feeder category of Junior Engineer and Senior Draughting Officer have been recognised and stipulated. Furthermore, it is also a matter of record that on the post of Assistant Engineer (RD) there is more than one mode of recruitment i.e. direct recruitment and recruitment by transfer from the feeder category of Overseers only. Therefore, the rules have provided a ratio on appointment to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer (RD) as 6:2:1 (promotion from AE (RD); JE; SDO). Therefore, the rules have provided a ratio on appointment to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer (RD) as 6:2:1 (promotion from AE (RD); JE; SDO). The appellants, however, claimed that this ratio ought to be 1:1, on the ground that otherwise they would stagnate on the position of Junior Engineer. We are unable to accept the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants. Prior to the absorption of the appellants in the RD Department admittedly they had no chance of being promoted on the post of Assistant Executive Engineer, Executive Engineer or Superintending Engineer. It is only upon their absorption that they now enjoy a chance of being promoted on the higher posts. We are unable to agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants that the aforesaid ratio is, in any manner, violative of Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution of India. 48. Even otherwise, the fixation of the quota/ratio is the prerogative of the executive. It is not disputed that the ratio of 6:2:1 has been fixed in the service rules in exercise of the powers of the Governor under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. In the absence of the appellants placing on the record material to establish that fixation of such a ratio is patently arbitrary, the action of the Government cannot be nullified. Fixation of rota/quota on the basis of qualification is well accepted in service jurisprudence. We, therefore, see no merit in the submissions of the appellants that the ratio of 6:2:1 ought to be replaced with the ratio by 1:1.” [emphasis supplied] 16. According to the State Government, the strength of Assistant Engineers is higher than the existing Junior Engineers for the reason that once a Junior Engineer in the Subordinate Service acquires qualification of degree, then he is shifted to the post of Assistant Engineer. By virtue of the aforesaid, many of the Junior Engineers who acquire qualification of degree are shifted to the post of Assistant Engineers. Therefore, it became necessary for the department to adequately change the ratio so as to give chance to the Assistant Engineers to get appointment on the higher post. 17. By virtue of the aforesaid, many of the Junior Engineers who acquire qualification of degree are shifted to the post of Assistant Engineers. Therefore, it became necessary for the department to adequately change the ratio so as to give chance to the Assistant Engineers to get appointment on the higher post. 17. The change in ratio to 3:1 would not be hit by the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of T.R.Kothandaraman, supra, because the challenge therein was made by Junior Engineers to seek equal ratio of 3:3 in the place of 3:2. It was not accepted mainly in reference to the higher qualification and finding the post of Assistant Engineer to be in State Service, though it had not been disputed by the parties that the Junior Engineers and Assistant Engineers discharge the same duties. In the judgment aforesaid, the issue in reference to the strength of the Junior Engineers and Assistant Engineers was not a highlight, but finding no justification to change the ratio from 3:2 to 3:3, the writ petition filed by the Junior Engineers was not accepted. 18. The second round of litigation was initiated by the Assistant Engineers by way of writ petitions filed in 2006 and 2009, where the ratio of 3:2 was challenged to pray for higher ratio for Assistant Engineers. The challenge did not sustain, rather the ratio of 3:2 was maintained by a Division Bench of this Court vide the judgment in the case of P.Sundar, supra. 19. Thus, we do not find any substance in the challenge to the amendment in the ratio from 3:2 to 3:1 for appointment to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer from the post of Assistant Engineer and Junior Engineer, respectively, in reference to the judgments aforesaid, because they were decided on their own facts and otherwise the amendment does not offend the Constitution of India. 20. The next issue for consideration is the retrospective effect of the government order dated 17.2.2015. 21. The challenge to the aforesaid has been made mainly on the ground that when this court by its judgment in the case of P.Sundar, supra, upheld the ratio of 3:2 in the year 2013 on a challenge to it by the Assistant Engineers to claim higher ratio, the respondents could not have brought the amendment with retrospective effect from 1.4.2011 offending the judgment. 22. 22. The argument aforesaid has been defended by learned counsel for the contesting respondent as well as learned Additional Advocate General on the ground that the judgment in the case of P.Sundar, supra, was passed taking into consideration the position obtaining in the year 2006 and 2009 when the writ petitions were filed by the Assistant Engineers. The court may not be having the strength of officers in the cadres of Junior Engineer and Assistant Engineer as on the date of judgment and, accordingly, the amendment was rightly brought retrospectively, making it effective from 1.4.2011. 23. To analyse the issue aforesaid, we have carefully gone through the judgment in the case of P.Sundar, supra, and all the documents placed before the court to support the ratio of 3:2 fixed by the Government. The history of that litigation shows that after a judgment of this court in W.P.Nos.600 of 2006 and 11772 of 2009, the matter ultimately reached to the Supreme Court and on remand the Division Bench heard the matter and decided it by the order dated 24.7.2013. It was based on the details given by the State Government giving out the strength of the Junior Engineers and the Assistant Engineers. The Division Bench upheld the ratio of 3:2. 24. Thus, we are unable to accept the argument of learned counsel for the respondents that the aforesaid judgment was given by the Division Bench taking into consideration the strength of the officers in the cadres of Junior Engineer and Assistant Engineer in the years 2006 and 2009, when the writ petitions were filed. In fact, on remand of the case by the Supreme Court, the Division Bench had taken up the matter afresh for adjudication of the issue and it was in reference to the strength at that time and thereby if the amendment applies retrospectively, it would be nothing but to nullify the judgment of this court upholding the ratio of 3:2. 25. The retrospective effect of the Rules, making it effective from 1.4.2011, cannot be held to be valid. It is in the light of the fact that an amendment in the Rules cannot be brought to nullify the judgment and that too when it was after accepting the plea raised by the Government. 25. The retrospective effect of the Rules, making it effective from 1.4.2011, cannot be held to be valid. It is in the light of the fact that an amendment in the Rules cannot be brought to nullify the judgment and that too when it was after accepting the plea raised by the Government. Therefore, the government cannot do a volte-face subsequently to nullify the judgment, otherwise it would be nothing but to nullify their own statement and even the affidavit to justify the ratio of 3:2. At this juncture, it is appropriate to refer to the Apex Court judgment in the case of S.R. Bhagwat v. State of Mysore, (1995) 6 SCC 16 , wherein it has been held as under: “12. It is now well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that a binding judicial pronouncement between the parties cannot be made ineffective with the aid of any legislative power by enacting a provision which in substance overrules such judgment and is not in the realm of a legislative enactment which displaces the basis or foundation of the judgment and uniformly applies to a class of persons concerned with the entire subject sought to be covered by such an enactment having retrospective effect. We may only refer to two of these judgments. ... 18. A mere look at sub-section (2) of Section 11 shows that the respondent State of Karnataka, which was a party to the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court against it had tried to get out of the binding effect of the decision by resorting to its legislative power. The judgments, decrees and orders of any court or the competent authority which had become final against the State were sought to be done away with by enacting the impugned provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 11. Such an attempt cannot be said to be a permissible legislative exercise. Section 11(2), therefore, must be held to be an attempt on the part of the State Legislature to legislatively overrule binding decisions of competent courts against the State. Such an attempt cannot be said to be a permissible legislative exercise. Section 11(2), therefore, must be held to be an attempt on the part of the State Legislature to legislatively overrule binding decisions of competent courts against the State. It is no doubt true that if any decision was rendered against the State of Karnataka which was pending in appeal and had not become final it could rely upon the relevant provisions of the Act which were given retrospective effect by sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Act for whatever such reliance was worth. But when such a decision had become final as in the present case when the High Court clearly directed respondent- State to give to the petitioners concerned deemed dates of promotions if they were otherwise found fit and in that eventuality to give all benefits consequential thereon including financial benefits, the State could not invoke its legislative power to displace such a judgment. Once this decision had become final and the State of Karnataka had not thought it fit to challenge it before this Court presumably because in other identical matters this Court had upheld other decisions of the Karnataka High Court taking the same view, it passes one's comprehension how the legislative power can be pressed in service to undo the binding effects of such mandamus. It is also pertinent to note that not only sub-section (2) of Section 11 seeks to bypass and override the binding effect of the judgments but also seeks to empower the State to review such judgments and orders and pass fresh orders in accordance with provisions of the impugned Act. The respondent- State in the present case by enacting sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the impugned Act has clearly sought to nullify or abrogate the binding decision of the High Court and has encroached upon the judicial power entrusted to the various authorities functioning under the relevant statutes and the Constitution. Such an exercise of legislative power cannot be countenanced. 19. It was contended by Shri Madhava Reddy that even assuming that the Division Bench judgment remained binding on the State despite the provisions of the impugned Act, all that the Division Bench has directed the State is to consider the case of the petitioners for deemed promotions on the basis of the final seniority list. 19. It was contended by Shri Madhava Reddy that even assuming that the Division Bench judgment remained binding on the State despite the provisions of the impugned Act, all that the Division Bench has directed the State is to consider the case of the petitioners for deemed promotions on the basis of the final seniority list. That has already been done and the petitioners have no grievance for the same. So far as the consequential financial benefits are concerned they would not cover the monetary benefits flowing from such deemed promotions. Even this submission cannot be countenanced. We have already extracted earlier the operative portion of the judgment of the Division Bench. It has been in terms directed that if the petitioner is found fit and promoted he may be given all the benefits consequential thereto including the financial benefits. It is, therefore, obvious that once the deemed date of promotion is given to the petitioners concerned it cannot be merely notional promotion re-fixing his pay in the promotional cadre with increments etc. but also would bring in its wake all consequential financial benefits, namely, the salaries that have accrued to them on account of such deemed promotions. Whether such deemed promotions can also entail actual monetary benefits when the employees concerned had not worked on the promotional posts, is a question which could have been agitated by the respondent-State, if so advised, by challenging the order of the Division Bench before this Court. That was not done. Instead it resorted to its legislative power for undoing the said directions of the Division Bench by arming itself with the power to review that judgment by resort to its legislative function. That was clearly not permissible as it was an act of encroachment on the judicial pronouncement of the High Court which had remained binding on the respondent-State. The ratio of the decisions of this Court as discussed earlier clearly get attracted on the facts of the present case and on the same grounds on which this Court invalidated the relevant provisions of Arbitration (Orissa Second Amendment) Act, 1991 in G.C. Kanungo [ (1995) 5 SCC 96 ]. Section 11 sub-section (2) of the impugned Act also has to be declared ultra vires and invalid. 20. We, therefore, strike down Section 11 subsection (2) as unconstitutional, illegal and void. Section 11 sub-section (2) of the impugned Act also has to be declared ultra vires and invalid. 20. We, therefore, strike down Section 11 subsection (2) as unconstitutional, illegal and void. So far as the underlined impugned portions of Section 4 sub-sections (2), (3) and (8) are concerned, they clearly conflict with the binding direction issued by the Division Bench of the High Court against the respondent-State and in favour of the petitioners. Once respondent-State had suffered the mandamus to give consequential financial benefits to the allottees like the petitioners on the basis of the deemed promotions such binding direction about payment of consequential monetary benefits cannot be nullified by the impugned provisions of Section 4. Therefore, the underlined portions of sub-sections (2), (3) and (8) of Section 4 will have to be read down in the light of orders of the court which have become final against the respondent-State and insofar as these provisions are inconsistent with these final orders containing such directions of judicial authorities and competent courts, these impugned provisions of Section 4 have to give way and to the extent of such inconsistency must be treated to be inoperative and ineffective. Accordingly the aforesaid provisions are read down by observing that the statutory provisions contained in subsections (2), (3) and (8) of Section 4 providing that such persons who have been given deemed promotions shall not be entitled to any arrears for the period prior to the date of their actual promotion, shall not apply in cases where directions to the contrary of competent courts against the respondent- State have become final.” 26. The Rule cannot be given retrospective effect only for the reason that appointment to the post would now be from the year 2011 and, therefore, it applies from that year. It is even if we ignore that the representation of the Assistant Engineers to change the ratio from 3:2 to 3:1 was made within 26 days from the date of the Division Bench judgment in the case of P.Sundar, supra, and accepted by the administration, though earlier they were supporting the ratio of 3:2. 27. It is even if we ignore that the representation of the Assistant Engineers to change the ratio from 3:2 to 3:1 was made within 26 days from the date of the Division Bench judgment in the case of P.Sundar, supra, and accepted by the administration, though earlier they were supporting the ratio of 3:2. 27. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner otherwise is that the State Government has not only acted against their own statement in the earlier writ petition filed by the Assistant Engineers, but endorsed the representation acting on the wishes of the Assistant Engineers in contrast to their own statement in the earlier writ petition. 28. In the light of the aforesaid, we would hold that even if the Rules have to be given retrospective effect, it cannot be from a date prior to the judgment in the case of P.Sundar, supra. The finding aforesaid has been made while not accepting the plea raised by the petitioners that Rule could not have been made retrospective. 29. It is in view of the fact that a Rule can be made retrospective subject to one condition that it should not take away the accrued rights of the parties. In the instant case, no accrued right was existing in favour of the petitioners till the amendment was brought, as the petitioners are yet to be given promotion to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer. The accrued right would exist only on the promotion. 30. The view aforesaid is in reference to various judgments of the Apex Court cited by the respondents and we accept that unless a candidate is given promotion or appointed to a higher post, he would not be having accrued right to continue and to seek benefit as were obtaining prior to the amendment. Thus, while we hold the Rule to be constitutionally valid even if it is given retrospective effect, it cannot be from a date prior to the judgment dated 24.7.2013 in the case of P.Sundar, supra, for the reasons given above and, therefore, the amended rules cannot be applied and given effect to prior to 24.7.2013, but would be applicable subsequent to the date aforesaid. 31. At this stage, there would be another limb of argument to be dealt regarding change of Rules after initiation of the process for appointment. 31. At this stage, there would be another limb of argument to be dealt regarding change of Rules after initiation of the process for appointment. It is in the light of the fact that for the year 2011 the process for making appointment to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer was initiated by the respondent authorities. It was much prior to the amendment and even process was completed by making recommendation for appointment of the eligible candidates in the ratio of 3:2. It is only that recommendation was not given effect to and in the meanwhile the amendment was brought by the government order dated 17.2.2015. 32. It is settled proposition of law that Rules of the game cannot be changed in the midst of the recruitment. Once the process of recruitment has been initiated as per the Rules obtaining as on the date, it cannot be subjected to any amendment in the Rules during the midst of the recruitment process. The law on this issue is well settled and in this regard a reference is made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of K. Manjusree v. State of A.P., (2008) 3 SCC 512 , wherein it has been held as under: “25. When the Administrative Committee placed the merit lists and selection list before the Full Court, apparently objections were raised on two grounds. One related to the failure to provide the minimum of 50%, 40% and 35% marks for interviews, on the interpretation of Resolution dated 30-11-2004 read with earlier Resolutions dated 24-7-2001 and 21-2- 2002. The second objection was that even though the Administrative Committee had resolved that the marks for written examination would be 75 and interview would be 25, at the time of tabulating the marks, the marks secured (out of 100 marks) in the written examination had been taken into account without scaling it down with reference to a maximum of 75 marks. The Full Court, therefore, appointed a sub-committee of two Judges to examine the matter and prepare a fresh merit list and selection list. The sub-committee examined the matter and submitted a revised merit list by incorporating two changes. The Full Court, therefore, appointed a sub-committee of two Judges to examine the matter and prepare a fresh merit list and selection list. The sub-committee examined the matter and submitted a revised merit list by incorporating two changes. Firstly, while tabulating the marks, it scaled down the marks secured by the candidates in the written examination with reference to a maximum of 100 marks, in proportion to a maximum of 75 marks so that the final marks were with reference to a base of 75 marks for written examination and 25 marks for interview as resolved on 30-11-2004. Secondly, it applied the minimum percentage of 50%, 40% and 35% for OC, BC, SC/ST even in regard to interviews and consequently, eliminated those who secured less than the minimum in the interview from the process of selection. The final selection list was prepared with reference to the fresh merit list prepared by incorporating the said two changes. 26. As far as the first change is concerned, we have already held that scaling down is unexceptional as it is in consonance with the criteria decided by the Administrative Committee on 30-11-2004 before commencing the selection process. 27. But what could not have been done was the second change, by introduction of the criterion of minimum marks for the interview. The minimum marks for interview had never been adopted by the Andhra Pradesh High Court earlier for selection of District & Sessions Judges, (Grade II). In regard to the present selection, the Administrative Committee merely adopted the previous procedure in vogue. The previous procedure as stated above was to apply minimum marks only for written examination and not for the oral examination. We have referred to the proper interpretation of the earlier Resolutions dated 24-7-2001 and 21-2-2002 and held that what was adopted on 30-11-2004 was only minimum marks for written examination and not for the interviews. Therefore, introduction of the requirement of minimum marks for interview, after the entire selection process (consisting of written examination and interview) was completed, would amount to changing the rules of the game after the game was played which is clearly impermissible. We are fortified in this view by several decisions of this Court. Therefore, introduction of the requirement of minimum marks for interview, after the entire selection process (consisting of written examination and interview) was completed, would amount to changing the rules of the game after the game was played which is clearly impermissible. We are fortified in this view by several decisions of this Court. It is sufficient to refer to three of them — P.K. Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India [ (1984) 2 SCC 141 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 214] , Umesh Chandra Shukla v. Union of India [ (1985) 3 SCC 721 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 919] and Durgacharan Misra v. State of Orissa [ (1987) 4 SCC 646 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 36 : (1987) 5 ATC 148] . 28. In Ramachandra Iyer [ (1984) 2 SCC 141 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 214] this Court was considering the validity of a selection process under the ICAR Rules, 1977 which provided for minimum marks only in the written examination and did not envisage obtaining minimum marks in the interview. But the Recruitment Board (ASRB) prescribed a further qualification of obtaining minimum marks in the interview also. This Court observed that the power to prescribe minimum marks in the interview should be explicit and cannot be read by implication for the obvious reason that such deviation from the Rules is likely to cause irreparable and irreversible harm. This Court held that as there was no power under the Rules for the Selection Board to prescribe the additional qualification of securing minimum marks in the interview, the restriction was impermissible and had a direct impact on the merit list because the merit list was to be prepared according to the aggregate marks obtained by the candidates at written test and interview. This Court observed: (SCC p. 181, para 44) “44. … Once an additional qualification of obtaining minimum marks at the viva voce test is adhered to, a candidate who may figure high up in the merit list was likely to be rejected on the ground that he has not obtained minimum qualifying marks at viva voce test. This Court observed: (SCC p. 181, para 44) “44. … Once an additional qualification of obtaining minimum marks at the viva voce test is adhered to, a candidate who may figure high up in the merit list was likely to be rejected on the ground that he has not obtained minimum qualifying marks at viva voce test. To illustrate, a candidate who has obtained 400 marks at the written test and obtained 38 marks at the viva voce test, if considered on the aggregate of marks being 438 was likely to come within the zone of selection, but would be eliminated by ASRB on the ground that he has not obtained qualifying marks at viva voce test. This was impermissible and contrary to Rules and the merit list prepared in contravention of Rules cannot be sustained.” 29. In Umesh Chandra [ (1985) 3 SCC 721 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 919] the scope of the Delhi Judicial Service Rules, 1970 came up for consideration. The Rules provided that those who secured the prescribed minimum qualifying marks in the written examination will be called for viva voce; and that the marks obtained in the viva voce shall be added to the marks obtained in the written test and the candidate's ranking shall depend on the aggregate of both. 27 candidates were found eligible to appear for viva voce on the basis of their having secured the minimum prescribed marks in the written examination. The final list was therefore, expected to be prepared by merely adding the viva voce marks to the written examination marks in regard to those 27 candidates. But the final list that was prepared contained some new names which were not in the list of 27 candidates who passed the written examination. Some names were omitted from the list of 27 candidates who passed the written examination. 30. It was found that the Selection Committee had moderated the written examination marks by an addition of 2% for all the candidates, as a result of which some candidates who did not get through the written examination, became eligible for viva voce and came into the list. Secondly, the Selection Committee prescribed for selection, a minimum aggregate of 600 marks in the written examination and viva voce which was not provided in the Rules and that resulted in some of the names in the list of 27 candidates being omitted. Secondly, the Selection Committee prescribed for selection, a minimum aggregate of 600 marks in the written examination and viva voce which was not provided in the Rules and that resulted in some of the names in the list of 27 candidates being omitted. This Court held neither was permissible. Dealing with the prescription of minimum 600 marks in the aggregate this Court observed: (Umesh Chandra case [ (1985) 3 SCC 721 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 919] , SCC pp. 735-36, para 14) “14. … There is no power reserved under Rule 18 of the Rules for the High Court to fix its own minimum marks in order to include candidates in the final list. It is stated in Para 7 of the counter-affidavit filed in Writ Petition No. 4363 of 1985 that the Selection Committee has inherent power to select candidates who according to it are suitable for appointment by prescribing the minimum marks which a candidate should obtain in the aggregate in order to get into the Delhi Judicial Service. … But on going through the Rules, we are of the view that no fresh disqualification or bar may be created by the High Court or the Selection Committee merely on the basis of the marks obtained at the examination because Clause (6) of the Appendix itself has laid down the minimum marks which a candidate should obtain in the written papers or in the aggregate in order to qualify himself to become a member of the Judicial Service. The prescription of the minimum of 600 marks in the aggregate by the Selection Committee as an additional requirement which the candidate has to satisfy amounts to an amendment of what is prescribed by Clause (6) of the Appendix. … We are of the view that the Selection Committee has no power to prescribe the minimum marks which a candidate should obtain in the aggregate different from the minimum already prescribed by the Rules in its Appendix. We are, therefore, of the view that the exclusion of the names of certain candidates, who had not secured 600 marks in the aggregate including marks obtained at the viva voce test from the list prepared under Rule 18 of the Rules is not legal.” 31. We are, therefore, of the view that the exclusion of the names of certain candidates, who had not secured 600 marks in the aggregate including marks obtained at the viva voce test from the list prepared under Rule 18 of the Rules is not legal.” 31. In Durgacharan Misra [ (1987) 4 SCC 646 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 36 : (1987) 5 ATC 148] this Court was considering the selection under the Orissa Service Rules which did not prescribe any minimum qualifying marks to be secured in viva voce for selection of Munsifs. The Rules merely required that after the viva voce test the State Public Service Commission shall add the marks of the viva voce test to the marks in the written test. But the State Public Service Commission which was the selecting authority prescribed minimum qualifying marks for the viva voce test also. This Court held that the Commission had no power to prescribe the minimum standard at viva voce test for determining the suitability of candidates for appointment of Munsifs. 32. In Maharashtra SRTC v. Rajendra Bhimrao Mandve [ (2001) 10 SCC 51 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 720] this Court observed that “the rules of the game, meaning thereby, that the criteria for selection cannot be altered by the authorities concerned in the middle or after the process of selection has commenced”. In this case the position is much more serious. Here, not only the rules of the game were changed, but they were changed after the game had been played and the results of the game were being awaited. That is unacceptable and impermissible. 33. The Resolution dated 30-11-2004 merely adopted the procedure prescribed earlier. The previous procedure was not to have any minimum marks for interview. Therefore, extending the minimum marks prescribed for written examination, to interviews, in the selection process is impermissible. We may clarify that prescription of minimum marks for any interview is not illegal. We have no doubt that the authority making rules regulating the selection, can prescribe by rules, the minimum marks both for written examination and interviews, or prescribe minimum marks for written examination but not for interview, or may not prescribe any minimum marks for either written examination or interview. Where the rules do not prescribe any procedure, the Selection Committee may also prescribe the minimum marks, as stated above. Where the rules do not prescribe any procedure, the Selection Committee may also prescribe the minimum marks, as stated above. But if the Selection Committee wants to prescribe minimum marks for interview, it should do so before the commencement of selection process. If the Selection Committee prescribed minimum marks only for the written examination, before the commencement of selection process, it cannot either during the selection process or after the selection process, add an additional requirement that the candidates should also secure minimum marks in the interview. What we have found to be illegal, is changing the criteria after completion of the selection process, when the entire selection proceeded on the basis that there will be no minimum marks for the interview.” [emphasis supplied] 33. In the instant case, the process to make appointment to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer was started much prior to the amendment of the Rule under challenge and thereby the recommendation already made cannot be governed by the amendment when the process to the extent of making recommendation of the candidates was completed, though the orders of appointment may not have been issued waiting for the outcome of this litigation. Therefore, the respondents were under an obligation to give effect to the recommendations already made without affecting it by the amended provision which was brought much after the selection. Therefore, the amendment given retrospective effect cannot nullify the selections already initiated and completed, barring issuance of the order of appointment. It is clarified that the acceptance of the aforesaid argument of the petitioners is not on the ground of accrued rights, but on the ground that the rules of the game cannot be changed in the midst of selection process. Therefore, this is also a ground to hold that the Rules so amended by the government order under challenge would not have effect on the selections already made for appointment to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer. 34. The challenge to the proviso added to Rule 2(b) vide the government order dated 17.2.2015 has also been made. Therefore, this is also a ground to hold that the Rules so amended by the government order under challenge would not have effect on the selections already made for appointment to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer. 34. The challenge to the proviso added to Rule 2(b) vide the government order dated 17.2.2015 has also been made. For ready reference, the amended Rule is quoted hereunder: “(b) Appointment to vacancies arising in Class IV shall be made by direct recruitment, by promotion from among the holders of the post of Assistant Engineer in Class V and by recruitment by transfer from among the holders of the post of Junior Engineer (Agricultural Engineer) in the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Engineer Subordinate Service in the ratio of 1:3:1 and shall be filled up in the following order of rotation, namely: i. By direct recruitment; ii. By Promotion; iii.By recruitment by transfer iv.By promotion; and v. By promotion Provided that no Junior Engineer (Agricultural Engineering) appointed in a particular year shall be considered for appointment to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer (Agricultural Engineering) by recruitment by transfer unless and until the Assistant Engineer (Agricultural Engineering) appointed in the same year is considered for promotion to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer (Agricultural Engineering).” 35. The proviso to Rule 2(b) of the Special Rules provides that no Junior Engineer appointed in a particular year vis-a-vis the Assistant Engineer appointed in the same year would be considered for appointment to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer, unless all the Assistant Engineers appointed in the said year are given promotion. The proviso aforesaid vitiates even the ratio of promotion between the Assistant Engineers and Junior Engineers. The aforesaid can be illustrated by giving an example that in the year 2010 assuming ten Assistant Engineers were appointed and in the same year eight Junior Engineers were appointed, then as per the proviso, till all the ten Assistant Engineers are given appointment to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer, the eight Junior Engineers would not be given appointment even in the ratio given in the Rule. If in a given year there are six posts of Assistant Executive Engineer to be filled up by appointment from amongst the Assistant Engineers and Junior Engineers, then ignoring the ratio of 3:2 earlier applicable and now 3:1, only the Assistant Engineers would be considered and given appointment, making it 100% appointment for Assistant Engineers, while earlier ratio was 3:2 and now 3:1. The ratio aforesaid is violated by the proviso. The State Government could not give justification to bring the proviso when the promotion from the post of Assistant Engineer and Junior Engineer has to be made in the ratio fixed by them. Therefore, we find reason to strike down the proviso added to Rule 2(b) by the government order dated 17.2.2015. 36. The appointment to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer would be made in the ratio operating from time to time i.e., 3:2 prior to the amendment and now 3:1 as per the amendment aforesaid which has been approved by us, though nullifying its retrospective effect from 1.4.2011, but allowing it to be made applicable from the date of the judgment in the case of P.Sundar, supra. The exercise of filling up the posts of Assistant Executive Engineers would be governed by this judgment. If the appointment was made to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer by taking the Rule to be effective from 1.4.2011, then it would not be affected, however, if appointments have already been given, then they would be adjusted against the subsequent years' vacancies, as now the intervening period is of 11 years. It is, however, with the arrangement that those Junior Engineers and Assistant Engineers eligible and recommended for appointment in the year 2011 would be given appointment as the Rule was amended much after the recommendation and further vacancies till the amendment is given effect from 24.7.2013 would be as per the unamended provision. 37. The writ petitions are diasposed of with the above directions. In view of the orders passed in the writ petitions, the contempt petitions are closed. There will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.