ORDER Javed Iqbal Wani, J. The instant petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the petitioner herein seeking setting-aside of order dated 27.04.2021 passed by the Court of Additional District Judge, Budgam (for short, ‘the Appellate Court’), in civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 685/2020 with a further prayer that the Court of Sub Judge, Chadoora (for short, ‘the Trial Court’) be directed to restore order dated 23.09.2020 passed by it. 2. The background facts emerging from the petition would reveal that the petitioner-company herein filed a civil suit accompanied with an application for interim relief before the Trial Court seeking therein following reliefs in the suit and in the application respectively :- Prayer made in the Civil Suit :- “It is accordingly prayed that the defendant company their agents and servants be perpetually restrained from appointing/nominating/engaging any other person or legal entity to act as the dealer of the defendant company at Srinagar, except the plaintiff company and by mandatory injunction the defendant company be directed to complete the process leading to the issuance of Letter of Intent in terms of Clause 10 of the communication dated 01.07.2019. Further the communication dated 21.09.2020, be declared to be of no legal effect and inconsequential. A decree in the aforesaid terms be passed in favour of the plaintiff company and against the defendant company. Any other decree or order as the Hon’ble Court may deem fit be also passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant company along with costs of the suit.” Prayer made in the Application for interim relief : “It is accordingly prayed that pending disposal of the suit defendants their agents and servants be restrained from allotting dealership or entering into agreement of the Motor Cars manufactured by the defendant company to any person or legal entity at Srinagar and or permit any other existing dealer of the defendant company to conduct business at Srinagar. Ex-parte interim order be made absolute after notice to the other side. Further the communication dated 21.09.2020 stayed. Any other interim order or direction as the Court may deem fit be also passed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.” 3. Ex-parte interim order be made absolute after notice to the other side. Further the communication dated 21.09.2020 stayed. Any other interim order or direction as the Court may deem fit be also passed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.” 3. The Trial Court initially passed an ex-parte interim order on 23.09.2020 whereby the said Court temporarily restrained the defendant-respondent herein from appointing, nominating and engaging any other person or legal entity to act as dealer of KIA Motors at Srinagar, except the plaintiff/petitioner-company herein. 4. An application under Order 39 Rule 4 CPC came to be filed before the Trial Court by the defendant-respondent herein seeking vacation of interim order dated 23.09.2020 and the Trial Court consequently, modified the said order on 16.11.2020 providing therein that the defendant-respondent herein is at liberty to appoint, nominate or engage any person or legal entity to act as its dealer in the whole valley except the Nowgam location, which is kept reserved till the disposal of the application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of CPC. 5. The Trial Court while modifying the initial ex-parte interim order dated 23.09.2020 in terms of the order dated 16.11.2020 kept the application for interim relief alive for consideration. 6. The plaintiff-petitioner herein challenged the order of the Trial Court dated 16.11.2020 in the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal before the Appellate Court on a fundamental plea that the Nowgam is the place for location of the office/showroom of the plaintiff-petitioner-company whereas the dealership granted to the plaintiff-petitioner-company by the defendant-respondent herein was for whole of District Srinagar. 7. The Appellate Court in terms of the impugned order maintained the modified order of the Trial Court dated 16.11.2020 while observing that the application for interim relief is pending, as such, dismissed the appeal as having no merit. 8. The impugned order dated 27.04.2021 is being challenged, inter-alia, on the following grounds :- “i) That both the courts below have acted contrary to law and without appreciating the controversy existing between the parties and have caused serious prejudice to the petitioner company. Both the courts below have totally failed to appreciate the issues involved in the case. 8. The impugned order dated 27.04.2021 is being challenged, inter-alia, on the following grounds :- “i) That both the courts below have acted contrary to law and without appreciating the controversy existing between the parties and have caused serious prejudice to the petitioner company. Both the courts below have totally failed to appreciate the issues involved in the case. The petitioner company has set up its case that it held Dealership of vehicles manufactured by KIA Motors and its area of operation is District Srinagar and since the office/show room was required for which initially Nowgam and subsequently Pantha Chowk was identified with the approval of the respondent company. Both the courts below have interestingly reserved Nowgam location. The petitioner company submits that it makes no sense to reserve the location of the showroom/office. Both the courts below failed to understand and appreciate that the controversy related to the Dealership of the petitioner company for District Srinagar. The office/showroom which were being made by the company, were only intended to facilitate sale of vehicles of the respondent company. The cause had arisen to the petitioner company because of various acts of omission and commission committed by the respondent company. Detailed submissions in this behalf had been made in the plaint. ii) That both the courts below have acted without jurisdiction and or in wrong exercise of jurisdiction. In a case of the nature, as has arisen between the parties, the courts below were required to see that breach of contract is prevented under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2. The breach was in respect of the Dealership of the plaintiff company and the follow up steps for setting up office/ show room of the company. The plaintiff company has sought the relief of injunction against the respondent company to prevent it from appointing any other person or legal entity as the dealer of the company at Srinagar. The relief of mandatory injunction was also sought against the respondent company to complete the process which had progressed between the parties in terms of the communication dated 01.07.2019. The petitioner company had also sought declaration in respect of the communication dated 21.09.2020 which had adversely affected the civil rights of the petitioner company. The cause of action which has accrued to the petitioner company has clearly been spelt out in the suit. The petitioner company had also sought declaration in respect of the communication dated 21.09.2020 which had adversely affected the civil rights of the petitioner company. The cause of action which has accrued to the petitioner company has clearly been spelt out in the suit. Having regard to the nature of relief prayed for and the case set out by the plaintiff company the courts below have passed an order which is a total mismatch with the pleadings of the plaintiff and the nature of controversy between the parties. In this view of the matter the courts below had acted without jurisdiction in as much as these courts had to prima facie adjudicate the controversy as had actually arisen between the parties, rather than a controversy which is totally out of place. Even if the courts below have jurisdiction to pass the orders, but in law the court below cannot pass the order which is altogether different and does not protect the lis. Instead the courts have granted liberty to respondent company, which if carried out will render the entire suit infructuous and meaningless. This has been done by the courts below only on the basis treating Nowgam location as the controversy between the parties, which it is not. The location of the show room is not in controversy. It is the dealership and the setting up of the office/show room of the vehicles of the respondent company which constitute subject matter of suit. The courts below, therefore, have not only acted contrary to law but have also acted without jurisdiction and or in erroneous exercise of jurisdiction. On all these grounds the judgments of the courts below deserves to be set aside. iii) That the petitioner company, on account of the lock down could not approach the Hon’ble court immediately after 27.04.2021 and other factors. The petitioner company is approaching immediately after physical hearing has been allowed by the Hon’ble High Court.” 9. Reply has been filed by the respondent herein to the petition wherein the petition is being opposed, inter-alia, on the premise that the petitioner has no cause or reason to file the instant petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 10. It is being further stated that the impugned orders passed by the Courts below are within their jurisdictional domain and that the petition has been filed on erroneous premise, facts and circumstances. 11. 10. It is being further stated that the impugned orders passed by the Courts below are within their jurisdictional domain and that the petition has been filed on erroneous premise, facts and circumstances. 11. It is being next stated in the objections that the order under challenge cannot be interfered with as the same has been passed after appreciation of facts, circumstances and evidence. The petition is stated to be based on conjectures and surmises. 12. It is being further stated that the suit of the plaintiff/petitioner herein revolves around a letter of respondent herein issued on 01.07.2019 being a conditional acceptance (for short, ‘LOA’) of petitioner’s application for establishment of KIA Motors Dealership at Srinagar, J&K, incorporated therein the said letter and that the petitioner failed to fulfil the said conditions constraining the respondent herein to withdraw the conditional LOA in terms of letter dated 17.09.2020 and the said letter is lawful within the legal domain of the respondent herein. 13. It is being next stated that the initial ex-parte interim order passed by the Trial Court came to be modified by the Trial Court after hearing both the sides and upon being challenged before the Appellate Court, by the petitioner herein, the said Appellate Court dismissed the appeal after hearing the parties and, as such, there is no occasion to interfere with the orders either of the Appellate Court or the Trial Court in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. 14. It is being next stated that the petitioner has approached this Court with unclean hands and has completely distorted the facts. The respondent is stated to be leading manufacturer of KIA range of vehicles in India and upon being approached by the petitioner for appointment as non-exclusive dealer in Srinagar, J&K, the respondent herein accepted the said request of the petitioner subject to the fulfilment of the essential conditions and upon failure of the petitioner to fulfil the said conditions resulted into withdrawal of the LOA dated 01.07.2019 vide letter dated 17.09.2020 issued by the respondent herein. 15. 15. The breaches and deviations alleged to have been committed by the petitioner of the conditions contained in the LOA dated 01.07.2019 have been referred to in the objections at Clause (A) to (E), providing therein that in terms of LOA, a ‘green field site’ was finalized and proposed date of start of operations was on or before 15.10.2019 in which the petitioner failed and that the petitioner herein instead proposed a ‘brown field site’ and sought its approval and proposed a site location situated at Nowgam Bye Pass Srinagar, which came to be approved by the respondent herein and that however, midway the petitioner herein changed the same while proposing an alternative second location at Pantha Chowk, Srinagar, and that upon persuasion of the petitioner herein approved by the respondent herein with a definite schedule to make the site ready in all respects and that the petitioner herein again sought the change of the site location requesting for third site change on vague and unjustified grounds and that the petitioner herein failed to submit comfort letter from the empanelled Bank i.e. HDFC Bank and kept on delaying the submission of said letter and that upon continuous failure of the petitioner herein to submit the requisite letter and fulfilment of other pre-conditions of LOA resulted into withdrawal of the LOA by the respondent herein and that the petitioner herein was bound by the terms and conditions of LOA dated 01.07.2019 and that the respondent herein held the right and discretion to appoint as many number of dealers in any location/territory. 16. To sum up, the respondent herein in the objections seek dismissal of the petition with exemplary costs while defending the impugned order(s). 17. 16. To sum up, the respondent herein in the objections seek dismissal of the petition with exemplary costs while defending the impugned order(s). 17. Before proceeding to advert to the issues involved in the instant petition, it would be appropriate and advantageous to refer to the nature, scope and object of injunctions enshrined in Order 39 of CPC being relevant and germane herein as under :- Rule 1 of Order 39 of the Code enables a court to grant temporary injunction in the following cases: (i) Where the disputed property is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or is wrongfully sold in execution of a decree; (ii) Where the defendant threatens, or intends to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defrauding his creditors; (iii) Where the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to the disputed property. Rule 1 of Order 39 has to be read with Rule 2 of Order 39 as also clause (c) of Section 94. So temporary injunction can also be granted in the following cases: (i) Where the defendant is about to commit breach of contract, or cause other injury (Or.39, R.2); (ii) Where grant of temporary injunction is necessary to prevent the ends of justice being defeated [S.94(c)]. 18. It is settled position of law that an interim or temporary injunction/relief is a judicial remedy by which a person is ordered to refrain from doing or to do a particular act or thing. The primary purpose of granting interim relief is the preservation of property in dispute till legal rights and conflicting claims of the parties before the court are adjudicated. The object of making an order of interim relief is to evolve a workable formula required in a particular situation, keeping in mind pros and cons of the matter while striking a delicate balance between two conflicting interests. The underlying object of grant temporary injunction is to maintain and preserve the lis/subject matter and to prevent any change in it until the final determination of the suit. An injunction may be in a restrictive form or a mandatory form. 19. A reference herein to the judgment of the Apex Court passed in case titled as “Dalpat Kumar and another Vs. An injunction may be in a restrictive form or a mandatory form. 19. A reference herein to the judgment of the Apex Court passed in case titled as “Dalpat Kumar and another Vs. Prahlad Singh and Others, reported in 1992 (1) SCC 719 , would be relevant and germane herein wherein at Para 4, & 5, the principles qua grant of interim injunctions have been reiterated as under : - “4. ……..……..……..Injunction is a judicial process by which a party is required to do or to refrain from doing any particular act. It is in the nature of preventive relief to a litigant to prevent future possible injury. In other words, the court in exercise of the power of granting ad interim injunction is to preserve the subject matter of the suit in the status quo for the time being. It is settled law that the grant of injunction is a discretionary relief. The exercise thereof is subject to the court satisfying that (1) there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the court, there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by the plaintiff/defendant; (2) the court’s interference is necessary to protect the party from the species of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damage would ensue before the legal right would be established at trial; and (3) that the comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be greater than that would be likely to arise from granting it. 5. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise that there is “a prima facie case” in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that “the balance of convenience” must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that it is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject-matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit. 20. Further the Apex court in case titled as “Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. Vs. Coca Cola Co. reported in 1995 (5) SCC 545 , in the matter of injunctions has observed following: “In the leading case of Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. V. Coca Cola co., the Apex Court observed that the decision whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction has to be taken at a time when the existence of the legal right assailed by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. Relief by way of interlocutory injunction is granted to mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff during the period before that uncertainty could be resolved. Relief by way of interlocutory injunction is granted to mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff during the period before that uncertainty could be resolved. The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial.” 21. A further reference to the judgement of the Apex court passed in “Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd V. Hindustan Lever Ltd., reported in 1999 (7) SCC 1 , would also be relevant and germane herein, wherein the Apex Court has laid down as under:- “24. We, however, think it fit to note herein below certain specific considerations in the matter of grant of interlocutory injunction, the basic being non-expression of opinion as to the merits of the matter by the court, since the issue of grant of injunction, usually, is at the earliest possible stage so far as the time-frame is concerned.” 22. Keeping in mind the aforesaid legal position and principles of law laid down by the Apex court and reverting back to the case in hand, the fundamental issue in the given facts and circumstances of the case involved in the present petition which arises for consideration of this Court would be as follows :- “Whether the impugned order of the Trial Court dated 16.11.2020 and the order of the Appellate Court dated 27.04.2021 are legally sustainable or not.” 23. Reverting back to the case in hand, perusal of the record tends to show that a letter of authority (LOA) had been issued by the defendant-respondent herein to the plaintiff-petitioner on 01.07.2019 appointing it as a dealer for District Srinagar with the location of the dealership at Nowgam Bye Pass. The said location of the dealership at the request of the plaintiff-petitioner was allowed to be shifted by the respondent herein from Nowgam Bye Pass to Pantha Chowk, in terms of the letter dated 01.07.2019 issued by the respondent herein. 24. Record further tends to show that the petitioner herein undertook to complete his obligation vis-a-vis second site till 30.09.2020. It is also an admitted fact that before the expiry of the said date on 30.09.2020, the respondent herein cancelled the dealership of the petitioner in terms of communication dated 17.09.2020. 25. 24. Record further tends to show that the petitioner herein undertook to complete his obligation vis-a-vis second site till 30.09.2020. It is also an admitted fact that before the expiry of the said date on 30.09.2020, the respondent herein cancelled the dealership of the petitioner in terms of communication dated 17.09.2020. 25. Perusal of the record would further demonstrate that the respondent herein upon entering appearance before the Trial Court laid a motion under Order 39 Rule 4 of CPC for vacation of ex-parte interim order dated 23.09.2020 contending therein specific terms in the said application at para No. 11 as follows :- “That in terms of the provision supra, an unambiguous and vivid language has been used on the strength of which those interim orders which have been granted without the other side being put to notice and by resorting to misleading statements in relation to material facts being on oath, in other words what is known in jurisprudence as suppression of material facts. On this account the ad-interim ex-parte direction be vacated.” 26. Order 39 Rule 4 CPC enables the Court to discharge, vary or set-aside an order of injunction on an application filed by the aggrieved party dissatisfied with such orders. The said provision has a salutary object, as thereby the Court is empowered to discharge, vary or set-aside an order of injunction when a party is dissatisfied therewith. 27. The First Proviso appended to Order 39 Rule 4 mandates where the applicant has obtained ex-parte injunction by making a false or misleading statement, the Court shall vacate injunction unless it considers necessary to continue of injunction in the interest of justice, whereas the second proviso on the other hand enacts that injunction made by the Court after hearing the parties should not be discharged, varied or set-aside except where it has been necessitated by the change in circumstances or by reason or hardship to the other party. 28. 28. Having regard to the aforesaid provisions of Order 39 Rule 4 CPC and the pleadings of respondent herein as contained in the application filed by it under Order 39 rule 4 CPC having been noticed in the preceding para that the ex-parte ad-interim order had been obtained by the petitioner herein by suppression of material facts, the Trial Court ought to have considered the said application and proceeded to dispose of the same on the said lines in terms of First Proviso appended to Order 39 Rule 4 CPC. The Trial Court admittedly has neither considered the application in tune with the said proviso nor recorded any finding thereto that the initial interim order dated 23.09.2020 had been obtained by the petitioner herein on the basis of false or misleading statements. The Trial Court instead has proceeded to consider the matter on merits and in the process modified the order of injunction wrongly restricting dealership allotted to the petitioner herein by the respondent herein to the location of a show room instead of District Srinagar for which the LOA had been issued. Even otherwise as well if it is assumed that the Trial court was considering the application filed by the defendant/respondent under the main provision as contained in Order 39 Rule 4 CPC yet the Trial Court was required to either discharge, vary or set-aside the order as it could not on one hand vary or modify the order and on the other hand keep the interim application pending under Order 39 Rule 4 PC. 29. The Appellate Court while considering the appeal filed against the order passed by the Trial Court on 16.11.2020 has also overlooked this settled position of law and also in the process erred. 30. Further the Appellate Court misdirected itself while placing reliance upon the judgments of the Apex Court reported in 1990 (Supp) SCC 727 ; 2001 (5) SCC 73 and 2010 (2) SCC 142 , while considering the appeal of the petitioner herein. 31. 30. Further the Appellate Court misdirected itself while placing reliance upon the judgments of the Apex Court reported in 1990 (Supp) SCC 727 ; 2001 (5) SCC 73 and 2010 (2) SCC 142 , while considering the appeal of the petitioner herein. 31. A combined reading of the orders of the Trial Court dated 23.09.2020 as well as of Appellate Court dated 27.04.2021 manifestly tends to show that the matter has not received appropriate consideration by both the Courts below and instead the Courts below have grossly erred in exercise of jurisdiction vested unto them and in the process have caused miscarriage of justice thus, warranting exercise of supervisory jurisdiction by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. 32. For what has been observed, considered and analyzed herein above, the instant petition merits to be accepted and is accordingly, allowed while setting-aside order dated 27.04.2021 passed by the Appellate Court as also the order dated 16.11.2020 passed by the Trial Court and restoring the initial order dated 23.09.2020 passed by the Trial Court with a direction to the Trial Court to re-consider and re-visit the matter afresh and to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. 33. Parties to appear before the Trial Court on 20.06.2022. 34. It is significant to mention here that this Court refrains from expressing any opinion about the merits of the case lest it may prejudice the rights of the parties. 35. It is made clear that nothing herein above shall be construed to be an expression of any opinion about the merits of the case.